Awaiting the next Revolution in Naval Affairs
The Oliver Hazard Perry Class (FFG‐7) became the benchmark surface warship design against which subsequent designs, be they Russian, British, Chinese, French, or German, drew their inspiration. Criticised at the time for being underarmed and lacking in redundancy, they were not regarded as being part of President Reagan's 500 ship Navy.Nonetheless, its conceptual design space (CDS) created a fundamental break with pre-existing designs. Consequently, it was more representative of the Information Age (1970‐2015), into which it was conceived and born in the mid‐1970s, than the Industrial Age(1920‐1965) designs that preceded it. This paper argues that subsequent designs, including the Littoral and Global Combat Ships (GCS – the British Type 26 Frigate), are essentially optimised versions of the FFG‐7.Concomitantly, they have fallen into the Pugh‐Augustine trap, whereby fleet numbers halve every 20‐25 years. By contrast, examination of submarine build programmes subject to regularly refreshed conceptual designs – including modularised build and construction – show submarine Basic Mass Empty (BME) costs have remained below those of other weapon systems; only increasing at or below historic inflation. In simple terms, submarines have become more affordable, not less, and this is reflected in countries like Thailand, Indonesia and Myanmar actively seeking such capabilities. Theoretically, surface warship BME costs should have kept pace with submarines – but they have not. In actuality, frigate and destroyer numbers have often halved over the same period – unlike submarines, surface warships have become less andnot more affordable. Nearing or at the end of the Information Age, this paper submits that a reconceptualization of the warship design space; shipyards and build techniques – a Revolution in Naval Affairs – is overdue. Only by restoring political, economic and military affordability of ships and potential losses, will usability be restored.
