Suchergebnisse

Part 1: Problems, Theories and Analyses -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Theories Related to Monetary Policy and Its Adjustment -- Chapter 3: A Walk-Through and Analysis of U.S. Monetary Policy -- Part 2: Impact of U.S. Monetary Policy Adjustments -- Chapter 4: Direct Impact of U.S. Monetary Policy Adjustments on International Monetary Policy -- Chapter 5: Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy Adjustments on the World Economy -- Chapter 6: Impact of U.S. Monetary Policy Adjustments on China's Economy -- Chapter 7: Impact of U.S. Interest Rate Cuts and Tariffs on China's Economy -- Chapter 8: Dollarization and Monetary Policy Spillovers -- Chapter 9: Impact of Continued U.S. Interest Rate Hikes on the RMB Exchange Rate and China's Countermeasures -- Part 3: China's Strategic Choices -- Chapter 10: China's Strategic Choices for Monetary Policy and Economic Adjustment -- Chapter 11: China's Economic Adjustment and Rebalancing: Challenges and Strategies -- Chapter 12: Global Financial Changes and China's Monetary Policy in the New Era. .

Over the last decades, an increasing number of empirical studies have examined foreign policy change. In this article, we provide an overview of different conceptualizations and understandings of foreign policy change, identify the different drivers and inhibitors of change, and suggest avenues for future research. Most importantly, this review argues that scholarship provides relevant insights in foreign policy change on specific issues, but currently fails to unravel cases of more fundamental change like, redirections of states' entire orientation toward world affairs or broader foreign policy categories (e.g. development aid or defense and security policy). Moreover, while the literature on foreign policy change has arrived at a list of plausible explanatory conditions for change, it has yet to provide a more general theoretical framework that captures the interplay between explanations from different levels of analysis in an integrated model. In consequence, we argue that research on foreign policy change would greatly benefit from comparative research that examines change in a more systematic way across countries, foreign policy domains, and over longer periods of time, with the goal of arriving at a more general explanatory model of foreign policy change.

A number of studies have investigated when parties change their policy positions. However, this growing body of research has had limited interaction with the literature on issue competition. To bring these two perspectives together, this article investigates how and when parties adjust their respective policy positions on immigration, the environment and the welfare state. In the article it is argued that especially large parties in electoral terms adjust their policy positions on specific issues in response to changes in the party system saliency of these issues. When the other parties increase their focus on a given issue, large parties adjust their position in the direction preferred by a majority of the voters. In the article this argument is investigated empirically, based on CMP data from 18 West European countries from 1980 to 2014. The findings largely support the argument and show a strong potential for further integration of the two dominant perspectives on party competition.

BY THE LATE 1980S THE COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTION HAD COME UNDER SEVERE PRESSURE FOR REFORM AS THE POPULATION SHIFTED MARKEDLY FROM A RURAL TO AN URBAN MAJORITY. THIS ARTICLE TELLS THE STORY OF HOW ITS INSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE WAS OVERCOME. IT ARGUES THAT SUCH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT MIGHT ONLY BE OVERCOME THROUGH EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL--ALTHOUGH STILL DEMOCRATIC--MEANS.

We propose a social choice rule for aggregating preferences elicited from surveys into a marginal adjustment of policy from the status quo. The mechanism is: (i) symmetric in its treatment of survey respondents; (ii) ordinal, using only the orientation of respondents' indifference surfaces; (iii) local, using only preferences in the neighborhood of current policy; and (iv) what we call "first-order strategy-proof," making the gains from misreporting preferences second order. The mechanism could be applied to guide policy based on how policy affects responses to subjective well-being surveys.