The Patent Buyout Price for Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) Vaccine and the Ratio of R&D Costs to the Patent Value
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8488
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8488
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Working paper
This paper considers the prospect of a government patent buyout in a model of endogenous growth. To this end, the author modifies a standard quality ladder growth model by incorporating possibility of imitation, and rent protection activities (RPAs) by the innovator. The government finances the buyout by imposing a per unit sales-tax on the goods. The author shows that in this set-up, patent buyout by the government can lead to higher level of welfare without lowering an economy's growth rate along the balanced path. He highlights two sources of welfare improvement: elimination of monopoly pricing, and reduction in RPAs.
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w20197
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 114, Heft 6, S. 1041-1068
ISSN: 1537-534X
The paper studies a fiscal policy instrument that can reduce fiscal distortions, without affecting revenues, in a politically viable way. The instrument is a private contract (tax buyout), offered by the government to each individual citizen, whereby the citizen can choose to pay a fixed price up front in exchange for a given reduction in her tax rate for a prespecified period of time. We consider a dynamic overlapping-generations economy, calibrated to match several features of the U.S. income and wealth distribution, and show that, under simple pricing, the introduction of the buyout is revenue neutral and at the same time can benefit a significant fraction of the population and lead to sizable increases in labor supply, income, consumption, and welfare.
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This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this record ; We study the effect of public-to-private buyout transactions on investments in innovation using an international sample over the 1997-2017 period. We use patent counts and citations to proxy for the quantity, quality, and economic importance of innovation. Our results are based on time analysis and matched sample regressions. The data indicate that buyouts are associated with a significant reduction in patents and patent citations, including a reduction in radical (i.e., more scientific) patents. When we split the sample into institutional and management buyouts, the negative effect of buyouts is confirmed only for institutional buyouts. This suggests that only institutional buyouts prevent target firms from adopting long-term investments. This finding is confirmed by reductions in innovator employment and innovation efficiency subsequent to going private. Moreover, the data indicate that the negative effect is most prevalent for transactions where the cost of the deal's debt financing is higher than that of the debt postbuyout. We rule out some alternative explanations for these findings, including but not limited to outliers, truncation bias, and endogeneity. ; European Union Horizon 2020 ; National Science Center, Poland
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 253
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: The journal of financial research: the journal of the Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 297-305
ISSN: 1475-6803
AbstractShareholder wealth effects of division management buyouts are examined: (1) for selling divisions with business operations unrelated to the parent, and (2) for announcements that do not report the sales price. Initial evidence suggests that both of these characteristics result in smaller abnormal returns. Further analysis, however, indicates that these individual effects are interdependent and that only their combined effect is accompanied by an abnormal return that is not significant.
In: Gabler Edition Wissenschaft
Ulrich A. C. Graebner: Die Auseinandersetzung um Leveraged Buyouts. Fritz Knapp Verlag, Frankfurt 1991. 148 Seiten, 40 DM
In: Forthcoming in N.Y.U. J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. L.
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In: Working paper series 89
Private equity has seen an impressive activity surge in Germany over the last ten years. This working paper meets the increasing thirst for information on the German buyout market with an overview of its historic development, a quantitative analysis of its performance and a future outlook. While the authors' findings show an outperformance of buyout-financed businesses with regard to sales growth on CAGR basis, profitability growth and capex expansion, significant underperformance in terms of interest coverage levels and equity funding becomes apparent. This is in contrast to studies conducted by private equity associations and consultancies, and gives some validity to the growing fear of target company collapses as a result of riskier financing at the next economic downturn. As far as activity is concerned, the authors project only a short time-out for private equity in the wake of the ongoing credit crisis. The majority of German buyouts are middle market transactions which are fairly unaffected by the crisis and continue to offer great hidden potential. Investor returns are likely to fall in the short and midterm due to higher interest rates and risk premiums but more restrictive financing, in turn, will also lower entry prices. If private equity groups can outbid strategic players at moderate levels going forward, returns should continue to be attractive. -- Private equity ; buyout ; LBO ; MBO ; financial sponsor ; leverage finance ; M&A ; merger ; acquisition ; locust debate ; credit crisis ; sup-prime ; middle market
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 57, Heft 5, S. 576-595