Suchergebnisse

Mestrado em Finanças ; Neste trabalho, analisamos os determinantes do rácio Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) dos bancos da União Europeia após a Crise das Dívidas Soberanas. Utilizámos informação da base de dados do Bankscope. Exportámos informação de 137 bancos dos 27 paises da UE no período de 2011 a 2018. Baseámos o nosso estudo numa análise de regressão, sendo que analisámos vários modelos de forma a analisar od determinantes e qual o seu impacto no rácio CET1. Para atestar a robustez dos resultados, replicámos a análise aplicando um processo winsor à variável dependente e à variável que representa o Return on Equity. Verificámos que o tamanho, a exposição ao risco, a alavancagem e a liquidez são fatores que afetam o rácio CET1 e consequentemente a solvabilidade do banco. Adicionalmente, observámos que o programa de compra de ativos por parte do Banco Central Europeu (BCE) aparenta aumentar a capacidade dos bancos para absorver as suas potencias perdas, pelo o que se justifica este tipo de ações por parte do regulador. ; We analysed European Union banks' Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio determinants after Sovereign Debt Crisis. We resorted to information from the Bankscope database. We exported information of 137 banks from the 27 countries belonging to the EU, from 2011 to 2018. We performed a regression analysis, running several models to identify the significant variables and their impact on the CET1 ratio. To attest the results' robustness, we replicate the analysis winsorizing the dependent variable and the variable that represents Return on Equity. We verified that size, risk exposure, leverage and liquidity are factors that affect CET1 ratio and banks solvency. Additionally, we observed that the European Central Banks' (ECB) asset purchase program seems to increase banks' capacity to absorb potential losses, which justifies this kind of measures by the regulator. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

We investigate the influence of the institutional environment on bank capital ratios. Using a sample of 149 banks operating in the Middle East and North Africa region for the period 2004 to 2014, we find that, when stock markets have little presence, institutional variables significantly affect risk-weighted regulatory capital ratios but not leverage ratios. Conversely, when stock markets are more developed, only leverage ratios are influenced by institutional factors. Our results also indicate that institutional variables affect non-weighted equity-to-asset ratios of banks that are listed on a stock exchange. Our findings contribute to the bank capital structure literature and have important policy implications for developing countries.

We investigate the influence of the institutional environment on bank capital ratios. Using a sample of 149 banks operating in the Middle East and North Africa region for the period 2004 to 2014, we find that, when stock markets have little presence, institutional variables significantly affect risk-weighted regulatory capital ratios but not leverage ratios. Conversely, when stock markets are more developed, only leverage ratios are influenced by institutional factors. Our results also indicate that institutional variables affect non-weighted equity-to-asset ratios of banks that are listed on a stock exchange. Our findings contribute to the bank capital structure literature and have important policy implications for developing countries.

PurposeThis study aims to understand how quickly Japanese banks readjust their capital ratios (leverage, regulatory capital, tier-I capital and common equity) following an economic shock.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a two-step system GMM framework to test the study's hypotheses using the annual data of Japanese commercial and cooperative banks ranging from 2005 to 2020.FindingsThe findings show that banks adjust their leverage ratio faster than regulatory capital, tier-I capital and common equity ratios. In addition to that, the results reveal that the speed of capital adjustment is higher for commercial banks than for cooperative banks, suggesting higher economic costs and implications for commercial banks. Furthermore, it is worth noting that well-capitalised (under-capitalised) banks tend to prioritise the adjustments to common equity (leverage) before considering the adjustments to leverage (common equity). According to the results, high-liquid (low-liquid) banks alter their regulatory capital and tier-I capital ratios (leverage) more quickly (more slowly) than low-liquid (high-liquid) banks.Practical implicationsThe findings suggest that when formulating and implementing new banking regulations, particularly in assessing and adjusting specific capital requirements under Pillar II of Basel III, management (including bankers, regulators and policymakers) should consider the heterogeneity observed in the rate of capital adjustment across various bank characteristics. Additionally, bank managers should also consider the speed of adjustment when determining optimal half-life and target capital structures.Originality/valueTo the author's knowledge, this study represents a pioneering investigation into the rate of adjustment of capital ratios (leverage, regulatory, tier-I and common equity) within Japan's banking sector. The study employs a comprehensive dataset encompassing both commercial and cooperative banks to facilitate this analysis. A notable contribution to the existing body of literature, this study offers a detailed analysis and emphasises the varying degrees of adjustment in capital ratios. The study also highlights the heterogeneous nature of the adjustment rate in these ratios by categorising the data into well-capitalised, under-capitalised, highly liquid and low-liquid banks.

After the financial crisis financial regulators increased banks' capital adequacy ratios (CET1/RWA) requirements in order to make the financial system more resilient. The new capital requirements could be achieved through different channels, some of which might affect bank's ability to finance the real economy. We perform a decomposition of the changes in capital adequacy ratios into seven factors to check whether banks adjusted their capital ratio by increasing equity, by reducing loans or securities, or by reducing the riskiness of their assets' portfolio. We employ consolidated balance sheet data of 257 European banking groups including M&A operations and state aid and covering the 2005-2014 period, and find that the main driver alters over time. Our decomposition shows that during the financial crisis the augmentation was mainly driven by new share issuances and government recapitalizations, while during the sovereign crisis a reduction in the RWA-density (RWA/TA) is found. In the post crisis period, we observe a large income effect and a reduction in total assets. Decompositions are also performed at country and major banking group level, showing high heterogeneity in responses to achieve the new requirements.

El 10 % de los activos totales de los bancos europeos se encuentra en carteras que generan ganancias y pérdidas no realizadas que bajo Basilea III dejarán de poder ser eliminadas del capital regulatorio de los bancos. Utilizando una muestra de bancos europeos, y aprovechando la heterogeneidad que bajo Basilea II se da al tratamiento de las ganancias y pérdidas entre jurisdicciones, entre los instrumentos financieros que las generan y a lo largo del tiempo, encontramos evidencia de que: a) la inclusión de las ganancias y pérdidas no realizadas en las ratios de capital aumenta su volatilidad ; b) la admisión parcial de las ganancias no realizadas junto con la inclusión de todas las pérdidas asociadas a valores de renta fija en el capital regulatorio reduce el volumen de los títulos clasificados como disponibles para la venta (AFS), en relación con la situación de exclusión completa de ambos (neutralización). Por lo tanto, el tratamiento de la deuda potencialmente afecta a la gestión de la liquidez y a la demanda de bonos (la mayoría de los cuales es actualmente deuda pública) ; c) cuanto mayor sea la proporción de las ganancias no realizadas derivadas de instrumentos de deuda incluidas en el capital, menor será la tenencia de dichos instrumentos en la categoría AFS y mayor será la ratio de capital Tier1, por lo que su tratamiento también afecta a la estrategia de los bancos sobre colchones de capital. No encontramos evidencia de que la desaparición de la neutralización pueda afectar a las ratios de capital ; European banks hold 10% of their total assets in portfolios that give rise to unrealised gains and losses which under Basel III will no longer be allowed to be removed from banks' regulatory capital. Using a sample of European banks, and taking advantage of the different treatment afforded, under Basel II, to such gains and losses among jurisdictions and instruments and over time, we find evidence that: a) the inclusion of unrealised gains and losses in capital ratios increases their volatility ; b) the partial inclusion of unrealised gains and total inclusion of losses on fixed-income securities in regulatory capital, compared with the complete exclusion of both (neutralisation), reduces the volume of securities categorised as Available For Sale (AFS), thus potentially affecting liquidity management and demand for bonds (most of which are currently government bonds) ; and c) the higher the partial inclusion of gains from debt instruments, the lower the holdings of such instruments in the AFS category and the higher the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio, thus affecting banks' capital buffer strategy. We do not find evidence that the removal of neutralisation would impact capital ratios