Suchergebnisse

Does exposure to refugees change the political preferences of natives towards far-right parties, and how does this change in preferences occur? This paper examines the political economy of refugee-hosting. Using the opening of refugee centers in France between 1995 and 2017, I show that voting for far-right parties in cities with such opening between two presidential elections has fallen by about 2 percent. The drop in far-right voting is higher in municipalities with a small population, working in the primary and secondary sectors, with low educational levels and few migrants. I show that this negative effect can not be explained by an economic channel , but rather by a composition channel, through natives' avoidance, and a contact channel, through natives' exposure to refugees. I provide suggestive evidence that too-disruptive exposure to refugees, as measured by the magnitude of the inflows, the cultural distance and the media salience of refugees, can mitigate the beneficial effects of contact on reducing far-right support.

Does exposure to refugees change the political preferences of natives towards far-right parties, and how does this change in preferences occur? This paper examines the political economy of refugee-hosting. Using the opening of refugee centers in France between 1995 and 2017, I show that voting for far-right parties in cities with such opening between two presidential elections has fallen by about 2 percent. The drop in far-right voting is higher in municipalities with a small population, working in the primary and secondary sectors, with low educational levels and few migrants. I show that this negative effect can not be explained by an economic channel , but rather by a composition channel, through natives' avoidance, and a contact channel, through natives' exposure to refugees. I provide suggestive evidence that too-disruptive exposure to refugees, as measured by the magnitude of the inflows, the cultural distance and the media salience of refugees, can mitigate the beneficial effects of contact on reducing far-right support.

Does exposure to refugees change the political preferences of natives towards far-right parties, and how does this change in preferences occur? This paper examines the political economy of refugee-hosting. Using the opening of refugee centers in France between 1995 and 2017, I show that voting for far-right parties in cities with such opening between two presidential elections has fallen by about 2 percent. The drop in far-right voting is higher in municipalities with a small population, working in the primary and secondary sectors, with low educational levels and few migrants. I show that this negative effect can not be explained by an economic channel , but rather by a composition channel, through natives' avoidance, and a contact channel, through natives' exposure to refugees. I provide suggestive evidence that too-disruptive exposure to refugees, as measured by the magnitude of the inflows, the cultural distance and the media salience of refugees, can mitigate the beneficial effects of contact on reducing far-right support.

Does exposure to refugees change the political preferences of natives towards far-right parties, and how does this change in preferences occur? This paper examines the political economy of refugee-hosting. Using the opening of refugee centers in France between 1995 and 2017, I show that voting for far-right parties in cities with such opening between two presidential elections has fallen by about 2 percent. The drop in far-right voting is higher in municipalities with a small population, working in the primary and secondary sectors, with low educational levels and few migrants. I show that this negative effect can not be explained by an economic channel , but rather by a composition channel, through natives' avoidance, and a contact channel, through natives' exposure to refugees. I provide suggestive evidence that too-disruptive exposure to refugees, as measured by the magnitude of the inflows, the cultural distance and the media salience of refugees, can mitigate the beneficial effects of contact on reducing far-right support.

Does exposure to refugees change the political preferences of natives towards far-right parties, and how does this change in preferences occur? This paper examines the political economy of refugee-hosting. Using the opening of refugee centers in France between 1995 and 2017, I show that voting for far-right parties in cities with such opening between two presidential elections has fallen by about 2 percent. The drop in far-right voting is higher in municipalities with a small population, working in the primary and secondary sectors, with low educational levels and few migrants. I show that this negative effect can not be explained by an economic channel , but rather by a composition channel, through natives' avoidance, and a contact channel, through natives' exposure to refugees. I provide suggestive evidence that too-disruptive exposure to refugees, as measured by the magnitude of the inflows, the cultural distance and the media salience of refugees, can mitigate the beneficial effects of contact on reducing far-right support.

This paper investigates the extent to which media impact immigration attitudes by modifying the salience of this topic. We measure the salience of immigration using original data including all the news covered on the main French national television evening news programs between 2013 and 2017. We combine this information with individual panel data that enable us to link each respondent to his/her preferred TV channel for political information. This allows us to address ideological self-selection into channels with individual-channel fixed effects. In contrast to prior evidence in the literature, we do not find that an increase in the salience of immigration necessarily drives natives' attitudes in a specific direction. Instead, our results suggest that it increases the polarization of natives by pushing individuals with moderate beliefs toward the two extremes of the distribution of attitudes. We show that these results are robust to controlling for differences in the framing of immigration-related subjects across TV channels. Conversely to priming, framing is found to drive natives' attitudes in very specific directions.

This paper investigates the extent to which media impact immigration attitudes by modifying the salience of this topic. We measure the salience of immigration using original data including all the news covered on the main French national television evening news programs between 2013 and 2017. We combine this information with individual panel data that enable us to link each respondent to his/her preferred TV channel for political information. This allows us to address ideological self-selection into channels with individual-channel fixed effects. In contrast to prior evidence in the literature, we do not find that an increase in the salience of immigration necessarily drives natives' attitudes in a specific direction. Instead, our results suggest that it increases the polarization of natives by pushing individuals with moderate beliefs toward the two extremes of the distribution of attitudes. We show that these results are robust to controlling for differences in the framing of immigration-related subjects across TV channels. Conversely to priming, framing is found to drive natives' attitudes in very specific directions.

This paper investigates the extent to which media impact immigration attitudes by modifying the salience of this topic. We measure the salience of immigration using original data including all the news covered on the main French national television evening news programs between 2013 and 2017. We combine this information with individual panel data that enable us to link each respondent to his/her preferred TV channel for political information. This allows us to address ideological self-selection into channels with individual-channel fixed effects. In contrast to prior evidence in the literature, we do not find that an increase in the salience of immigration necessarily drives natives' attitudes in a specific direction. Instead, our results suggest that it increases the polarization of natives by pushing individuals with moderate beliefs toward the two extremes of the distribution of attitudes. We show that these results are robust to controlling for differences in the framing of immigration-related subjects across TV channels. Conversely to priming, framing is found to drive natives' attitudes in very specific directions.

This paper investigates the extent to which media impact immigration attitudes by modifying the salience of this topic. We measure the salience of immigration using original data including all the news covered on the main French national television evening news programs between 2013 and 2017. We combine this information with individual panel data that enable us to link each respondent to his/her preferred TV channel for political information. This allows us to address ideological self-selection into channels with individual-channel fixed effects. In contrast to prior evidence in the literature, we do not find that an increase in the salience of immigration necessarily drives natives' attitudes in a specific direction. Instead, our results suggest that it increases the polarization of natives by pushing individuals with moderate beliefs toward the two extremes of the distribution of attitudes. We show that these results are robust to controlling for differences in the framing of immigration-related subjects across TV channels. Conversely to priming, framing is found to drive natives' attitudes in very specific directions.

This paper investigates the extent to which media impact immigration attitudes by modifying the salience of this topic. We measure the salience of immigration using original data including all the news covered on the main French national television evening news programs between 2013 and 2017. We combine this information with individual panel data that enable us to link each respondent to his/her preferred TV channel for political information. This allows us to address ideological self-selection into channels with individual-channel fixed effects. In contrast to prior evidence in the literature, we do not find that an increase in the salience of immigration necessarily drives natives' attitudes in a specific direction. Instead, our results suggest that it increases the polarization of natives by pushing individuals with moderate beliefs toward the two extremes of the distribution of attitudes. We show that these results are robust to controlling for differences in the framing of immigration-related subjects across TV channels. Conversely to priming, framing is found to drive natives' attitudes in very specific directions.