Suchergebnisse

Policy science can be seen as conceptually distinct from policy analysis. 3 historical approaches to solving practical problems have been developed: (1) science/engineering, (2) trial & error, & (3) decision theory. Policy science can be conceived as the effort to produce knowledge functionally equivalent to science & its engineering applications, without attaining scientifically validated knowledge in connection with policy problems. Policy science is defined in reference to specific human goals; concepts therefore cannot be changed in meaning to attain optimal theoretical significance, but must remain tied to applications, & because it is commonly applied to rather basic goals: freedom from fear of death, & material well-being. In METASCIENTIFIC LATITUDE, Milton Marney (George Washginton U, Washington DC) claims Reynold's conservatism does not allow for the element of change; science, being a human institution, is marked by constant change. It is impossible to extract a methodology from science, since it is the sum of what is known at any one time. Reynold's paper is an extremely valuable contribution in 2 critical areas: (1) it identifies explicit limitations of objective scientific method in the context of theory construction for nonlinear systems, & (2) it realizes that reconstruction is necessary in theoretical bases & institutional structures of practical social decision-making, & particularly in the philosophy of science. In SCIENCE, OPTIMALITY AND VINDICATION, James F. Reynolds rejoins Marney's criticism based mostly on the latter's concern with the "vindication of values." When an optimal value orientation emerges through sound scientific knowledge, it is 'optimal' & in need of no vindication. If Marney's version of policy science founds values that are optimal & then achieved through vindication, the distinction between science & vindication holds & his criticism is not challenging to the key premise of Reynold's paper. Modified HA.