Introduction -- Literature Review: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) -- Research Context - Ghana -- Methodology -- The land reclamation processes and the mutually beneficial consequences to local mining communities -- Water quality management at OMCL -- Working conditions and labour relations at OMCL -- Conclusion.
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Leveraging novel experimental designs and 2,160 months of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) spending by legislators in Ghana, I examine whether and how fairer elections promote democratic responsiveness. The results show that incumbents elected from constituencies that were randomly assigned to intensive election-day monitoring during Ghana's 2012 election spent 19 percentage points more of their CDFs during their terms in office compared with those elected from constituencies with fewer monitors. Legislators from all types of constituencies are equally present in parliament, suggesting that high levels of monitoring do not cause politicians to substitute constituency service for parliamentary work. Tests of causal mechanisms provide suggestive evidence that fairer elections motivate high performance through incumbents' expectations of electoral sanction and not the selection of better candidates. The article provides causal evidence of the impact of election integrity on democratic accountability.
In this dissertation, I examine the causal effect of election integrity on the responsiveness of elected officials in developing democracies. In many countries, domestic and international organizations regularly support interventions aimed at reducing electoral fraud. These efforts are rooted in the belief that fairer elections will strengthen the ability of citizens to control politicians and promote political responsiveness. However, we have no empirical support for this widely held belief. I describe a field experiment that randomized the deployment of roughly 1,300 election observers at different intensities across 60 electoral constituencies in Ghana. I leverage this experiment to test the effects of fairer elections on the responsiveness of Members of Parliament (MPs). Because the higher concentration of observers was associated with lower levels of election-day fraud and violence, the random assignment of election observation intensities across constituencies provides an instrument for levels of election integrity.I assess responsiveness using original data on how MPs in Ghana allocate their state- provided Constituency Development Funds to provide private benefits and public infrastructure to constituents. The results show that politicians elected in intensely monitored elections spend more of their CDFs, suggesting that fairer elections increase the effort of incumbents. Decomposing this effect, intense monitoring increases MPs' spending on public goods but does not affect the level of private goods provision. Moreover, legislators elected in constituencies that had a higher presence of observers are more likely to abide by the national procurement laws when spending their funds, indicating that fairer elections also promote good governance. Overall, the findings suggest that the quality of elections is an important determinant of political responsiveness and provide the first causal evidence of the connection between election integrity and the performance of elected officials.To explain my findings, I hypothesize that MPs exposed to high-intensity monitoring in the past improve their performance in office because they do not expect to have opportunities to commit fraud in future elections. I contend that the ability of politicians to rig elections influences incumbents' levels of effort to meet the expectations of constituents. The ability to manipulate elections allows politicians to substitute fraud for effort without facing electoral consequences.To investigate the effects of clean elections on the behavior of politicians, researchers need to manipulate incumbents' beliefs about the integrity of future elections. To manipulate these expectations, I implement an experiment that randomized information to 60 of 120 MPs to say that they should expect to receive intense monitoring of their constituencies in Ghana's December 2016 parliamentary elections. The control group did not receive such a letter. I argue that such information should motivate incumbents to work harder to satisfy the demands of citizens because they believe that they cannot rely on election-day fraud. Analysis of election results from the December 2016 election provides tentative support for my hypothesis. Future analyses of legislator spending of CDFs in 2016 would provide a definitive assessment of my primary explanation of the causal effect of fair elections on political responsiveness.
Abstract Legislators make trade-offs when allocating their time and resources to their multiple tasks of representation, legislation, executive oversight, and constituency service. Furthermore, they must decide how much effort to exert or the balance to strike when undertaking a specific function. Existing research provides limited insights into citizens' preferences over these officeholder multifaceted decisions in sub-Saharan Africa. I offer novel insights into citizens' preferences using a conjoint survey experiment of Ghanaians to address this knowledge gap. My findings are threefold. First, I find that citizens put more 'weight' on constituency-related activities than parliamentary work. Second, in the constituency, citizens value political representation activities more than constituency services. Third, they weigh public-good-oriented constituency services higher than private ones. The research contributes to our understanding of citizen–legislator accountability relationships in sub-Saharan Africa.
Leveraging novel experimental designs and 2,160 months of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) spending by legislators in Ghana, I examine whether and how fairer elections promote democratic responsiveness. The results show that incumbents elected from constituencies that were randomly assigned to intensive election-day monitoring during Ghana's 2012 election spent 19 percentage points more of their CDFs during their terms in office compared with those elected from constituencies with fewer monitors. Legislators from all types of constituencies are equally present in parliament, suggesting that high levels of monitoring do not cause politicians to substitute constituency service for parliamentary work. Tests of causal mechanisms provide suggestive evidence that fairer elections motivate high performance through incumbents' expectations of electoral sanction and not the selection of better candidates. The article provides causal evidence of the impact of election integrity on democratic accountability.
This article explores the logics, persistence and evolution of perspectives on the Chinese labour regime in Africa. Studies find that Chinese firms' labour practices engender abuse via casualisation of labour, low remuneration, and a general lack of adherence to occupational safety. Contrarian studies however demonstrate variations among Chinese firms' labour practices as mediated by the labour dynamics of host countries, labour specificities and industrial capitalism dynamics. The article concludes by questioning the 'talent gap' dynamic in Africa in relation to Chinese firms' managerial hiring practices and calls for an engaged scholarship on how Chinese investment in Africa's human resource base is altering the 'talent gap' phenomenon.
On the 7th December 2012 Ghana held its sixth presidential and parliamentary elections under the Fourth Republic. The incumbent presidential candidate, John Dramani Mahama, won, narrowly beating his major opponent, Nana Akufo-Addo. The president's party-the National Democratic Congress (NDC)-also retained a majority in the unicameral parliament. Following the declaration of the results, the main opposition party the New Patriotic Party (NPP)-filed a petition to the Supreme Court arguing that the election was marred by widespread electoral malpractices and fraud. Over the next eight months Ghanaians were fixated on the court proceedings which were broadcast live on television and radio. In August 2013, President Mahama was eventually declared to have been validly elected by the Supreme Court. Ghana's 2012 elections show the role of the judiciary in promoting electoral integrity and securing political stability. The elections also saw an increase in issue-based campaigning. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]
Traditional leaders can influence electoral outcomes. We designed an experiment to investigate why public endorsements by chiefs affect voters—and which types of voters they influence. Chiefs have incentives to prefer politicians who will promote local development, and can use endorsements to sway elections accordingly. We argue that voters often interpret chiefs' endorsements as a signal of candidate quality. To assess this argument, we exposed voters to real endorsements made by chiefs during Ghana's 2020 presidential election. We show that endorsements impact the vote choice of undecided voters. Consistent with a signaling mechanism, respondents exposed to chiefs' rationale for endorsing a candidate were no more likely to vote for the endorsed candidate than those who only heard chiefs' approval of a candidate. Further, treated respondents hold higher evaluations of the endorsed candidate on multiple dimensions of candidate quality. Our results suggest that chiefs influence voters through a non-coercive mechanism, which has positive implications for accountability.
