Suchergebnisse

Ownership and control of defense industrial firms affords the military power, auton- omy, and a claim to economic rents. Why do some countries succeed at shifting some or all such firms from military to civilian ownership and control, while others do not? I argue that differing configurations of relative civilian and military coali- tional and institutional strength contribute to outcomes. Civilian and military must find party and executive-branch allies who can compete for them to craft or defeat legislation affecting their interests, but coalition building alone is insufficient. Actors must also cultivate executive bureaucratic institutions able to design and implement policies promoting their interests. How coalitions and institutions form, ossify, or fail to develop is assessed through a comparative study of Chile, Argentina (1983– 1989), and Argentina (1989–1997).

Levies imposed on the export earnings of natural resource producers provide the armed forces with sizeable off-budget revenue not subject to oversight or scrutiny. Why do some nations succeed at reforming or eliminating these levies, while others do not? This article argues that outcomes have to do with the balance of coalition strength between civilians and the armed forces. In the contemporary period, the military can no longer go at it alone, relying on tactics of coercive intimidation. Like civilians, it must find political party allies who can compete legislatively on its behalf. How coalitions either congeal, come unraveled, or fail to develop is assessed through a small-N comparative study of Ecuador and Chile.