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China's unique system of hiring and promoting talented people within the state, under the supervision of the Communist Party, has been held up as an important institutional factor supporting its remarkably rapid and sustained economic growth. Jointly with Professor Peter L. Lorentzen, we explore this meritocracy argument in the context of Chinese leader Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Some question the sincerity of the campaign, arguing that it is nothing but a cover for intra-elite struggle and a purge of Xi's opponents. In the first chapter of my thesis, we use a dataset I have created to identify accused officials and map their connections. Our evidence supports the Party's claim that the crackdown is primarily a sincere effort to cut down on the widespread corruption that was undermining its efforts to develop an effective meritocratic governing system. First, we visualize the "patron-client'' network of all probed officials announced by the central government and identify the core targets of the anti-corruption campaign. Second, we use a recursive selection model to analyze who the campaign has targeted, providing evidence that even personal ties to top leaders have provided little protection. Finally, we show that, in the years leading up to the crackdown, the provinces later targeted had departed from the growth-oriented meritocratic selection procedures evident in other provinces. In addition to its motivation, I also discuss the campaign's effects on economic efficiency. The second chapter of my thesis tests the "greasing-the-wheels'' hypothesis in the context of China's residential land market. We show that China's anti-corruption campaign, aimed at removing corruption in China's monopoly land market, caused a decrease in land transaction volumes. Furthermore, not removing any form of corruption would also lead to a similar decrease. It is only necessary to remove corruption that enables real estate developers to circumvent red tape and reduce trading costs. Our findings support the "greasing-the-wheels'' hypothesis hypothesis: when an economy has a low outcome owing to some preexisting distortions, corruption could be a positive factor in that it offers a "second-best world.''

Based on data collected in a survey conducted in six Chinese provinces at the end of 1997 and early 1998, this article offers a preliminary analysis of why some peasants wished to see Mao-style anti-corruption campaigns. It shows that the support for campaigns is negatively correlated with the respondents' evaluation of local officials' performance in governing by law, their confidence in the equality before the law, and their assessment of the effectiveness of lawful participation. It concludes that popular support for mass mobilization could contribute to rural instability as Chinese farmers become increasingly impatient with the regime's failure to control corruption. (J Contemp China/DÜI)

We examine the impact of China's anti-corruption campaign on firm-level financial reporting quality (FRQ). As an important component of the anti-corruption campaign, in October 2013, "Rule 18" was issued to prohibit party and government officials from serving as directors for publicly listed firms. The regulation led to a large number of official directors resigning from their roles as directors involuntarily. As such, Rule 18 has effectively weakened, if not fully discontinued, the political connections of the firms that previously hired officials as directors. Our empirical analyses employ a difference-in-differences research design with firm fixed effects and propensity-score matching to examine the pre- and post-period FRQ around the enactment of Rule 18. We find that, compared to propensity-score-matched control firms, FRQ of firms with resigned official directors increases after Rule 18. Further evidence suggests that the impact is stronger when firms are located in regions with more developed financial markets and in regions with higher judiciary efficiency. We also find that the effect is more pronounced when firms are non-state-owned, received preferential credits, and face refinancing pressure.

We examine the impact of China's anti-corruption campaign on firm-level financial reporting quality (FRQ). As an important component of the anti-corruption campaign, in October 2013, "Rule 18" was issued to prohibit party and government officials from serving as directors for publicly listed firms. The regulation led to a large number of official directors resigning from their roles as directors involuntarily. As such, Rule 18 has effectively weakened, if not fullydiscontinued, the political connections of the firms that previously hired officials as directors. Our empirical analyses employ a difference-in-differences research design with firm fixed effects and PSM to examine the pre- and post- period FRQ around the enactment of Rule 18. We find that, compared to propensity-score-matched control firms, FRQ of firms with resigned officialdirector increases after Rule 18. Further evidence suggests that the impact is stronger when firms are located in regions with more developed financial markets and in regions with higher judiciary efficiency. We also find that the effect is more pronounced when firms are non-state-owned, received preferential credits, and face refinancing pressure.