Individual Incentives to Fix Organizational Problems?
In: Medical care research and review, Band 61, Heft 3_suppl, S. 76S-79S
ISSN: 1552-6801
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In: Medical care research and review, Band 61, Heft 3_suppl, S. 76S-79S
ISSN: 1552-6801
In: Game Theory and Economic Analysis; Routledge Advances in Game Theory
In: Environmental science & policy, Band 102, S. 1-8
ISSN: 1462-9011
In this paper we investigate two stages in the process that leads to participation in ALMP programs. We use unique administrative data from the Austrian unemployment registers which allow us to distinguish between caseworker assignment and actual program enrollment. Although 25% of newly unemployed workers are assigned to a program, only half of them enroll and participate in the program longer than 5 days. This difference between assignment and enrollment rates cannot be explained by job entries, program cancelations, or rejected program applications alone. Therefore we analyze the influence of observable characteristics on each stage of the participation process. We find that beside policy regulations individual worker incentives play an important role in determining program participation.
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In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 877-895
ISSN: 0092-5853
THIS PAPER FOCUSES ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH A LEGISLATOR'S INSTITUTIONAL POSITION ACCOUNTS FOR HIS OR HER WILLINGNESS TO PUNISH VIOLATIONS OF NORMS. THE CASE COMES FROM THE 1100TH CONGRESS IN WHICH A RULE WAS PROPOSED THAT WOULD HAVE FORCED CONSIDERATION OF A LONG-TERM HEALTH CARE BILL WITHOUT FIRST GOING THROUGH THE COMMITTEES OF JURISDICTION AND WITHOUT FOLLOWING NORMAL DISCHARGE PROCEDURES. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FLOOR VOTE ON THE RULE SUGGESTS THAT MEMBERS WERE NOT GUIDED IN THEIR VOTE BY THE FACT THAT PROCEDURAL NORMS HAD BEEN VIOLATED BUT RATHER VOTED BASED ON PERSONAL PREFERENCES. IN PARTICULAR, THE ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THOSE MEMEBERS EXPECTED TO BE MOST LIKELY TO PUNISH THE VIOLATION DID NOT DO SO.
In: American journal of political science, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 877
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 36,N. 4 (N, S. 877
ISSN: 0092-5853
Razones de índole académica, socio-política, económica y de competencia entre instituciones, han convertido a la calidad institucional, a su aseguramiento y a su mejora, en tema de permanente interés y preocupación para los responsables políticos, académicos y gestores de los sistemas educativos y, en particular, de las universidades y de la educación superior en su conjunto. El pago por mérito al profesorado es uno de los mecanismos empleados para intentar gestionar la calidad y su mejora de manera justa y eficaz. En este artículo, se ofrece un análisis de las potencialidades y contraindicaciones del procedimiento, así como la síntesis de una revisión metaevaluativa de la evaluación para incentivos individuales al profesorado, auspiciada por los gobiernos autonómicos, que desde hace unos años (entre seis y ocho, mayoritariamente) se ha generalizado en las universidades españolas. Este periodo de aplicación, a pesar de la extraordinaria diversidad entre comunidades y universidades, parece un periodo suficiente para llevar a cabo una metaevaluación del proceso y su impacto y, en la medida de lo posible, sugerir potenciales acciones de mejora. Esta metaevaluación, un estudio de revisión externo, variado en fuentes y metodología y con orientación formativa, sintetiza la situación de los modelos de evaluación que se aplican en las diferentes universidades, las fortalezas y debilidades de los mismos y de su aplicación, su impacto en el profesorado y en las instituciones universitarias y la valoración que de ello hacen los diferentes sectores implicados, así como las propuestas de cambio que se sugieren. El artículo concluye con la síntesis de los hallazgos más relevantes del estudio, así como un conjunto de sugerencias de cambio en los modelos y procesos de evaluación, necesarios para el logro de los objetivos previstos de mejora en el cumplimiento de sus funciones por parte de los profesores y de las universidades. ; Academical, socio-political and economical reasons, and competence among institutions have converted institutional quality, its assurance and enhancement, in a permanent issue of interest and concern for academical and political authorities and managers of educational systems and, particularly, of universities and higher education systems. Teacher merit pay is a mechanism used to manage quality and its improvement in a fair and effective way. This article offers an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the procedure, as well as the synthesis of a metaevaluative revision of the evaluation for teacher individual incentives, promoted by autonomous goverments, that have been generalized in Spanish universities in the last sixeight years. This period of application, in spite of the great diversity among autonomous communities and universities, seems a sufficient period of time to carry on a metaevaluation of the process and its impact and, as much as possible, to offer potential improvement actions. This metaevaluation, an external revision study with several sources and methods and formative orientation, synthesize the situation of the applied models in different autonomous communities, their strengths and weaknesses, their impact on teachers and universities, the evaluation that different implicated sectors made and the change proposals that are suggested. The article conclude with a synthesis of the most relevant results, and a set of suggestions to modify the models and procedures of evaluation, in order to get the foresight goals of improvement in the acomplishment of their functions in teachers and universities.
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In: The Pacific review
ISSN: 1470-1332
Many China observers have commented that Beijing is harsh and assertive on diplomatic occasions. By publicizing the nationalistic rhetoric and moves in internal propaganda, the PRC aims to please domestic audiences. This article examines China's practices of 'wolf-warrior diplomacy', explicates the rationale behind it, and provides three plausible explanations. Firstly, the individualist explanation highlights the personal motives of 'wolf-warrior' diplomats. However, wolf-warrior diplomacy is not the common practice of Chinese diplomats, as most Chinese diplomats, unlike these wolf-warriors, remain conservative, taking an orthodox approach to their duties. Secondly, the institutional explanation presents a potential conflict between propaganda and diplomacy agencies in conducting waixuan (external propaganda, overseas-targeted propaganda: 外宣). I elaborate on how the changing working doctrines of waixuan have encouraged wolf-warrior diplomacy. Finally, the strategic explanation highlights how Beijing diverts the popular attention away from its domestic issues and towards 'external threats' and rallies popular support at home by 'talking tough' and 'blaming others'. The diversionary use of assertive diplomacy also allows Beijing to avoid publicizing its policy failures, buy more time and room for manoeuvre, and plan tactical reforms while preserving its fundamental political system. I also argue that the wolf-warrior diplomacy is more of ad hoc response to perceived geopolitical risk in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic than a well-crafted strategy. (Pac Rev / GIGA)
World Affairs Online
In: The Pacific review, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 585-603
ISSN: 1470-1332
In: Revista de ciencia política
ISSN: 0718-090X
In: Working paper UM_CEE_2012-06
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Working paper