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The author of the book being reviewed challenges what he incorrectly believes is the existing consensus on the character of British capital ship fire control and attempts to reinterpret aspects of the Battle of Jutland. This essay seeks to provide a guide to the book's most important analytical shortcomings for those either unfamiliar with the large body of relevant sources or who lack the technical knowledge to evaluate the engineering aspects of long-range gunnery.

In several recent studies of the Royal Navy a theory has emerged about the development of British battle-fleet tactics. It is suggested that, in the period leading up to the battle of Jutland, the Admiralty possessed intelligence which indicated that the German naval leadership, if it sought to fight at all, wanted to engage at medium range, where its superior secondary batteries and heavier torpedo armament could be used to maximum advantage. Rather than seeking to frustrate this desire by manoeuvring to keep the battle at long range, the British, it has been argued, decided to accommodate to the German preference, but only with a view to using their superior main armament to unleash a concentrated five-minute pulse of fire at the approaching German vessels, before turning away. This article looks at one of the underpinnings of this argument, namely British intelligence on German gunnery. It shows that from the start of the First World War, if not earlier, the Admiralty had information that contested the idea that the Germans wanted a medium-range engagement. Not only was it discovered that the Germans had been practising long-range firing for some years, but, in addition, early wartime encounters with German vessels, for example at the battle of the Falkland Islands, showed that they had developed considerable proficiency in it. This quickly led the Royal Navy's top leadership to the conclusion that engagements at maximum range rather than medium range might better reflect both German capabilities and intentions and that British tactics would need to take this into account. In the light of this finding, Grand Fleet Battle Orders, which have defied obvious explanation when it was assumed that the British naval leadership expected the Germans to seek a medium-range engagement, can now be put into a more logical context.

George P. Costas enlisted in July 1952 and served in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War, rising to the rank of Gunnery Sergeant. Though he entered the service with only a 9th grade education, Costas succeeded in completing both a high school and college degree during his 21 years in the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserves. He participated in a number of operations in the Dong Ha area of South Vietnam. ; https://vc.bridgew.edu/vhp_stories/1043/thumbnail.jpg

"The torpedo is born -- First World War fire control techniques -- Between the wars -- An analysis of the fire control problem -- The Second World War -- The Era of the GUPPY -- From Tang to Nautilus -- A most unusual torpedo -- Skipjack, the convergence of Nautilus and Albacore -- The Sturgeon-class submarine -- The Los Angeles class submarine -- The ballistic missile submarine -- The Seawolf and Virginia submarines -- The future of American submarines -- Appendix A: A glossary of submarine fire control terminology -- Appendix B: An evolution of submarine torpedo fire control equipment."

Intro -- Introduction -- Timeline -- Chapter 1: Medieval Origins (14th-15th centuries) -- Chapter 2: The Renaissance (16th-17th centuries) -- Chapter 3: The Age of Reason (18th century) -- Chapter 4: The Wars of Napoleon (1792-1815) -- Chapter 5: The Industrial Age (1815-1914) -- Chapter 6: World War I (1914-1918) -- Chapter 7: World War II and After (1919-present).

For more than two decades at the beginning of the 20th century William S. Sims was at the forefront of naval affairs. From the revolution in naval gunnery that he led as a junior officer, to his advocacy for the Dreadnaught style all-big-gun battleship, to his development of torpedo boat and destroyer operations, he was a central figure in helping to prepare the U.S. Navy for World War I. During the war he served as the senior naval commander in Europe and was instrumental in the establishment of the convoy system that won the Battle of the Atlantic. Following the war his leadership as Preside

During World War II, United States Army and Navy pilots trained on several hundred bombing ranges encompassing more than 12 million acres of land, leaving behind crater-scarred landscapes across the country. Post-war estimates suggest that 10-15% of aerial bombs used failed to detonate as intended, so these areas today are contaminated by a large number of dangerous unexploded bombs (UXB) which remain under the surface. Until recently, detecting UXB has been a tedious and expensive process done in three stages: (1) identifying and mapping general areas of concentrated bomb craters using historical air photos and records; (2) intensely searching these areas at a larger scale for much smaller UXB entry holes; and (3) confirming the presence of individual UXB using magnetometry or ground-penetrating radar. This research aims to streamline the workflow for stage 1 and 2 using semi-automated object-based image analysis (OBIA) methods with multi-source high spatial-resolution imagery. Using the Fort Myers Bombing and Gunnery Range in Florida as a study area, this thesis determines what OBIA software and Imagery is best at locating UXB in this environment. I assess the use of LiDAR-derived DEMs, historical air photos and high-resolution color digital orthophotos in Feature Analyst and Imagine Objective, and discuss optimal inputs and configurations for UXB searches in karst wetlands. This methodology might be applied by the detection and clearance industry in former war zones, and aid in restoring former training ranges to safe land uses in the U.S.

International audience ; Tartaglia's Nova Scientia published in 1537 heralded a new approach to the problems of military technology, by adopting neo-platonistic principles to physical phenomena. However, his enquiry was limited by his Aristotelian viewpoint, and his final edition of 1558 offered the idea that nature could be explained by knowledge applied through Platonic philosophy. Tartaglia had accepted that the flight of the missile, hitherto thought to comprise distinct violent and natural phases, had to be of a mixed nature. While application of mathematics in a mechanical paradigm offered a practical validity, readers needed convincing by a formal proof. The problem of the Gunner was finding a reliable way of firing his shot with reasonable accuracy. Neo-platonist philosophy needed a convincing solution to this problem. In his Stratioticos (1579) Thomas Digges' chapter on gunnery proposed an extensive list of parameters for investigation, thus offering an experimental programme for the English Gunners to follow over the next century. Some thoughts on learning in communities and epistemologies are considered