Deductions
In: Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law, S. 47-66
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In: Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law, S. 47-66
In: Stanford Law Review Online, Band 70
SSRN
In: Kantian questions
This book is organized as a commentary following the text of the B-Transcendental Deduction line by line. In so doing, it becomes evident that each step of the Deduction necessarily follows from the preceding step and is grounded in it, although not in the way the steps of a formal-logic deduction are. The primary hypothesis of this book is that the succession of steps is but the unfolding of the Principle of Apperception. The commentary assumes that the entire argument of the B-Deduction consists in a progressive enlargement and enrichment of the Principle of Apperception. The book draws its unity from this assumption, as well as from the strong concatenation of the successive steps. Focusing the monograph on the very narrow problem of the B-Deduction's argumentative structure enables the author to settle several controversial questions, such as, for instance, those originating in the division of the B-Deduction in two steps, and that of the function of the doctrine of the transcendental subject expounded in paragraphs 24 and 25. Its comprehensive explanation of the Transcendental Deduction ensures that the book will be helpful to students of Kantian Philosophy, while its focus on a single problem will make it useful to specialists. Kant's B Deduction is part of the Kantian Questions series.
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 148, Heft 3, S. 639-657
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 163, Heft 2, S. 187-198
ISSN: 1573-0964
If charity begins at home, scholarship on the charitable deduction has stayed at home. In the vast legal literature, few authors have engaged the distinction between charitable contributions that are meant to be used within the United States and charitable contributions that are meant to be used abroad. Yet these two types of contributions are treated very differently in the Code and raise very different policy issues. As Americans' giving patterns and the U.S. nonprofit sector grow increasingly international, the distinction will only become more salient. This Article offers the first exploration of how theories of the charitable deduction apply to internationally targeted donations. In so doing, the Article aims to contribute not only to a methodological shift in nonprofit tax scholarship (a strategic remapping), but also to a reappraisal of the deduction literature (an analytic remapping): just as existing theories of the deduction can inform our understanding of foreign charity, considerations of foreign charity can shed light back on the existing theories. I argue that the standard rationales are underdetermined and undertheorized, and propose a new, integrated approach to the charitable deduction. Internationally targeted donations emerge from the analysis holding a strong claim to deductibility – often a stronger claim than domestically targeted donations hold – on almost every relevant dimension, which calls into question current regulations that privilege domestic giving. Oversight and foreign policy concerns, however, complicate the ideal of geographic neutrality and illuminate the charitable deduction's role as an instrument of statecraft. Admitting foreign charity into the debate over the deduction thus changes the debate's terms; it gives deduction theory new urgency as well as new complexity.
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During the Middle Ages, the wealthy often requested burial in mass graves with their fellow mortals, as a sign of humility. But since the rise of the cult of the individual during the Renaissance, individual burial plots have been an expression of prestige, wealth, and social status for some. For example, Leona Helmsley, real estate baroness and "Queen of Mean," dedicated $3 million upon her death for the care and maintenance of her 1300 square foot, $1.4 million mausoleum. Respectful disposition of the body is a hallmark of civilization and a common law requirement of estate administration, but an extravagant burial is a personal choice which can impose significant costs on future generations. A tax deduction for discretionary spending is a government subsidy which shifts part of that cost to other taxpayers. The current federal estate tax deduction for funeral expenses, combined with accommodating laws for administering decedents' estates, allow the rich to shift 40 percent of the entire cost of big-money burials to other taxpayers. These deductible big-money burials can monopolize substantial, valuable real estate and significantly contribute to environmental pollution. An analysis of current case law reveals that estate and trust law doctrines generally fail to recognize the potential dual character of burial expenses and fail to curb excesses. This Article asserts that funeral expenses, including burial and related costs, can have a dual character. On the one hand, to the extent of the reasonable cost of a respectful burial, a federal estate tax deduction is appropriate because a decent disposition is mandated by law and social norms—those expenses are not voluntary. In contrast, this Article asserts that excessive funeral and burial expenses are a voluntary transfer of personal wealth at death, and those expenses should not be deductible. Other taxpayers should not have to subsidize land-hoarding, environmentally-damaging burials of the wealthy.
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In: American behavioral scientist: ABS, Band 40, Heft 6, S. 782-797
ISSN: 1552-3381
In Deduction, Johnson-Laird and Byrne have made an extremely important contribution to the study of cognition by providing a unified theory of all types of deduction, including modal inferences. Their theory is that, contrary to the traditional view, deduction is not rule-based but model-based reasoning, and the central cognitive process involves a model-based search for counterexamples to conclusions. Although the author believes that Johnson-Laird and Byrne are right about the significance of mental models when it comes to certain types of deduction, their quest for a single cognitive process underlying all types of deductive inference has forced them to adopt the logician's notion of a model rather than a more psychological one. As a result, they are open to criticism. In this article, the author shows how mental models actually work in the case of deduction. However, the mental models discussed are a far cry from the mental models found in Deduction.
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In: Social work: a journal of the National Association of Social Workers
ISSN: 1545-6846
In: American behavioral scientist: ABS, Band 40, Heft 6, S. 782-797
ISSN: 0002-7642
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 101, Heft 3, S. 433-463
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 39, Heft 3, S. 417-434
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 25-33
ISSN: 1573-0964