Suchergebnisse

Fisheries management has been a strongly contested aspect of the UK's position in the EU since UK accession, with the fishing industry frequently questioning both the efficacy and fairness of arrangements. During the campaign for UK exit (Brexit) from the EU, and the subsequent negotiations of a new legal and political relationship from 2016 to 2020, senior UK political leaders strongly committed to deliver radically changed fisheries arrangements with respect to the three central issues: regulatory autonomy; access to waters; and quota shares, all while maintaining minimal trade impacts. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement diverges from this Brexit rhetoric. Whilst some regulatory independence has been achieved, UK fisheries management continues in a state of interdependence and significant EU access to UK waters remains, even in the 6-12 nautical mile territorial waters. While the UK gained an increase in quota shares which is estimated to reach 107 thousand tonnes of landed weight annually by 2025 (an increase of 21.3% for quota species and 16.9% for all species, or 17.8% and 12.4% by value), this pales in comparison to the UK Government's stated ambitions for zonal attachment (achieving 68% by weight and by value). This modest change explains the negative reaction of the fishing industry and claims of betrayal in the face of the UK Government's announcement of a 'successful' deal. The stark delivery gap between rhetoric and reality means the UK government faces a challenging start to managing fisheries outside of the Common Fisheries Policy.

Recent research on global fisheries has reconfirmed a 2006 study that suggested global fisheries would collapse by 2048 if fisheries were not better managed and trends reversed. While many researchers have endorsed rights-based fishery management as a key ingredient for successful management and rebuilding fisheries, in practice the results are mixed and success varies by geographic region. Rights-based approaches such as individual transferable quota (ITQ) provide a necessary help to the important task of rebuilding fisheries, but we assert that they are sometimes less effective due to the human component of the system. Specifically, we examine the issue of setting an appropriate total allowable catch (TAC) in Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems. ITQ are designed on the premise that economic ownership is sufficient incentive to entice fishers to be stewards of the resource. However, an excessive short-term orientation and an affective risk response by fishers can overwhelm feelings of ownership. In such cases, fishers and fishing communities can exert sufficient pressure on TAC setting and reduce the effectiveness of ITQ fisheries toward rebuilding fish stocks. Based on our analysis that draws on cognitive psychology, short-termism, and affective risk, we suggest heightened and wider democratic involvement by stakeholders in co-managed ITQ fisheries along with potential pilot tests of government-assisted financial transfers to help in transitioning ITQ fisheries to sustainable states.

The Barents Sea contains some of the most valuable fish resources in the world, including the world's largest cod stock. Since the mid-1970s, Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia have managed the most important stocks in the area together, through the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission. During the 1990s, the precautionary approach was adopted as the leading device for global fisheries management, introducing a requirement for additional precaution when scientific evidence is uncertain, as well as a number of practical regulatory measures related to scientific research, regulation and enforcement. Since the late 1990s, the Joint Commission has gradually adopted a number of measures required by the precautionary approach. Russia has never formally introduced the principle in its own fisheries legislation, but by and large employed regulatory measures in line with it. The article presents the major precautionary regulatory measures adopted by the Commission, including precautionary reference points for spawning stocks and fish mortality, a harvest control rule for quota settlement and various enforcement initiatives. A particular focus is on Norwegian–Russian collaboration and how Norway has bargained with Russia for precautionary management measures.Keywords: Barents Sea, fisheries management, precautionary principleCitation: Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 5, 1/2014 pp. 75–99. ISSN 1891-6252

Many fishery management tools currently in use have conservation value. They are designed to maintain stocks of commercially important species above target levels. However, their limitations are evident from continuing declines in fish stocks throughout the world. We make the case that to reverse fishery declines, safeguard marine life and sustain ecosystem processes, extensive marine reserves that are off limits to fishing must become part of the management strategy. Marine reserves should be incorporated into modern fishery management because they can achieve many things that conventional tools cannot. Only complete and permanent protection from fishing can protect the most sensitive habitats and vulnerable species. Only reserves will allow the development of natural, extended age structures of target species, maintain their genetic variability and prevent deleterious evolutionary change from the effects of fishing. Species with natural age structures will sustain higher rates of reproduction and will be more resilient to environmental variability. Higher stock levels maintained by reserves will provide insurance against management failure, including risk-prone quota setting, provided the broader conservation role of reserves is firmly established and legislatively protected. Fishery management measures outside protected areas are necessary to complement the protection offered by marine reserves, but cannot substitute for it.

Electronic Monitoring (EM) with video is a tool often mentioned to ensure compliance with fishing regulations while vessels are at sea. Since 2008, several trials have been conducted in the European Union on the use of EM. One of the largest and longest running European trials was the 2010–2016 Cod Catch Quota Management trial (CCQM) in Denmark. This paper reviews the methods and experiences gained from this trial, with focus on the last two years where criteria for video audits were expanded and major technical developments took place. The cost-effectiveness and potential of EM for compliance, management and scientific purposes is discussed. The present study demonstrates that EM is capable of high precision detection of non-compliance with a discard ban and that developments in the transmission of EM data allowed for a smoother and more reliable Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) system. Although further developments are needed, especially within the field of automated image analysis, we conclude that EM is one of the few feasible tools where fisheries information and compliance can be ensured under a Landing Obligation.

The present report is an EU-FP7-SOCIOEC Report giving an overview and critical evaluation of the current management measures implemented for the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries and the fish stocks involved in this. Also, this involves review and critical evaluation of the scientific advice supporting the fisheries management for the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries and the stocks involved herein. Management of the demersal roundfish and flatfish fisheries in the North Sea is conducted mainly through the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the yearly EU-Norway Bilateral Fishery Agreements. The prevailing management system and principle has been landing quotas (TAC, Total Allowable Catch) mainly based on the EU principle of relative stability in the international sharing of the TAC. Also, general effort limitations and technical measures are set for the EU and Norwegian fisheries on top of the TAC regulations. Technical measures have mainly aimed at reducing the retention and discard of the juveniles through gear measures and to protect the spawners and/or recruits in the fish populations through closures. Furthermore, the management is based on a set of national measures especially concerning control and enforcement measures, national distribution of the overall TAC, individual special technical measures, allocation (distribution) of national TACs to different fisheries and vessels including the share to e.g. Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) or Vessel Quota Shares (VQSs). The management of the North Sea demersal fisheries has changed quite a lot over the last decades following the need to rebuild the fish stocks, and in particular the North Sea cod stock in relation to the present case study. The CFP has increasing focus towards implementing multi-annual or long term management plans (MAMPs, LTMPs) partly to avoid the annual political battles over setting the TAC. There has furthermore been a trend during the last decade to move away from the Precautionary Approach and towards Maximum Sustainable Yield as the overarching management objective and Harvest Control Rules (HCRs) based on this. There have been introduced increasingly restrictive fisheries-based effort limitations with possibilities for exemption or for less drastic effort reductions provided that cod avoidance behavior can be demonstrated. Although the decision-makers under the CFP have had a reputation of consistently setting TACs way above the scientific advice, the development in recent years has been towards this gap being reduced. Management of the fisheries has undergone a number of structural and behavioral changes, and these have already yielded some positive results as the state of the demersal stocks in the North Sea have globally improved. The status of main demersal stocks has considerably improved over the last decade. Fishing mortality has globally decreased and biomass has increased, and most of the assessed demersal stocks are now within sustainable limits. Some issues remain with North Sea cod, for which recovery is slower. At present, cod is the limiting species for all the North Sea demersal fisheries. Over a time span from the 1960s landings of demersal stocks have declined with an accelerating decrease since the mid-1990s in line with the falling stock sizes and regulated reductions in total allowable catches (TACs). A clear decrease in the mean fishing mortality (F) is observed in the 2000-2010 period with current F values between Fmsy and Fpa, and the spawning stock biomass (SSB) has on average been above Bpa for the period 1983-2010 for the assessed stocks. The effort in the central North Sea and along the Norwegian waters has decreased as well as the number of operating fishing vessels (capacity). Overall, the nominal effort (kW-days) by European fleets using demersal trawl, seine, beam trawl and gillnet in the North Sea, Skagerrak and the Eastern Channel have been substantially reduced (-20% between 2003 and 2011). Since 2000, the total fish biomass for exploited stocks in the North Sea is about 4-5 million tonnes with an increasing trend in the most recent years. Despite the decrease of landings and fishing mortality in the last recent decade, the overall recruitment has shown a clear decreasing trend from 1985-2010. The recent increase in SSB during the last decase, which is likely due to lower landings and fishing mortality levels in the last 15 years, indicate inclinations of the North Sea ecosystem to recover. However, this has not converted in higher recruitment levels in the most recent years in which there may be a time delay. There is a clear trend that both the gross profit and the net profit has improved from 2008-2010 for the main fleets of the North Sea with the only exception of the Dutch beam trawlers 18-24m, for which the gross profit decreased by nearly 90%. The positive development in economic performance measures can be a result of the structural changes that have recently occurred in many fisheries. There are fewer vessels sharing the available resources (reduction in over-capacity). Especially, the movement towards right-based systems is expected to have had positive effects on reducing the over-capacity and improving the economic performance of many fleets. Historically, EU subsidies over the years have contributed to making the fleet more efficient, so the success of the CFP in the area of developing an efficient fleet has historically contributed to its failure in relation to conserve fish stocks, as overcapacity is consistently mentioned as one of the fundamental reasons for the conservation failure historically. Employment in fishing as a social indicator is shrinking, not least for the North Sea, and has been so for many years. There are multiple explanations for this: i) individual vessels are getting more efficient, ii) consolidation of fleets whereby fewer vessels catch the available resources with noticeable decrease in number of operating fishing vessels, and iii) decreasing fishing opportunities in the shape of lower quotass. The raw number of fishers tells a story of a sector that in reality, at least in the prosperous countries around the North Sea, provides only few jobs. Despite the above trends indicating positive effects of the most recent fisheries management of the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries there are a row of general problems in the present management. Population dynamics with respect to recruitment variations, sub-populations and changes in distribution of several demersal North Sea stocks influenced by environmental factors besides fishery are not fully understood and taken into consideration in management (and management advice). Also, biological multi-species interactions between the stocks are not fully taken into account in the management of the stocks when setting the MSY management and exploitation limits for the stocks. Management is not based on broader ecosystem and multi-species objectives, but based mainly on single stock objectives. Also technical interactions between fisheries are not taken fully into account in management of the North Sea demersal fisheries. The fisheries targeting cod, whiting, haddock, saithe, flatfish and Nephrops in the North Sea and Kattegat-Skagerrak are mixed demersal fisheries for towed gears. Mixed fisheries considerations are of primary importance for the management of North Sea species. Single stock management is a cause of discarding in mixed fisheries, because individual stock management objectives may not be consistent with each other. As such, the TAC of one species may be exhausted before the TAC of another, leading to catches of valuable fish that cannot be landed resulting in over-quotas discard. Overall, present management and fisheries policy is characterized by the CFP having in many ways taken form of a classical intergovernmentalist, state-centric command-and-control, top-down management system, where member states' ministers in the Council have exercised strong control over the fisheries management measures which have been developed and adopted on the background of proposals from the Commission and the Parliament, though since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the Parliament has assumed a role of co-legislator alongside the Council. EC has identified the lack of stakeholder involvement as one of the major weaknesses of the CFP, recognizing that this fact clearly undermine its legitimacy. Establishment of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) with the 2003 CFP can be seen as the first formal attempt to generate a network of multi-national, multi-interest advisory organizations with a strong regional focus among other involving resource users in the decision making. However, the RACs have at present only an advisory function on decisions and are not formally integrated directly in management on a regional basis, i.e. the RAC system is primarily intended to provide a regional stakeholder perspective to the Commission's deliberations rather than providing stakeholders with real decision-making authority. RACs constitute, nevertheless, a move towards regionalization of the fisheries policy. Present management is, furthermore, characterized by a high degree of complexity, bureaucracy, and examples of micro-management where different management systems and measures are implemented in parallel making evaluation of impact of the individual measures and systems very complicated and the system suffers from lack of transparency. With respect to the complexity the different management measures are acting top of each other with impact on the same fisheries and stocks at the same time (and with time overlap in their implementation) creating a very complex management and associated advisory system, where it is difficult to distinguish specific effects and impacts of each individual measures implemented. Accordingly, it is also very difficult to make scientific management evaluation and advice associated to the individual measures

AbstractThe existing fisheries economics literature analyzes compliance problems by treating the fishing firm as one cohesive unit, but in many cases violations are committed by agents acting on behalf of a firm. To account for this, we analyze the principal–agent relationship within the fishing firm. In the case where the firm directly benefits from illegal fishing, the firm must induce its crew to violate regulations through the incentive scheme. Within this framework, we analyze how the allocation of liability between fishing firms and crew affects quota violations and the ability to design a socially efficient fisheries policy. We show that without wage frictions, it does not matter who is held liable. However, under the commonly used share systems of remuneration, crew liability generally yields a more efficient outcome than firm liability. Furthermore, asset restrictions may affect the outcome under various liability rules.

The Barents Sea contains some of the most valuable fish resources in the world, including the world's largest cod stock. Since the mid-1970s, Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia have managed the most important stocks in the area together, through the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission. During the 1990s, the precautionary approach was adopted as the leading device for global fisheries management, introducing a requirement for additional precaution when scientific evidence is uncertain, as well as a number of practical regulatory measures related to scientific research, regulation and enforcement. Since the late 1990s, the Joint Commission has gradually adopted a number of measures required by the precautionary approach. Russia has never formally introduced the principle in its own fisheries legislation, but by and large employed regulatory measures in line with it. The article presents the major precautionary regulatory measures adopted by the Commission, including precautionary reference points for spawning stocks and fish mortality, a harvest control rule for quota settlement and various enforcement initiatives. A particular focus is on Norwegian–Russian collaboration and how Norway has bargained with Russia for precautionary management measures.Keywords: Barents Sea, fisheries management, precautionary principleCitation: Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 5, 1/2014 pp. 75–99. ISSN 1891-6252

With the reform of the European Union (EU) Common Fisheries Policy and the implementation of the Landing Obligation the ability of the fishing industry to adjust the selectivity of their gears is more than ever important in determining the revenue of fisheries. This is due to the change from landings- to catch-based fisheries management, where unwanted catches of regulated species now have to be landed and counted against the quota. Moreover, as the quantity and composition of unwanted catch varies with type of fishing gear used, fishing areas, season, fishing practice and quota availability, changes to the selectivity of the gears will be needed at the vessel level. This implies that a larger number of specialized selective gears need to be available to the different fisheries. Such an extensive development and testing of selective gears is difficult to achieve under the traditional process for gear development under the current EU fisheries management system. Therefore, this study investigates the potential of an industry-led process for identifying issues, and for development and testing of gear solutions as a way to provide the necessary tool-box of more specialized gears. Having industry lead the gear development process allows testing numerous fishing gears in parallel, as well as establishing a real commercial development and testing phase prior to expensive scientific trials. Moreover, this parallel development of different gear solutions allows for quickly filtering the most promising ones. Key steps of such an industry-led gear development process were investigated during this study, such as the possibility for industry to collect selectivity data on the gears tested, or what type of gears can this process produce. This PhD thesis consists of a synopsis and four papers.

Irish fisheries policy discourse insists that fishing opportunities are a public resource that are managed to ensure that such opportunities are not concentrated into the hands of large fishing interests. Yet, an examination of the ontological assumptions underlying Irish fisheries governance reveals that access to valuable quota-controlled stocks is shaped by historical assumptions that reinforce the worlds or ontological 'realities' of larger vessels, while different requirements combine to frustrate the attempts of small-scale vessels to assert a reality that is designed around their differences. Drawing on ethnographic research into small-scale fishing communities in Ireland's offshore islands, and supported by an emerging theoretical focus on the politics of diverse ontologies, I argue that we need to examine the ontological assumptions underpinning State approaches to fisheries governance to gain a fuller understanding of the on-the-ground implications of the governance arrangements that shape the day-to-day lives of fishing communities in Ireland's offshore islands. I consider six key ontological assumptions (social-historical, ecological, geographical, technocratic, material and markets-driven) that define these approaches. I focus on two islands-driven fisheries governance initiatives that have challenged these ontological assumptions in their assertion of particular fisheries worlds, and I consider what the State's response, of retrenchment of the ontological status quo, means for fisheries policy and governance. I conclude that by failing to accommodate diverse ontologies, the State is locked into (re)producing a fisheries seascape that is stifling the exploration of alternative governance possibilities, while privileging institutional arrangements, approaches and practices that do not challenge the ontological status quo.

DIRECTOR'S FOREWARD (Daniel Pauly). EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. PART 1: PAPERS. Prohibited species bycatch in the eastern Bering Sea flatfish fisheries - an analysis of institutions and incentives (Joshua K. Abbott and James E. Wilen). Modelling short-term choice behaviour of Danish fishermen in a mixed fishery (Bo S. Andersen and Annie-Sofie Christensen). Modeling effects of habitat closures in ocean fisheries (Matthew Berman). High seas fisheries governance: a framework for the future? (Stan Crothers and Lindie Nelson). Investing in natural capital - the case of fisheries (Ralf Doering). The catch 22 of licensing policy: socio-economic impacts in British Columbia's commercial ocean fisheries (Danielle N. Edwards, Astrid Scholz, Eric E. Tamm and Charles Steinback). The impact of rights-based management regimes on fishery productivity (Stephanie F. McWhinnie). Data fouling in marine fisheries: findings and a model for Newfoundland (Kaija I. Metuzals, C. Michael Wernerheim,Richard L. Haedrich, Parzival Copes and Ann Murrin). Early attempts at establishing exclusive rights in the British Columbia salmon fishery (Frank Millerd). Industrial evolution in response to changes in the demand for traceability and assurance: a case study of Chilean salmon aquaculture (Tyler K. Olson and Keith R. Criddle). Optimal location of marine protected areas in an international context (Arjan Ruijis and John Janmaat). An economic analysis of management options in the western rock lobster fishery of Western Australia (Neil Thomson and Nick Caputi). Testing the stability of recreational fishing participation probabilities (Eric M. Thunberg and Charles M. Fulcher). Improving utilization of the Atlantic sea scallop resource: an analysis of rotational management of fishing grounds (Diego Valderrama and James L. Anderson). PART 2: ABSTRACTS. Preferences for a buyout program: survey results from U.S. Atlantic shark fishermen (Charles M. Adams and Sherry L. Larkin). Measuring welfare effects of multispecies quota management systems (J. Agar). Economic evaluation of marine ecosystem restoration in northern British Columbia (Cameron H. Ainsworth). Valuing U.S. marine habitats: fantasy or fact? (Jackie Alder, William Cheung, Gakushi Ishimura and U. Rashid Sumaila). Price discovery in laboratory tradable fishing allowance markets with concurrent leasing (Christopher M. Anderson and Jon G. Sutinen). Excessive shares in ITQ fisheries (Lee G. Anderson). Framework for the evaluation of socio-economic and environmental indicators of sustainability in marine ecosystem based fisheries management: The Veracruz Reef system case (Patricia Arceo, Leonardo Ortiz, and Alejandro Granados). Measuring performance in a multi-output industry (Frank Asche, Daniel Gordon and Carsten Lynge Jensen). Experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance(Sam Bwalya, Christopher M. Anderson and Jon G. Sutinen). Effort response, harvest, and climate in the Gulf of Mexico recreational red snapper fishery (D.W. Carter and D. Letson). Socioeconomic impacts of fishery subsidies: a review (Tony Charles). The buyback subsidy problem: time inconsistencies and the ITQ alternative (Colin W. Clark, Gordon R. Munro and U. Rashid Sumaila). Deterrence and compliance in the artisanal Lake Victoria fisheries (H. Eggert and R. Lokina). Reconciling the revocable (or impermanent) privilege of IFQs with economic needs of fishermen (Mark Fina and Joseph Sullivan). Fraser salmon and the species-at-risk act: socio-economic impacts (Gordon S. Gislason). Genetic resources for fun and profit - the role of the interest rate in natural selection (Atle G. Guttormsen, Dadi Kristorfersson and Eric Naevda). Bering Sea pollock fisher response to the Steller sea lion conservation area (Alan C. Haynie and David F. Layton). Dynamic discrete choice modleing: Monte Carlo analysis (Robert Hicks and Kurt E. Schnier). Individual habitat quotas for fisheries: the influences of regulatory scale and spatial heterogeneity (Daniel S. Holland and Kurt E. Schnier). Fisheries cooperartives - varieties and consequences (Daniel D. Huppert and Jennifer Kassakian). Treadmill effects and capitalization of resource rent in Norweigian fisheries (Gakushi Ishimura and Rognvaldur Hannesson). Global cost and regional benefit of open ocean aquaculture with ocean nourishment (Ian S.F. Jones and Ibrahem Al Tarawneh). A dynamic spatial model to predict net distribution of fishing effort in relation to changes in fish abundance in the global tuna longline fishery (Heather Keith, Carl Walters and U. Rashid Sumaila). Simulating with ISIS-Fish V2.0 the dynamics of a north-east Atlantic mixed fishery subject to spatial closures (Stephanie Mahevas, Dominique Pelletier, Paul Marchal, Olivier Guyader, Raul Prellezo and Marina Santurtun). Entering and exiting a fishery: a strategic choice? (S. Mardle and T. Hutton). International trade, fisheries, and Canadian marine ecosystems: an empirical analysis (A. Dale Marsden and U. Rashid Sumaila). Ecosystem of a small lake (Kawahara-oike, Japan) invaded by two alien species: bluegill Lepomis macrochirus and largemouth bass Micropterus salmoides (Takashi Matsuishi, Md. Monir Hossain, Akira Goto and Mikio Azuma). Decision structuring to alleviate embedding in environmental valuation (Timothy L. McDaniels, Robin Gregory, Jospeh Arvai and Ratana Chuenpagdee). A preliminary look at the Hawai'ian swordfish regulations at reducing sea turtle bycatch (Jeffrey K. O'Hara and Theodore Groves). Importation of tasteless smoke (CO) treated tuna and its impacts to local market and fisheries (Minling Pan and Timothy Ming). Risk-shifting in farm-raised catfish marketing channels (K. Quagrainie and I. Neira). Stranded capital and impacts to processors of ITQs (Kate Quigley). Modeling economic efficiency in a fishery: the Norwegian cod trawl fishery (Kristin H. Roll, Frank Asche and Atle G. Guttormsen). Protecting marine biodiveristy: a comparison of inidividual habitat quotas (IHQs) and the marine protected areas (Kurt E. Schnier and Daniel S. Holland). Outside the realmn of economics: what are the implications of environmental ethics for fisheries management? (Donald M. Schug). Spatial management of metapopulations in fisheries : the bioeconomic effects of source-sink configurations (J.C. Seigo and J.F. Caddy). Valuing ecosystem services with fishery rents: a lumped-parameter approach to hypoxia in the Neuse River estuary (Martin D. Smith and Larry B. Crowder). A hierarchical Bayes approach to discrete choice fisheries modeling: the effect of marine reserves on fishing behaviour (Marin D. Smith, Junjie Zhang and Felicia C. Coleman). Amending the Alaska halibut/sablefish IFQ program to address community needs (P.J. Smith). Ecological and economic analysis of sablefish aquaculture in British Columbia (U. Rashid Sumaila, John Volpe and Yajie Liu). On the economics of fisheries governance: a Presidential address (Jon G. Sutinen). The economic costs of regulation: a bioeconomic comparison of legislative mandates for rebuilding fish stocks in the United States and New Zealand (Gil Sylvia, Sherry L. Larkin and Michael Harte). Bayesian estimation of technical efficiency in fisheries (D. Tomberlin, X. Irz and G. Holloway). Beyond ITQs: transactions costs and self-governance in New Zealand (Ralph E. Townsend). The effect of regulatory regimes on productivity development in fisheries: a comparative country study (Ragnar Tveteras and Hakan Eggert). Market power, sharing rule and fishery co-management (J. Uchida and J. Wilen). Moving toward market based management regimes: implementing days at sea leasing in the northeast (USA) multispecies fishery (John B. Walden and Charles Fulcher). Like counting sheep from a helicopter on a cloudy day: the effects of scientific uncertainty on stock assessment and ITQ fisheries management (T. Yandle). The contribution of fisheries to GDP: underestimating the role of small-scale fisheries (Dirk Zeller, Shawn Booth and Daniel Pauly). ; Fisheries Centre (FC) ; Unreviewed ; Faculty ; Researcher ; Graduate

In 1986, the New Zealand government implemented one of the world's first nationally comprehensive private fisheries management systems, or Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) systems. However, complete implementation was only possible after Māori groups agreed to formally renegotiate their Treaty and Aboriginal Title rights to fisheries. These negotiations resulted in the internationally acclaimed 1992 Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act. In the Settlement, Māori groups obtained commercial fishing rights in the form of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). They also received subsistence fishing rights, and later, customary governance rights. Today, Māori groups collectively own some 50% of the nation's Individual Transferable Quota. This should give them unprecedented formal control over national fisheries and related fishing revenues. Yet, few Māori can make a living by fishing. Māori groups' efforts to establish commercial fishing operations and to govern fisheries have been unsuccessful in addressing the uneven development seen in New Zealand's fisheries and Māori communities. This puzzle—of how an indigenous group can hold rights to valuable commercial and subsistence resources, but be unable to fully benefit from them—is what underlies the histories told here.In this dissertation, I identify the barriers blocking Māori fishery management and precluding Māori from realizing the benefits that ITQ ownership should bring them. Drawing on over two years of ethnographic research and extensive interviews in New Zealand's South Island, with Māori and non-Māori fishers, processors, tribal leaders, scientists, and state regulators, I argue that conceptions of property and sovereignty are at the heart of these problems. In the Settlement, Māori groups were not granted sovereignty over natural resource access and trade arrangements. Rather, they have been expected to re-organize hundreds of years of practices to meet entirely new conditions in the current political economic regime. They must also adapt their management strategies to additional restrictions imposed by the government on their fisheries. While the Fisheries Settlement granted property and governance rights to Māori groups, the state retains authority over how, when, and where these property and governance rights can be implemented. While Māori are expected to comply with the "full and final" condition of the Settlement, the New Zealand government continues to change the physical, social, and legal environments within which Māori can operate their fishing rights. Māori groups' restricted control over their fishing practices and rights—the barrier to their development—is made visible in examining the effects of state regulations imposed after the 1992 Settlement. In this dissertation, I analyze three policy, ecological, and practical contexts within which the New Zealand government has created barriers that constrain Māori access to the benefits from the fisheries in which they hold legal rights. First, fish processing regulations have restricted Māori fishers' access to markets, even though they hold the required quota rights needed to sell their fish. Second, government subsidies and programs supporting predominately non-Māori dairy farming operations upstream from Māori fisheries have intensified production and degraded water quality downstream, negatively impacting fishery sustainability and development. Third, the government's establishment of new marine reserves in particular regions has legally excluded Māori from fisheries they previously managed and utilized for subsistence. These findings demonstrate that the creation and allocation of private property rights to indigenous groups, without granting them concurrent authority to amend the regulations affecting the broader economic and ecological contexts in which these rights are realized, is unlikely to redress the consequences of their dispossession from land and marine resources.

This dissertation addresses the political economy of the Common Fisheries Policy and investigates how traditional concepts can hinder the success of the European fisheries management. The first paper focuses on the institutional set-up of the decision-making process. This process is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in discrete time. It is shown that due to the uncertainty in the annual TAC setting the optimal feedback strategy for the impatient decision-makers is to set inefficiently high TACs in Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. According to this theoretical analysis, the institutional set-up of the decision-making process itself promotes inefficient TACs. A binding commitment between the two groups of decision-makers to a long-term management plan could lead to a more sustainable fisheries management. The second paper is concerned with an empirical analysis of the distribution of bargaining power between different interests groups in the TAC decision-making of the European Union. The process is modeled as a cooperative game between two players with different interests regarding TACs. The estimation results show that the player representing interests of the fishing industry has the stronger bargaining position compared to the player representing conservation interests. The analysis also shows that scientific recommendations have a greater influence in the bargaining when the underlying data is of good quality. The conclusion is that effective TAC management requires both, a sound scientific assessment and a stronger inclusion of scientific advice. The third paper investigates the regional trade-offs of different management options of a multi-species management in the Baltic Sea. An ecological-economic model of the Baltic Sea is developed simulating the stock dynamics of interacting population in order to investigate a set of different strategic management options. The profits for each country participating in the Baltic fishery differ between the management options. We show that the inflexibility of TAC distribution according to the principle of relative stability can lead to regional inequality in future profits. A reallocation of profits is required to achieve a concordant agreement on strategic multi-species management goals. The fourth paper examines the efficiency of different segments of the Baltic trawler fleet in order to evaluate whether quota trade between vessels of different countries could improve the situation. The distance function approach is used to derive an equation to estimate the efficiencies of different fleet segments. Data for different vessel length categories for different countries is used. The estimation reveals significant asymmetries in the efficiencies between countries. Allowing for quota trade in the Baltic fleet could improve the overall efficiency. Such a transnational quota trading system would enable the fleet to coordinate its fishing activities far more flexible than under the fixed allocation of TACs according to the principle of relative stability.