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The main economic function of the university is associated with providing the organizations-economic operators with new highly qualified personnel. The formal grounds of professional ethos of high school teacher should first be: an adequate level of professional competence in a particular field of scientific knowledge, adequate pedagogical skills, high level of reflectivity and especially moral consciousness of the teacher, educational services market presence, a sufficient level of economic development, formation of basic communities involved in the use of professional competence of university lecturer (most professors, students, customers qualified university graduates, university administration etc.). Market society gave commercialism problem in education providing the industrial scale, that even post-industrial technologies are unable to overcome. The main economic benefit of university activity should evaluate in the terms of capital turnover - but, above all, symbolic capital, then social capital, then economic (including financial), and then all other forms of capital that one can imagine – political or any more. University produces and reproduces meanings – these meanings drive development of society in general, including economic. The situations of social interaction then becomes the foundation that creates institutions not formally, but informally and continuously: this generation is comparable to the democratic way of doing business every day as opposed to participation in democratic elections just once every five years. The model of conversation sets the thematic certainty, not just grammatical correctness of communication. So, for our study it refers to the specific educational ethical values that may limit some and stimulate other economic actions with specific educational ethics. These rules are in its most specific so that the better they work in education - the worse they can be applied in other fields such as politics, law, religion or any other. Therefore the use of this approach to education focuses on general research not of social norms, but of the specific educational standards, and within the education system is not to create a specific "institutional educational sub-world" as a variation of the overall institutional world that "rutinize" educational practice, but to study existing forms of educational communication to the (in Luhmann's terms) contingence in the course of educational interactions, which combines binding behaviors and casualty select from these options, ie a combination of situational over-situationality. This over-situationality appears not as typization of available, but as the identification of its selective character. The fact that certain educational practices used in various educational circumstances does not mean that it is a typical or even successful, or some certified algorithms for solving educational problems. The same educational practice may be the answer to a completely different educational situations that have only a few identical components, which revealed sensitive for such practice. Accordingly, it can be more or less successful depending on how these "sensitive" components are crucial for any givensituation. This applies to the comparison of educational ethics norms with no-educational, and a variety of ethical standards. However, on educational standards - there should still be own, especially "sensitive"components in each case, ie in particular also has its own economic behavior ethics in education. The main economic criterion in the selection of education applicants is estimation of the prospects of the applicant as a future professional. Hardly anyone who participated in some role (as applicant or a member of the selection committee) in the admission campaign in university might argue that this particular economic criterion could be only partly formalized and contains a significant proportion of ethical (or unethical) ratio selection committee to the applicant . And this ethic is directly related to economic calculation - even when it is not aware of the selection committee members or the university administration. If selection of applicants will be made successful, the economic component of education depends on – whether a student will be able to master the curriculum, or one will be expelled for academic failure, or find further place of employment, and therefore raise the market value or university and its business reputation, or vice versa, and so on.Keywords: university, values, ethical values, a high school teacher, economic function, professional ethos, professional competence ; Основна економічна функція університету пов'язана іззабезпеченням організацій-суб'єктів економічної діяльності новимивисококваліфікованими кадрами. До формальних підстав виникнення професійного етосу викладача вищої школи слід зараховувати передусім: достатній рівень фахової компетентності у певній царині наукового знання, достатній рівень педагогічної майстерності, високий рівень рефлективності і особливо моральної свідомості викладача, наявність ринку педагогічних послуг, достатній рівень розвитку економіки, сформованість основних спільнот, причетних до застосування професійної компетенції викладача університету (самої професури, студентства, замовників кваліфікованих випускників університету, адміністрації університету тощо). Ринкове суспільство надало проблемі меркантильності у наданні освіти індустріальних масштабів, які не в змозі перебороти навіть постіндустріальні технології. Основний економічний ефект від діяльності університету варто оцінювати мовою обертання капіталу – але, передусім, капіталу символічного, потім вже капіталу соціального, потім економічного (у тому числі фінансового), а вже потім усіх інших форм капіталу, які можна уявити – політичного чи будь-якого ще. Університет продукує і репродукує смисли – ці смисли рухають розвиток суспільства загалом, у тому числі й економічний.Ключові слова: університет, цінності, етичні цінності, викладач вищої школи, економічна функція, професійний етос, професійна компетенція.Основная экономическая функция университета связана с обеспечением организаций-субъектов экономической деятельности новыми высококвалифицированными кадрами. К формальным основаниям возникновения профессионального этоса преподавателя высшей школы следует относить прежде всего: достаточный уровень профессиональной компетентности в определенной области научного знания, достаточный уровень педагогического мастерства, высокий уровень рефлексивности и особенно нравственного сознания преподавателя, наличие рынка педагогических услуг, достаточный уровень развития экономики, сформированность основных сообществ, причастных к применению профессиональной компетенции преподавателя университета (самой профессуры, студенчества, заказчиков квалифицированных выпускников университета, администрации университета и т.д.). Рыночное общество придало проблеме меркантильности в предоставлении образования индустриальных масштабов, которые не в состоянии преодолеть даже постиндустриальные технологии. Основной экономический эффект от деятельности университета стоит оценивать на языке обращения капитала – но, прежде всего, капитала символического, потом уже капитала социального, затем экономического (в том числе финансового), а уже потом всех форм капитала, которые можно представить – политического или какого-либо еще. Университет производит и репродуцирует смыслы – эти смыслы движут развитие общества в целом, в том числе и экономическое.Ключевые слова: университет, ценности, этические ценности, преподаватель высшей школы, экономическая функция, профессиональный этос, профессиональная компетенция.The main economic function of the university is associated with providing the organizations-economic operators with new highly qualified personnel. The formal grounds of professional ethos of high school teacher should first be: an adequate level of professional competence in a particular field of scientific knowledge, adequate pedagogical skills, high level of reflectivity and especially moral consciousness of the teacher, educational services market presence, a sufficient level of economic development, formation of basic communities involved in the use of professional competence of university lecturer (most professors, students, customers qualified university graduates, university administration etc.). Market society gave commercialism problem in education providing the industrial scale, that even post-industrial technologies are unable to overcome. The main economic benefit of university activity should evaluate in the terms of capital turnover - but, above all, symbolic capital, then social capital, then economic (including financial), and then all other forms of capital that one can imagine – political or any more. University produces and reproduces meanings – these meanings drive development of society in general, including economic. The situations of social interaction then becomes the foundation that creates institutions not formally, but informally and continuously: this generation is comparable to the democratic way of doing business every day as opposed to participation in democratic elections just once every five years. The model of conversation sets the thematic certainty, not just grammatical correctness of communication. So, for our study it refers to the specific educational ethical values that may limit some and stimulate other economic actions with specific educational ethics. These rules are in its most specific so that the better they work in education - the worse they can be applied in other fields such as politics, law, religion or any other. Therefore the use of this approach to education focuses on general research not of social norms, but of the specific educational standards, and within the education system is not to create a specific "institutional educational sub-world" as a variation of the overall institutional world that "rutinize" educational practice, but to study existing forms of educational communication to the (in Luhmann's terms) contingence in the course of educational interactions, which combines binding behaviors and casualty select from these options, ie a combination of situational over-situationality. This over-situationality appears not as typization of available, but as the identification of its selective character. The fact that certain educational practices used in various educational circumstances does not mean that it is a typical or even successful, or some certified algorithms for solving educational problems. The same educational practice may be the answer to a completely different educational situations that have only a few identical components, which revealed sensitive for such practice. Accordingly, it can be more or less successful depending on how these "sensitive" components are crucial for any givensituation. This applies to the comparison of educational ethics norms with no-educational, and a variety of ethical standards. However, on educational standards - there should still be own, especially "sensitive"components in each case, ie in particular also has its own economic behavior ethics in education. The main economic criterion in the selection of education applicants is estimation of the prospects of the applicant as a future professional. Hardly anyone who participated in some role (as applicant or a member of the selection committee) in the admission campaign in university might argue that this particular economic criterion could be only partly formalized and contains a significant proportion of ethical (or unethical) ratio selection committee to the applicant . And this ethic is directly related to economic calculation - even when it is not aware of the selection committee members or the university administration. If selection of applicants will be made successful, the economic component of education depends on – whether a student will be able to master the curriculum, or one will be expelled for academic failure, or find further place of employment, and therefore raise the market value or university and its business reputation, or vice versa, and so on.Keywords: university, values, ethical values, a high school teacher, economic function, professional ethos, professional competence

В статье анализируются монои мультилинейные концептуальные подходы к развитию человечества, представленные в трудах таких выдающихся интеллектуалов как Н.Я. Данилевский, О. Шпенглер, А.Дж. Тойнби, Т. Парсонс, И. Валлерстайн, Ф. Фукуяма, Л.Н. Гумилев, С. Хантингтон, Гж. Колодко, Л.С. Васильев, Ю.И. Семенов, М. Музилис, Б. Витрок и др. Подчеркивается, что разнообразие линий социально-экономического развития народов основывается на различиях двух доминирующих макротипов цивилизации «европейского» и «азиатского». В контексте этих и локальных цивилизационных различий рассматриваются модели социально-экономической трансформации постсоциалистических стран; при этом особое внимание уделяется российскому вектору посткоммунистического транзита, в основу анализа которого, по мнению автора, может быть положена теория евразийства Л. Гумилева, Н. Савицкого, Н. Трубецкого и концепции современных российских авторов С.Г. Кордонского, В.Б. Пастухова, О.Э. Бессоновой и других ученыхThe discussion of transformation outcomes has become increasingly tense in the recent years and is now challenging contemporary social sciences. Two major approaches can be distinguished today. According to one of them, transformation is a linear process and it refers to logical transition from non-market to market economy. Such understanding of social development constitutes the classic theory of modernization (W. Rostow, T. Parsons). Similar lack of alternativeness is also a characteristic of the increasingly popular world-system analysis (I. Wallerstain). Yet it can be argued that institutional structure and value systems, which determine the inner logics of social development, are not so universal in nature. The end of 1990s has seen the rise of new theories of non-European modernity, the variety of capitalisms and the trend towards distinguishing modernization from westernization. These ideas have received much support in developing countries. We too argue that the difference of transformation outcomes in European and Eurasian areas cannot be adequately explained in terms of single-vector deterministic model. The reason for the emerging variety of socio-economic developments may very well lie in the inner civilization differences between countries. We argue that both, Marxist and liberal unitarisms with their optionless evolutionary approaches to certain sociohistoric organisms, ignore the interconnection of common and particular in the human history and thus become a subject to discussion. Along with unitarian approach, according to which the development processes within particular sociohistoric organisms follow a single logic in human history, there also exists a pluralist multilinear approach. It implies, that humanity is represented by a set of relatively autonomous historic entities, each of which has a certain life cycle with its own stages of birth, development and decease. The concept of monolinearity has been criticized as far back as in the late XIXth century by a Russian historian N. Danilevsky, whose notion of civilization concurrency ('ryadopolozhennost' tsivilizatsiy') [Danilevsky 2003] suggests that along with some universal essentials civilizations may have very specific goals of development and their own criteria of civilization's successful reproduction. Danilevsky is also the author of the idea that among the factors, which stipulate multilinearity of historical process and the variety of options of social development, a special role belongs to the type of civilization we choose. He also produced his own theory of cultural-historical types: '…civilization is a notion far more extensive than science, art, religion, political, economic or social development taken alone. Civilization includes it all. I am saying that even religion itself is a notion inferior to that of civilization.' [Danilevsky 2003, p.129]. He reckoned that such analysis of history-dependent types of civilization can help explain many phenomena in the past, the present and the future of different peoples, especially since he had learned about the particularities of Russian culture and history. Although he never criticized the Romano-Germanic culture, Danilevsky completely denied its universality and perceived his native Russian civilization as its equal but essentially different counterpart. In XXth century the popularity has come to such advocates of historical pluralism as O. Spengler, A.J. Toynbee, L. Gumilyov, S. Huntington and others. By accepting the possibility of concurrent development for countries, which belong to different civilizations, one does not have to deny the universality of technologies of existence in the very broad sense of its meaning. Although what we must consider is that institutional structure and value systems, which regulate development processes within certain social organisms, may not, and usually are not, universal in nature. Thus it makes sense, that different civilizations and, consequently, national states, which fall under these civilizations, are very likely to develop along different vectors. The institutional theory has also produced a hypothesis, according to which there exist different institutional matrices that can be regarded as latent mechanisms of functioning and reproduction of sociohistoric organisms. The matrix acts as a stable and historically dependent set of interacting institutions that are specific for particular civilizations. By applying this logics in comparative analysis of Eastern and Western macrocivilizations some Russian economists argue that in historical perspective Eastern matrix persistently features non-market mechanisms of distribution, centralized state and the priority of collective values over individual ones. The existing variety of development paths can generally be reduced to the differences that arise between two dominating types of civilization, which contingently can be referred to as European and Asiatic. The first one emerged from ancient polises and, basically, represents the chain of societies with private property, the balance between civil society and civil institutions, advanced personality and the priority of individual values. The latter type Asiatic one is historically connected to Asian despotisms, the domination of state property, all-powerful government institutional structures, the lack of civil society and so forth. We rely on the explanatory concept of basic institutional structures, which distinguish Eastern civilizations from Western ones the so called relations of power-property. This concept has been developed by an outstanding Russian orientalist L. Vasiliev in his works from 1960s 1990s. It is peculiar that in the course of human history this type of civilization has been dominating geographically as well as historically. And it also explains why in the XXth century etacratism (in other terms, etatism or statism) has developed in the countries, which fall under the Asiatic civilization area. Yet it should be underlined that there is no such necessity as to draw the dividing line between monolinear and multilinear approaches. We cannot as well ignore the experience of the previous centuries, which has been institutionalized in verifiable sources. This experience provides evidence of completely different options of social development not only for the organisms that have literally become history, but for those which survived until today. Some of them progressed from savagery feudalism and then onto capitalism; some have initially turned to the Asian mode of production and have only recently developed the advanced forms of capitalism (postindustrialism); the others got 'stuck' in a non-market phase of development and adapted it to the circumstances of contemporary global system. Yet we are only able to speculate within a definite historical horizon, that is measured by the life of a few nearest generations. The point is: there is no sense in crossing swords regarding the future of humanity beyond the XXIst century. Starting from the end of 1990s the Western literature brings an increasingly bigger number of publications, which support theories of non-European modernity and variability of development and attempt to separate modernization concept from westernization. These ideas have gained a lot of support in developing countries, where authors draw attention to the lack of explanatory power of existing social theories, which are incompatible with non-Western forms of contemporary society. According to multilinear approach in the modern world there coexist several main civilizations with distinct institutional, axiological and behavioral characteristics. These civilizations are connected with dominating religious systems. As applied to Central European, Southern European and Eurasian areas (post-communist countries, which are in the process of transformation) these religious systems are Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Islam. The social, economic and political situation in the corresponding countries is essentially different in a number of aspects. Moreover it explains the variation of development paths and the outcomes of liberal reforms in many post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently we argue that these civilization particularities must be closely studied. Even today many European researchers and analysts are still convinced that social and economic order of contemporary Russia is not essentially different from that of the developed European countries a still another type of capitalism. One of the most popular approaches is the so called variety of capitalisms approach [Drahokoupil 2009]. According to this approach the variety of social and economic systems, which exist in contemporary Europe, may be reduced to several fundamental forms (e.g. 'liberal market economies', 'controlled market economies' or even 'dependent market economies'). So it, basically, reduces the problem of determining the outcomes of various policies to the problem of diagnosing various states of capitalism in different countries depending on the structure of its economic institutions and the presence of foreign capital. Yet it is never discussed how and why Russia and its predominantly 'orthodox' post-socialist neighbours deviate from any of these classifications. Etacratism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was enforced from the USSR. The ones that resisted most were the countries which already had the most experience of market economy, some forms of civil society and the rule of law in the course of their history. During the 45 years of Soviet domination these countries have always been the most unreliable periphery of the 'true socialism'. All of them belonged to Catholic and Protestant Christian cultures. At the same time, etacratism voluntarily and rather autonomously developed in countries, which have never known capitalist relations and had a different history China, Vietnam and Mongolia. The contemporary societal system, which formed in CEE countries, was a result of a single anti-communist revolution of 1989 -1991, which according to V. Ilin had a system nature. These revolutions were encouraged by the idea of catch-up modernization. In CEE and Baltia the original goal of transformation, which included higher standards of mass consumption, social state and technological modernization was rather quickly reduced to two basics which represent the idea of progress market economy and competitive democracy (political pluralism along with democratic freedom) [Ilin 2006, p. 262-266]. The development in Russia, as well as some other countries of the former USSR, went in a different manner. The achievements of market economy and liberal democracy were far more modest than in the CEE neighborhood. We hold the following conceptual viewpoint on Russia's development. The contemporary Russian society, as well as Soviet, belongs to a particular civilization (Eurasian), which is essentially different from European (Atlantic) in relation to its institutional structure and system of values. Thus, in the social space of Europe there actually exist at least two substantially distinct 'Europes'.

Soviet and post-Soviet historians have not paid enough attention to the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) – the U.S. principal archive that preserves historical documentary sources of national importance. In the United States the history of the National Archives is presented in the works of Wayne C. Grover, Donald R. McCoy, H.G. Jones, Herman J. Viola, Anna Bruner Eales and other authors. The 1940-1950's in NARA's history is one of the most important periods, the time of "maturing and gaining self-awareness", which the author intends to explore in this article. NARA, established in 1934, tried to represent itself as a very important state agency. During World War II, NARA received a significant number of historical documents of the federal executive departments for storage, executed thousands of requests from civilian and military government agencies, popularized historical documents in order to reinforce a sense of patriotism, created thousands of security copies, let their premises to important military defense offices, made important steps to save documents of the occupied countries. Due to the services, rendered by archivists to the U.S. Army and Navy, NARA got the title of "National Defense Agency." Immediately after the war, the Second Archivist of the USA Solon J. Buck suggested creating the International Council on Archives and the UNO Archives. Prominent American archivists Waldo Gifford Leland, one of the founders of (NARA) the National Archives, Chairman of the Committee on Conservation of Cultural Resources, Collas G. Harris, the head of an Archives committee on protection against the hazards of war, Vernon D. Tate, the head of NARA photo archives department, Philip M. Hamer, the Records Control Officer NARA contributed to the development of the records' saving methods during the war. Ernst Posner, a scholar and lecturer at the American University, headed of the project on compilation of guides of archives in Germany, Italy and many occupied countries. The guides were created in order to save the repositories and documentary treasures they contained. Under the leadership of Philip M. Hamer the staff of the National Archives prepared "Guides to Records of World War II" for print. Consequently, archivists believed they were able to prove the value of archives as a strategic state informational resource that preserves nation's historical documents and provides government institutions with important retrospective information. However, in the postwar years, the government made decisions unfavorable for further development of the National Archives. Before and during the war an extraordinary number of documents in need of appraisal and disposal were accumulated in federal departments. In 1943 Congress issued the «Records Disposal Act» which demanded institutions to submit schedules of records, allocated for destruction to the U.S. Archivist. However, the devising of schedules progressed slowly. In 1945 amendments to the Act were adopted, which authorized the Archivist of the United States to compile mandatory General schedules. In 1946 President Harry S. Truman signed EO 9784 "Providing for the More Efficient Use and for the Transfer and Other Disposition of Government Records". This order required the departments of the executive branch to implement records management programs, and made NARA responsible for control and coordination in the area of the records management. It seemed that the measures taken to resolve the problem of appraisal and records management were sufficient. In 1947 the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government was established in the U.S. government, headed by the former U.S. President Herbert Hoover. Although Hoover declared that the reorganization was necessary for management simplification, clarity of the executive branch of power's policies, according to the Constitution of the United States, the real purpose of reorganization was the executive branch's attempt to take over all possible functions of governance, strengthening the status of major federal departments and cost savings. A special group was created as a part of the Commission. Its task was to survey the records management in federal agencies and provide recommendations for its improvement. Emmett J. Leahy led the group. He suggested the creation of a Federal Records Administration, incorporating it as a component of the National Archives and all the repositories, that stored non-current federal government documents, and passing a law to coordinate formation, storage, management and destruction of records procedures, appointing a person responsible for records management in each department, developing and implementing the relevant standards and regulations. However, the only Leahy's proposal the members of the Hoover Commission realized concerned NARA association with the General Services Administration (GSA), the office, responsible for ensuring the operation of public institutions and their buildings, transport and so on. The Third Archivist of the USA Wayne C. Grover (1948-1965) directed his own suggestions to the Hoover Commission, in which he appealed against the decision to establish a new Administration and insisted that NARA was able to successfully perform the functions of records management on its own. Opponents criticized Leahy for the narrowness of the aim he pursued: the problem of reducing the quantity of records and saving space for their storage. They made hints that he was more concerned with how to "sell" his idea to the Commission, than the communal benefit. They also pointed out the lack of alternatives and the uncertain status of the National Archives. Their fears were justified. On June 30, 1949 «Federal Property and Administrative Services Act» (PL 152) concerning federal property and administrative services was adopted, according to which all government records were declared federal property, centralized management was entrusted to GSA, which the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) was subjected to. With a few exceptions, the law passed in 1949 ensured that all the U.S. Archivist's responsibilities were passed to the head of GSA. Archives lost its authority as an independent government agency, and even changed its name from NARA to NARS. This resulted in the inability of the National Archives to conduct independent policy in the field of archival affairs and to control human resources and finances, which adversely affected the further development of the Archives. In 1953 U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) intended to politicize the post of the Archivist, to remove W.C. Grover from the office and appoint a politician. In 1965 Grover resigned because of a conflict with GSA regarding Archives funding cuts. Before that he had written a letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) with a request to reestablish the National Archives into an independent agency. For 25 years the conflict between the GSA and NARS had been developing into a state of "war" in which, fortunately for American Archivists, they achieved a victory, returning not only the name but also the independence and rights to the Archives in 1985. Changes in the archives legislation concerning U.S. Archives in the 1940s – 1950s improved the records management in federal agencies: General and specific schedules were introduced, the activities of institutions in the field of records management were regulated, the rules for records disposition were established, retention periods were determined, destruction procedures were standardized, federal records centers were founded. Institutions were freed from aggravating work with noncurrent records, receiving an opportunity to transfer them to temporary repositories, appraisal and subsequent disposal in records centers. Activities of federal agencies in the area of records were subjected to centralized management, coordination and control by NARS. In fact, NARS powers were increased with the right to the records management programs control of the life cycle of documents from the formation in an institution until the final disposition. This was a significant step forward in comparison with the situation in the first half of the XX century. It ensured systematic acquisition of records of historical value by NARS and prevented the loss of valuable documents. Assessment of the guidelines given to the government by Hoover Commission is not high. The National Archives as an independent agency of the executive branch could have implemented its tasks in the field of records management on its own without unnecessary complications. Instead, it was held "captive" for 25 years (in the words of American Archivists) by the GSA and worked under pressure of an unresolved conflict which was time and energy consuming for the archivists. The examined period in the history of the National Archives of the United States (1940-1950's) was important both in terms of archives' achievements in practicing their trade and in terms of understanding their role as archivists. American archivists managed to prove to their federal departments the importance of transferring documents to be stored in the Archives and showed department heads that the Archives are a federal agency, which guarantees and reliably ensures the safety of government records and information as well as institutions' services. Later on, the heads of federal agencies had no doubts about the wisdom of submitting records to the NARA. Archives' informational activities didn't focus solely on executing state civilian and military agencies' requests, but on actively popularizing historical documents among officials, military men and citizens too. Actions, intended to popularize historical documents, helped to form a positive image of archives in the community. For the United States it was of great importance as American citizens as taxpayers assess the necessity of an institution's existence in terms of its cost justification. Activities of American archivists had a positive impact on the safety of occupied countries' documents. Contribution to the salvage of documents of other countries positively influenced the perception of the United States as one of the founders of the International Council on Archives by the international archival community. Decisions taken by the U.S. government in the postwar years were positive as a whole. Firstly, a strict records management system was implemented in federal agencies. The problem of appraisal and temporary storage of records was solved. Second, the loss of National Archives status as an independent public entity, which negatively reflected on all of the Archives' activities until 1985, taught archivists a lesson. Archivists realized that their mission was not to be clerks, who perform routine paperwork, but as guardians of history. W.C. Grover commented on this in his farewell letter to the staff of the Archives: «These missions, as I have repeated many times, are important. They are at the center of man's effort to preserve and carry forward civilization itself. "The written word endures" - at least such portions of the word as we archivists decide are worth preserving! It is a worrisome and responsible task, but I can't think of a nobler one in this rather uncivilized era we find ourselves». It took years for archivists to overcome the resistance of politicians and government officials, return an independent status to the Archives, eliminate the threat of politicization and turn archival branch into a separate independent public system. This does not mean that the U.S. archival branch and National Archives today operate without problems, but they experienced a period of "maturing and gaining self-awareness", which allowed archivists to move on to a new level of perception and representation of themselves and their role in State and society. ; Освещена история Национального архива США в период Второй мировой войны и первые послевоенные годы, усилия архивистов, направленные на организацию экспертизы ценности и обеспечение сохранности документов департаментов федерального правительства, популяризацию исторических источников; деятельность первой и второй Гуверовских комиссий, изменения законодательства в отраслях архивного дела и управления документацией в США в 1940-1950-х гг. Особенное внимание уделено статусу Национального архива США как самостоятельного органа исполнительной ветви власти и стратегического информационного ресурса государства ; Висвітлено історію Національного архіву США у період Другої світової війни та перші повоєнні роки, зусилля архівістів з організації експертизи цінності та забезпечення збереженості документів департаментів федерального уряду, популяризації історичних джерел; діяльність першої та другої Гуверівських комісій, зміни законодавства у галузі архівної справи та у сфері управління документацією у США у 1940-1950-х рр. Особливу увагу приділено статусу Національного архіву США як самостійного органу виконавчої гілки влади та стратегічного інформаційного ресурсу держави

Problem setting. The issues of preventing social orphanhood, developing new and reforming existing social services for children and families with children have become a major focus in academia and in various structures at all levels working with children. Improving the quality of life of children is not only a matter of time, but also its need. Progressive world processes for the protection of the rights of the child, declared by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which stimulate major changes in legislation, policies and practices for supporting and protecting children. Such targeted actions are widespread in many countries of the world. Today, Ukraine is taking the first steps towards deinstitutionalization and creating its own model of social service formation, which will become the basis for preventing social orphanage among children. The article analyzes the existing model of managing the sphere of protection of children's rights in the context of preventing social orphanage and implementing the principles of DI reform (deinstitutionalization).Today, in the context of transformational changes, Ukraine has faced significant socio-economic problems that have led to a decrease in the standard of living of Ukrainian families, the emergence of such negative phenomena as social orphanhood, child homelessness and a number of other manifestations. The resolution of these issues has also recently become more complicated due to hostilities in the East of our country conducting by the Russian Federation. In this context, it is important to focus on the problems of providing social guarantees and social protection for children of vulnerable categories, creating conditions for their adaptation in a complex social environment. Exactly in the context of these aspects arises a need for a significant improvement in the public administration system, in particular in sphere of organizing effective social work with children, as well as increasing the effectiveness of the social function of the state in total.Recent research and publications analysis. Nowadays, such scientists as V. Sobchenko, V. Moskalenko, V. Skuratovsky, O. Paliy, E. Libanova are studying and researching the problems and modern approaches to the development of the sphere of social protection of the population. Studies of reforming and improving the system of social services in general, and services for children and families with children, in particular, are engaged such Ukrainian researchers as L. Volynets, N. Komarov, O. Antonova-Turchenko, I. Ivanova, I. Pesha, A. Kapska, I. Pinchuk, S. Tolstoukhova, M. Lukashevich, I. Mygovich. Issues of implementation of institutional care and childcare reform are engaged T. Veretenko, O. Denesyuk, T. Spirina.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. However, it should be noted that the current state of scientific development of the problem of modernization the activities of public administration bodies in the field of social work with children of vulnerable categories and families with children in Ukraine is insufficient, since today this area is in the process of reforming. The sources of conducted scientific researches were mainly concerned certain aspects of the functioning of public administration and the social security system of the population, partly work with children, namely: the history of formation and development, directions and forms of social work. Today, the issue of preventing social orphanage in the context of the implementation of the DI-reform principles is little explored and not discovered.Paper main body. Despite the rather significant interest of scientists in the problems of managing the social sphere in Ukraine, there are still insufficiently developed approaches to the activities of government bodies and local self-government, as well as non-governmental organizations in the field of social work with children of vulnerable categories and deinstitutionalization processes, their practical implementation in terms of interagency cooperation , institutional and resource support, transformation of the network of social institutions and institutions involved in problems of vulnerable categories of children. Considering this, the topic is relevant and needs a deeper study.An analysis of the legislation on the protection of the rights and interests of children shows that the concept of social protection is often interpreted as a similar to the social security concept. The concept of social protection of children is much more widely interpreted in the Law of Ukraine "On bodies and services for children and special institutions for children": it is a complex of measures and means of socio-economic and legal character for ensuring children's rights to life, development, upbringing, education, medical care, financial support.A number of scientists accentuate on the concept of the so-called hidden social orphanhood, which is associated with the deterioration of the family's living conditions and the decline of its moral foundations, resulting in a growing neglect of a huge number of children and adolescents. Hidden social orphanhood is spreading in the form of institutionalization of children whose parents for various reasons are not able to provide them with proper care and upbringing at home. Consequently, hidden social orphanhood is hiding in outwardly normal families, which in reality are dysfunctional, and parents do not cope with their basic responsibilities for raising children.Thus, social orphanhood can be defined as a social phenomenon caused by the self-willed evasion of parents from fulfilling their parental duties responsibilities for the child, which is accompanied by the breaking and loss of family relations between parents and a child, the parental indifference to the child's needs and the future fate of the child.Practical experience and international experience show that only a small number of children need specialized hospital care and approaches to education. Such care should be provided in small individual institutions that are integrated into the life of the local community with the ability to apply inclusive education components. All other children should be excluded from social isolation and brought up in a family or close to family environment and attend educational institutions in the system of inclusive education.The process of reforming the current system of institutional care (deinstitutionalization) in the field of protection of children's rights should be a long-term, well-planned and structured process of reforming the child care system based on the principle of taking into account the best interests of the child, recognizing the priority of family education over placement in the state guardianship institutions. During such reforms, the family should receive clear government standards for social services:– services and assistance that will contribute to its preservation for the purpose of full-fledged child development;– adoption or family forms of alternative care become a priority for the placement of children who have lost parental care due to orphancy, living in difficult life circumstances, violence or neglect from their parents side;– institutions are redeployed into specialist care centers (family and child support) or closed.The main problems of deinstitutionalization mechanism implementation today are:– developing a common vision and a holistic approach to reforming the current system of institutional care, education and upbringing of children, both at the national level and at the level of territorial communities;– the lack of an interdisciplinary algorithm of interaction, interdepartmental and intersectoral coordination of actions and cooperation, the lack of a training system for specialists, including heads of institutions of various departmental subordination, parental support programs, despite the fact that the basic mechanism is just beginning to be developed.Today, the development of a strategic deinstitutionalization program requires the involvement of partners from all possible areas: social, educational, healthcare, civil society institutions and the parent community. An additional advantage of attracting partners from different disciplines and industries is an increase in the availability of resources for the implementation of the deinstitutionalization program. A list of tasks should be the creation of conditions to ensure the realization of the right of every child to raise a family, to prevent the spread of social orphanhood.Achieving this goal requires resolving the following key tasks: – improving the activities of guardianship and care services for the prevention of social orphanhood, providing families with children with high-quality social services aimed at supporting the family's educational function;– involvement of enterprises, institutions, organizations, regardless of ownership and management, in the provision of social, rehabilitation services to children and families with children in difficult life circumstances, introduction of a social order mechanism in this field;– forming a tolerant attitude of society towards children and families with children who are in difficult circumstances, preventing various forms of discrimination against such children and families;– introduction of new social technologies aimed at early identification of families with children who are in difficult life circumstances, raising responsible paternity, and preventing cases of the taking of a child from parents without depriving them of their parental rights;– improving the quality of social services provided by social work entities to children and families with children who are in difficult life circumstances;– introduction of social services for parents, whose children are being brought up in boarding schools, in order to create conditions for the return of the child to parents;– introduction of social services for children to prepare them for return to the biological family after a long stay in a boarding school;– introduction of social services for families with children, in which the process of parents' divorce is ongoing, resolves the dispute between the mother and the father regarding the place of residence of the children, participation in their upbringing;– providing social support for parents who for certain reasons (due to long-term illness, disability, poverty, unemployment, etc.), are unable to properly maintain and care for the child, families with children with special needs family members, as well as social support for children whose parents are labor migrants;– providing social support for parents from whom children were taken away without depriving them of parental rights, as well as parents deprived of parental rights and intend to bring a lawsuit to renew parental rights (if their children are not adopted), in order to create conditions for restoring the educational function of the family and returning the child to parents;– provision of information to the population about the types of social services and benefits provided by the subjects of social work with families with children.Further long-term decisions for deinstitutionalization should include:– managed transitional stage with definition of clear terms for its duration;– approval of legislation requirements, services that should be provided at the local level;– approval in the legislation of the requirement on the personal responsibility of the community leader for the provision / non-provision of social services in the field of childhood protection;– redistribution of resources and introduction of an interdisciplinary approach to services at the local level;– helping families;– consultations with organizations representing the interests of persons with disabilities, children with disabilities, their parents and guardians.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Thus, Ukraine's course towards European integration and implementation of the UN Convention requires a revision of the priorities of state policy in the field of social protection of children and families with children, protection of childhood and the rights of children in general, the introduction of successful approaches from the world practice of protecting children based on ensuring the rights and best interests of the child are aimed at supporting the family, creating conditions for the upbringing and development of children in the family or environment as close as possible to the family will definitely contribute to the gradual disappearance of such phenomena as social orphanhood.Despite all efforts of the state, today in Ukraine the share of orphans and children deprived of parental care remains quite high, as well as the share of children-social orphans, which indicates the necessity of organizing measures in order to transform the child support system into a family form of education and changes in the nationwide trend of childcare. ; Розглянуто питання запобігання соціальному сирітству, розвиток нових та реформування існуючих соціальних послуг для дітей та сімей із дітьми, що стали привертати значну увагу в наукових колах та різноманітних структурах усіх рівнів, які працюють із дітьми. Зазначено, що підвищення якості життя дітей є не лише питанням часу, а його велінням. Проаналізовано прогресивні світові процеси стосовно захисту прав дітей, зумовлені Конвенцією ООН "Про права дитини", які стимулюють суттєві зміни в законах, політиці та практиці підтримки та захисту дитинства. Зауважено, що такі цілеспрямовані дії суттєво поширюються в багатьох державах світу. Доведено, що на сьогодні Україна робить перші кроки у напрямку деінституціалізації та створення власної моделі формування соціальних послуг, яка стане основою запобігання соціальному сирітству серед дітей. Проаналізовано існуючу модель управління сферою захисту прав дітей у контексті запобігання соціальному сирітству та впровадження принципів ДІ-реформи.

Problem setting. The issues of preventing social orphanhood, developing new and reforming existing social services for children and families with children have become a major focus in academia and in various structures at all levels working with children. Improving the quality of life of children is not only a matter of time, but also its need. Progressive world processes for the protection of the rights of the child, declared by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which stimulate major changes in legislation, policies and practices for supporting and protecting children. Such targeted actions are widespread in many countries of the world. Today, Ukraine is taking the first steps towards deinstitutionalization and creating its own model of social service formation, which will become the basis for preventing social orphanage among children. The article analyzes the existing model of managing the sphere of protection of children's rights in the context of preventing social orphanage and implementing the principles of DI reform (deinstitutionalization).Today, in the context of transformational changes, Ukraine has faced significant socio-economic problems that have led to a decrease in the standard of living of Ukrainian families, the emergence of such negative phenomena as social orphanhood, child homelessness and a number of other manifestations. The resolution of these issues has also recently become more complicated due to hostilities in the East of our country conducting by the Russian Federation. In this context, it is important to focus on the problems of providing social guarantees and social protection for children of vulnerable categories, creating conditions for their adaptation in a complex social environment. Exactly in the context of these aspects arises a need for a significant improvement in the public administration system, in particular in sphere of organizing effective social work with children, as well as increasing the effectiveness of the social function of the state in total.Recent research and publications analysis. Nowadays, such scientists as V. Sobchenko, V. Moskalenko, V. Skuratovsky, O. Paliy, E. Libanova are studying and researching the problems and modern approaches to the development of the sphere of social protection of the population. Studies of reforming and improving the system of social services in general, and services for children and families with children, in particular, are engaged such Ukrainian researchers as L. Volynets, N. Komarov, O. Antonova-Turchenko, I. Ivanova, I. Pesha, A. Kapska, I. Pinchuk, S. Tolstoukhova, M. Lukashevich, I. Mygovich. Issues of implementation of institutional care and childcare reform are engaged T. Veretenko, O. Denesyuk, T. Spirina.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. However, it should be noted that the current state of scientific development of the problem of modernization the activities of public administration bodies in the field of social work with children of vulnerable categories and families with children in Ukraine is insufficient, since today this area is in the process of reforming. The sources of conducted scientific researches were mainly concerned certain aspects of the functioning of public administration and the social security system of the population, partly work with children, namely: the history of formation and development, directions and forms of social work. Today, the issue of preventing social orphanage in the context of the implementation of the DI-reform principles is little explored and not discovered.Paper main body. Despite the rather significant interest of scientists in the problems of managing the social sphere in Ukraine, there are still insufficiently developed approaches to the activities of government bodies and local self-government, as well as non-governmental organizations in the field of social work with children of vulnerable categories and deinstitutionalization processes, their practical implementation in terms of interagency cooperation , institutional and resource support, transformation of the network of social institutions and institutions involved in problems of vulnerable categories of children. Considering this, the topic is relevant and needs a deeper study.An analysis of the legislation on the protection of the rights and interests of children shows that the concept of social protection is often interpreted as a similar to the social security concept. The concept of social protection of children is much more widely interpreted in the Law of Ukraine "On bodies and services for children and special institutions for children": it is a complex of measures and means of socio-economic and legal character for ensuring children's rights to life, development, upbringing, education, medical care, financial support.A number of scientists accentuate on the concept of the so-called hidden social orphanhood, which is associated with the deterioration of the family's living conditions and the decline of its moral foundations, resulting in a growing neglect of a huge number of children and adolescents. Hidden social orphanhood is spreading in the form of institutionalization of children whose parents for various reasons are not able to provide them with proper care and upbringing at home. Consequently, hidden social orphanhood is hiding in outwardly normal families, which in reality are dysfunctional, and parents do not cope with their basic responsibilities for raising children.Thus, social orphanhood can be defined as a social phenomenon caused by the self-willed evasion of parents from fulfilling their parental duties responsibilities for the child, which is accompanied by the breaking and loss of family relations between parents and a child, the parental indifference to the child's needs and the future fate of the child.Practical experience and international experience show that only a small number of children need specialized hospital care and approaches to education. Such care should be provided in small individual institutions that are integrated into the life of the local community with the ability to apply inclusive education components. All other children should be excluded from social isolation and brought up in a family or close to family environment and attend educational institutions in the system of inclusive education.The process of reforming the current system of institutional care (deinstitutionalization) in the field of protection of children's rights should be a long-term, well-planned and structured process of reforming the child care system based on the principle of taking into account the best interests of the child, recognizing the priority of family education over placement in the state guardianship institutions. During such reforms, the family should receive clear government standards for social services:– services and assistance that will contribute to its preservation for the purpose of full-fledged child development;– adoption or family forms of alternative care become a priority for the placement of children who have lost parental care due to orphancy, living in difficult life circumstances, violence or neglect from their parents side;– institutions are redeployed into specialist care centers (family and child support) or closed.The main problems of deinstitutionalization mechanism implementation today are:– developing a common vision and a holistic approach to reforming the current system of institutional care, education and upbringing of children, both at the national level and at the level of territorial communities;– the lack of an interdisciplinary algorithm of interaction, interdepartmental and intersectoral coordination of actions and cooperation, the lack of a training system for specialists, including heads of institutions of various departmental subordination, parental support programs, despite the fact that the basic mechanism is just beginning to be developed.Today, the development of a strategic deinstitutionalization program requires the involvement of partners from all possible areas: social, educational, healthcare, civil society institutions and the parent community. An additional advantage of attracting partners from different disciplines and industries is an increase in the availability of resources for the implementation of the deinstitutionalization program. A list of tasks should be the creation of conditions to ensure the realization of the right of every child to raise a family, to prevent the spread of social orphanhood.Achieving this goal requires resolving the following key tasks: – improving the activities of guardianship and care services for the prevention of social orphanhood, providing families with children with high-quality social services aimed at supporting the family's educational function;– involvement of enterprises, institutions, organizations, regardless of ownership and management, in the provision of social, rehabilitation services to children and families with children in difficult life circumstances, introduction of a social order mechanism in this field;– forming a tolerant attitude of society towards children and families with children who are in difficult circumstances, preventing various forms of discrimination against such children and families;– introduction of new social technologies aimed at early identification of families with children who are in difficult life circumstances, raising responsible paternity, and preventing cases of the taking of a child from parents without depriving them of their parental rights;– improving the quality of social services provided by social work entities to children and families with children who are in difficult life circumstances;– introduction of social services for parents, whose children are being brought up in boarding schools, in order to create conditions for the return of the child to parents;– introduction of social services for children to prepare them for return to the biological family after a long stay in a boarding school;– introduction of social services for families with children, in which the process of parents' divorce is ongoing, resolves the dispute between the mother and the father regarding the place of residence of the children, participation in their upbringing;– providing social support for parents who for certain reasons (due to long-term illness, disability, poverty, unemployment, etc.), are unable to properly maintain and care for the child, families with children with special needs family members, as well as social support for children whose parents are labor migrants;– providing social support for parents from whom children were taken away without depriving them of parental rights, as well as parents deprived of parental rights and intend to bring a lawsuit to renew parental rights (if their children are not adopted), in order to create conditions for restoring the educational function of the family and returning the child to parents;– provision of information to the population about the types of social services and benefits provided by the subjects of social work with families with children.Further long-term decisions for deinstitutionalization should include:– managed transitional stage with definition of clear terms for its duration;– approval of legislation requirements, services that should be provided at the local level;– approval in the legislation of the requirement on the personal responsibility of the community leader for the provision / non-provision of social services in the field of childhood protection;– redistribution of resources and introduction of an interdisciplinary approach to services at the local level;– helping families;– consultations with organizations representing the interests of persons with disabilities, children with disabilities, their parents and guardians.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Thus, Ukraine's course towards European integration and implementation of the UN Convention requires a revision of the priorities of state policy in the field of social protection of children and families with children, protection of childhood and the rights of children in general, the introduction of successful approaches from the world practice of protecting children based on ensuring the rights and best interests of the child are aimed at supporting the family, creating conditions for the upbringing and development of children in the family or environment as close as possible to the family will definitely contribute to the gradual disappearance of such phenomena as social orphanhood.Despite all efforts of the state, today in Ukraine the share of orphans and children deprived of parental care remains quite high, as well as the share of children-social orphans, which indicates the necessity of organizing measures in order to transform the child support system into a family form of education and changes in the nationwide trend of childcare. ; Розглянуто питання запобігання соціальному сирітству, розвиток нових та реформування існуючих соціальних послуг для дітей та сімей із дітьми, що стали привертати значну увагу в наукових колах та різноманітних структурах усіх рівнів, які працюють із дітьми. Зазначено, що підвищення якості життя дітей є не лише питанням часу, а його велінням. Проаналізовано прогресивні світові процеси стосовно захисту прав дітей, зумовлені Конвенцією ООН "Про права дитини", які стимулюють суттєві зміни в законах, політиці та практиці підтримки та захисту дитинства. Зауважено, що такі цілеспрямовані дії суттєво поширюються в багатьох державах світу. Доведено, що на сьогодні Україна робить перші кроки у напрямку деінституціалізації та створення власної моделі формування соціальних послуг, яка стане основою запобігання соціальному сирітству серед дітей. Проаналізовано існуючу модель управління сферою захисту прав дітей у контексті запобігання соціальному сирітству та впровадження принципів ДІ-реформи.

Problem setting. The state of the national labor market is characterized by an extremely acute crisis. Its essence is that there is no balance in the field of public administration of the population employment system. In particular, as always, national governments and international structures draw the attention to the imbalance of labor markets, as an important determinant of socio-economic development and a multidimensional problem of public administration policy. Due to globalization, digitalization, demographic change, migration, etc., the problem of public administration in the field of population employment became significantly relevant in recent years, which has a strong impact on the state of the world and national labor markets. The importance of labor market institutions is critical for overcoming imbalances in the employment sector – this is clear from global and, including European experience. Now it is necessary for domestic state policy to comprehend and adapt such experience, as in recent years there have been significant conceptual and practical differences between the institutional approaches used by Ukraine and the European Union concerning how to develop labor and social relations.The effectiveness of the population employment system which is conducted by public administration at the current stage of development of the country – a qualitative indicator of the effectiveness of public policy in the socio-economic sphere, its level directly determines the current state of the domestic economy. The structure of employment and the level of its efficiency, which had a direct connection with various sectors of the economy, the phenomena of illegal labor migration and shadow employment, still remain problems of the labor market. The inefficiency of the structure of public administration of the population employment system is a reflection of the model of economic development, which is based on cheap workforce. Thus, in connection with the current state of the Ukrainian economy, public administration bodies must develop a very prudent employment policy, because only positive changes in public administration of the employment system, including the possibility of free movement of labor, which stimulates structural change, can assist the country to emerge from the crisis and revive economic growth.Recent research and publications analysis. Many researches by both domestic and foreign authors are dedicated to the analysis of the institutional environment of the employment system and the labor market. Analysis of employment legislation and its impact on the labor market, the activities of employment services in the world is presented in researches of such foreign authors as J. Keynes, A. Marshall, O. Williamson, Fan Tui, E. Hansent and D. Price others.Among the domestic authors who resaerched this issue can be identified scientific achievements of M. Butka, S. Goncharova, Yu. Marshavina, E. Libanova, L. Novak-Kalyaeva, V. Petyukha, L. Shchetinina, L. Fokas, T. Vonberg, T. Kitsak, S. Kalinina and others.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. The diversity of modern institutional research, however, leaves unanswered a number of important issues for modern state policy of Ukraine - the institutional foundations of public administration of the population employment system of Ukraine. Paying tribute to the conducted researchws, many important problems of institutional restructuring of the domestic labor market in the context of the social crisis and the destruction of the regional economic space remain unresolved.Paper main body. The interaction of individuals in society is regulated by numerous social organizations and regulations. In other words, the activity of each person is institutionalized. Institutionalization is mainly understood as the formalization of social relations, the transition from informal relations and unorganized work to the formation of organizational structures, which were characterized by a clear hierarchy of power. The process of institutionalization also means that the activities of people and their relationships will be regulated, legally legalized organizational structures, if it is necessary and possible.The process of institutionalization is associated with a complex systemic transformation, differently implemented in the normative, organizational and communicative forms of social institutions.At the present stage, the institutional basis (formal component) of the state employment service is determined:1) The Law of Ukraine "On Population Employment" № 5067-VI of 05.07.2012, in its section III it is determined that the state policy in the field of population employment and labor migration is carried out by the Central Executive Body, which implements the state policy in the field of population employment and labor migration, which has its own territorial bodies that are legal entities under public law. Financing of activity is carried out at the expense of means of Fund of the Obligatory State Social Insurance of Ukraine in Case of Unemployment;2) The Law of Ukraine "On Compulsory State Social Insurance in Case of Unemployment" stipulates that the functions of the executive directorate of the Fund are performed by the central executive body implementing state policy in the field of population employment and labor migration, and its territorial bodies;3) In accordance with the Fundamentals of the legislation of Ukraine concerning compulsory state social insurance, the management of funds of compulsory state social insurance is carried out by the boards and executive directorates of insurance funds, which ensure defined by laws specific types of social insurance, the implementation of board decisions;4) The Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the State Employment Service of Ukraine" № 19/2013 of January 16, 2013 approved the Regulations on the State Employment Service of Ukraine, determined that the new service is the successor of the relevant bodies of the state employment service. The same Decree amended Section II and Clause 12 of Section IV of the Scheme of Organization and Interaction of Central Executive Bodies of the Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Optimization of the System of Central Executive Bodies" № 1085/2010 of December 9, 2010, supplemented by the following paragraph: "State Employment Service of Ukraine". We would like to draw special attention to the fact that the Decree of the President of Ukraine is currently in force. However, the new "State Employment Service of Ukraine" did not last long after its creation. On July 11, 2013, the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "Issues of the State Employment Service" №565 was adopted, according to it territorial bodies of the State Employment Service were established as legal entities under public law, and the State Employment Center of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy was merged with the State Employment Service. According to the appendix to the Resolution, departments of the State Employment Service was established in regional and district centers. However, in fact this did not happen. The Resolution expired on the basis of the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "Some Issues of Public Administration in the Field of Employment" № 90 of March 5, 2014, which states that "in order to improve public administration in the field of population employment and optimize the system of central executive bodies "the state employment service" was liquidated. It was also determined that the state employment service as a centralized system of state institutions, its activities are directed and coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Development, Trade and Agriculture, is the successor of the State Employment Service. Along with the liquidation of the State Employment Service of Ukraine, employees of the State Employment Service also lost the status of civil servants. It is interesting that the Presidential Decree established the State Employment Service of Ukraine, and the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine abolished the State Employment Service;5) Presidential Decree "On Optimization of the System of Central Executive Bodies" № 1085/2010 of 09.12.2010, where in the section "Central authorities" there is such a body as the "State Employment Service", and in section IV the central executive bodies, which activities are directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the relevant members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, determine that the activities of "the State Employment Service of Ukraine" are directed through the Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine.We would like to draw your attention to the fact that "the State Employment Service of Ukraine" was liquidated, but this Decree is valid and was not amended since 2014;6) There was also an attempt to change the organizational and legal form and transform the SESU into the National Employment Agency. The concept of such reform was presented by the Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine on June 25, 2015 at the International Scientific and Practical Conference "Labor Market of Ukraine: European Dimension". The work of the National Employment Agency on the basis of the SESU was scheduled to start on January 1, 2016. However, due to the lack of substantiation of the planned reforms, no reforms were carried out. Even while discussing the idea of reorganization, experts had doubts about its relevance, but noted the necessity for change in the work of the employment service;7) The next step in "reforming" the state employment service was the issuance of the Order of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine № 1543 of 15.12.2016, which approved the "Regulations on the State Employment Service", but not taking into account that the title mentions "state", according to item 1 of the Regulation such institution as "State employment service" which is the centralized system of the state institutions which activity is directed and coordinated by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine again appears. The Service consisted of the Central Office of the Service, Regional and Basic Employment Centers, the Ukrainian State Employment Service Training Institute, vocational schools of the State Employment Service, which are defined as legal entities under public law. However, this Order expired on the basis of the Order of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine "On approval of the Regulations on the State Employment Service" № 945 of June 14, 2019. In our opinion, the only significant change in this order was that instead of the Central Office in the service, the State Employment Center reappeared. This provision is valid;8) On December 5, 2019, the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Formation of State Policy in the Sphere of Labor, Labor Relations, Employment and Labor Migration" № 341-IX was adopted, pursuant to it the Resolution was adopted Of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 206 of March 3, 2020 "On Amendments to Certain Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Concerning the Transfer of Certain Powers from the Ministry of Social Policy to the Ministry of Economic Development, Trade and Agriculture in the Field of Employment population", which entered into force on March 12, 2020. In accordance with the provisions of this Resolution, taking into account the new priorities of public policy, the issue of public administration of the employment system is a component of economic rather than social policy. Also, this resolution, by amending the existing regulations, destroys the concept of "public employment service". Only the State Employment Center remains. At the same time, no changes were made to the Order of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine "On approval of the Regulations on the State Employment Service" № 945 of June 14, 2019, according to it the activities of the State Employment Service are directed and coordinated by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. is the main institution of the service. The new provision has not yet been approved. In connection with these conflicts in the law there is a question of legitimacy of the institution.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further researches. Institutional principles of public administration of the population employment system of Ukraine are a process that consists in defining and consolidating social norms, rules, statuses and roles, bringing them into a system capable of acting to reduce the negative impact of unemployment by identifying, eliminating and neutralizing the causes and conditions of unemployment. The result of this process is the creation of an institute of state employment service.The analysis makes it possible to identify in our country an imperfect institutional environment for employment and the labor market. First of all, it is related to the existing contradictions in the legislative system, the shortcomings of the current regulations on the state employment service in Ukraine, and the lack of a clearly defined development strategy.A clearly defined goal, a detailed presentation of the tasks and functions of the state employment service were not formed, in particular those that take into account new trends and realities of employment and the labor market, provide employment legislation with formalities that do not ensure effective activity of service, does not encourage new forms of cooperation of neither potential employees nor employers. ; Розглянуто співвідношення понять "інституціоналізація" та "інституалізація".Зроблено висновок, що ці поняття є тотожними. Доведено, що у контексті глобалізації, цифровізації, демографічних змін, міграції тощо проблема державного управління у сфері зайнятості населення упродовж останніх років суттєво актуалізується, що сильно впливає на стан світового і національного ринків праці. Наголошено, що значення інститутів ринку праці є критичним для подолання розбалансованості у секторі зайнятості. Досліджено інституціональні основи діяльності Державної служби зайнятості. Визначено, що інституціональне середовище зайнятості та ринку праці є недосконалим: існує велика кількість колізій у нормативно-правовому забезпеченні, відсутня чітко окреслена стратегія розвитку

Problem setting. The state of the national labor market is characterized by an extremely acute crisis. Its essence is that there is no balance in the field of public administration of the population employment system. In particular, as always, national governments and international structures draw the attention to the imbalance of labor markets, as an important determinant of socio-economic development and a multidimensional problem of public administration policy. Due to globalization, digitalization, demographic change, migration, etc., the problem of public administration in the field of population employment became significantly relevant in recent years, which has a strong impact on the state of the world and national labor markets. The importance of labor market institutions is critical for overcoming imbalances in the employment sector – this is clear from global and, including European experience. Now it is necessary for domestic state policy to comprehend and adapt such experience, as in recent years there have been significant conceptual and practical differences between the institutional approaches used by Ukraine and the European Union concerning how to develop labor and social relations.The effectiveness of the population employment system which is conducted by public administration at the current stage of development of the country – a qualitative indicator of the effectiveness of public policy in the socio-economic sphere, its level directly determines the current state of the domestic economy. The structure of employment and the level of its efficiency, which had a direct connection with various sectors of the economy, the phenomena of illegal labor migration and shadow employment, still remain problems of the labor market. The inefficiency of the structure of public administration of the population employment system is a reflection of the model of economic development, which is based on cheap workforce. Thus, in connection with the current state of the Ukrainian economy, public administration bodies must develop a very prudent employment policy, because only positive changes in public administration of the employment system, including the possibility of free movement of labor, which stimulates structural change, can assist the country to emerge from the crisis and revive economic growth.Recent research and publications analysis. Many researches by both domestic and foreign authors are dedicated to the analysis of the institutional environment of the employment system and the labor market. Analysis of employment legislation and its impact on the labor market, the activities of employment services in the world is presented in researches of such foreign authors as J. Keynes, A. Marshall, O. Williamson, Fan Tui, E. Hansent and D. Price others.Among the domestic authors who resaerched this issue can be identified scientific achievements of M. Butka, S. Goncharova, Yu. Marshavina, E. Libanova, L. Novak-Kalyaeva, V. Petyukha, L. Shchetinina, L. Fokas, T. Vonberg, T. Kitsak, S. Kalinina and others.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. The diversity of modern institutional research, however, leaves unanswered a number of important issues for modern state policy of Ukraine - the institutional foundations of public administration of the population employment system of Ukraine. Paying tribute to the conducted researchws, many important problems of institutional restructuring of the domestic labor market in the context of the social crisis and the destruction of the regional economic space remain unresolved.Paper main body. The interaction of individuals in society is regulated by numerous social organizations and regulations. In other words, the activity of each person is institutionalized. Institutionalization is mainly understood as the formalization of social relations, the transition from informal relations and unorganized work to the formation of organizational structures, which were characterized by a clear hierarchy of power. The process of institutionalization also means that the activities of people and their relationships will be regulated, legally legalized organizational structures, if it is necessary and possible.The process of institutionalization is associated with a complex systemic transformation, differently implemented in the normative, organizational and communicative forms of social institutions.At the present stage, the institutional basis (formal component) of the state employment service is determined:1) The Law of Ukraine "On Population Employment" № 5067-VI of 05.07.2012, in its section III it is determined that the state policy in the field of population employment and labor migration is carried out by the Central Executive Body, which implements the state policy in the field of population employment and labor migration, which has its own territorial bodies that are legal entities under public law. Financing of activity is carried out at the expense of means of Fund of the Obligatory State Social Insurance of Ukraine in Case of Unemployment;2) The Law of Ukraine "On Compulsory State Social Insurance in Case of Unemployment" stipulates that the functions of the executive directorate of the Fund are performed by the central executive body implementing state policy in the field of population employment and labor migration, and its territorial bodies;3) In accordance with the Fundamentals of the legislation of Ukraine concerning compulsory state social insurance, the management of funds of compulsory state social insurance is carried out by the boards and executive directorates of insurance funds, which ensure defined by laws specific types of social insurance, the implementation of board decisions;4) The Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the State Employment Service of Ukraine" № 19/2013 of January 16, 2013 approved the Regulations on the State Employment Service of Ukraine, determined that the new service is the successor of the relevant bodies of the state employment service. The same Decree amended Section II and Clause 12 of Section IV of the Scheme of Organization and Interaction of Central Executive Bodies of the Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Optimization of the System of Central Executive Bodies" № 1085/2010 of December 9, 2010, supplemented by the following paragraph: "State Employment Service of Ukraine". We would like to draw special attention to the fact that the Decree of the President of Ukraine is currently in force. However, the new "State Employment Service of Ukraine" did not last long after its creation. On July 11, 2013, the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "Issues of the State Employment Service" №565 was adopted, according to it territorial bodies of the State Employment Service were established as legal entities under public law, and the State Employment Center of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy was merged with the State Employment Service. According to the appendix to the Resolution, departments of the State Employment Service was established in regional and district centers. However, in fact this did not happen. The Resolution expired on the basis of the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "Some Issues of Public Administration in the Field of Employment" № 90 of March 5, 2014, which states that "in order to improve public administration in the field of population employment and optimize the system of central executive bodies "the state employment service" was liquidated. It was also determined that the state employment service as a centralized system of state institutions, its activities are directed and coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Development, Trade and Agriculture, is the successor of the State Employment Service. Along with the liquidation of the State Employment Service of Ukraine, employees of the State Employment Service also lost the status of civil servants. It is interesting that the Presidential Decree established the State Employment Service of Ukraine, and the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine abolished the State Employment Service;5) Presidential Decree "On Optimization of the System of Central Executive Bodies" № 1085/2010 of 09.12.2010, where in the section "Central authorities" there is such a body as the "State Employment Service", and in section IV the central executive bodies, which activities are directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the relevant members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, determine that the activities of "the State Employment Service of Ukraine" are directed through the Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine.We would like to draw your attention to the fact that "the State Employment Service of Ukraine" was liquidated, but this Decree is valid and was not amended since 2014;6) There was also an attempt to change the organizational and legal form and transform the SESU into the National Employment Agency. The concept of such reform was presented by the Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine on June 25, 2015 at the International Scientific and Practical Conference "Labor Market of Ukraine: European Dimension". The work of the National Employment Agency on the basis of the SESU was scheduled to start on January 1, 2016. However, due to the lack of substantiation of the planned reforms, no reforms were carried out. Even while discussing the idea of reorganization, experts had doubts about its relevance, but noted the necessity for change in the work of the employment service;7) The next step in "reforming" the state employment service was the issuance of the Order of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine № 1543 of 15.12.2016, which approved the "Regulations on the State Employment Service", but not taking into account that the title mentions "state", according to item 1 of the Regulation such institution as "State employment service" which is the centralized system of the state institutions which activity is directed and coordinated by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine again appears. The Service consisted of the Central Office of the Service, Regional and Basic Employment Centers, the Ukrainian State Employment Service Training Institute, vocational schools of the State Employment Service, which are defined as legal entities under public law. However, this Order expired on the basis of the Order of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine "On approval of the Regulations on the State Employment Service" № 945 of June 14, 2019. In our opinion, the only significant change in this order was that instead of the Central Office in the service, the State Employment Center reappeared. This provision is valid;8) On December 5, 2019, the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Formation of State Policy in the Sphere of Labor, Labor Relations, Employment and Labor Migration" № 341-IX was adopted, pursuant to it the Resolution was adopted Of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 206 of March 3, 2020 "On Amendments to Certain Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Concerning the Transfer of Certain Powers from the Ministry of Social Policy to the Ministry of Economic Development, Trade and Agriculture in the Field of Employment population", which entered into force on March 12, 2020. In accordance with the provisions of this Resolution, taking into account the new priorities of public policy, the issue of public administration of the employment system is a component of economic rather than social policy. Also, this resolution, by amending the existing regulations, destroys the concept of "public employment service". Only the State Employment Center remains. At the same time, no changes were made to the Order of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine "On approval of the Regulations on the State Employment Service" № 945 of June 14, 2019, according to it the activities of the State Employment Service are directed and coordinated by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. is the main institution of the service. The new provision has not yet been approved. In connection with these conflicts in the law there is a question of legitimacy of the institution.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further researches. Institutional principles of public administration of the population employment system of Ukraine are a process that consists in defining and consolidating social norms, rules, statuses and roles, bringing them into a system capable of acting to reduce the negative impact of unemployment by identifying, eliminating and neutralizing the causes and conditions of unemployment. The result of this process is the creation of an institute of state employment service.The analysis makes it possible to identify in our country an imperfect institutional environment for employment and the labor market. First of all, it is related to the existing contradictions in the legislative system, the shortcomings of the current regulations on the state employment service in Ukraine, and the lack of a clearly defined development strategy.A clearly defined goal, a detailed presentation of the tasks and functions of the state employment service were not formed, in particular those that take into account new trends and realities of employment and the labor market, provide employment legislation with formalities that do not ensure effective activity of service, does not encourage new forms of cooperation of neither potential employees nor employers. ; Розглянуто співвідношення понять "інституціоналізація" та "інституалізація".Зроблено висновок, що ці поняття є тотожними. Доведено, що у контексті глобалізації, цифровізації, демографічних змін, міграції тощо проблема державного управління у сфері зайнятості населення упродовж останніх років суттєво актуалізується, що сильно впливає на стан світового і національного ринків праці. Наголошено, що значення інститутів ринку праці є критичним для подолання розбалансованості у секторі зайнятості. Досліджено інституціональні основи діяльності Державної служби зайнятості. Визначено, що інституціональне середовище зайнятості та ринку праці є недосконалим: існує велика кількість колізій у нормативно-правовому забезпеченні, відсутня чітко окреслена стратегія розвитку

At the present stage of development of the world community, accompanied by processes of globalization, when the world is «united», on the one hand, there is a natural strengthening of ties between the countries and peoples of the world, which is manifested in a certain degree of standardization of some cultural norms and principles perceived and used in the different countries, nations, ethnic groups etc. Instead, on the other hand, there is some increasing of the cultural differentiation and disintegration in various areas of public life, which were generated by the phenomenon of «ethnic and religious revival». This phenomenon is associated with an increase of the interest of traditional, sectional, heritable forms of identity (ethnic, religious, racial) and, accordingly, the traditional social practices.These phenomena cause frequent conflicts between different ethnic and national groups in multi-ethnic states. In the early XXI century such conflicts began to cover not only the countries and societies with the unfinished national unity, but also nation-states in Europe and America, where seemingly ethnic majority and minority groups are combined into a single nation-state «body» based on shared values, ideals and goals, but which have an inherent desire to preserve its cultural diversity.Therefore, there is so important to find and explore the new concepts and theoretical models that would allow to ensure peaceful, conflict-free co-existence of ethnic minorities within a common political space on the basis of mutual respect, respect each other's rights and cultural exchanges.Given the urgency and the need for further study of the problem, the author put a goal: 1) to identify and analyze the key concepts of co-existence of minorities in today's globalizing world; 2) to find out the advantages and disadvantages of each of the concepts, identifying the best option co-existence of minorities within a common political space.The object of the study is the national and ethnic minorities as a subject of political processes, and the subject is the modern concept of minorities' co-existence in the common political space.According to the Art. 1 of UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, it is reflected in the uniqueness and diversity of features that are inherent in groups and communities, of which humanity is created. This phenomenon is considered to be a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, thus it is defined not less need for human existence than biodiversity for the functioning of the world of nature as a whole.However, this variety generates now some problems of co-existence of different cultures. Along with the long-standing controversies of intercultural interaction in the multi-ethnic states, which are formed on this basis, a number of new problems continues to arise. It leads to the need to seek such theoretical concepts and form a practical policies based on these concepts, that would effectively solve the existing ethno-national disputes and prevent the emergence of the some new, based on consideration of the interests of both titular nations and national minorities living within these countries.The beginning of the 70s of the XX century was a time of the emergence of fundamentally new concept of co-existence between nations and cultures within a common political space, which are known as «multiculturalism». The basis of multiculturalism was the rejection of the idea of continuous civic integration in such semantic content, in which it remained dominant until that time. Instead, the key role is assigned to the promotion and maintenance of cultural diversity, «neighborhood» of communities within a single state.In one version, the term of «multiculturalism» began to be used in academic circles from 1957 in order to determine the official policy of Switzerland, which was based on the idea of uniting the various ethnic and cultural communities into one nation. According to statements by other researchers, «multiculturalism» as a scientific concept originated in Canada in the 1960s to refer the state of Anglo-French bi-culture in terms of the threat of Quebec separatism. Multiculturalism gained the official political recognition in 1971, when it was included as one of the basic principles of the Constitution of Canada to outline the new governmental course of this country has finally admitted the defeat of assimilation policy. Among the states, which are recognized officially multiculturalism, are the USA, Australia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and others.Thus, by the beginning of 80's of the XX century the key tenets of the concept of multiculturalism reached the level of the fundamental principles of political practice of most Western countries and international organizations.There are Western scholars Ch. Taylor, W. Kymlicka, Ch. Kukatas, A. Perotti etc. among the most prominent theorists of multiculturalism. There are many critics of multiculturalism, such as representative of the British egalitarian liberalism B. Berry, A. Schlesinger-Jr., A. Bloom.As one of the founders of the concept of multiculturalism Ch. Taylor said, hat this phenomenon is a form of self-assertion. Multiculturalism is not only in the struggle for the recognition of individuals, but also the requirement to recognize their originality, identity of groups, slides to the other. According to Ch. Taylor, some cultures are independent nature; any individual can exist only as part of the culture.Addressing to the problem of political equality between the minority and majority of the multi-national society, another theorist of multiculturalism W. Kymlicka focuses on the problem of the significance and status of minorities. He said that national minorities have the right to consider themselves as the cultural-distinctive communities only if they are guided by liberal principles, recognizing the rights of other communities.W. Kymlicka believes that the state cannot be separated from the problems of ethnic and ethnicity in general. He recognizes that the demands of ethnic and religious groups about financial support of some cultural activities are fair, implying those stocks that support the wealth and diversity of cultural resources. It increases the stability of society and eliminates the disparities between ethnic and religious groups. Without some financial support from the state a significant amount of national minorities may simply disappear and lose their cultural identity. The researcher supports the cultural market. However, W. Kymlicka puts on the agenda such questions: 1) the reasons why society should support cultural diversity or originality; 2) the need of researching of immigrants' and national languages; 3) the issue of citizenship, which is connected directly to the problem of tolerance.The American political scientist Ch. Kukatas, exploring multiculturalism, offers five options of the community response to cultural diversity: isolation, assimilation, soft multiculturalism, hard multiculturalism, apartheid.According to the scientist, soft multiculturalism appears as the rejection of attempts to prevent the emergence of cultural diversity through isolation. On the other hand, it is the rejection of its strengthening using a policy of assimilation of ethnic minorities. The freedom to choose the degree of assimilation according to the desires of the individual should be guaranteed in society.A common characteristic of hard multiculturalism is that society should take active steps to ensure that minorities are not only full participators in society, but also provide maximum opportunities to maintain their identity and traditions. By diversity should be treated not just tolerated, it should be consolidated, promoted and supported, not only financially, but also through the provision for cultural minorities some special rights.For Russian scientist E. Pain, who researches ethnic and cultural diversity in society, multiculturalism is a «very fresh» concept, which appeared in the scientific use until the end of 1980 and in connection with his youth has not yet severe theoretical background. But the researcher said that despite this, the popularity of multiculturalism lies in its key postulate that recognizes the value of cultural diversity of the country (region, world) and the impossibility of ranking of crops (including ethnic) on a «lower – higher», «primary – secondary» etc.The Ukrainian researcher A. Kolodiy, focusing on the study of issues of ethnicity and ethnic policy, defines multiculturalism as a principle of national ethnic, educational, cultural policy that recognizes and supports the right of citizens to preserve, promote and protect by all lawful means the (ethno)cultural features, and commitments the state to support such citizens' efforts.Given the complexity of the term of «multiculturalism» and the presence of a number of different interpretations in modern political science, the Ukrainian researcher N. Vysotska identifies five scientific approaches to understanding of multiculturalism:- demographic and descriptive: multiculturalism is as a characteristic of the state or society with cultural, ethnic, racial diversity etc.;- political program: multiculturalism is defined as a set of political programs and activities aimed at providing practical co-existence of different minorities, based on consideration of their differences and respective needs and rights with maintaining of the national unity;- ideological and normative: multiculturalism is a collection of all sorts of ideological currents, which are based on the idea of cultural diversity;- social and transformative: multiculturalism is the specific activity of governmental institutions in the country to ensure elimination of any discrimination or restriction of the rights of minorities;- historical: multiculturalism appears as a need to study the causes and conditions for the emergence of cultural diversity within a single socio-political space.Analyzing the diversity of approaches to the definition of multiculturalism, we can add to the classification of N. Vysotska some another interpretation of the term as a separate principle, which can be the basis of ethnic policy that supports diversity in society.Thus, we can define the concept of multiculturalism as an ideology and political practices of cultural inhomogeneous society to official recognition and real security of minorities' rights at the public-state level and to support the restoration and development of different cultural systems.The descriptive characteristics of multiculturalism is to recognize the possibility of co-existence in the same political space of several different cultural, ethnic or other groups that are willing and able to reproduce its identity.However, this descriptive diversity does not give the rise to characterize the society that really delivers its existence and development. It creates a need of existence of some regulatory side of multiculturalism. It lies in the use of state of specific measures to ensure the rights, dignity and welfare of its citizens regardless of their ethnicity, race, religion, language etc.However, we must admit, that in practice the policy of multiculturalism, solving some problems in the functioning of multi-ethnic states, may cause the new problems. In particular, multiculturalism, which was offered by its theorists (Ch. Taylor, W. Kymlicka, Ch. Kukatas), causes the revival of group forms of cultural identity through the inhibition of individual cultural diversity. For example, Western countries, which were actively implementing in practice the policy of multiculturalism, witnessed the fact that citizens who because of certain objective or subjective circumstances have lost their group (ethnic, religious, racial etc.) identity, returned to it influenced by multiculturalism. It was due to the fact that the privileges granted by governments to support and develop of cultural and ethnic uniqueness concerned the groups rather than individuals. In similar cases found the expression such defect of multiculturalism as a tendency to increase the isolation of ethnic communities and the creation of artificial boundaries between them.A. Schlesinger-Jr. defines multiculturalism on this occasion as an ideological concept that leads by its nature to the replacement of social ideals: «from assimilation to fragmentary, from integration to separatism». The same view is held by A. Bloom, who insists that fragmentation and separatism are alarming in multiculturalism, and the concept of multiculturalism leads to neglect of personal rights of the individuals.The Russian scientist A. Borisov understands multiculturalism as a phenomenon of ethnic and cultural fragmentation of society that opposes culture as a national movement.Therefore, we can agree with E. Pain, who identifies the following defects of the political practices of multiculturalism:- multiculturalism as an official policy actually addresses the state support to the specific groups representing the national and ethno-cultural minority in the state. In this regard, using the benefits these groups wrongly assume the role of representing the interests of their ethnic group or all religions;- stimulating the state support of groups and communities, multiculturalism promotes the community identity by suppressing of the individual identity. A similar policy deprives a person of the possibility to choose, consolidating the power of the group to which it belongs over this person;- multiculturalism creates obstacles for individual integration of different minorities to civil society;- the policy of multiculturalism creates an artificial segregation of groups, forming «a kind of voluntarily ghetto».Not only the majority of scientists and experts in the field of national and ethno-cultural policy are agree with this claim, but also the broad political circles. For example, the evidence of this fact is that in 2009 the Council of Europe issued «The White Book of Intercultural Dialogue» in which critically assessed the concept of cultural assimilation and the theory and practice of multiculturalism.As a result, in the early ХХІ century even those states, where multiculturalism was enshrined at the constitutional level, began to refuse from its use. Therefore it was necessary to find a fundamentally new concept and a political practice that takes into account the defects of previous concepts and would allow solving the problem of co-existence of different cultural and ethnic communities in the political space. One such attempt was the strategy of division of the sphere of culture. It says that in public sphere the maintenance of cultural homogeneity of representatives of all ethnic, religious, racial and other groups is encouraged. It based on the recognition and observance of formal rules that are common for all citizens of the state, and the principles of implementation, controlled by civil society. In the private sector, on the contrary, this concept gives the preference to cultural diversity. The ideological inspirers of the strategy of division of the sphere of culture emphasize that this model can be considered a compromise, because it creates the opportunities for the rights and freedoms of the individual regardless of cultural, ethnic, national, racial identity, on the one hand, and will provide unity and integrity of contemporary multicultural, multi-ethnic society, on the other hand.However, we must admit that this model of co-existence generates a question: is it possible and how to draw a line in real social life between the public and private sectors? In practice we see that the distinction between these spheres of human life and society is quite thin, because they are intertwined with each other. For example, if members of certain ethnic groups will to dress up in traditional clothing, it is an expression of his individual rights, freedom of choice with regard to the private sector. It generates a question: do they have the right to appear in this form in the streets within the state of their residence, where the titular nation is different from other by traditions in dress? It can apply to using of the language of community: does the model of division of the sphere of culture mean that minorities have the right to use their own language only at home, but in public places they must use only official language of the state in which they live? Or, for example, members of religion groups have a personal, «private» right to practice their faith and religious worship. But do they have the right to build their own churches in their places of residence, where they constitute an ethnic or religious minority? In this case, their freedom to practice their religion will go from the private sphere into the public sector, where the different doctrine can be declared as the official religion.Thus, the continuity of the public and private spheres of life points to the most obvious defect of the model of division of the sphere of culture. This defect is embedded in the title of concept. It generates the impossibility of its realization in practice and the need to find the new strategies of ethno-national cultural policy.One such model is the concept of individual freedom and cultural choice proposed by the famous philosopher and scientist, Nobel Prize in Economics A. Sen. Its main idea is the gradual weakening of group forms of identification and moving to individual choice. «Cultural liberty» is giving to individuals the right to live and exist according to their own choice, with a real opportunity to evaluate other options. A. Sen emphasizes that «the large number of existing injustices in the world remains and thrives because they turn their victims into allies, depriving them of the possibility to choose a different life and preventing their learning about the existence of another life». That's ethnic, religious and other cultural traditions of groups are not willingly, they are prescribed from birth. Therefore, the main objective of the policy of promoting cultural liberty is the weakening of traditions. The concept considers the cultural diversity as a tool for implementing of cultural freedom when «due to it the cultural range of social life and possibility of choosing are expanding». But the concept of cultural freedom hasn't become the norm in Western countries because there is a difficulty with the development of mechanisms for public policy which can break the power of traditions, customs, attitudes, mentality etc.The modern theorists and practitioners offer to combine all advantages of multiculturalism and the concept of individual freedom and cultural choice in the model of interkulturalism. Interkulturalism based on the idea of cultural diversity in the world and countries, but in contrast to multiculturalism, which offers the neighborliness between communities and cultures, it focused on the finding some ways of interaction of these different communities as members of different cultural systems. Interkulturalism requires a common interest of different nationalities and religions shared by a common sense of public responsibility for their country.Thus, we can admit multiculturalism, the concept of division of the sphere of culture, the model of individual freedom and cultural choices and interkulturalism are the key modern concepts of co-existence of ethnic and national minorities in the political space. These theories are based on the recognition and consideration of the fact of multiculturalism of globalizing world, separate states and societies. The differences between them lie mainly in the mechanisms proposed for use to assist the maintenance and development of different national, ethnic, religious, linguistic, racial and other minorities. Multiculturalism offers a policy of «neighborhood» of minorities on the principles of mutual recognition and tolerance. But it contributes to the strengthening of group and the suppression of individual identification of a person, leading sometimes to the increasing of segregation, intergroup hostility through the using of state measures to promote some individual communities. The model of division of the sphere of culture has a disadvantage: it proposes the distribution of culture to private and public sector, but doesn't include the fact that they are inseparable in real life. Hence its principles lose the ability to be realized in social and political life. The concept of individual freedom and cultural choice advocates the promoting to overcome the certainty of norms and values for members of communities, urging them to make independent choices, but does not offer some specific mechanisms to overcome the force of customs, traditions and mentality. Interkulturalism is the most optimal concept that favors to find some ways of interaction between different communities and different cultures. The common interests of citizens of different nationalities and religions are one of these ways. All citizens are united by common sense of public responsibility for their own state. ; Статья посвящена анализу современных концепций сосуществования национально-этнических меньшинств в пределах общего политического пространства. Сделана попытка определить преимущества и недостатки каждой из них, а также сделать вывод о наиболее оптимальной модели сосуществования меньшинств сегодня в глобализирующемся мире. ; Статтю присвячено аналізові сучасних концепцій співіснування національно-етнічних меншин у межах спільного політичного простору. Зроблено спробу окреслити переваги та недоліки кожної з них, а також зробити висновок про найбільш оптимальну модель співіснування меншин на сьогодні у світі, що глобалізується.

The analysis of articles and normative documents for quality control and regional origin of wines was carried out. Chemical composition of the grapes and the wine has been considered, qualitative and quantitative changes during vinification, maturation and aging of wine were shown. The basic group of compounds contents and ratios which determine the qualitative characteristics of wines, as well as have an important role in the formation of aroma and taste of the drink was found. The prerequisites for the development of the market of counterfeit products and wine falsification methods were discussed. The analysis of scientific literature and regulatory framework governing the quality of the wines on the territory of Russia and the European Union and the existing approaches to determine their authenticity was conducted, the advantages and disadvantages are shown. The examples of using different criteria for the establishment of natural and adulterated wines have been discussed, as well as their approaches to identify and create a comprehensive system of wine production quality evaluation using methods of physicochemical analysis. The main methodological approaches to establish a wine regional origin, combining the capabilities of modern methods of analysis, mathematical modeling and statistics are analyzed, examples of their use in practice are shown.Keywords: wine, methods of analysis, quality, authenticity, regional origin, falsification, mathematical modeling (Russian)DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/analitika.2014.18.4.001 Yu.F. Yakuba1, A.A. Kaunova2, Z.A. Temerdashev2, V.O. Titarenko2, A.A. Halafjan2 1North Caucasian Regional Research Institute of Horticulture and Viticulture of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Krasnodar, Russian Federation2 Kuban State University, Krasnodar, Russian FederationREFERENCES1. 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Food Chemistry, 2010, vol. 122, pp. 366-372. doi:10.1016/j.foodchem.2010.02.053.174. Arozarena I., Casp A., Marin R., Navarro M. Differentiation of some Spanish wines according to variety and region based on their anthocyanin composition. European Food Research and Technology, 2000, vol. 212, pp. 108-112. doi:10.1007/s002170000212.175. Rastija V., Srečnik G., Marica-Medić-Šarić. Polyphenolic composition of Croatian wines with different geographical origins. Food Chemistry. 2009, vol. 115, pp. 54-60. doi:10.1016/j.foodchem.2008.11.071.176. Li Z., Pan Q., Jin Z., Mu L., Duan C. Comparison on phenolic compounds in Vitisvinifera cv. Cabernet Sauvignon wines from five wine-growing regions in China. Food Chemistry, 2011, vol. 125, pp. 77-83. doi:10.1016/j.foodchem.2010.08.039.177. Bellomarino S.A., Conlan X.A., Parker R.M., Barnett N.W., Adams M.J. Geographical classification of some Australian wines by discriminant analysis using HPLC with UV and chemiluminescence detection. Talanta, 2009, vol. 80, pp. 833-838. doi:10.1016/j.talanta.2009.08.001.178. Rebolo S., Peсa R.M., Latorre M.J., GarcıÏa S., Botana A.M., Herrero C. Characterization of Galician (NW Spain) Ribeira Sacra wines using pattern recognition analysis. Analytica Chimica Acta, 2000, vol. 417, pp. 211-220. doi:10.1016/S0003-2670(00)00929-6.179. Gremaud G., Quaile S., Piantini U., Pfammatter E., Corvi C. Characterization of Swiss vineyards using isotopic data in combination with trace elements and classical parameters. Eur. Food Res. Technol., 2004, vol. 219, pp. 97-104. doi:10.1007/s00217-004-0919-0.180. Dutra S.V, Adami L, Marcon A.R, Carnieli G.J, Roani C.A, Spinelli F.R, Leonardelli S, Ducatti C, Moreira M.Z, Vanderlinde R. Determination of the geographical origin of Brazilian wines by isotope and mineral analysis. Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry, 2011, vol. 401, pp. 1571-1576. doi:10.1007/s00216-011-5181-2.181. Almeida C.M., Vasconcelos M.T.S.D. ICP-MS determination of strontium isotope ratio in wine in order to be used as a fingerprint of its regional origin. J. Anal. At. Spectrom., 2001, vol. 16, pp. 607-611. doi:10.1039/B100307K.182. Liu L., Cozzolino D., Cynkar W.U., Gishen M., Colby C.B. Geographic Classification of Spanish and Australian Tempranillo Red Wines by Visible and Near-Infrared Spectroscopy Combined with Multivariate Analysis. J. Agric. Food Chem., 2006, vol. 54, pp. 6754-6759. doi:10.1021/jf061528b.183. Brescia M.A, Kosir I.J, Caldarola V., Kidric J., Sacco A. Chemometric Classification of Apulian and Slovenian Wines Using 1H NMR and ICP-OES Together with HPICE Data. J. Agric. Food Chem., 2003, vol. 51, pp. 21-26. doi:10.1021/jf0206015.184. Adami L, Dutra S.V, Marcon A.R, Carnieli G.J, Roani C.A, Vanderlinde R. Geographic origin of southern Brazilian wines by carbon and oxygen isotope analyses // Rapid Communications in Mass Spectrometry. 2010, vol. 24, no. 20, pp. 2943-2948. doi:10.1002/rcm.4726.185. Dutra S.V., Adami L., Marcon A.R., Carnieli G.J., Roani C.A., Spinellia F.R., Leonardelli S., Vanderlinde R. Characterization of wines according the geographical origin by analysis of isotopes and minerals and the influence of harvest on the isotope values. Food Chemistry, 2013, vol. 141, no. 3, pp. 2148-2153. doi:10.1016/j.foodchem.2013.04.106.186. Kaunova A.A., Petrov V.I., Tsiupko, T.G., Tеmеrdashеv Z.A., Pеrеkotii V.V., Luk'ianov A.A. [Identification of wine provenance by ICP-AES multielement analysis], Journal of Analytical Chemistry, 2013, vol. 68, no. 9, pp. 917-922. doi:10.7868/S0044450213090065. ; Проведен анализ опубликованных работ и нормативных документов, посвященных вопросам контроля качества и региональной принадлежности вин. Рассмотрен химический состав винограда и изготавливаемой из него винодельческой продукции, показано его качественное и количественное изменение в процессе винификации, созревания и выдержки вин. Установлены основные группы соединений, содержания и соотношения которых определяют качественные характеристики вин, а также играют важную роль в формировании аромата и вкуса напитка. Обсуждены предпосылки развития рынка поддельной продукции и способы фальсификации вин. Проведен анализ научной литературы и нормативной базы, регламентирующей качество вин на территории России и стран Европейского союза, существующих подходов к определению их подлинности, указаны достоинства и недостатки. Обсуждены примеры использования различных критериев для установления натуральных и фальсифицированных вин, а также подходов их комплексной идентификации и создания системы оценки качества винодельческой продукции с помощью методов физико-химического анализа. Проанализированы основные методические подходы к установлению региональной принадлежности вин, сочетающие возможности современных методов анализа, математического моделирования и статистики, продемонстрированы примеры их использования на практике.Ключевые слова: вина, методы анализа, качество, подлинность, региональная принадлежность, фальсификация, математическое моделированиеDOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/analitika.2014.18.4.001

President Volodymyr Zelensky and the current Ukrainian parliament are approaching the hour when their formal legitimacy, their mandate, comes to an end. Under normal conditions, elections to the Verkhovna Rada would have been held last October, while candidates for the presidency would have started preparing for elections scheduled for the last Sunday in March of 2024. But the country is consumed by war, and elections are probably not an option. Or are they? President Zelensky is considering the answer to this question. [1]I should state at the outset that I find the idea of organizing elections, whether presidential only or both presidential and parliamentary, during wartime is a very bad idea. At the same time, I also disagree with those who think the matter of postponing elections can be settled purely by having recourse to existing laws.In this brief I show that the ruling group could, if it chose, adopt some legal maneuvering that would formally respect the constitution and the nation's laws (though violating their spirit), and that these maneuvers have been tested several times in Ukraine since 2014. But such formally legal if doubtfully legitimate elections could also pose unjustifiably high sociopolitical risks for a state at war, and this creates a dilemma for the nation.Defining the Wartime Electoral DilemmaCurrently, the Zelensky administration is under pressure to organize parliamentary and presidential elections soon. The first source of the pressure is the West.[2] Behind the scenes, Ukraine's allies are allegedly demanding that Kyiv renew its government's legitimacy, despite the ongoing war and the mass dislocation of citizens. Ukraine's allies know well the constitutional limitations on wartime elections in Ukraine. They also know that the current legal regime is "flexible" enough to find legal ways of organizing elections. After all, they point out, the war started in 2014, and thereafter two presidents and two parliaments were elected. Also, some opposition-minded groups in the United States and Europe are casting doubt on the democratic nature of Ukraine's government as a reason to reduce the military and financial support being provided to Ukraine.[2] Elections would help the Western pro-Ukrainian governments overcome these objections at home in the upcoming budgetary debates.A second source of pressure to hold elections is the domestic political situation. After a very uneven, challenging, and tragic five-year governing effort that had to deal with the "Green Wave" of radical reforms, the COVID-19 pandemic, growing clashes with opposition groups, and Russia's full-fledged invasion, President Zelensky and his party need to renew their mandate. For the sake of political stability they must demonstrate their democratic legitimacy to the nation, the opposition, and, especially, the army. Whatever future awaits Ukraine, whether protracted war or peace negotiations, the government must be regarded as fully legitimate and must be trusted by its constituencies and the military to cope with upcoming challenges.Under such circumstances, Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest associates must resolve the dilemma: to hold elections or not to hold elections. Each choice has pros and cons.Reasons to defer elections. Russia's war of attrition goes on and demands all the government's attention and all the nation's resources. There are also many constitutional, legal, and political reasons for not holding elections.[4] To organize meaningful, free, and fair elections, Kyiv would need to lift the many political restrictions that were put in place to create national solidary and a singular national focus on achieving victory. This means that the government would need to revise electoral legislation, create new tools to enable the vast number of displaced citizens to vote, allow a more capacious writ and greater ideological diversity of the media, and restart political competition. Reasons not to defer elections. On the other hand, without the essential democratic legitimacy conferred by free and fair elections, it may soon be impossible to govern a nation embroiled in a war for freedom. Even more, if elections were organized, they would need to be conducted in a way that citizens—whether serving at the front or working in the rear or living in the occupied territories—fully recognized that the campaign and ballot count were honest. Ukrainians have a record of revolts provoked by a suspicious electoral process and results.[5] The wartime legal, administrative, socioeconomic, and demographic problems could influence any elections in a big way and so rattle the political order and divert the government's attention from the needs of the front. Legal-Political Flexibility as Ukraine's Answer to a Long WarDespite pressures for—and expert voices against—holding the elections in wartime, Zelensky's team is taking into account Ukraine's recent experience in living under conditions of war. The war in Ukraine started de facto with Russia's first acts of aggression, in 2014, and has now spread throughout the country with Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. However, de jure, the war between Russia and Ukraine has seen three different legal regimes during the past nine years. First, between April 15, 2014, and April 30, 2018, Ukraine existed in the regime of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), which was a set of military and legal measures adopted by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and aimed at countering Russian and pro-Russian armed groups in the war in eastern Ukraine. This regime limited some civil rights in some territories, but it was not martial law.[6] So both presidential and parliamentary elections could be conducted in 2014 in all regions not directly affected by war. Both presidential and parliamentary elections were internationally recognized as free and fair, despite military actions in some oblasts and the inability of voters to participate in elections in Crimea and some districts of the Donbas.[7] The legal regime flexibly mixed elements of martial law and peacetime politics.Second, between April 30, 2018, and February 24, 2022, the regime of the Joint Forces Operation was in effect which continued the logic of the ATO in slightly different military and administrative terms. Again, this flexible legal-political regime allowed free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in 2019, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas and the annexed Crimea.[8] Even though President Petro Poroshenko attempted to impose martial law and postpone the elections of 2019, the Verkhovna Rada resisted his efforts and saved the elections in a form characteristic of peacetime.[9]The same legal flexibility allowed Zelensky to use military elements of the legal regime and to start using the Security Council as a core instrument in his fight with the oligarchs in 2020–2021.[10]The third legal regime started with Russia's full-fledged invasion on February 24, 2022. It was thought that this time, Ukraine's legal-political flexibility would not be up to the task. But again, some legal-political flexibility remained: martial law (voiennyi stan) was imposed without declaration of a state of war (stan viiny) and war on Russia. Indeed, de jure, martial law was initiated by Volodymyr Zelensky and approved by the Rada on February 24, 2022.[11] Since then the process has been repeated regularly, with martial law being continued for several months ahead at each approval.[12] This time, the legal order of war was additionally defined by the Law on the Use of the Armed Forces and other military formations to defend the country.[13] Military-civil administrations started governing all regions of Ukraine, and civilian associations, mass media outlets, and political parties began functioning under wartime restrictions.[14]According to the laws on the legal regime of martial law and on defense, martial law was introduced to avert the threat to the nation and to repel armed aggression in all regions of Ukraine.[15] The laws on martial law and on defense provide state authorities, the military command, military administrations, and local self-government bodies with special powers necessary to fight the enemy. Also, as allowed by the constitution's Article 64, certain temporary restrictions on many civil rights and freedoms were imposed. Altogether, the various ramifications of the legal regime of martial law have directly affected domestic political processes.At the same time, the Ukrainian government did not announce a state of war and did not declare war on Russia. Volodymyr Zelensky submitted to parliament a draft law on the declaration of a state of war, but it was never considered by parliament (and only the web archive has actually preserved some traces of this step).[16] Even though a state of war regime is mentioned in the Ukrainian constitution, it has never been defined. Where does the concept of a "state of war" come from, particularly with reference to Ukraine and its political-legal flexibility? In a nutshell, the concept stems from international agreements such as the Third Hague Convention on the Opening of Hostilities (1907) or the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974), both of which introduce the concepts of war and aggression (Ukraine is a signatory to both). They define the norm according to which one state may not initiate military action against another state absent a declaration of war or an ultimatum. They also stipulate that the use of armed force by one state is sufficient evidence of an act of aggression against another state. By not announcing war on Russia and not introducing a state of war, the Ukrainian government has some flexibility, for example, in continuing to transit Russian gas to the EU.[17] So, even after announcing martial law, the government of Ukraine has preserved some element of legal-political flexibility by not declaring war on Russia.All three legal-political regimes have allowed and prepared Ukrainians to adapt their political and legal systems, as well as their communal life and economy, to the conditions of a temporally protracted and spatially enlarging war. This adaptability has immersed Ukrainian institutions in a state of legal, political, security, and even military affairs that has proved rather flexible in merging de jure and de facto situations. For example, it has allowed the nation to survive when some of its territory was occupied by Russia or Russia-backed separatists—yet there are front-line areas with vast Ukrainian military operations. There are also the rear regions where, prior to the current state of conflict, Ukrainians continued to live and work. And before 2022, but during wartime, they enjoyed competitive elections, the division of power, functional courts, and active participation in international relations. This flexibility, whose roots survived even after 2022, may be used by the ruling group to organize yet another wartime election. And Western allies know it well. Does the Current Legal Regime Allow Elections in Ukraine? Usually, elections are not conducted in countries at war. However, if the war is protracted, elections might be needed to reestablish the domestic and international legitimacy of the government. The Ukrainian constitution and its laws do not provide a clear answer to this question, and this ambiguity is one of the sources of wartime Ukraine's legal-political flexibility.Indeed, the constitution's Article 83 states that if the term of service of the Verkhovna Rada expires when the country is under martial law, its authority is extended until a new parliament is elected. This and other constitutional provisions cannot be changed while martial law is in effect (Article 157). However, the constitution does not prohibit either presidential or local elections from being held. The restrictions on presidential and local elections are provided for in the Law on Martial Law and the Electoral Code's Articles 20 and 280.[18] These stipulations, however, can be changed by parliament and approved by the president, if there is political will to do so. Thus, if the Ukrainian political class agrees, presidential elections can be conducted under martial law next year. Even more, if the president and the Rada agree, they could stop continuing the regime of martial law, despite ongoing military actions on the soil of Ukraine. That way even parliamentary elections could be legally held. However, in such a case the legality and the legitimacy of the decisions would openly contradict each other.In sum, the existing legal-political flexibility indeed provides an opportunity for elections. But it neither resolves the question of the essential democratic legitimacy of elections held during a de facto war nor decreases the risk of desolidarization of society during competitive elections. Security Risks around Wartime Elections Despite all the legal workarounds and some benefits that flexibility can bring, elections pose an existential risk for a nation at war. Ukraine has nonetheless held elections in the face of this risk after 2014, but with the current war of vastly greater scale than earlier stages of the conflict and having an incalculably greater influence on Ukrainian society, economy, and political institutions, the former success may not be repeatable. If elections are attempted in 2024, they may lead to disaster for Ukraine.Ukrainian experts who publicly oppose the decision to hold elections in 2024 typically adduce two arguments. The first is that the constitution and laws prohibit elections when the country is under martial law. This argument has its weak side: there are ways to get around such prohibitions, as discussed above. The second argument is stronger: the sociopolitical order will face overwhelming challenges to its stability if elections are conducted during wartime. The reasoning here usually refers to the unjustifiably high costs of elections and the fact that they would undermine national unity during war. Wartime elections would indeed drag a hugely sensitized society into debates that might still be constrained by the needs of war and into voting that might not be well attended by so many displaced citizens, reducing representation. Here is the major contradiction that makes wartime elections so potentially destructive. If the aim is to uphold and reinforce by democratic means the legitimacy of the government, elections must be free, honest, based on open debate and competition, and accessible to all voters. If some element on this list is missing, the aim of elections will not be achieved. Also, if some element on this list is missing, the sensitized Ukrainian society, which already trusts military institutions more than it trusts civilian, democratic ones, might protest en masse. The picture is even more contradictory: if resources are so scarce as to hamper the country's defense efforts, and if international support is slowing, then diverting resources away from defense and toward some other purpose is counterproductive. Indeed, allocating human, administrative, and financial resources to elections during a war of attrition is an unjustifiable luxury. Over 47 percent of the Ukrainian budget for 2024 is planned to come from external sources.[19] And these sources, as the current debates in the U.S. Congress demonstrate, may not be as generous as in 2022–2023. Every public and economic sector in Ukraine reports a growing deficit in human resources.[20] Well over six million Ukrainians have left the country, and many of them—over a million, at a minimum—live on the territory of the aggressor state.[21] Over three million Ukrainians are fighting to survive in internal displacement. Another four million Ukrainians live in Russia-occupied Ukrainian territory.[22] Under such conditions, it would be close to impossible to organize an inclusive and accessible voting apparatus. And that would put in doubt the legitimacy of any government elected under such conditions.The question of legitimacy gains another wrinkle when citizens' fading trust in the government and democratic institutions is considered. After almost two years of life under martial law, Ukrainian society shows signs of stable trust in security institutions and declining trust in public organizations. Even though polls conducted under conditions of war have, as expected, a large margin of error, the results still deserve attention for the social dynamics and the relative ratios they reveal. For example, according to a recent poll by the Razumkov Center, a nongovernmental think tank, the most trusted state bodies include military or war-related institutions and organizations: the armed forces (93 percent of respondents trust them), volunteer organizations (that support the army, 84 percent), the National Guard (81 percent), the State Border Service (76.5 percent), the president (who is commander in chief, 72 percent), the Ministry of Defense (71 percent), and the Security Service (66 percent).[23] But trust in democracy-related institutions is falling. The majority of respondents expressed distrust in political parties (74 percent), public officials (72 percent), the courts (70 percent), parliament (64 percent), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (53 percent), and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (52 percent). Despite being dissatisfied with the civil part of government, the population remaining within Ukraine's borders is opposed to the prospect of elections in 2024. According to the same Razumkov Center poll, only 15 percent of respondents support holding national elections before the end of the war, with almost two-thirds (64 percent) rejecting such a proposal and 21 percent of respondents undecided. Election supporters argue that elections are necessary to support democracy in the country (6 percent) and to show the world that Ukraine is a democratic state (5 percent); another 5 percent see the need to change the government or at least to renew President Zelensky's mandate (5 percent). Election opponents argue that elections are too expensive for the current state budget (36 percent), that the legislation does not allow them (32 percent), that voting would be insecure (31 percent), and that, under martial law, it is impossible to observe democratic standards (29 percent).These data are supported by many other polls (such as ones conducted by KIIS and the IRI/Rating Group).[24] Altogether they show that Ukraine's wartime society has greater trust in the army than in civil authorities and values elections only if they are conducted as a genuine democratic process. More generally, even if a political system were to develop some adaptive legal-political flexibility, war is not conducive to democracy-reinforcing elections.Let's Wait on Elections and Focus on Core IssuesI want to stress that the vox populi as represented, with all caveats, in the above polls and in experts' analysis is aligned, for one good reason: Under current military conditions in Ukraine, it would be hugely risky to conduct elections. All available resources must be poured into defense and achieving victory.Elections would most likely not respond to the legitimate expectations of citizens and would not comply with OSCE standards. Even if the wartime restrictions on the political rights and freedoms of citizens and on the operations of the mass media were canceled, it would arguably take another year to return to the pre-2022 mode of operations. Public debate has long been absent, and Ukrainian society is fragmented, with new cleavages. It will take time for political parties to address both issues and restart meaningful competition for the voters' sympathies in Ukraine. Without such careful preparation of society, elections would be a senseless formality that would only intensify the population's dissatisfaction with the government and negative reactions to those Western nations pushing for elections to be held. Even if some European politicians might not insist on the proper democratic quality to any election, the Ukrainian citizenry would be quite unlikely to tolerate electoral incongruencies.[25] And Zelensky needs real, essential democratic legitimacy in 2024. I believe that the Zelensky administration should resist all pressures and postpone elections. Instead, it should address legitimate dissatisfaction with the public administration and the lack of access to trusted mass media, and focus on the major security needs of Ukraine.[1] Sky News: "President Zelenskyy weighing up spring presidential elections," Sky News, November 3, 2023, https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-russian-man-arrested-for-passing-secrets-to-ukraine-moscow-ready-for-talks-on-post-conflict-settlement-12541713?postid=6708241#liveblog-body. [2] David L. Stern, Catherine Belton, John Hudson, "Western Officials Press Ukraine to Hold Elections," Washington Post, September 24, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/24/ukraine-elections-war-russia-west/.[3] "Zelensky showing 'authoritarian traits', says Swiss intelligence report," Swissinfo, July 9, 2023, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/zelensky-showing--authoritarian-traits---says-swiss-intelligence-report/48652496. ; Harry Enten, "How Republicans Have Grown More Skeptical of Zelensky and Ukraine," CNN, September 21, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/21/politics/republicans-zelensky-ukraine-polls-skeptical/index.html[4] Olga Aivazovska, "Opinion: Elections and War Are Incompatible," The Kyiv Independent, November 1, 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/opinion-elections-and-war-are-incompatible/. [5] "Orange Revolution," Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed November 15, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orange-Revolution. [6] "Про Тимчасові Заходи На Період Проведення Антитерористичної Операції," Офіційний вебпортал парламенту України, June 2, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1669-18#Text. [7] "Despite Violence and Threats in East, Ukraine Election Characterized by High Turnout and Resolve to Guarantee Fundamental Freedoms, International Observers Say," OSCE, May 26, 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/119081. ; "Ukraine, Early Parliamentary Elections, 26 October 2014: Final Report," OSCE, December 19, 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556.[8] "Presidential Election, 31 March and 21 April 2019." OSCE. Accessed November 15, 2023. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/407660. ; "Early Parliamentary Elections, 21 July 2019," OSCE, accessed November 15, 2023, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/422585. [9] Andrian Prokip, "Ukraine's State of Martial Law: A Surprise, with Political Undertones," web log, Focus Ukraine (blog) (Wilson Center, November 29, 2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-state-martial-law-surprise-political-undertones. [10] Mykhailo Minakov, "The Three Ages of Zelensky's Presidency," web log, Focus Ukraine (blog) (Wilson Center, June 9, 2022), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-ages-zelenskys-presidency. ; Minakov, Mikhail. "War, De-Oligarchization, and the Possibility of Anti-Patronal Transformation in Ukraine." In Ukraine's Patronal Democracy and the Russian Invasion: The Russia-Ukraine War, Volume One, edited by Bálint Madlovics and Bálint Magyar, 141–66. Central European University Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.7829/jj.3985461.9. [11] "Проект Закону про затвердження Указу Президента України "Про введення воєнного стану в Україні"", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 24, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39147.[12] "Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, August 17, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/451/2023#Text.[13] "Проект Закону про схвалення Указу Президента України "Про використання Збройних Сил України та інших військових формувань"", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 3, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39151.[14] Serhii Tarasov, "The Role of Civil-Military Cooperation in the Protection of Civilians: The Ukraine Experience", Center for Civilians in Conflict, October 2023, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Role-of-Civil-Military-Cooperation-in-Protection-of-Civilians-The-Ukraine-Experience.pdf.[15] "Про оборону України," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, April 15, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12#n138. ; "Про правовий режим воєнного стану," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 19, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#n5. [16] "Проект Закону про оголошення стану війни," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, February 24, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220413044605/http:/w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=73873.[17] "Russian Gas Transit through Ukraine," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 3, 2023, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/qa-russian-gas-transit-through-ukraine/.[18] "Про правовий режим воєнного стану," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 19, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#Text. ; "Election Code of Ukraine," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, July 16, 2020, https://cvk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Election-Code-of-Ukraine.pdf. [19] "Ukraine Releases 2024 Budget Plan, More Spending on Military, but Raising Enough Funding Will Be Tough", Intellinews, September 28, 2023, https://www.intellinews.com/ukraine-releases-2024-budget-plan-more-spending-on-military-but-raising-enough-funding-will-be-tough-294429/.[20] Andriy Karakuts, Yuriy Schedrin, and Oleksandra Davymuka, rep., "Future of Ukraine Workforce" Center for Applied Research, May 2023, https://cpd.com.ua/future-of-ukraine-workforce.pdf. [21] Andriy Karakuts, Yuriy Schedrin, Oleksandra Davymuka, "Future of Ukraine Workforce," Center for Applied Research, https://cpd.com.ua/future-of-ukraine-workforce.pdf. ; "Report on Ukraine Refugees," UN, Accessed November 15, 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.[22] Ella Libanova, "Ukraine's Demography in the Second Year of the Full-Fledged War," Focus Ukraine, June 27, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-demography-second-year-full-fledged-war.[23] "Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country," Razumkov Center, October 15, 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/en/component/k2/citizens-assessment-of-the-situation-in-the-country-trust-in-social-institutions-politicians-officials-and-public-figures-attitude-to-holding-national-elections-in-ukraine-before-the-end-of-the-war-september-2023.[24] "National Survey of Ukraine: October 2023," IRI/Rating Group, October 27, 2023, https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/vseukra_nske_opituvannya_m_zhnarodnogo_respubl_kanskogo_nstitutu_iri_zhovten2023.html. ; "When Elections Should Be Held, Attitudes Towards Online Voting and Possible Restrictions on Citiyens Rights," Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, October 30, 2023, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1309&page=1.[25] Sergiy Sdorenko and Tiny Kox, "Nobody Will Blame Ukraine If Post-War Elections Are Not Perfect." Interview with PACE President," Ukrainiska Pravda, May 16, 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2023/05/16/7161793/.

President Volodymyr Zelensky and the current Ukrainian parliament are approaching the hour when their formal legitimacy, their mandate, comes to an end. Under normal conditions, elections to the Verkhovna Rada would have been held last October, while candidates for the presidency would have started preparing for elections scheduled for the last Sunday in March of 2024. But the country is consumed by war, and elections are probably not an option. Or are they? President Zelensky is considering the answer to this question. [1]I should state at the outset that I find the idea of organizing elections, whether presidential only or both presidential and parliamentary, during wartime is a very bad idea. At the same time, I also disagree with those who think the matter of postponing elections can be settled purely by having recourse to existing laws.In this brief I show that the ruling group could, if it chose, adopt some legal maneuvering that would formally respect the constitution and the nation's laws (though violating their spirit), and that these maneuvers have been tested several times in Ukraine since 2014. But such formally legal if doubtfully legitimate elections could also pose unjustifiably high sociopolitical risks for a state at war, and this creates a dilemma for the nation.Defining the Wartime Electoral DilemmaCurrently, the Zelensky administration is under pressure to organize parliamentary and presidential elections soon. The first source of the pressure is the West.[2] Behind the scenes, Ukraine's allies are allegedly demanding that Kyiv renew its government's legitimacy, despite the ongoing war and the mass dislocation of citizens. Ukraine's allies know well the constitutional limitations on wartime elections in Ukraine. They also know that the current legal regime is "flexible" enough to find legal ways of organizing elections. After all, they point out, the war started in 2014, and thereafter two presidents and two parliaments were elected. Also, some opposition-minded groups in the United States and Europe are casting doubt on the democratic nature of Ukraine's government as a reason to reduce the military and financial support being provided to Ukraine.[2] Elections would help the Western pro-Ukrainian governments overcome these objections at home in the upcoming budgetary debates.A second source of pressure to hold elections is the domestic political situation. After a very uneven, challenging, and tragic five-year governing effort that had to deal with the "Green Wave" of radical reforms, the COVID-19 pandemic, growing clashes with opposition groups, and Russia's full-fledged invasion, President Zelensky and his party need to renew their mandate. For the sake of political stability they must demonstrate their democratic legitimacy to the nation, the opposition, and, especially, the army. Whatever future awaits Ukraine, whether protracted war or peace negotiations, the government must be regarded as fully legitimate and must be trusted by its constituencies and the military to cope with upcoming challenges.Under such circumstances, Volodymyr Zelensky and his closest associates must resolve the dilemma: to hold elections or not to hold elections. Each choice has pros and cons.Reasons to defer elections. Russia's war of attrition goes on and demands all the government's attention and all the nation's resources. There are also many constitutional, legal, and political reasons for not holding elections.[4] To organize meaningful, free, and fair elections, Kyiv would need to lift the many political restrictions that were put in place to create national solidary and a singular national focus on achieving victory. This means that the government would need to revise electoral legislation, create new tools to enable the vast number of displaced citizens to vote, allow a more capacious writ and greater ideological diversity of the media, and restart political competition. Reasons not to defer elections. On the other hand, without the essential democratic legitimacy conferred by free and fair elections, it may soon be impossible to govern a nation embroiled in a war for freedom. Even more, if elections were organized, they would need to be conducted in a way that citizens—whether serving at the front or working in the rear or living in the occupied territories—fully recognized that the campaign and ballot count were honest. Ukrainians have a record of revolts provoked by a suspicious electoral process and results.[5] The wartime legal, administrative, socioeconomic, and demographic problems could influence any elections in a big way and so rattle the political order and divert the government's attention from the needs of the front. Legal-Political Flexibility as Ukraine's Answer to a Long WarDespite pressures for—and expert voices against—holding the elections in wartime, Zelensky's team is taking into account Ukraine's recent experience in living under conditions of war. The war in Ukraine started de facto with Russia's first acts of aggression, in 2014, and has now spread throughout the country with Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. However, de jure, the war between Russia and Ukraine has seen three different legal regimes during the past nine years. First, between April 15, 2014, and April 30, 2018, Ukraine existed in the regime of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), which was a set of military and legal measures adopted by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and aimed at countering Russian and pro-Russian armed groups in the war in eastern Ukraine. This regime limited some civil rights in some territories, but it was not martial law.[6] So both presidential and parliamentary elections could be conducted in 2014 in all regions not directly affected by war. Both presidential and parliamentary elections were internationally recognized as free and fair, despite military actions in some oblasts and the inability of voters to participate in elections in Crimea and some districts of the Donbas.[7] The legal regime flexibly mixed elements of martial law and peacetime politics.Second, between April 30, 2018, and February 24, 2022, the regime of the Joint Forces Operation was in effect which continued the logic of the ATO in slightly different military and administrative terms. Again, this flexible legal-political regime allowed free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in 2019, despite the ongoing war in the Donbas and the annexed Crimea.[8] Even though President Petro Poroshenko attempted to impose martial law and postpone the elections of 2019, the Verkhovna Rada resisted his efforts and saved the elections in a form characteristic of peacetime.[9]The same legal flexibility allowed Zelensky to use military elements of the legal regime and to start using the Security Council as a core instrument in his fight with the oligarchs in 2020–2021.[10]The third legal regime started with Russia's full-fledged invasion on February 24, 2022. It was thought that this time, Ukraine's legal-political flexibility would not be up to the task. But again, some legal-political flexibility remained: martial law (voiennyi stan) was imposed without declaration of a state of war (stan viiny) and war on Russia. Indeed, de jure, martial law was initiated by Volodymyr Zelensky and approved by the Rada on February 24, 2022.[11] Since then the process has been repeated regularly, with martial law being continued for several months ahead at each approval.[12] This time, the legal order of war was additionally defined by the Law on the Use of the Armed Forces and other military formations to defend the country.[13] Military-civil administrations started governing all regions of Ukraine, and civilian associations, mass media outlets, and political parties began functioning under wartime restrictions.[14]According to the laws on the legal regime of martial law and on defense, martial law was introduced to avert the threat to the nation and to repel armed aggression in all regions of Ukraine.[15] The laws on martial law and on defense provide state authorities, the military command, military administrations, and local self-government bodies with special powers necessary to fight the enemy. Also, as allowed by the constitution's Article 64, certain temporary restrictions on many civil rights and freedoms were imposed. Altogether, the various ramifications of the legal regime of martial law have directly affected domestic political processes.At the same time, the Ukrainian government did not announce a state of war and did not declare war on Russia. Volodymyr Zelensky submitted to parliament a draft law on the declaration of a state of war, but it was never considered by parliament (and only the web archive has actually preserved some traces of this step).[16] Even though a state of war regime is mentioned in the Ukrainian constitution, it has never been defined. Where does the concept of a "state of war" come from, particularly with reference to Ukraine and its political-legal flexibility? In a nutshell, the concept stems from international agreements such as the Third Hague Convention on the Opening of Hostilities (1907) or the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974), both of which introduce the concepts of war and aggression (Ukraine is a signatory to both). They define the norm according to which one state may not initiate military action against another state absent a declaration of war or an ultimatum. They also stipulate that the use of armed force by one state is sufficient evidence of an act of aggression against another state. By not announcing war on Russia and not introducing a state of war, the Ukrainian government has some flexibility, for example, in continuing to transit Russian gas to the EU.[17] So, even after announcing martial law, the government of Ukraine has preserved some element of legal-political flexibility by not declaring war on Russia.All three legal-political regimes have allowed and prepared Ukrainians to adapt their political and legal systems, as well as their communal life and economy, to the conditions of a temporally protracted and spatially enlarging war. This adaptability has immersed Ukrainian institutions in a state of legal, political, security, and even military affairs that has proved rather flexible in merging de jure and de facto situations. For example, it has allowed the nation to survive when some of its territory was occupied by Russia or Russia-backed separatists—yet there are front-line areas with vast Ukrainian military operations. There are also the rear regions where, prior to the current state of conflict, Ukrainians continued to live and work. And before 2022, but during wartime, they enjoyed competitive elections, the division of power, functional courts, and active participation in international relations. This flexibility, whose roots survived even after 2022, may be used by the ruling group to organize yet another wartime election. And Western allies know it well. Does the Current Legal Regime Allow Elections in Ukraine? Usually, elections are not conducted in countries at war. However, if the war is protracted, elections might be needed to reestablish the domestic and international legitimacy of the government. The Ukrainian constitution and its laws do not provide a clear answer to this question, and this ambiguity is one of the sources of wartime Ukraine's legal-political flexibility.Indeed, the constitution's Article 83 states that if the term of service of the Verkhovna Rada expires when the country is under martial law, its authority is extended until a new parliament is elected. This and other constitutional provisions cannot be changed while martial law is in effect (Article 157). However, the constitution does not prohibit either presidential or local elections from being held. The restrictions on presidential and local elections are provided for in the Law on Martial Law and the Electoral Code's Articles 20 and 280.[18] These stipulations, however, can be changed by parliament and approved by the president, if there is political will to do so. Thus, if the Ukrainian political class agrees, presidential elections can be conducted under martial law next year. Even more, if the president and the Rada agree, they could stop continuing the regime of martial law, despite ongoing military actions on the soil of Ukraine. That way even parliamentary elections could be legally held. However, in such a case the legality and the legitimacy of the decisions would openly contradict each other.In sum, the existing legal-political flexibility indeed provides an opportunity for elections. But it neither resolves the question of the essential democratic legitimacy of elections held during a de facto war nor decreases the risk of desolidarization of society during competitive elections. Security Risks around Wartime Elections Despite all the legal workarounds and some benefits that flexibility can bring, elections pose an existential risk for a nation at war. Ukraine has nonetheless held elections in the face of this risk after 2014, but with the current war of vastly greater scale than earlier stages of the conflict and having an incalculably greater influence on Ukrainian society, economy, and political institutions, the former success may not be repeatable. If elections are attempted in 2024, they may lead to disaster for Ukraine.Ukrainian experts who publicly oppose the decision to hold elections in 2024 typically adduce two arguments. The first is that the constitution and laws prohibit elections when the country is under martial law. This argument has its weak side: there are ways to get around such prohibitions, as discussed above. The second argument is stronger: the sociopolitical order will face overwhelming challenges to its stability if elections are conducted during wartime. The reasoning here usually refers to the unjustifiably high costs of elections and the fact that they would undermine national unity during war. Wartime elections would indeed drag a hugely sensitized society into debates that might still be constrained by the needs of war and into voting that might not be well attended by so many displaced citizens, reducing representation. Here is the major contradiction that makes wartime elections so potentially destructive. If the aim is to uphold and reinforce by democratic means the legitimacy of the government, elections must be free, honest, based on open debate and competition, and accessible to all voters. If some element on this list is missing, the aim of elections will not be achieved. Also, if some element on this list is missing, the sensitized Ukrainian society, which already trusts military institutions more than it trusts civilian, democratic ones, might protest en masse. The picture is even more contradictory: if resources are so scarce as to hamper the country's defense efforts, and if international support is slowing, then diverting resources away from defense and toward some other purpose is counterproductive. Indeed, allocating human, administrative, and financial resources to elections during a war of attrition is an unjustifiable luxury. Over 47 percent of the Ukrainian budget for 2024 is planned to come from external sources.[19] And these sources, as the current debates in the U.S. Congress demonstrate, may not be as generous as in 2022–2023. Every public and economic sector in Ukraine reports a growing deficit in human resources.[20] Well over six million Ukrainians have left the country, and many of them—over a million, at a minimum—live on the territory of the aggressor state.[21] Over three million Ukrainians are fighting to survive in internal displacement. Another four million Ukrainians live in Russia-occupied Ukrainian territory.[22] Under such conditions, it would be close to impossible to organize an inclusive and accessible voting apparatus. And that would put in doubt the legitimacy of any government elected under such conditions.The question of legitimacy gains another wrinkle when citizens' fading trust in the government and democratic institutions is considered. After almost two years of life under martial law, Ukrainian society shows signs of stable trust in security institutions and declining trust in public organizations. Even though polls conducted under conditions of war have, as expected, a large margin of error, the results still deserve attention for the social dynamics and the relative ratios they reveal. For example, according to a recent poll by the Razumkov Center, a nongovernmental think tank, the most trusted state bodies include military or war-related institutions and organizations: the armed forces (93 percent of respondents trust them), volunteer organizations (that support the army, 84 percent), the National Guard (81 percent), the State Border Service (76.5 percent), the president (who is commander in chief, 72 percent), the Ministry of Defense (71 percent), and the Security Service (66 percent).[23] But trust in democracy-related institutions is falling. The majority of respondents expressed distrust in political parties (74 percent), public officials (72 percent), the courts (70 percent), parliament (64 percent), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (53 percent), and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (52 percent). Despite being dissatisfied with the civil part of government, the population remaining within Ukraine's borders is opposed to the prospect of elections in 2024. According to the same Razumkov Center poll, only 15 percent of respondents support holding national elections before the end of the war, with almost two-thirds (64 percent) rejecting such a proposal and 21 percent of respondents undecided. Election supporters argue that elections are necessary to support democracy in the country (6 percent) and to show the world that Ukraine is a democratic state (5 percent); another 5 percent see the need to change the government or at least to renew President Zelensky's mandate (5 percent). Election opponents argue that elections are too expensive for the current state budget (36 percent), that the legislation does not allow them (32 percent), that voting would be insecure (31 percent), and that, under martial law, it is impossible to observe democratic standards (29 percent).These data are supported by many other polls (such as ones conducted by KIIS and the IRI/Rating Group).[24] Altogether they show that Ukraine's wartime society has greater trust in the army than in civil authorities and values elections only if they are conducted as a genuine democratic process. More generally, even if a political system were to develop some adaptive legal-political flexibility, war is not conducive to democracy-reinforcing elections.Let's Wait on Elections and Focus on Core IssuesI want to stress that the vox populi as represented, with all caveats, in the above polls and in experts' analysis is aligned, for one good reason: Under current military conditions in Ukraine, it would be hugely risky to conduct elections. All available resources must be poured into defense and achieving victory.Elections would most likely not respond to the legitimate expectations of citizens and would not comply with OSCE standards. Even if the wartime restrictions on the political rights and freedoms of citizens and on the operations of the mass media were canceled, it would arguably take another year to return to the pre-2022 mode of operations. Public debate has long been absent, and Ukrainian society is fragmented, with new cleavages. It will take time for political parties to address both issues and restart meaningful competition for the voters' sympathies in Ukraine. Without such careful preparation of society, elections would be a senseless formality that would only intensify the population's dissatisfaction with the government and negative reactions to those Western nations pushing for elections to be held. Even if some European politicians might not insist on the proper democratic quality to any election, the Ukrainian citizenry would be quite unlikely to tolerate electoral incongruencies.[25] And Zelensky needs real, essential democratic legitimacy in 2024. I believe that the Zelensky administration should resist all pressures and postpone elections. Instead, it should address legitimate dissatisfaction with the public administration and the lack of access to trusted mass media, and focus on the major security needs of Ukraine.[1] Sky News: "President Zelenskyy weighing up spring presidential elections," Sky News, November 3, 2023, https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-russian-man-arrested-for-passing-secrets-to-ukraine-moscow-ready-for-talks-on-post-conflict-settlement-12541713?postid=6708241#liveblog-body. [2] David L. Stern, Catherine Belton, John Hudson, "Western Officials Press Ukraine to Hold Elections," Washington Post, September 24, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/24/ukraine-elections-war-russia-west/.[3] "Zelensky showing 'authoritarian traits', says Swiss intelligence report," Swissinfo, July 9, 2023, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/zelensky-showing--authoritarian-traits---says-swiss-intelligence-report/48652496. ; Harry Enten, "How Republicans Have Grown More Skeptical of Zelensky and Ukraine," CNN, September 21, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/21/politics/republicans-zelensky-ukraine-polls-skeptical/index.html[4] Olga Aivazovska, "Opinion: Elections and War Are Incompatible," The Kyiv Independent, November 1, 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/opinion-elections-and-war-are-incompatible/. [5] "Orange Revolution," Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed November 15, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orange-Revolution. [6] "Про Тимчасові Заходи На Період Проведення Антитерористичної Операції," Офіційний вебпортал парламенту України, June 2, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1669-18#Text. [7] "Despite Violence and Threats in East, Ukraine Election Characterized by High Turnout and Resolve to Guarantee Fundamental Freedoms, International Observers Say," OSCE, May 26, 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/119081. ; "Ukraine, Early Parliamentary Elections, 26 October 2014: Final Report," OSCE, December 19, 2014, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556.[8] "Presidential Election, 31 March and 21 April 2019." OSCE. Accessed November 15, 2023. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/407660. ; "Early Parliamentary Elections, 21 July 2019," OSCE, accessed November 15, 2023, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/422585. [9] Andrian Prokip, "Ukraine's State of Martial Law: A Surprise, with Political Undertones," web log, Focus Ukraine (blog) (Wilson Center, November 29, 2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-state-martial-law-surprise-political-undertones. [10] Mykhailo Minakov, "The Three Ages of Zelensky's Presidency," web log, Focus Ukraine (blog) (Wilson Center, June 9, 2022), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-ages-zelenskys-presidency. ; Minakov, Mikhail. "War, De-Oligarchization, and the Possibility of Anti-Patronal Transformation in Ukraine." In Ukraine's Patronal Democracy and the Russian Invasion: The Russia-Ukraine War, Volume One, edited by Bálint Madlovics and Bálint Magyar, 141–66. Central European University Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.7829/jj.3985461.9. [11] "Проект Закону про затвердження Указу Президента України "Про введення воєнного стану в Україні"", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 24, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39147.[12] "Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, August 17, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/451/2023#Text.[13] "Проект Закону про схвалення Указу Президента України "Про використання Збройних Сил України та інших військових формувань"", Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 3, 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39151.[14] Serhii Tarasov, "The Role of Civil-Military Cooperation in the Protection of Civilians: The Ukraine Experience", Center for Civilians in Conflict, October 2023, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Role-of-Civil-Military-Cooperation-in-Protection-of-Civilians-The-Ukraine-Experience.pdf.[15] "Про оборону України," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, April 15, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1932-12#n138. ; "Про правовий режим воєнного стану," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 19, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#n5. [16] "Проект Закону про оголошення стану війни," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, February 24, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220413044605/http:/w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=73873.[17] "Russian Gas Transit through Ukraine," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 3, 2023, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/qa-russian-gas-transit-through-ukraine/.[18] "Про правовий режим воєнного стану," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, October 19, 2023, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#Text. ; "Election Code of Ukraine," Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, July 16, 2020, https://cvk.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Election-Code-of-Ukraine.pdf. [19] "Ukraine Releases 2024 Budget Plan, More Spending on Military, but Raising Enough Funding Will Be Tough", Intellinews, September 28, 2023, https://www.intellinews.com/ukraine-releases-2024-budget-plan-more-spending-on-military-but-raising-enough-funding-will-be-tough-294429/.[20] Andriy Karakuts, Yuriy Schedrin, and Oleksandra Davymuka, rep., "Future of Ukraine Workforce" Center for Applied Research, May 2023, https://cpd.com.ua/future-of-ukraine-workforce.pdf. [21] Andriy Karakuts, Yuriy Schedrin, Oleksandra Davymuka, "Future of Ukraine Workforce," Center for Applied Research, https://cpd.com.ua/future-of-ukraine-workforce.pdf. ; "Report on Ukraine Refugees," UN, Accessed November 15, 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.[22] Ella Libanova, "Ukraine's Demography in the Second Year of the Full-Fledged War," Focus Ukraine, June 27, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraines-demography-second-year-full-fledged-war.[23] "Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country," Razumkov Center, October 15, 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/en/component/k2/citizens-assessment-of-the-situation-in-the-country-trust-in-social-institutions-politicians-officials-and-public-figures-attitude-to-holding-national-elections-in-ukraine-before-the-end-of-the-war-september-2023.[24] "National Survey of Ukraine: October 2023," IRI/Rating Group, October 27, 2023, https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/vseukra_nske_opituvannya_m_zhnarodnogo_respubl_kanskogo_nstitutu_iri_zhovten2023.html. ; "When Elections Should Be Held, Attitudes Towards Online Voting and Possible Restrictions on Citiyens Rights," Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, October 30, 2023, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1309&page=1.[25] Sergiy Sdorenko and Tiny Kox, "Nobody Will Blame Ukraine If Post-War Elections Are Not Perfect." Interview with PACE President," Ukrainiska Pravda, May 16, 2023, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2023/05/16/7161793/.