Suchergebnisse

The nature of Dutch democracy, once considered a highly stable product of cooperation, compromise and consensus-seeking practices across socioeconomic and sociocultural lines, has changed. Whereas the accessibility and levels (not forms) of participation have changed little, autocratically led protest parties have won ground and in the polls draw support from a stable 15% – 17% of the electorate. Corruption prevention in politics, especially regarding party finances, appears to fall under the bar of international standards. Political rhetoric has grown increasingly polarized (or politicized) as the political middle is waning and extreme positions on either side are on the rise. The Dutch media landscape remains highly pluralistic, although there are some concerns about the growing concentration of media ownership, a situation aggravated by the present financial economic crisis, rapid commercialization, and international ownership of national media outlets. In legal arrangements, citizens" right to privacy is subject to pressures from the information revolution and the massive use of information technology (IT) in all kinds of policy fields, primarily relating to internal and external security. In addition, some conspicuous miscarriages of justice have spawned a public debate on the quality of the justice system, including the need for a special court charged with handling mistrials. Anti-terrorism and integration policies have put considerable pressure on the exercise of basic political liberties, such as the freedoms of speech, religion and press as well as protection against unreasonable search and seizure actions. Tough immigration laws have come under international legal scrutiny, in particular where the rights of children and family reunion are concerned. In short, although the quality of Dutch democracy remains satisfactory, it has suffered several blows in several areas. Policy-specific performance during the Balkenende IV government – the coalition cabinet formed by the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Labor (PvdA) and Christian Union (CU) parties – was in general incremental, save for the proposal to phase-in an extension of the pension age to 67 that was adopted by the cabinet in 2009. Policy performance in matters relating to internal and external safety remained adequate, although at rising public cost. The Health Care Insurance Act (Zvw) of 2006 was continued, although its impact on cost control issues and enhancing market-like competition between health care providers remains unclear. Stagnation continues to characterize environmental, research and development, and innovation policies alike. No changes have been made to education Netherlands report SGI 2011 | 4 policy, although it is now generally judged to be in crisis. Serious concerns have been raised about the lack of good teachers, literacy and numeracy skills among elementary students, and high attrition rates at all levels of education. As is the case in most other European countries, the financial and banking crisis (followed by the euro crisis) has proven detrimental to economic policy performance, which negatively affects prospects in almost all other policy areas. Strategic Outlook The long-term viability of the D utch polity depends on the acumen with which the three following challenges are treated: the state"s weakened fiscal position; facilitating technology innovation in order to develop an ecologically modernized and sustainable economy; and societal integration and coherence. (1) Improving the state"s weakened fiscal position. The state"s financial problems can in large part be attributed to recent bailouts of Dutch banks and financial businesses, as well as individual euro zone countries and the euro itself. An effective long-term solution to these fiscal problems therefore requires (domestic as well as European-level) reforms involving stricter regulation and oversight in order to improve risk-management. The Dutch government must also undertake substantive reforms in the banking and financial sector. (2) Improve technology innovation in order to ensure an ecologically modernized and sustainable economy. The Dutch government must invest more wisely in efforts targeting the transition to renewable and alternative energy sources, such as wind and solar energy. The government will also need to pursue a structural reform of the education system, which is in a state of crisis. (3) Facilitate societal integration and coherence while implementing flexicurity policies. The Dutch welfare state urgently needs reforms that ensure continued investment in human capital while protecting workers and families from the brunt of structural adjustments. Opportunities for combining work and family life ought to be expanded and improved. The pension system and the moribund state of its financial underpinning must also undergo reforms. Social coherence will not be advanced through tighter immigration and citizenship policies. Instead, policies focused on urban and residential area renewal should be sustained through adequate funding. Netherlands report SGI 2011 | 5 A sound, functional democracy requires clearly structured forms of issue-specific, interactive policy-making in which citizens" voices are represented. In tripartite governance structures like that of the Netherlands, the primacy of politics vis-à-vis markets and civil society ought to be reconfirmed. Where possible, politics should respect the self-regulation of citizen life and markets. But as the only institution capable of regulating tripartite relations, the state must also live up to its responsibilities in maintaining the framework in which democratic decision-making takes place.

Die hier vorgestellte Untersuchung des Vermögens privater Haushalte als ein möglicher Indikator für den Wohlstand einer Gesellschaft hat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland einen starken Anstieg der Vermögen seit 1970 aufgezeigt. Dies gilt sowohl für die makroökonomischen Resultate der Finanzierungsrechnung der Deutschen Bundesbank als auch für die mikroökonomischen Ergebnisse der Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben des Statistischen Bundesamts. Allerdings werden auch wesentliche Unterschiede im Aussagegehalt der einzelnen Datensätze deutlich. Während die Finanzierungsrechnung eine Steigerung des Nettovermögens um 808 Prozent in 27 Jahren aufweist (von 1,3 Billionen DM im Jahr 1970 auf 12,1 Billionen DM im Jahr 1997) lautet der entsprechende Prozentwert auf der Berechnungsbasis der Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben nur 280 Prozent in 25 Jahren bei einer wesentlich niedrigeren Gesamthöhe in späteren Untersuchungen (von 2,2 Billionen DM im Jahr 1973 auf nur 8,3 Billionen DM im Jahr 1998). Die Untersuchung der Daten der EVS hat aufgezeigt, welch große Bedeutung das Immobilienvermögen für die Vermögenssituation der privaten Haushalte hat. Allerdings ist es nicht so, dass alle Haushalte über Eigentum an Grund- und Hausbesitz verfügen. In Westdeutschland hat es zwar eine starke Steigerungen der Eigentümerquote seit 1961 gegeben. Seit 1993 ist jedoch eine Stagnation bei etwa 50 Prozent zu konstatieren. Die Analyse der Vermögensverteilung nur bezogen auf die westdeutschen Haushalte hat im Zeitraum von 1973 bis 1993 eine abnehmende Konzentration sowohl bei der Betrachtung der Anteile einzelner Haushaltsquintile am Nettogesamtvermögen als auch bei der Analyse des Gini-Koeffizienten ergeben. Allerdings hat sich dieser Trend in den Jahren bis 1998 nicht weiter fortgeführt. Für das Jahr 1998 ist in Westdeutschland feststellbar, dass die unteren 40 Prozent der Haushalte über praktisch kein Vermögen verfügen, während das oberste Quintil über 60 Prozent des Gesamtvermögens aufweisen kann. Für Ostdeutschland sind starke Anpassungstendenzen hin zu den Werten der westdeutschen Bundesländer festzustellen. Dies betrifft einerseits die absolute Höhe der Vermögenswerte, auch wenn diese bisher nur 38 Prozent des entsprechenden Wertes westdeutscher Haushalte bei einer Betrachtung der Durchschnittswerte je Haushalte im Jahr 1998 erreichen. Andererseits ist auch die Eigentümerquote an Haus- und Grundbesitz nach der Wiedervereinigung stark angestiegen. Durch dieses Immobilieneigentum auf breiterer Basis wird die Ungleichheit der Vermögensverteilung in Ostdeutschland im Zeitablauf etwas verringert, so dass der Gini-Koeffizient in den Jahren von 1993 zu 1998 leicht gesunken ist. Jedoch kann auch für die neuen Bundesländer festgestellt werden, dass die unteren 40 Prozent der Haushalte über praktisch kein Vermögen verfügen, während das oberste Quintil ostdeutscher Haushalte sogar über 70 Prozent des Gesamtvermögens aufweisen kann. Feststellbar ist weiterhin eine hohe Übereinstimmung der Vermögensverteilung in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Sowohl die Vermögensverteilung auf der Basis der Quintilswerte als auch die Resultate der Gini-Koeffizienten weisen ähnliche Ergebnisse auf, wobei eine starke Angleichungstendenz zwischen beiden Landesteilen gegeben ist. Diese Ähnlichkeit der Ergebnisse kann nur als erstaunlich bezeichnet werden, wenn man bedenkt, dass beide Landesteile für über 40 Jahre unterschiedlichen wirtschaftspolitischen Leitbildern gefolgt sind – die Bundesrepublik Deutschland der sozialen Marktwirtschaft und die Deutsche Demokratische Republik der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft. ; This investigation of the wealth of private households as a possible indicator for the prosperity of a society indicated a strong increase in wealth for the Federal Republic of Germany since 1970. This applies both to the macro-economic results of the financial accounting of the Deutsche Bundesbank and to the micro-economic results of the Income and Consumption Surveys of the Federal Statistical Office. However, substantial differences become clear in the content expressed by these two different sets of data. While the financial accounting of the Deutsche Bundesbank shows an increase of net assets of around 808 per cent over 27 years (from 1.3 trillion DM in the year 1970 to 12.1 trillion DM in 1997), calculations on the basis of the Income and Consumption Surveys yield a corresponding value of only 280 per cent in a 25-year period, with a substantially lower overall magnitude in later investigations (from 2.2 trillion DM in 1973 to only 8.3 trillion DM in 1998). Investigation of the EVS data pointed out the great importance of property for the wealth situation of private households. However, not every household has property in the form of housing and real estate. In West Germany, ownership rates have increased substantially since 1962. However, since 1993 these rates have stagnated at about 50 per cent. The analysis of the distribution of wealth for West German households yielded a decline in the concentration of wealth in the period from 1973 to 1993, both in terms of the shares of total wealth held by individual quintiles of households, and as expressed by the Gini coefficients. However, this trend did not continue in the years between 1993 and 1998. For the year 1998 it can be determined that the lowest 40 per cent of households in West Germany had practically no wealth, while the highest quintile claimed over 60 per cent of total assets. For East Germany, strong tendencies are established toward adapting to the values in the West German Länder. This concerns first the absolute level of net assets, even though in 1998 these amounted to just 38 per cent of the analogous value in West German households, in terms of the average value per household. Similarly, the ownership rates of housing and real estate also rose dramatically after reunification. The inequality of the distribution of wealth in East Germany was reduced somewhat by this broader basis of real-estate ownership over the course of time, such that the Gini coefficient decreased slightly in the period from 1993 to 1998. However, it is also true for the new Länder in the Federal Republic that the lowest 40 per cent of households have practically no wealth, while the highest quintile of East German households claim over 70 per cent of total assets, even higher than its share in West Germany. Furthermore, the distribution of wealth is remarkably congruous in East and West Germany. Both the distribution of wealth as expressed by the quintile values and the results of the Gini coefficients yield similar results, whereby the trend in both regions is toward convergence. The similarity of these results must be regarded as nothing less than amazing, considering that the two regions followed different economic models for over forty years: the social free-market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the socialist planned economy (Sozialistische Planwirtschaft) in the German Democratic Republic.

This investigation of the wealth of private households as a possible indicator for the prosperity of a society indicated a strong increase in wealth for the Federal Republic of Germany since 1970. This applies both to the macro-economic results of the financial accounting of the Deutsche Bundesbank and to the micro-economic results of the Income and Consumption Surveys of the Federal Statistical Office. However, substantial differences become clear in the content expressed by these two different sets of data. While the financial accounting of the Deutsche Bundesbank shows an increase of net assets of around 808 per cent over 27 years (from 1.3 trillion DM in the year 1970 to 12.1 trillion DM in 1997), calculations on the basis of the Income and Consumption Surveys yield a corresponding value of only 280 per cent in a 25-year period, with a substantially lower overall magnitude in later investigations (from 2.2 trillion DM in 1973 to only 8.3 trillion DM in 1998). Investigation of the EVS data pointed out the great importance of property for the wealth situation of private households. However, not every household has property in the form of housing and real estate. In West Germany, ownership rates have increased substantially since 1962. However, since 1993 these rates have stagnated at about 50 per cent. The analysis of the distribution of wealth for West German households yielded a decline in the concentration of wealth in the period from 1973 to 1993, both in terms of the shares of total wealth held by individual quintiles of households, and as expressed by the Gini coefficients. However, this trend did not continue in the years between 1993 and 1998. For the year 1998 it can be determined that the lowest 40 per cent of households in West Germany had practically no wealth, while the highest quintile claimed over 60 per cent of total assets. For East Germany, strong tendencies are established toward adapting to the values in the West German Länder. This concerns first the absolute level of net assets, even though in 1998 these amounted to just 38 per cent of the analogous value in West German households, in terms of the average value per household. Similarly, the ownership rates of housing and real estate also rose dramatically after reunification. The inequality of the distribution of wealth in East Germany was reduced somewhat by this broader basis of real-estate ownership over the course of time, such that the Gini coefficient decreased slightly in the period from 1993 to 1998. However, it is also true for the new Länder in the Federal Republic that the lowest 40 per cent of households have practically no wealth, while the highest quintile of East German households claim over 70 per cent of total assets, even higher than its share in West Germany. Furthermore, the distribution of wealth is remarkably congruous in East and West Germany. Both the distribution of wealth as expressed by the quintile values and the results of the Gini coefficients yield similar results, whereby the trend in both regions is toward convergence. The similarity of these results must be regarded as nothing less than amazing, considering that the two regions followed different economic models for over forty years: the social free-market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the socialist planned economy (Sozialistische Planwirtschaft) in the German Democratic Republic. ; Die Entwicklung des aggregierten Privatvermögens und seine Verteilung in Deutschland seit 1970 Die hier vorgestellte Untersuchung des Vermögens privater Haushalte als ein möglicher Indikator für den Wohlstand einer Gesellschaft hat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland einen starken Anstieg der Vermögen seit 1970 aufgezeigt. Dies gilt sowohl für die makroökonomischen Resultate der Finanzierungsrechnung der Deutschen Bundesbank als auch für die mikroökonomischen Ergebnisse der Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben des Statistischen Bundesamts. Allerdings werden auch wesentliche Unterschiede im Aussagegehalt der einzelnen Datensätze deutlich. Während die Finanzierungsrechnung eine Steigerung des Nettovermögens um 808 Prozent in 27 Jahren aufweist (von 1,3 Billionen DM im Jahr 1970 auf 12,1 Billionen DM im Jahr 1997) lautet der entsprechende Prozentwert auf der Berechnungsbasis der Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben nur 280 Prozent in 25 Jahren bei einer wesentlich niedrigeren Gesamthöhe in späteren Untersuchungen (von 2,2 Billionen DM im Jahr 1973 auf nur 8,3 Billionen DM im Jahr 1998). Die Untersuchung der Daten der EVS hat aufgezeigt, welch große Bedeutung das Immobilienvermögen für die Vermögenssituation der privaten Haushalte hat. Allerdings ist es nicht so, dass alle Haushalte über Eigentum an Grund- und Hausbesitz verfügen. In Westdeutschland hat es zwar eine starke Steigerungen der Eigentümerquote seit 1961 gegeben. Seit 1993 ist jedoch eine Stagnation bei etwa 50 Prozent zu konstatieren. Die Analyse der Vermögensverteilung nur bezogen auf die westdeutschen Haushalte hat im Zeitraum von 1973 bis 1993 eine abnehmende Konzentration sowohl bei der Betrachtung der Anteile einzelner Haushaltsquintile am Nettogesamtvermögen als auch bei der Analyse des Gini-Koeffizienten ergeben. Allerdings hat sich dieser Trend in den Jahren bis 1998 nicht weiter fortgeführt. Für das Jahr 1998 ist in Westdeutschland feststellbar, dass die unteren 40 Prozent der Haushalte über praktisch kein Vermögen verfügen, während das oberste Quintil über 60 Prozent des Gesamtvermögens aufweisen kann. Für Ostdeutschland sind starke Anpassungstendenzen hin zu den Werten der westdeutschen Bundesländer festzustellen. Dies betrifft einerseits die absolute Höhe der Vermögenswerte, auch wenn diese bisher nur 38 Prozent des entsprechenden Wertes westdeutscher Haushalte bei einer Betrachtung der Durchschnittswerte je Haushalte im Jahr 1998 erreichen. Andererseits ist auch die Eigentümerquote an Haus- und Grundbesitz nach der Wiedervereinigung stark angestiegen. Durch dieses Immobilieneigentum auf breiterer Basis wird die Ungleichheit der Vermögensverteilung in Ostdeutschland im Zeitablauf etwas verringert, so dass der Gini-Koeffizient in den Jahren von 1993 zu 1998 leicht gesunken ist. Jedoch kann auch für die neuen Bundesländer festgestellt werden, dass die unteren 40 Prozent der Haushalte über praktisch kein Vermögen verfügen, während das oberste Quintil ostdeutscher Haushalte sogar über 70 Prozent des Gesamtvermögens aufweisen kann. Feststellbar ist weiterhin eine hohe Übereinstimmung der Vermögensverteilung in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Sowohl die Vermögensverteilung auf der Basis der Quintilswerte als auch die Resultate der Gini-Koeffizienten weisen ähnliche Ergebnisse auf, wobei eine starke Angleichungstendenz zwischen beiden Landesteilen gegeben ist. Diese Ähnlichkeit der Ergebnisse kann nur als erstaunlich bezeichnet werden, wenn man bedenkt, dass beide Landesteile für über 40 Jahre unterschiedlichen wirtschaftspolitischen Leitbildern gefolgt sind – die Bundesrepublik Deutschland der sozialen Marktwirtschaft und die Deutsche Demokratische Republik der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft.

Book Reviews in This Article:H. P. R. Finberg and V. H. T. Skipp. Local History: Objective and Pursuit.J. S. Cockburn, H. P. F. King, and K. G. T. McDonnell (Eds). A History of the County of Middlesex, vol. i. Victoria History of the Counties of England.A. T. Gaydon (Ed.). A History of the County of Shropshire, vol. VIII. Victoria History of the Counties of England.G. R. Elvey (Ed.). Luffield Priory Charters. Part 1.J. Z. Titow. English Rural Society, 1200‐1350.Joyce Youings. Tuckers Hall, Exeter: the History of a Provincial City Company through Five Centuries.James E. Oxley. The Fletchers and Longbowstringmakers of London.G. G. Cruickshank. Army Royal: an Account of Henry VIII's Invasion of France, 1513.R. B. Outhwaite. Inflation in Tudor and Early Stuart England.Edwin Welch (Ed.). The Admiralty Court Book of Southampton, 1566‐1585.Shelagh Bond (Ed.). The First Hall Book of the Borough of Mew Windsor, 1653‐1J25.H. E. S. Fisher (Ed.). The South‐West and the Sea. 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Over the last decade, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs have become one of the most widely adopted anti-poverty initiatives in the developing world. Inspired particularly by Mexico's successful program, CCTs are viewed as an effective way to provide basic income support while building children's human capital. These programs have had a remarkable global expansion, from a handful programs in the late 1990s to programs in close to 30 countries today, including a demonstration program in the United States. In contrast to many other safety net programs in developing countries, CCTs have been closely studied and well evaluated, creating both a strong evidence base from which to inform policy decisions and an active global community of practice. This paper first reviews the emergence of CCTs in the context of a key theme in welfare reform, notably using incentives to promote human capital development, going beyond the traditional focus on income support. The paper then examines what has been learned to date from the experience with CCTs in the South and raises a series of questions concerning the relevance and replicability of these lessons in other contexts. The paper concludes with a call for further knowledge sharing in two areas: between the North and South as the experience with welfare reform and CCTs in particular expands, and between behavioral science and welfare policy.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

The concept of producing energy from biomass has, for the last two decades, occupied attention of policy-makers, private industries, researchers and civil societies around the world. The highly contested and contingent character of the biofuel production, its entanglement in the nexus of three problematic issues of energy, climate and agriculture, as well as its injection into the current socioeconomic arrangements, is what makes it timely to analyse. The thesis sheds light on the state of international debate on bioenergy by looking at deliberations of three major global institutions: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Energy Agency (IEA) and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The primary aim is to trace and analyse how the concept of bioenergy is conceptualized and contextualized in assessments, reports, policy papers and other documents issued by FAO, IEA and IPCC in the 1990-2010 period. The secondary aim of the thesis, based on results derived from the primary objective, is set to problematize and reflect upon currently dominating socioeconomic arrangements that the concept of biomass-derived energy is inserted into. The research questions are organized around four distinctively contentious issues in the debate: biofuel production in developing countries, the food vs. fuel dilemma, bioenergy as a win-win-win solution and the future role of the second-generation bioenergy technology. The research questions are operationalized by applying four theoretical perspectives: the world-economy, Michel Foucault's genealogy, discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and Fredric Jameson's critical approach. The institutional debate illustrates that, while bioenergy appears to be an easy, plausible and thus attractive patch able to temporarily fix societal challenges of energy insecurity, climate change and agricultural crisis without changing much in the socioeconomic structure, its implementation exposes internal discrepancies of the hegemonic capitalist system. Whether bioenergy could actually function as a feasible win-win-win solution is of secondary importance. It is its economic feasibility expressed in the pressure on cost-effectiveness that matters the most but, at the same time, causes serious internal discrepancies in conceptualizations pursued by the organizations. The results point to two main conclusions. On the one hand, bioenergy is inevitably entrapped by the rules and arrangements of the hegemonic system that, in turn, cause internal contradictions. On the other hand, the institutional debate attempts to stabilize the shaky conceptualization of bioenergy, so that it can appear consistent and plausible, even if the possibility of reaching the closure of meaning fades away, with more conflicts on the rise. Furthermore, the results also show that the three international organizations exhibit uniform patterns of argumentations and the way they similarly discuss biomass-derived energy illustrates the objective to stabilize the meaning and adjust the concept of bioenergy to the hegemonic system. ; Under de senaste två decennierna har idén om att producera energi av biomassa rönt stor uppmärksamhet bland forskare, företagare, beslutsfattare och i samhället i övrigt. De förhållandevis många kontroverser och alternativ som är förbundna med produktion av biobränslen, deras koppling till de tre problemområdena energi, klimat och jordbruk, samt deras etablering inom samtida geopolitiska, socioekonomiska och miljömässiga sammanhang, gör dem till en aktuell fråga att analysera. Avhandlingen belyser den internationella debatten genom att fokusera överväganden och ståndpunkter inom tre globala institutioner: FN:s mat- och jordbruksorgan (FAO), Internationella Energiorganet (IEA) och FN:s klimatpanel (IPCC). Huvudsyftet är spåra och analysera hur begreppet bioenergi formas och kontextualiseras i bedömningsrapporter och policydokument producerade av FAO, IEA och IPCC under perioden 1990-2010. Ett ytterligare syfte är att problematisera och reflektera över de socioekonomiska förhållanden som bioenergibegreppet ingår i. Forskningsfrågorna är formulerade utifrån fyra kontroversiella områden i debatten: biobränsleproduktion i utvecklingsländer, dilemmat mat kontra biobränsle, bioenergi som en "win-win-win-lösning" och den framtida roll som tillskrivs andra generationens bioteknologi. Forskningsfrågorna operationaliseras genom att var och en knyts till ett av fyra teoretiska perspektiv: världssystemteori, Michel Foucaults genealogi, Ernesto Laclaus och Chantal Mouffes diskursteori respektive Fredric Jamesons kritiska ansats. I debatten framställs ofta bioenergi som ett enkelt och rimligt alternativ med kapacitet att tillfälligt lösa samhälleliga utmaningar som energi-osäkerhet, klimatförändringar och jordbrukskrisen, dock utan att den socioekonomiska strukturen ändras nämnvärt. Analysen visar emellertid att begreppsliggörandet istället påvisar interna diskrepanser i det hegemoniska, kapitalistiska systemet. Huruvida bioenergi verkligen kan fungera som en sådan "win-win-win"- lösning framstår som sekundärt i dessa texter. Det är kostnadseffektiviteten som har störst betydelse, men samtidigt skapar man här allvarliga begreppsliga diskrepanser inom organisationerna. Utfallet av analysen pekar på två huvudslutsatser. Å ena sidan är bioenergin oundvikligen låst av det hegemoniska systemets struktur och de motsägelser som det rymmer. Å andra sidan tycks debatten inom organisationerna söka efter en stabilisering av det instabila begreppsliggörandet av bioenergin så att den framstår som konsistent och möjlig. Vidare visar analysen också att de tre organisationerna har liknande argumentationsmönster, och det likartade sätt på vilket de diskuterar energi från biomassa illustrerar en stabilisering av mening inom diskursen där bioenergibegreppet anpassas till det hegemoniska systemet.

This paper studies the possibility of using financial regulation that prohibits the use of money substitutes as a tool for mitigating the adverse effects of deviations from the Friedman rule. When inflation is not too high regulation aimed at eliminating money substitutes improves welfare by economizing on transaction costs. The gains from regulation depend on the distribution of income and the level of direct taxation. The area under the demand for money curve is equal to the welfare cost of inflation only when there are no direct taxes and no proportional intermediation cost: otherwise, the area under the demand curve overstates the welfare cost of inflation when money substitutes are not important and understates the welfare cost when money substitutes are important.