Suchergebnisse

The study investigates the effects of Cohesion Policy (CP) which occur in a country other than the one in which CP resources were actually spent. The study estimates that macroeconomic spillovers significantly contribute to the impact of CP. Spillovers directed to EU countries represent around 9% of the total annual CP expenditure. Other spillovers to Non-EU countries are around 8% of the CP expenditure. Macro and micro spillovers together arrive at 21% of the annual CP expenditure, 67% of which is distributed among EU countries. Around 20% of the CP expenditure can trigger sectoral spillover effects in the environment, transport and higher education sectors. The analysis demonstrates that externalities reinforce EU growth and competitiveness without CP deserting its convergence objective.

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of European Cohesion Policy in the regions of 12 EU countries in the period 1991–2008, on the basis of a spatial growth model, which allows for the identification of both direct and indirect effects of EU funds on GDP per worker growth. We find that "Objective 1" funds are characterized by strong spatial externalities and a positive and concave effect on the growth of GDP per worker, which reaches a peak at the ratio funds/GDP of approximately 3 percent and becomes non-significant after 4 percent. "Objective 2" and "Cohesion" funds have nonsignificant effects, while all the other funds exert a positive and significant effect, but their size is very limited. EU Cohesion Policy, moreover, appears to have increased its effectiveness over time. In the period 2000–2006 Objective 1 funds are estimated to have a median multiplier equal to 1.52, and to have added 0.37 percent to the GDP per worker growth. Overall, in the period 1991–2008, funds are estimated to have added 1.4 percent to the median annual growth, and to have reduced regional disparities of 8 basis points in terms of the Gini index.

Introduction: Understanding the Effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy -- The Evaluation of EU Cohesion Policy -- A Different Approach to Evaluating Cohesion Policy : Theory-Based Evaluation -- What was the Problem? Regional Development Challenges and Needs -- Regional Strategies and their Relevance to Needs -- The Effectiveness of Programmes in Achieving Objectives -- The Relevance of Programmes to Regional Needs : Utility-- Implications for the Design and Implementation of Policies and Programmes -- Conclusions

Network-based arrangements are increasingly used for policy implementation. Arguments are made for the potential benefits of this approach, but evidence of their efficiency is inconclusive. Recent methodological innovations, incorporating social network analysis, are building the evidence base. This article contributes to a growing area of study by exploring the relationship between the efficient implementation of European Union cohesion policy projects, and the characteristics of the networks involved in the implementation process. The research combined quantitative analysis of implementation of projects in Scotland in 2007–2013 and semi-structured interviews. The research finds that the involvement of many partners can have a negative impact on implementation. Rather, the strategic position of key actors in the network is important for efficient implementation. The results stress the importance of network governance and the role of key agents as nodes that bridge structural gaps and facilitate exchange of knowledge and resources.

Spain has enjoyed large net inflows of public funds from the European Union (EU) since accession in 1986. These funds have contributed to a strong growth performance, a largely successful economic transition, and economic convergence. Enlargement of the EU has transformed Spain's relative
position from that of a poor country to that of a middle-income one, thus reducing its claim on EU funding. Lower levels of funding under the next EU financial perspective (2007–13) and a reformed cohesion policy will affect the model of economic development and will have domestic and
external political consequences. Adapting to European enlargement, a new funding relationship with Europe and a reformed cohesion policy will require a rethinking of economic policy if the momentum of convergence is to be maintained.

ore than one third of the European Union's total budget is spent on socalled Cohesion Policy via the structural funds. Its main purpose is to promote the development of the EU and to support convergence between the levels of development of the various European regions. Investigating the impact of European Cohesion Policy on economic growth and convergence is a wide research topic in applied econometric research. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence has provided mixed, if not contradictory, results. Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to provide a fundamental review on this topic. Taking fundamental methodological issues into account, we review the existing econometric evaluation studies, draw several conclusions and provide some remarks for future research.

Some regions in Europe that have been heavily supported by the European Union's Cohesion Policy have recently opted for parties with a strong Eurosceptic orientation. The results at the ballot box have been put forward as evidence that Cohesion Policy is ineffective for tackling the rising, European-wide wave of discontent. However, the evidence to support this view is scarce and often contradictory. This paper analyses the link between Cohesion Policy and the vote for Eurosceptic parties. It uses the share of votes cast for Eurosceptic parties in more than 63,000 electoral districts in national legislative elections in the EU-28 to assess whether Cohesion Policy investment since the year 2000 has made a difference for the electoral support for parties opposed to European integration. The results indicate that Cohesion Policy investment is linked to a lower anti-EU vote. This result is robust to employing different econometric approaches, to considering the variety of European development funds, to different periods of investment, to different policy domains, to shifts in the unit of analysis and to different levels of opposition by parties to the European project.