Suchergebnisse

Since 2003, Peru has emerged as an open, rapidly growing economy. Over the review period of 2003-09, successive governments adopted policy platforms aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability, furthering the private sector supply response, broadening participation in growth, improving social service delivery, and strengthening public institutions. The World Bank Group (WBG) supported each of the three pillars of the government's poverty reduction strategy, namely: (i) broad-based economic growth that engaged a higher share of the population; (ii) enhanced human development through improved social service delivery; and (iii) strengthened public sector institutions. Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) recommends that the WBG: (i) tailor its strategy to support long-term integration of Peru's three distinct regions; (ii) seek opportunities to support large-scale infrastructure development; (iii) develop a more strategic approach to helping improve public sector management; (iv) seek further innovations in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD's) instruments against a backdrop of declining demand for its financial resources; (v) seek to help develop a strategic planning function in Peru; (vi) build a close strategic partnership with development partners that provides concessional finance in the social sectors to optimize synergies with IBRD policy lending and analytic and advisory activities; (vii) develop a strategic focus for International Finance Corporation (IFC) around employment- generating industries in emerging sectors; (viii) maintain IFC's additionality by supporting lower-tier and more regionally dispersed private companies; and (ix) leverage the strong country presence of IBRD and IFC to enhance Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency's (MIGA's) marketing and risk assessment functions.

Infrastructure has contributed significantly to the growth of West African economies during the past decade. In Sierra Leone, infrastructure added only around 0.51 percentage points to the per capita growth rate over 2003-07. Similarly to other countries in the region and the rest of the continent, the boost to historic growth came predominately from the ICT (Information and Telecommunications Technology) revolution while power-sector deficiencies and poor roads held back growth. After nine years of peace, economic activity is flourishing at every level in Sierra Leone. Political stability, high government accountability, good governance standards, and streamlined tax reform helped Sierra Leone to become a bright success story, turning the country into the easiest and quickest place to start business in West Africa. Sierra Leone's image in the eyes of investors is strengthened as the country ranked as one of the top five countries in Africa for investor protection. Looking ahead, the country faces a number of critical infrastructure challenges. Perhaps the most daunting of these challenges lies in the power sector, the poor state of which retards development of other sectors. Access to power is very low, at around 1 to 5 percent in urban areas, and is nonexistent in the countryside. The country's installed power-generation capacity is around 13 megawatts per million people, which is lower than what other low-income and fragile states have installed. The entire existing power infrastructure is concentrated in the western part of the country, and even with the functioning of the Bumbuna power plant, only half the suppressed demand for Freetown, let alone that for the rest of the country, is being met. Regardless of recent reduction in tariffs, Sierra Leoneans still pay some of the highest tariffs in Africa. In 2010, Sierra Leoneans paid three times as much for power as did residents of African countries that relied on hydropower. Making investments in more cost-effective power generation options is therefore an important strategic objective for Sierra Leone, without which further electrification will simply be unaffordable for the wider population.

Doing business in the East African Community 2011 is a regional report that draws on the global doing business project and its database as well as the findings of doing business 2011: making a difference for entrepreneurs, the eighth in a series of annual reports investigating regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 183 economies from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe over time. This report presents a summary of doing business indicators for the East African Community. It focuses on five economies: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Data in doing business 2011 are current as of June 1, 2010. The indicators are used to analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms have worked, where and why. The methodology for the employing workers indicators changed for doing business 2011.

The seminar "The European Union and the fragmentation of international trade: a view from Barcelona", organised in collaboration with the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona and with the support of the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce, took place on December 13th, 2023. The experts present provided insights on how the European Union and Barcelona are responding to the fragmentation of international trade.







Antoni Segura, the president of CIDOB, introduced the seminar by positing that the liberal international order is splitting into two blocs, one around the United States and the other led by China. These blocs are also beginning to emerge in the system of international trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Annual Report 2023 warns of signs of fragmenting international trade along these lines. Commerce between "hypothetical blocs" has grown by between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. The European Union (EU), then, whether it looks east or west, is faced by actors who are undermining the rules-based system of international trade. Oriol Illa, from the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, said that understanding the EU's response to this international situation is crucial to be able to take public administration decisions in Barcelona as there is a direct and significant relationship between macro and micro policies.The CIDOB seminar began with an opening address from Ignacio García Bercero, a director at the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission, who explained the EU's response to fragmenting trade. He was followed by a panel of experts who elaborated on the issues highlighted by Mr García Bercero. This briefing provides a summary of the main ideas discussed. Overall, the experts agreed the EU is ready to defend itself from aggressive geo-economic action on the part of third countries, even if that means lowering its trade openness sights. Chinese investment will continue to come to Barcelona, but it may be limited in the tech field.1. EU responseIgnacio García Bercero kicked off the seminar with a review of the current international political instability. He recalled that the EU's goal is to secure strategic autonomy while limiting the fragmentation of international trade as much as possible, even if some degree of fragmentation is inevitable. He also outlined the European economic security strategy, which is based on three pillars: (1) promoting competitiveness and reinforcing the resilience of the single market; (2) protecting itself from external economic coercion; and (3) strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries. EU trade policy supports the pursuit of this strategy through its three lines of work: the multilateral agenda, the bilateral agenda and the development and implementation of a toolbox of "autonomous instruments".At multilateral level, the EU remains committed to the future of the WTO. The WTO is at a critical juncture and faces three possible scenarios. The first is for things to remain as they are where the WTO continues to have a marginal but useful role, though this scenario is unrealistic. The second is further fragmentation of international trade where the WTO plays an even smaller part. The final scenario is a reform of the WTO, increasing its relevance in international trade. Reform must mean that the WTO contributes to goals such as the green transition or sustainable development, agrees new rules on services, digital trade, subsidies and investments, and restores the dispute settlement system. The EU is working to make the reform happen and the next step is to delve deeper into this issue at the upcoming ministerial conference in February. At present, China is more active in the WTO than the United States and has yielded to allow an agreement on fisheries subsidies. But it will be much harder for it to back down on key elements of its agenda such as industrial subsidies.The EU's bilateral agenda continues to be the most ambitious in the world, in contrast to the United States. Recently, the commission has signed agreements or modernisations of agreements with New Zealand, Kenya and Chile, and remains ready to do the same with Mercosur and Mexico, as well as to continue negotiations with India, plus Indonesia and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. Still, the EU must relax its approach to bilateral negotiations. Rather than negotiating only global agreements, it is necessary to think about other more specific and flexible forms of free trade, like the agreement on investment with Angola or on digital trade with Japan. In addition, it is important to look at how trade policy can interact with other policies such as development or regulatory cooperation. For its trade agreements, the EU thinks in terms of value chains to promote its diversification while ensuring security of supply. It should not limit itself to like-minded countries alone.Lastly, the EU has autonomous instruments that can be classified into three types. The traditional level playing field instruments include its anti-dumping and anti-subsidies tools, to which it has added instruments to control the subsidising of foreign companies operating in the single market, or on reciprocity in public procurement. Regarding the instruments in this first group, effective and vigorous implementation is a must. The second group comprises the European Green Deal instruments like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and deforestation or due diligence regulations. These tools help Europe to achieve its decarbonisation goals, but at the same time they have an adverse effect on our relations with developing countries. The ambition is to reconcile the two goals, and one way of doing it could be through trade facilitation. The last group covers economic security tools that include foreign investment and dual-use export controls and the anti-coercion instrument. Unlike the other groups of instruments that require improvements in implementation, the economic security tools require better policy development. That is why the commission will shortly present a proposal for an instrument to control outbound investment. China appears to be more concerned about the autonomous instruments than the United States.In Mr García Bercero's view, EU trade policy has evolved. Now it must not only try to preserve and boost trade multilateralism, as well as further bilateral and regional freed trade agreements, it must also protect the environment and ensure security – for example, through de-risking or reduced dependence on a single supplier for risk products in sectors such as the critical minerals required in new technologies.2. Is this the best response?Oscar Guinea, a senior economist at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), opened the panel discussion by criticising the imbalance in trade policy over the last few years. Much greater weight has been given to defensive action (new instruments) recently, rather than going on the front foot (new free trade area agreements), and this has had a negative effect on trade. If the EU is to achieve its goals, to be at the forefront of technology and decarbonisation while maintaining strategic autonomy, it must increase its access to markets and boost its resilience. This requires more ambitious agreements that lower the cost of trade.Jerónimo Maillo, professor of Public International Law and International Relations at CEU University San Pablo, shared some ideas about the new outbound investment screening instrument that the European Commission will propose in 2024. The instrument's main goal is national security, as it will try to prevent key technologies from falling into the hands of rivals. National security is the responsibility of each member state in the EU and, therefore, one would expect a framework instrument, as in the case of the screening of inbound investment, which limits the EU's role to coordination. In terms of its scope, it may well only cover direct investments and those in certain tech areas at first. Some countries like Germany are already drawing up national instruments of this type, so it will require swift action on the part of the EU. In Mr Guinea's view, autonomous instruments – this one included – could increase the EU's bargaining power with China, though he pointed out that this would only be possible if the measures were discretionary rather than automatic.Olga Baus Gibert, deputy head of unit at the Directorate General for International Partnerships of the European Commission, laid out the Global Gateway that seeks to change the EU's relations with developing countries by facing the triple climate, demographic and digital transition together. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, this will be achieved with an investment agenda that has clear public policy goals. These projects will be delivered through a "team Europe" approach that includes not just the EU institutions and member states, but also development banks (including the European Investment Bank) and private companies. The Global Gateway can help European industry to export while also helping to limit the impact of the autonomous instruments in third countries. China feels threatened by the Global Gateway as it (unsuccessfully) lobbied Latin American countries to reject a digital partnership with the EU in the framework of the initiative.Luís Pinheiro, senior economist at CaixaBank Research, went next with a presentation on de-risking. He said that when developed countries try to reduce their dependence on certain Chinese products, rather than de-risking triangulation occurs. For example, while trade between the United States and China in certain goods has fallen, US trade with Vietnam in those same products has doubled, and trade between China and Vietnam has increased by 40%. This would suggest that Chinese companies relocate to Vietnam in order to continue exporting to the United States. Thus, rather than de-risking it appears to be leading to a diversion of trade flows and it may make value chains less transparent. In the short term, there is no alternative to China in terms of regional specialisation, though we are witnessing a reconfiguration of value chains, the scale of which is unknown. To paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, we could be looking at "a globalisation with Chinese characteristics".The final speaker on the panel, Josep Maria Gomes, international business developer at the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce, spoke of Barcelona's enduring appeal to investors, especially Chinese investors. There has been an increase in interest from Chinese firms to invest in Barcelona through the creation of their own establishments and trade networks. In addition, they are beginning to want to sell with their brand rather than as others' house brands. Barcelona entrepreneurs have tried to diversify their suppliers by seeking alternatives in India, but they have found that the main suppliers in India are Chinese, making diversification futile.Ignacio García Bercero wanted to close the round of contributions by emphasising that while it is true the balance appears to have tipped in favour of trade defence instruments, that has not been the case as far as the commission's work and effort is concerned. Closing a free trade agreement is a long and arduous process, as is the reform of the WTO. He also pointed out that the EU can only move forward on economic security with more and better coordination and treading very carefully, as it is an issue of national responsibility. On the subject of de-risking, diversification from China's value chains is achievable, but only in the medium term and it only makes sense if it focuses on a small number of products linked to defence and technology.3. ConclusionThe seminar made it clear that the EU has taken steps to defend itself from aggressive geo-economic action, though its goal remains rules-based trade centred around the WTO. What the EU is doing is blocking any attempt by third countries to get their hands on its technology, be it by investing in the EU or by attracting investment from European companies.The EU has no wish to depend on certain strategic products from countries that offer only limited supply guarantees. It also wants to maintain good relations with developing countries. The Global Gateway is a tool that can help achieve both goals and, moreover, foster the internationalisation of companies from Barcelona.Barcelona will continue to receive Chinese investment. Problems will only arise if the targets of investment are tech companies.

The seminar "The European Union and the fragmentation of international trade: a view from Barcelona", organised in collaboration with the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona and with the support of the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce, took place on December 13th, 2023. The experts present provided insights on how the European Union and Barcelona are responding to the fragmentation of international trade.Antoni Segura, the president of CIDOB, introduced the seminar by positing that the liberal international order is splitting into two blocs, one around the United States and the other led by China. These blocs are also beginning to emerge in the system of international trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Annual Report 2023 warns of signs of fragmenting international trade along these lines. Commerce between "hypothetical blocs" has grown by between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022. The European Union (EU), then, whether it looks east or west, is faced by actors who are undermining the rules-based system of international trade. Oriol Illa, from the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, said that understanding the EU's response to this international situation is crucial to be able to take public administration decisions in Barcelona as there is a direct and significant relationship between macro and micro policies.The CIDOB seminar began with an opening address from Ignacio García Bercero, a director at the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission, who explained the EU's response to fragmenting trade. He was followed by a panel of experts who elaborated on the issues highlighted by Mr García Bercero. This briefing provides a summary of the main ideas discussed. Overall, the experts agreed the EU is ready to defend itself from aggressive geo-economic action on the part of third countries, even if that means lowering its trade openness sights. Chinese investment will continue to come to Barcelona, but it may be limited in the tech field.1. EU responseIgnacio García Bercero kicked off the seminar with a review of the current international political instability. He recalled that the EU's goal is to secure strategic autonomy while limiting the fragmentation of international trade as much as possible, even if some degree of fragmentation is inevitable. He also outlined the European economic security strategy, which is based on three pillars: (1) promoting competitiveness and reinforcing the resilience of the single market; (2) protecting itself from external economic coercion; and (3) strengthening partnerships with like-minded countries. EU trade policy supports the pursuit of this strategy through its three lines of work: the multilateral agenda, the bilateral agenda and the development and implementation of a toolbox of "autonomous instruments".At multilateral level, the EU remains committed to the future of the WTO. The WTO is at a critical juncture and faces three possible scenarios. The first is for things to remain as they are where the WTO continues to have a marginal but useful role, though this scenario is unrealistic. The second is further fragmentation of international trade where the WTO plays an even smaller part. The final scenario is a reform of the WTO, increasing its relevance in international trade. Reform must mean that the WTO contributes to goals such as the green transition or sustainable development, agrees new rules on services, digital trade, subsidies and investments, and restores the dispute settlement system. The EU is working to make the reform happen and the next step is to delve deeper into this issue at the upcoming ministerial conference in February. At present, China is more active in the WTO than the United States and has yielded to allow an agreement on fisheries subsidies. But it will be much harder for it to back down on key elements of its agenda such as industrial subsidies.The EU's bilateral agenda continues to be the most ambitious in the world, in contrast to the United States. Recently, the commission has signed agreements or modernisations of agreements with New Zealand, Kenya and Chile, and remains ready to do the same with Mercosur and Mexico, as well as to continue negotiations with India, plus Indonesia and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. Still, the EU must relax its approach to bilateral negotiations. Rather than negotiating only global agreements, it is necessary to think about other more specific and flexible forms of free trade, like the agreement on investment with Angola or on digital trade with Japan. In addition, it is important to look at how trade policy can interact with other policies such as development or regulatory cooperation. For its trade agreements, the EU thinks in terms of value chains to promote its diversification while ensuring security of supply. It should not limit itself to like-minded countries alone.Lastly, the EU has autonomous instruments that can be classified into three types. The traditional level playing field instruments include its anti-dumping and anti-subsidies tools, to which it has added instruments to control the subsidising of foreign companies operating in the single market, or on reciprocity in public procurement. Regarding the instruments in this first group, effective and vigorous implementation is a must. The second group comprises the European Green Deal instruments like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and deforestation or due diligence regulations. These tools help Europe to achieve its decarbonisation goals, but at the same time they have an adverse effect on our relations with developing countries. The ambition is to reconcile the two goals, and one way of doing it could be through trade facilitation. The last group covers economic security tools that include foreign investment and dual-use export controls and the anti-coercion instrument. Unlike the other groups of instruments that require improvements in implementation, the economic security tools require better policy development. That is why the commission will shortly present a proposal for an instrument to control outbound investment. China appears to be more concerned about the autonomous instruments than the United States.In Mr García Bercero's view, EU trade policy has evolved. Now it must not only try to preserve and boost trade multilateralism, as well as further bilateral and regional freed trade agreements, it must also protect the environment and ensure security – for example, through de-risking or reduced dependence on a single supplier for risk products in sectors such as the critical minerals required in new technologies.2. Is this the best response?Oscar Guinea, a senior economist at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), opened the panel discussion by criticising the imbalance in trade policy over the last few years. Much greater weight has been given to defensive action (new instruments) recently, rather than going on the front foot (new free trade area agreements), and this has had a negative effect on trade. If the EU is to achieve its goals, to be at the forefront of technology and decarbonisation while maintaining strategic autonomy, it must increase its access to markets and boost its resilience. This requires more ambitious agreements that lower the cost of trade.Jerónimo Maillo, professor of Public International Law and International Relations at CEU University San Pablo, shared some ideas about the new outbound investment screening instrument that the European Commission will propose in 2024. The instrument's main goal is national security, as it will try to prevent key technologies from falling into the hands of rivals. National security is the responsibility of each member state in the EU and, therefore, one would expect a framework instrument, as in the case of the screening of inbound investment, which limits the EU's role to coordination. In terms of its scope, it may well only cover direct investments and those in certain tech areas at first. Some countries like Germany are already drawing up national instruments of this type, so it will require swift action on the part of the EU. In Mr Guinea's view, autonomous instruments – this one included – could increase the EU's bargaining power with China, though he pointed out that this would only be possible if the measures were discretionary rather than automatic.Olga Baus Gibert, deputy head of unit at the Directorate General for International Partnerships of the European Commission, laid out the Global Gateway that seeks to change the EU's relations with developing countries by facing the triple climate, demographic and digital transition together. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, this will be achieved with an investment agenda that has clear public policy goals. These projects will be delivered through a "team Europe" approach that includes not just the EU institutions and member states, but also development banks (including the European Investment Bank) and private companies. The Global Gateway can help European industry to export while also helping to limit the impact of the autonomous instruments in third countries. China feels threatened by the Global Gateway as it (unsuccessfully) lobbied Latin American countries to reject a digital partnership with the EU in the framework of the initiative.Luís Pinheiro, senior economist at CaixaBank Research, went next with a presentation on de-risking. He said that when developed countries try to reduce their dependence on certain Chinese products, rather than de-risking triangulation occurs. For example, while trade between the United States and China in certain goods has fallen, US trade with Vietnam in those same products has doubled, and trade between China and Vietnam has increased by 40%. This would suggest that Chinese companies relocate to Vietnam in order to continue exporting to the United States. Thus, rather than de-risking it appears to be leading to a diversion of trade flows and it may make value chains less transparent. In the short term, there is no alternative to China in terms of regional specialisation, though we are witnessing a reconfiguration of value chains, the scale of which is unknown. To paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, we could be looking at "a globalisation with Chinese characteristics".The final speaker on the panel, Josep Maria Gomes, international business developer at the Barcelona Chamber of Commerce, spoke of Barcelona's enduring appeal to investors, especially Chinese investors. There has been an increase in interest from Chinese firms to invest in Barcelona through the creation of their own establishments and trade networks. In addition, they are beginning to want to sell with their brand rather than as others' house brands. Barcelona entrepreneurs have tried to diversify their suppliers by seeking alternatives in India, but they have found that the main suppliers in India are Chinese, making diversification futile.Ignacio García Bercero wanted to close the round of contributions by emphasising that while it is true the balance appears to have tipped in favour of trade defence instruments, that has not been the case as far as the commission's work and effort is concerned. Closing a free trade agreement is a long and arduous process, as is the reform of the WTO. He also pointed out that the EU can only move forward on economic security with more and better coordination and treading very carefully, as it is an issue of national responsibility. On the subject of de-risking, diversification from China's value chains is achievable, but only in the medium term and it only makes sense if it focuses on a small number of products linked to defence and technology.3. ConclusionThe seminar made it clear that the EU has taken steps to defend itself from aggressive geo-economic action, though its goal remains rules-based trade centred around the WTO. What the EU is doing is blocking any attempt by third countries to get their hands on its technology, be it by investing in the EU or by attracting investment from European companies.The EU has no wish to depend on certain strategic products from countries that offer only limited supply guarantees. It also wants to maintain good relations with developing countries. The Global Gateway is a tool that can help achieve both goals and, moreover, foster the internationalisation of companies from Barcelona.Barcelona will continue to receive Chinese investment. Problems will only arise if the targets of investment are tech companies.

The role of developing countries like India in climate action has undergone a shift in the last five to ten years. Several factors have led to this development. Firstly, with the signing of the Paris Agreement and its emphasis on bottom-pledges, all countries have become co-enactors to mitigation. Secondly, continued scientific research on co-benefits and climate damages has reduced the gap between mitigation and development priorities. Lastly, capital costs of renewable energy (RE) have plummeted making them cheaper than new coal plants in most countries, thereby providing a solid economic incentive to increase the share of RE. Despite these developments, decarbonisation of the power sector in low-income countries faces significant socio-economic and political barriers. This dissertation identifies some of those barriers, eventually suggesting policy solutions to overcome them. While one publication of this cumulative dissertation % I changed it here has a global scope, the other two papers focus on India, a country with low cumulative historic emissions, but is currently the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG). Per-capita energy consumption is still low, but it has one of the fastest growing electricity markets in the world. Thus, the policy decisions in the power sector in India can substantially affect the global goal to decarbonisation. The first publication identifies the risk of carbon lock-ins in the power sector if India were to continue a trajectory based on current policies. We find that continued investment into fossils could eventually lead to stranded assets in the future because of the faster pace of decarbonisation required in scenarios achieving the Paris Agreement goals. Since most of the stranding arises from plants yet to be built, it can be avoided through additional capacity installations of RE, i.e., increasing current ambition in RE-deployment and limiting new coal power plants to those under construction. Most of the additional capacity would come from solar and wind, given their large resource potentials and favourable economic viability in India. The expansion potential of other sources like gas, nuclear, and hydro remains low, owing to constraints on supply, cost, and construction duration. The second article uses different mitigation scenarios and analyses, on a global level but based on country-specific data, the labor market implications of a decarbonisation policies. Although ambitious policies supporting RE and discouraging coal power, e.g., through a coal moratorium, discussed above are favourable for (future) deep decarbonisation, they could lead to disruptive changes adversely affecting the employment situation, specifically the drastic losses in the fossil sector. We show that in the near-term, stringent mitigation results in a net increase in jobs compared to a weaker climate action scenario (based on currently pledged country objectives), mainly through gains in solar and wind jobs in construction, installation, and manufacturing, despite significantly higher losses in coal fuel supply. However, global energy jobs eventually peak, because the falling labour intensity (i.e. jobs per megawatt, due to increasing productivity) outpace increases in RE installations. In the future, total jobs are still higher in stringent mitigation than in a scenario with less mitigation with most people employed in the operation and maintenance of RE infrastructure, unlike fuel extraction today. Although stricter mitigation could lead to higher jobs globally, the role of employment in decarbonisation in specific regions could play out very differently. In countries with significant people employed in fossil-fuel industries, a just transition for those workers could become important. The third publication highlights that the regional mismatch of energy infrastructure in India could become a significant barrier to effective decarbonisation. Most of the coal mines and coal power plants in India are concentrated in the poorer eastern states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Jharkhand, where it is an important source of both employment and public economy. On the other hand, the best RE potentials in India are concentrated in the relatively wealthier western and southern states and are home to current and planned RE installations. Continued fossil investments in coal-bearing regions could widen this gap and in pathways to deep decarbonisation, strongly accelerate the loss of coal jobs. Without complementary opportunities, this would negatively impact the livelihood of people living in these areas. We show that dedicated policies to increase solar installations in coal regions could ensure early geographic diversification of solar energy. It could help build broad support for the energy transition, required for climate targets, and could give India important benefits in terms of avoided climate impacts and local health. At the same time, solar alone cannot provide a just transition and there is an urgent need for engagement with all stakeholders exploring challenges and other opportunities into the transition. In summary, despite the proliferation of climate considerations into decision-making at all political levels, there are still significant barriers to decarbonisation. Some of the most pressing challenges for fast-growing economies like India involve avoiding lock-ins in the power sector, which could have far-reaching consequences on the pace and cost of future decarbonisation. Higher-income nations could support the transition by providing cheaper RE-related finance and knowledge of increasing power system flexibility. At the same time, changes in the quantity and structure of jobs in the energy sector could also affect the pace of decarbonisation. Here, one key factor is the just transition of predominantly coal-bearing regions. The regional divide of fossil and RE assets and resources in India means that a regionally balanced transition from a fossil to a RE-based economy would not happen on its own; it needs dedicated policies supporting future solar installations in coal-bearing states. However, given the large size of the current coal workforce, additional solar capacity alone (in these regions) cannot replace all the lost jobs. It therefore requires to look for alternatives beyond the energy sector. ; Die Rolle von Entwicklungsländern wie Indien bei den Klimaschutzmaßnahmen hat sich in den letzten fünf bis zehn Jahren gewandelt. Mehrere Faktoren haben zu dieser Entwicklung geführt. Erstens sind mit der Unterzeichnung des Pariser Abkommens und seiner Betonung der "bottom-pledges" alle Länder zu Mitakteuren beim Klimaschutz geworden. Zweitens hat sich durch wissenschaftliche Forschung über Klimaschäden und positive Nebeneffekte von Klimaschutz die Kluft zwischen Minderungs- und Entwicklungsprioritäten verringert. Drittens sind die Kapitalkosten für erneuerbare Energien (EE) drastisch gesunken, so dass sie in den meisten Ländern billiger sind als neue Kohlekraftwerke, was einen verlässlichen wirtschaftlichen Anreiz zur Erhöhung des Anteils regenerativer Energien bietet. Trotz dieser Entwicklungen sind die sozioökonomischen und politischen Hindernisse für die Dekarbonisierung des Stromsektors in Ländern mit niedrigem Einkommen erheblich. In dieser Dissertation werden einige dieser Hindernisse aufgezeigt und schließlich politische Lösungen zu deren Überwindung vorgeschlagen. Während eine Publikation dieser kumulativen Dissertation eine globale Perspektive einnimmt, konzentrieren sich die anderen beiden Artikel l auf Indien, dessen kumulierte historische Emissionen gering sind, das jedoch derzeit der drittgrößte Emittent von Treibhausgasen (THG) ist. Der Pro-Kopf-Energieverbrauch ist immer noch niedrig, aber das Land hat einen der am schnellsten wachsenden Strommärkte der Welt. Daher können die politischen Entscheidungen im indischen Energiesektor das globale Ziel der Dekarbonisierung erheblich beeinflussen. In der ersten Publikation wird das Risiko von Kohlenstoff-Lock-Ins im Energiesektor aufgezeigt, wenn Indien den auf der aktuellen Politik basierenden Kurs fortsetzen würde. Wir zeigen, dass ein Fortsetzen der Investitionen in fossile Energieträger in der Zukunft zu "verlorenem Kapital" (stranded assets) führt, sobald die Dekarbonisierung derart beschleunigt wird, dass die Ziele des Pariser Abkommens in den analysierten Szenarien erreicht werden. Da die meisten dieser Fehlinvestitionen aus noch zu bauenden Anlagen stammen, können sie vermieden werden, wenn zusätzliche EE-Kapazitäten aufgebaut und neue Kohlekraftwerke auf die im Bau befindlichen beschränkt werden. Der größte Teil der zusätzlichen Kapazität würde aus Sonnen- und Windenergie stammen, da sie über ein großes Potenzial verfügen und in Indien wirtschaftlich rentabel sind. Das Ausbaupotenzial anderer Energieträger wie Gas, Kernkraft und Wasserkraft bleibt aufgrund von Einschränkungen bei Angebot, Kosteneffizienz und Bauzeit gering. Im zweiten Artikel werden verschiedene Minderungsszenarien verwendet und auf globaler Ebene, aber auf der Grundlage länderspezifischer Daten, die Auswirkungen einer Dekarbonisierungspolitik auf den Arbeitsmarkt analysiert. Obwohl ehrgeizige politische Maßnahmen zur Förderung von EE und zur Eindämmung der Kohleverstromung, z.B. durch ein Kohlemoratorium, wie oben erörtert für eine (künftige) tiefgreifende Dekarbonisierung günstig sind, könnten sie zu disruptiven Veränderungen führen, die sich nachteilig auf die Beschäftigungssituation auswirken, insbesondere durch drastische Verluste im fossilen Sektor. Wir zeigen, dass ein strenger Klimaschutz kurzfristig zu einem Nettozuwachs an Arbeitsplätzen im Vergleich zu einem schwächeren Klimaschutzszenario (basierend auf den derzeit zugesagten Länderzielen) führt, vor allem durch einen Zuwachs an Arbeitsplätzen in der Solar- und Windenergiebranche in den Bereichen Bau, Installation und Produktion, trotz deutlich höherer Arbeitsplatzverluste im Kohlesektor. Allerdings erreicht die Zahl der Arbeitsplätze im Energiesektor weltweit letztendlich ihren Höchststand, da die sinkende Arbeitsintensität (d. h. Arbeitsplätze/Megawatt, aufgrund steigender Produktivität) den Anstieg der EE-Installationen überkompensiert. In der Zukunft ist die Gesamtzahl der Arbeitsplätze bei schneller Dekarbonisierung immer noch höher als bei einem Szenario mit geringerem Klimaschutz, wobei die meisten Menschen nicht wie heute in der Brennstoffgewinnung, sondern im Betrieb und in der Wartung der EE-Infrastruktur beschäftigt sind. Obwohl strengerer Klimaschutz weltweit zu mehr Arbeitsplätzen führen könnte, könnten die Auswirkungen der Dekarbonisierung auf die Beschäftigung in einzelnen Regionen sehr unterschiedlich ausfallen. In Ländern, in denen viele Menschen in der Produktion fossiler Brennstoffe beschäftigt sind, könnte die Berücksichtigung sozialer Gerechtigkeit bei diesem Übergang im Sinne einer "just transition" wichtig werden. Im dritten Artikel wird hervorgehoben, dass das regionale Ungleichgewicht der Energieinfrastruktur in Indien zu einem erheblichen Hindernis für eine wirksame Dekarbonisierung werden könnte. Die meisten Kohleminen und Kohlekraftwerke in Indien befinden sich in den ärmeren östlichen Bundesstaaten Chhattisgarh, Odisha und Jharkhand, wo sie eine wichtige Stütze des Arbeitsmarkts und der öffentlichen Wirtschaft darstellen. Andererseits konzentrieren sich die besten EE-Potenziale in Indien auf die wohlhabenderen westlichen und südlichen Bundesstaaten, in denen bestehende und geplante EE-Anlagen zu finden sind. Fortgesetzte Investitionen in fossile Energieträger in den Kohleregionen könnten diese Kluft vergrößern und auf dem Weg zu einer tiefgreifenden Dekarbonisierung den Verlust von Arbeitsplätzen in der Kohleindustrie stark beschleunigen. Ohne Alternativmöglichkeiten würde sich dies negativ auf den Lebensunterhalt der in diesen Gebieten lebenden Menschen auswirken. Wir zeigen, dass gezielte Politikmaßnahmen, um Solaranlagen in Kohleregionen zu installieren, eine frühzeitige geografische Diversifizierung der Solarenergie sicherstellen könnten. Dies könnte dazu beitragen, eine breite Unterstützung für die Energiewende aufzubauen, die für die Erreichung der Klimaziele erforderlich ist, und Indien wichtige Vorteile im Hinblick auf die lokale Gesundheit un die Vermeidung von Klimaschäden bringen. Gleichzeitig kann die Solarenergie allein keinen gerechten Übergang sicherstellen, und es besteht dringender Bedarf, alle Interessengruppen zu beteiligen, um Herausforderungen und weitere Möglichkeiten für diesen Übergang zu identifizieren. Zusammenfassend gibt immer noch erhebliche Hindernisse für die Dekarbonisierung, obwohl Klimaaspekte bei der Entscheidungsfindung auf allen politischen Ebenen zunehmend berücksichtigt werden. Einige der dringendsten Herausforderungen für schnell wachsende Volkswirtschaften wie Indien bestehen darin, Lock-Ins im Energiesektor zu vermeiden, die weitreichende Folgen für das Tempo und die Kosten der künftigen Dekarbonisierung haben könnten. Länder mit höherem Einkommen könnten den Übergang unterstützen, in dem sie ihre Kenntnisse zur Erhöhung der Flexibilität des Stromsystems anbieten und für eine günstigere Finanzierung erneuerbarer Energien sorgen. Gleichzeitig könnten sich Veränderungen in der Anzahl und Struktur der Arbeitsplätze im Energiesektor auch auf das Tempo der Dekarbonisierung auswirken. Ein Schlüsselfaktor in diesem Zusammenhang ist ein gerechter Übergang in Regionen, in denen überwiegend Kohle gefördert wird. Die regionale Verteilung der fossilen und erneuerbaren Ressourcen in Indien bedeutet, dass ein regional ausgewogener Übergang von einer fossilen zu einer auf erneuerbaren Energien basierenden Wirtschaft nicht von alleine erfolgen würde; es bedarf spezieller politischer Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung des Baus von Solaranlagen in den bisher kohlefördernden Bundesstaaten. In Anbetracht der großen Zahl der derzeit im Kohlebergbau Beschäftigten können zusätzliche Solarkapazitäten allein (in diesen Regionen) jedoch nicht alle verlorenen Arbeitsplätze ersetzen. Daher muss nach Alternativen außerhalb des Energiesektors gesucht werden.

This thesis discusses policies, discourses and institutionalizations of the green economy in the Global South, and analyzes how the green economy is being implemented in the Global South particularly through the case of the new green revolution in Africa and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). The objective of the thesis is to examine how the green economy agenda is transferred from the global discursive level to implementation in the Global South and transformed in the process. The aim is to provide insights into the processes and mechanisms that guide green economy implementation in the Global South. The contribution of this study lies within the exploration and examination of how, as a global environmental discourse, the green economy translates to policy implementation and how it transforms in the process towards institutionalization in the Global South. Since the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, in 2012, "greening" economies and growth has been of key importance in international politics. Leading policy actors and businesses increasingly frame the emerging green economy as an opportunity to realize a triple-bottom line comprising people, planet and profit. A two-fold trend seems to have emerged in the global green shift. In the Global North, the green economy usually means market-based solutions and technological innovation to make energy sectors more environmentally sustainable. By contrast, in the Global South, green economy implementations often imply transformed and modernized management or utilization of – or control over – natural resources, often under schemes that are driven from abroad. While there is a growing body of research on various implementations and outcomes of the green economy, particularly technological innovations and market-based solutions, less attention has been paid to policy implications and governance aspects. This is especially the case for the Global South. For this reason, the aim of this study is to examine and discuss the processes and discursive powers that influence these trends. I apply an overall political ecology framework to understand how a global environmental discourse is translated into policies concerning the environment and natural resources. I explore how these policies are implemented in a developing country, on the basis of discursive powers and power structures. I use an overall discourse approach, especially the concepts of discourse institutionalization and governmentality, to explain how policies are formed and implemented in practice. Finally, I employ the concept of institutional bricolage to explain how the green economy has been adopted and reshaped in green economy institutionalization in the Global South. These theoretical approaches are framed in an overall critical realist epistemology. The research for this thesis has been undertaken by using a qualitative research design, and the data collection methods consisted particularly of qualitative interviews, document analysis, event ethnography, and discourse analysis. Part II of the thesis comprises three individual papers that all contribute to answering the research questions and fulfilling the study objectives. The papers discuss the implementation of the green economy in the Global South in different ways. However, common to all the three papers is the examination of how actors find new ways of opportunistically engaging with the green economy as an agenda and a discourse. All three papers explore a certain "spatial fix" element of green economy implementation in the Global South. Furthermore, they all explore some level of discourse institutionalization or influence, and draw on how discourses, informed by narratives, drive the green economy. Finally, the papers all show how a certain shift in management of natural resources is being formed by a modernization discourse under the implementation of the green economy in the Global South. This thesis extends existing research in three main ways. First, it demonstrates how discursive drivers informed by narratives influence green economy policies and agendas. Second, it examines how the green economy and the new green revolution for Africa have merged. Third, and finally, it empirically explores one example of a green economy implementation in the Global South, namely the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Based on the findings from this research, I argue that there is reason to claim that so far the green economy has not succeeded in fulfilling its ambitious targets, but rather it has led to two distinct processes when implemented in the Global South. One process is "grabbing green" and greenwashing due to the need for "spatial fixes" caused by dynamics inherent to capitalism. The other process is modernization of natural resource management, which may lead to transformed control over the use of natural resources, such as land, or transformation of agricultural practices. ; Denne avhandlingen diskuterer grønn økonomi som et globalt politisk og diskursivt rammeverk som for alvor fikk fotfeste på den internasjonale dagsordenen etter FN-toppmøtet i Rio i 2012 (Rio+20). Målet med denne studien er å undersøke og diskutere prosessen hvor grønn økonomi går fra å være en miljøstyringsdiskurs og et politisk rammeverk på globalt plan, til å bli implementert i det globale Sør gjennom ulike initiativer og miljøpolitiske retningslinjer. Studien bidrar med kunnskap om de prosessene, mekanismene og aktørene som styrer og påvirker implementeringen av grønn økonomi i det globale Sør. Grønn økonomi og vekst har vært sentralt på den internasjonale dagsordenen og for nasjonale regjeringer verden over siden Rio+20-toppmøtet. Men hvordan en grønn økonomi skal implementeres i praksis, er ikke like tydelig. Grovt sett kan vi skille mellom to ulike tilnærminger til implementering av grønn økonomi; i det globale Nord skjer denne oftest via markedsbaserte løsninger på klima- og miljøproblemer, samt en urokkelig tro på at teknologisk innovasjon skal løse utfordringene verden står ovenfor. I det globale Sør, derimot, ser grønn økonomi ut til å ofte innebære endringer og modernisering i forvaltningen av naturressurser, samt i hvordan disse utnyttes og kontrolleres i de såkalt grønne sektorene. Slik styring over naturressurser forekommer typisk i ulike «grønne» initiativer som er drevet av eksterne aktører, ofte via multinasjonale selskaper og privat utenlandsk sektor. Vi ser videre at ledende aktører innen beslutningstaking og næringsliv i økende grad benytter den sterkt fremvoksende grønne økonomien for å støtte oppunder og rettferdiggjøre sine egne ambisjoner, som ofte kan være relativt perifere fra den grønne økonomiens uttalte mål om bærekraftig utvikling, grønn vekst og fattigdomsreduksjon. Teknologiske og økonomiske aspekter ved den grønne økonomien er bredt diskutert i eksisterende forskning, men politiske og institusjonelle aspekter ved innføringen av grønn økonomi, særlig i utviklingsland, har ikke blitt viet like mye oppmerksomhet. Denne studien har derfor som mål å diskutere implikasjonene av, samt aktørene og de diskursive kreftene, som påvirker og styrer implementering av grønn økonomi. Studien tar utgangspunkt i politisk økologi for å forstå hvordan en global, hegemonisk miljøstyringsdiskurs overføres til politiske rammeverk innen naturressursforvaltning på nasjonalt og lokalt plan. Særlig er det interessant og aktuelt å se på dette via ulike maktperspektiver, samt hvordan disse politiske rammeverkene implementeres i det globale Sør. Videre er denne studien underordnet en diskursiv innramming, primært ved å benytte konseptene diskursinstitusjonalisering og 'governmentality' ('styringsmentalitet') for å forklare hvordan politiske rammeverk formes og blir implementert. Disse teoretiske tilnærmingene er forankret i den epistemologiske vitenskapsfilosofien kritisk realisme. Sist, men ikke minst, har jeg anvendt det teoretiske konseptet institusjonell 'bricolage' for å forklare hvordan grønn økonomi har blitt tatt i bruk og omformulert i institusjonaliseringen av grønn politikk og «grønne» initiativer i det globale Sør. Forskningen som danner det empiriske grunnlaget for denne avhandlingen, har blitt gjennomført under en kvalitativ metodologisk tilnærming, hvor datainnsamling hovedsakelig har bestått av dybdeintervjuer, dokumentanalyse, konferanseetnografi og diskursanalyse. Avhandlingen består av tre individuelle vitenskapelige artikler som alle bidrar til å svare på de forskningsspørsmålene studien stiller. De tre artiklene diskuterer implementeringen av grønn økonomi i det globale Sør på forskjellige måter. Felles for dem er likevel en redegjørelse for hvordan aktører finner nye måter å utnytte den grønne økonomien både som agenda og diskurs. Artiklene diskuterer i tillegg hvordan implementering av grønn økonomi bærer preg av kapitalismens behov for å ekspandere ('spatial fix'). Videre analyserer de hvordan diskurser påvirker politikk, strategier, retningslinjer og rammeverk, særlig hvordan narrativer og diskurser driver grønn økonomi. Endelig, og sentralt for hele avhandlingen, illustrerer alle tre artiklene hvordan inngripen i, og modernisering av, naturressursforvaltning er grunnleggende for hvordan grønn økonomi implementeres i det globale Sør. Avhandlingen utfyller eksisterende forskning på hovedsakelig tre måter. For det første demonstrerer den hvordan diskursive krefter og narrativer påvirker politiske strategier og retningslinjer for grønn økonomi. For det andre utforsker den hvordan den grønne økonomien og den nye, grønne revolusjonen i Afrika har blitt sammenblandet under felles mål og retorikk. For det tredje utforsker den et empirisk eksempel av hvordan grønn økonomi implementeres i det globale sør, gjennom Tanzanias jordbrukskorridor The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Denne avhandlingen argumenterer for at ulike initiativer under grønn økonomi er dypt formet av utvalgte elementer som politiske aktører velger å inkludere eller ekskludere i sine tilnærminger og politiske rammeverk. På bakgrunn av funnene i denne studien, er det grunn til å tro at grønn økonomi så langt ikke har lyktes i å innfri sine ambisiøse mål, men snarere ført til to distinkte prosesser når den har blitt implementert i det globale Sør. Disse er, for det første, en «kapring» av den grønne diskursen og «grønnvasking» som en konsekvens av interne motsetninger og dynamikker i det kapitalistiske systemet, og for det andre, modernisering av naturressursforvaltning, som kan føre til endret kontroll over tilgang til og bruken av naturressurser.

As the world is preparing to scale up its efforts to combat global climate change, groups are increasingly recognizing the vital role forests play in maintaining ecological, social, economic and cultural well-being. They are beginning to affirm more that forest tenure plays a fundamental role in determining the fate of the world's forests. In many countries, questions are raised on whether tropical forests should be publicly, commonly or privately owned. For many countries the forest management policies will likely involve a combination of: i) protected areas of sufficient size to provide habitat protection, and in a contiguous pattern; ii) forest concessions with enforceable performance-based management criteria; iii) community forests and community forest concessions managed by communities and indigenous groups. The challenge is to undertake the land use planning commitment and implementation to achieve this in the face of pressure from internal and external interests. Forest concessions of various types are the dominant form of forest tenure in almost all the forest countries of West and Central Africa. They are also the dominant types of forest tenure in Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Cambodia). In South America, Peru and Bolivia introduced forest concession as a possible tenure model in the early 90's with the strong support of international NGOs. In Brazil, after two failed attempts, the government has passed its new forest management law in 2006. Bolivia and Brazil have much in common regarding forest tenure conflicts and challenges to enforce new rules in the forestry sector. Forest concession implementation in these countries has generated many expectations and investments in law changes.This research work focuses on the main barriers faced by Bolivian and Brazilian forest authorities in implementing forest concession on the scale initially planned. The studies required a mapping of the property rights regimes over forest and forest resources as well as a theoretical approach of economic sociology. This approach, which provides elements to evaluate the process of social market construction, is dependent upon four essential factors: property rights, governance structures, rules of exchange and conceptions of control. The political-cultural approach emphasizes the historic perspective of the markets to understand the role of dominant groups and challengers in action arenas. It also considers the participation of social actors like governments, firms and consumers, among others, and their incentives for cooperative actions based on the cognitive ties that bind them. This empiric study focused on each country's geographically-delimited regions of Amazon: in the Bolivian lowlands region and in the Brazilian Cuiabá-Santarém Highway (namely BR-163). That's because they are the main targets for forest concession implementation. We show in this study that under a tenure uncertainty scenario, in which there are battles for territorial pieces and political alliances are forged that prefer other land use (and forests uses also) patterns the forest concessions implementation on a large scale will be jeopardized in these territories. ; Les forêts (tempérées et tropicales) couvrent près de quatre milliards d'hectares de la planète (FAO, 2005, 2009). On estime que la plupart de ces forêts (75%) sont dans le domaine publique et sont administrées par les gouvernements nationaux, locaux ou régionaux (RRI et OIBT, 2009). Dans plusieurs pays, développés et en voie de développement, la concession forestière est un moyen d'accorder et de règler les droits de propriété sur ces forêts publiques (Gray, 2000, 2002, White et Martin, 2002). La concession est un acte juridique pris par une autorité publique qui attribue à une personne privée, un droit d'utilisation ou un privilège (FAO, 1999, p.8). Dans la législation brésilienne, ainsi que dans le droit français, cette définition comprend également l'idée que l'acte de concession porte sur la délégation des droits et des devoirs du gouvernement à un agent privé. Cette relation est médiatisée par un contrat et implique la nécessité d'un paiement pour le concessionnaire (Karsenty, 2007, Brésil, 2006). Au niveau international, les plus anciennes expériences de concessions forestières sont dans les pays de l'Afrique (de l'ouest et centrale). Dans ces régions, les études montrent l'adoption du modèle depuis la fin du XIXe siècle (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2001). On estime qu'il y a environ 55 millions d'hectares de forêts publiques affectés dans six pays de la région d'Afrique centrale (Cameroun, Gabon, Congo, République Démocratique du Congo, la République Centrafricaine et Guinée Equatoriale) (Karsenty, 2007). En Asie, les concessions forestières couvrent 69 millions d'hectares. Sur ce total, 38 millions d'hectares sont situés en Indonésie (Gray, 2002, RRI, 2008, l'OIBT, 2005). Dans ce pays, les concessions sont devenues la principale méthode de répartition des droits sur les forêts pendant le régime de Suharto (Singer, 2009). Dans les forêts tropicales d'Amérique, les études rapportent l'existence de concessions sur une surface de 34 millions d'hectares de forêts (OIBT, 2005). Ces zones sont au Suriname, au Guyana, au Venezuela et au Guatemala (avec une prédominance des concessions aux communautés et seulement deux concessions industrielles), la Colombie, la Bolivie et le Pérou. Récemment, le Brésil, a adopté ce modèle pour gérer une partie de ses forêts publiques. L'évaluation globale de la mise en oeuvre du système est d'environ 158 millions d'hectares dans le cas des forêts tropicales. Par rapport aux forêts tempérées, les zones avec les plus grandes surfaces sur concession sont au Canada. Bien qu'étant l'un des principaux moyens d'attribuer les droits de propriété sur les forêts, un vif débat politique et académique persiste sur les avantages et les inconvénients de cette option (Hardner et Rice, 2000, Gray, 2002, Boscolo et Vincent, 2000, Karsenty et al., 2008). En dépit de l'investissement et de soutiens internes et externes, la Bolivie et le Brésil ont rencontré des difficultés à poursuivre la mise en oeuvre des concessions. La Bolivie a mené ses réformes juridiques et mis en oeuvre quelques concessions à la fin des années 90. Le Brésil, après deux tentatives avortées (dans les années 70 et au début de 2000) a reussi à faire des réformes et adopter une nouvelle loi sur la gestion forestière, y compris l'établissement de concessions, en 2006 (gouvernement de Luis Inacio Lula da Silva). Le plan initial du gouvernement bolivien était d'en affecter 22 millions ha principalement pour la production de bois. Cependant, sur cette même zone, les peuples indigènes ont déjà revendiqué une surface d'environ 20 millions ha pour la démarcation de leurs Terres Communautaires D'Origine (TCO). Selon les données officielles, en 2007 les concessions forestières attribuées aux industries de la Bolivie totalisaient un peu plus de 5 millions ha (attribués en une seule fois, en 1997, sans appel d'offre concurrentiel). Les concessions communautaires totalisaient un peu plus de 600.000 ha. En outre, les permis de déboiser dans les forêts privées se sont accrus et la délimitation des Terres Communautaires D'Origine a progressé. Au Brésil, les objectifs initiaux de l'attribution des concessions étaient ambitieux. Depuis 2002, le Programme Forestier National (PNF) a voulu étendre la surface sur l'amenagement forestier en Amazonie brésilienne comme stratégie pour combattre l'accroissement du déboisement. Au début des années 2000, l'objectif était d'atteindre une superficie de 15 millions ha sous gestion durable des forêts en Amazonie jusqu'à 2010. Une partie de cette zone était située dans les forêts nationales déjà classées. D'autres parties étaient dans les terres publiques couvertes par des forêts, mais souvent déjà occupées (terras devolutas da União e dos Estados). À la fin de 2009, le total des concessions forestières au Brésil s'élève à 96.000 ha de forêt attribués à trois entreprises dans une Forêt Nationale dans l'Etat de Rondonia. Au début de 2010 un deuxième et un troisième appel d'offre ont été lancés. Ces appel d'offre comprenait une surface d'environ 480.000 ha dans deux Forêts Nationales dans l'État du Pará. Face à cette situation de difficile application de la politique de concessions forestières dans les deux pays, ce travail demande: pourquoi la politique de concessions forestières en Bolivie et au Brésil, malgré les attentes et des investissements significatifs, est-elle si peu avancée par rapport aux objectifs de la mise en oeuvre prévue dans les deux pays? Le travail a impliqué la mobilisation de deux approches théoriques et méthodologiques. La première d'entre elles était l'application de la matrice d'analyse des modes d'appropriation et gestion du foncier et des ressources forestières. Cet outil , résulte de la réunion de deux cadres analytiques principalement de la contribution de Schlager et Ostrom (1992), et du travail d'un anthropologue du droit, Etienne Le Roy (1996). L'utilisation de la matrice a permis de réaliser une cartographie des modes d'appropriation et de gestion des forêts et un aperçu de la gamme des acteurs qui possèdent ou revendiquent des droits d'occupation et d'utilisation dans les deux études de cas. En complément, l'approche politique-culturelle, développée par le sociologue américain Neil Fligstein (1990, 1996, 2001) a fourni un cadre permettant de discerner l'organisation sociale de production de bois dans les deux cas étudiés et de trouver les acteurs et les dynamiques des groupes en compétition pour le territoire de l'Amazonie. Ce cadre théorique a permis également d'envisager comment ces acteurs mettent en forme les droits de propriété, les structures de gouvernance, les règles d'échange et les conceptions de contrôle qui régissent les relations sociales dans ces territoires. La conclusion principale de ce travail est que les gouvernements n'ont pas assez pris en compte la diversité des acteurs qui occupent, historiquement, le territoire forestier de la Bolivie et du Brésil. La modestie des réalisations en matière de développement des concessions est due aux meilleures compétences sociales et à la plus grande force politique des acteurs qui se positionnent contre le nouveau régime de concessions. Ainsi, ces acteurs cherchent à défendre leurs intérêts et à assurer leur position tandis que les acteurs favorables (les "challengers") ne sont pas assez fort politiquement pour changer le statu quo en ce qui concerne la manière d'occupation, d'utilisation et de gestion des terres forestières.

Executive summary Introduction CTA works primarily through intermediary organisations and partners (non-governmental organisations, farmers' organisations, regional organisations) to promote agriculture and rural development and to deliver its various information products and capacity building services. By partnering with these organisations, CTA seeks to increase the number of ACP organisations capable of generating and managing information and developing their own information and communication management strategies. In the period 2003 – 2005, CTA undertook a series of needs assessment studies in 21 countries in the ACP Pacific and Caribbean. As a continuation of this process, CTA have now commissioned assessments of the agricultural information needs of 6 countries emerging from prolonged conflict situations in ACP Africa, including Mozambique, which forms the focus of this report. Objectives of the Study The objectives of this study are to develop a strategy for CTA's approach to post-conflict countries, to improve the effectiveness of CTA's support for post-conflict countries and to compile baseline data on the status of ICM and ICTs in agriculture and rural development in Mozambique. Methodology The country profile was produced through a desk study. This study relied heavily on information available on the internet and additional information was obtained from various institutions in Mozambique, internationally and from key informants. Through the desk study we were able to identify a list of nine key institutions. This list was discussed with CTA and informants in Mozambique and face to face interviews were requested with each institution. Of these, seven of the institutions agreed, whilst one indicated that it would be closing its operations within a year and was therefore removed from the list. Expected results This study will provide: 1) an inventory of the status of agricultural information services, institutions and other actors and their needs as their relate to physical infrastructure, information availability and access and human capacity development; 2) an assessment of the current and / or planned interventions of the government and bi- or multilateral agencies in the field of information for agriculture and rural development; 3) an overview of the needs of potential partners for CTA activities and services in terms of building capacity for information and communication management; 4) a short-list of potential partners / beneficiaries for CTA activities and services; 5) baseline data to facilitate subsequent monitoring activities. The study will also provide a framework for CTA to develop a framework for action and fashion a strategy aimed at institutions in countries emerging from conflict situations and provide input into its 2006 – 2010 strategic plan. Findings Following the signing of a peace agreement in 1992 to end 16 years of conflict, Mozambique has achieved impressive economic growth and lowered its prevalence of poverty. Sustained by strong foreign investment, real GDP in Mozambique has been growing at rates in excess of 7 percent for the last 4 consecutive years, and per capita income in US dollars has increased by nearly 50 percent between 2001 and 2004. Mozambique's economic growth, however, implies an important transformation in the composition of its GDP, although services remain the dominant sector. The share of industry in total GDP increased to 27 percent in 2004 from about 16 percent in 1996, whereas the share of agriculture decreased to 23 percent from about 30 percent in the same period. The agricultural sector, however, still supports 80 percent of the economically active population, and agriculture still provides major export earnings from commodities such as prawns and fish, cotton, sugar, timber and cashew nuts. The forestry sector also has an important role in the country, contributing 4 percent of gross domestic product and supplying about 80 percent of the energy used. There is no unified policy or strategy in Mozambique with regard to the management of agricultural information and broad dissemination networks are not well developed. Institutions that fall outside of the state or donor worlds often find it difficult to get hold of information. Information exchange between institutions tends to be informal rather than structured. Agricultural research generally is restricted by the insufficient number of scientists who can formulate and carry out studies relevant to Mozambican needs. Budgets for information management tend to be a low priority. In-house capacity for maintaining and troubleshooting computer networks is a constraint; reliance is made upon private companies specialised in IT. Retention of staff at the centre with IT skills, in the face of competition from the private sector, was cited as a problem by all of the state agencies. Building the capacities of in-house staff was therefore felt to be important. Existing websites, maintained by some of the key institutions vary in their effectiveness as publishing outlets and often tend to be reflections of the institution, its structure and its work programme, rather than being designed specifically to disseminate information, reports, studies, etc. that are produced, or to act as advocacy tools. Use of radio as a means of disseminating information in vernacular languages is still rather limited. Problems in this respect are the costs of translation and payments for the transmissions. Training in how to pass information on to low literacy groups was also indicated by several agencies. This included training in more effective writing skills and training in how to compile radio programmes and audio visual materials. There is a general lack of metadata; documentation on who is doing what and types of available information is generally poor. This has a double negative effect. On one hand, potential data and information users have difficulties finding or getting access to relevant information and on the other hand, information suppliers do not know what they have, which prevents better organisation of information for dissemination. Conclusions Most of the institutions which we interviewed have fairly well-developed links to relevant sources of information; data on the functioning of markets, prices and production levels in the agriculture and fisheries sectors has vastly improved in recent years. Some of these agencies need information on regional and international markets and production levels. Technical data is still harder to source, particularly in Portuguese. There are information needs regarding developments in thinking on food security, forms and means of supporting organisations at community level, participatory approaches to resource management, information on low cost technologies for increasing production and conserving produce, on gender, on HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation strategies and on general rural development issues. Respondents requested capacity building in information management to increase the effectiveness of their organisations. Government services and NGO staff indicated the importance of training in the analysis of socio-economic data. Training in the use of the internet to obtain information and in the targeting of information by library and documentation services was also a broad need. The design and development of web sites was indicated by many respondents, but it is felt that there is a particular need for support in how to conceptualise these as sources of information rather than just 'publicity'. Training in effective communication to low literacy target audiences, in the development of extension materials and the use of radio and audio-visual materials is also important. Recommendations We recommend that CTA provide support to the development of a national IMC strategy for agricultural information that takes full advantage of the opportunities offered by the new GovNet infrastructure. The ICM strategy should ensure that information is easily available to all stakeholders in rural development. Furthermore, the ICM strategy should prevent a gap from evolving between organisations connected to GovNet and those that are not. Finally, the ICM should provide for communication channels from the rural poor to research organisations and policy makers, to ensure that research and policies are guided by the needs of poor rural households. We recommend that CTA attempts to increase the amount of information disseminated in Portuguese language, particularly in regard to food security, forms and means of supporting organisations at community level, participatory approaches to resource management, information on low cost technologies for increasing production and conserving produce, on gender, on HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation strategies and on general rural development issues. We recommend that CTA support short term research activities targeted at Mozambican-specific issues in relation to agricultural production and the conservation of produce. Links should be set up to inform IIAM and DNER about the information needs of poor farmers, women and PLWHA. These links can be set up through members organisations such as ORAM and UNAC, through Farmer Field Schools and through NGOs to which DNER has outsourced extension activities. We recommend that CTA investigate ways of supporting exchange of experience between organisations involved in training through associations and support to the development of training packages for associations. These should be provided to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of extension efforts in the field. In the long term, the required technical information can be provided to associations through newly developed training packages. ; The objectives of this study are to develop a strategy for CTA's approach to post-conflict countries, to improve the effectiveness of CTA's support for post-conflict countries and to compile baseline data on the status of ICM and ICTs in agriculture.

With the European Parliament elections already in full swing in some of the European Union's 27 member states, the consensus among EU watchers is that the populist right is poised to make sweeping gains in the pan-European legislature. Some alarmed mainstream commenters warn of a "Trumpian moment" in Europe.It is true that parties broadly fitting in the populist right/national-conservative camp have been going from strength to strength in the EU. Today, they are either leading, are part of ruling coalitions, or offer crucial parliamentary backing in Italy, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Croatia, and the Czech Republic, with the Netherlands soon to join the club following the electoral victory of Geert Wilders's party. If the populist right wins in Austria later this year, as the polls predict, and manages to form a government, then roughly one third of EU countries will be governed by right-wing populists. For a full picture, in France, the National Rally party is polling around 30% for the European Parliament, far ahead of the liberal President Emmanuel Macron's party, which is stuck at just 15%. And in Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is polling second to the center-right Christian-Democratic Union, ahead of all three ruling coalition parties — center-left social-democrats, Greens, and center-right liberals. In Poland, the Law and Order party, though no longer in government, is still a potent force. Since the European elections are, in effect, a sum of 27 national elections, it is entirely expectable that they will mirror these trends and see a further rise of the populist right. Yet hyperbolic comparisons with the Trumpian phenomenon obscure far more than they enlighten. Two reasons stand out.First, even the most optimistic (or alarming, according to one's perspective) projections do not predict that any of the existing populist right groups in the European Parliament will earn a plurality of the seats in the new assembly. There are currently two such groups: European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID). The polls predict that the more successful of them – ECR – could garner around 86 seats in a 720-member strong assembly (that is an increase from the current 66 seats). ID is expected to win 67 seats (up from the current 49), and that excludes the German AfD, which could bring another 20 but was recently expelled from the ID over its lead member's pro-Nazi comments. Still, both ECR and ID are very far from challenging the center-right European People's Party (EPP) which is widely expected to win the elections with 172 MEPs, as well as center-left Socialists&Democrats (S&D), which is slated to get around 137 seats.Second, the comparisons with Trump do not stand because there is no European equivalent of the Republican Party, and the right populist parties come in many shades and forms. The closest thing the EU has to the Republican party on the pan-European level is the EPP, itself a big tent that uneasily holds together centrist German and Benelux Christian-democrats, French Gaullists, Spanish post-Francoists, Nordic market liberals, and eastern European and Balkan ethnic nationalists. Since a Trump-style takeover of the EPP is impossible, for the populist right to fundamentally reshape European politics, it needs to establish a firm alliance with the EPP while forging its own internal cohesion. That is a tall order. While all parties on the populist right, and increasingly many within the EPP, share restrictive stances on immigration (particularly from Muslim countries), climate action skepticism, and social conservatism of varying degrees, there is a crucial divide on the war in Ukraine. All the EPP parties are solidly pro-Ukraine. So are the leading forces in the ECR — Italian Prime-Minister Giorgia Meloni and the Polish Law and Order. ID, by contrast, offers a more mixed picture: While the Italian Lega, Meloni's coalition partner, generally toes the line on Ukraine, other heavy hitters, such as the French Marine Le Pen, and, before its expulsion, the German AfD, have been seen as far more reluctant to back Kyiv. Add to that one of Europe's chief Ukraine skeptics, the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban and his Fidesz party, currently without an affiliation in the European Parliament. Leaders like Orban and Le Pen consistently call for a consolidation of the populist right into a single powerful bloc and court the ECR's Meloni and the Poles to that end, but Ukraine remains a powerful deal-breaker. To find a way around it, however, it is the Ukraine skeptics who will more likely have to come around to adopt the mainstream EU line. The Dutch Wilders, whose party sits with Le Pen's ID in the European Parliament, used to be a staunch opponent of military aid to Ukraine, but as soon as he got a shot to form a government in the Netherlands, he shed his previous misgivings and pledged both support for Ukraine and increased defense spending to reach NATO's 2% of GDP target. Le Pen, in what one observer called the "process of Melonisation," is similarly working to overcome her pro-Kremlin image and now offers full-throated support for Ukraine. Orban, of course, remains something of an outlier, but despite punching above his weight, he represents a relatively small Central European country and is dependent on EU cash handouts. Herein lies another key difference with the "Trumpian moment": Whereas in the U.S. the rise of the populist right has led to an emergence of a strong pro-foreign policy restraint camp within the Republican party, the European populist right is more likely to follow the opposite path by accepting the mainstream orthodoxies on foreign policy as a ticket to acceptance and power.That may yet prove to be an Achilles heel for the populist right. While Europe has shown consistent solidarity with Ukraine and resilience in the sanctions war with Russia, there are signs of growing war fatigue. This hasn't translated into demands to abandon Ukraine and appease Russia, but rather an expectation of some sort of a negotiated settlement to the war. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations' EU-wide poll, 41% of Europeans hold the view that the EU should push Ukraine towards negotiating a peace deal with Russia, while 31% say the EU should support Ukraine in taking back the territories occupied by Russia.By failing to articulate the preferences of that 41%, the populist right is leaving the field wide open for competitors from its own camp, as well as forces on the far left. The latter, according to the polls, may not reach even 40 MEPs and won't win any votes in the European Parliament on an anti-war platform, but they could use their presence in the assembly strategically to channel the voice of those Europeans who do not feel represented by the current mainstream on questions of war and peace.

A New Public Tool for Planning Cost-Effectiveness ResearchRigorous research on cost is needed to generate reliable and transparent estimates of cost-effectiveness — but a high quality cost study has to be planned prospectively.CEGA Program Scientist Liz Brown launches a new Costing Pre-analysis Planning template to foster collaboration between cost and impact evaluation research. This work was developed by CEGA's Cost Transparency Initiative and we welcome your feedback.A young woman sells tomatoes in a local market using her mobile phone to process the transaction. | Credit: Confidence Nzewi via Dreamstime.comJust one in five impact evaluations include any type of cost evidence (Brown & Tanner, 2019), which means that decision makers frequently lack key information to compare per beneficiary cost-per-impact across studies. CEGA's Cost Transparency Initiative has developed a new tool for researchers to help generate a rigorous estimate of the cost-effectiveness of an intervention, improve confidence in their findings, and provide actionable costing insights for policymakers. The publicly-accessible Costing Pre-analysis Planning template aligns impact estimates of an evaluation with final cost estimates, generating a rigorous and transparent estimate of cost per impact per beneficiary at the close of the study.CEGA developed and field-tested our cost pre-analysis planning tool on five cash-benchmarking impact evaluations completed in 2023. Throughout this engagement, we encountered wariness about the reliability and reproducibility of cost estimates and uncertainty about the underlying need for cost "research" among academic research economists. CEGA now routinely completes Costing Pre-analysis Planning templates in advance of conducting cost research, with costing-pre analysis plans in place on three active impact evaluations, Lishe Bora, Titukulane, and Takunda.The Costing Pre-analysis Planning template is designed using LaTeX so that it can either efficiently integrate with the pre-analysis plan (PAP) of an impact evaluation or serve as a standalone draft of a costing report that is fit for publication. The tool includes a structured outline and prompts to motivate the cost analysis, define the primary and secondary cost research questions, and identify the cost-relevant features of the intervention design and delivery.Cost pre-analysis plans document cost study designs and transparently share data, methods, and planned empirical analyses. As with PAPs for impact evaluations, costing PAPs minimize the risk of "cherry picking" specifications, such as narrowly-defining cost inclusion criteria that do not reflect the full cost of delivery or that only produce interesting cost-efficiency metrics. The tool improves collaboration around the use of sensitive and highly detailed expenditure data and the chances for better partnerships with decision makers on their cost research questions."Cost Is The Easiest Part" — A Common MisconceptionIt may seem straightforward to calculate the cost-effectiveness of an anti-poverty program: simply divide the total budget of the evaluated program by the number of households served, and compare it to the benefits per household. But there are several drawbacks to this approach:Expenditures in accountancy do not capture all relevant costs. There can be large deviations between budgets and actual expenditures — both in terms of the total cost and how resources are allocated across activities and time. Generally, actuals are the gold standard of cost data. However, the accountancy of the primary implementing partner(s) is a key source of data for this exercise. It has all the hallmarks of administrative data with some well-known advantages and limitations. We find that careful review of the chart of accounts, interviews, and supplementary data are needed to catch mis-classified expenses, to disaggregate "catch-all" categories of cost, and identify incompleteness.The development intervention and the development program may not be identical. Careful identification of treatment activities is needed to align the costing with the intervention that is the subject of the impact evaluation and the specific beneficiary population(s) of the evaluation. For example, our costing of a complex, large scale, bundled program of activities during a five-year intervention targets a subset of activities within the more 'complete' program. This well-established program has its own theory of change and targeting criteria. Our work isolates the costs of the intervention activities apart from the broader program.Different research questions require different cost data. It is not always evident which costs should be included in a cost evaluation. The criteria for inclusion or exclusion will depend largely on the research question at hand. For example, disentangling the cost of bundled intervention activities requires the identification of separate inputs for each component of the intervention. In this case, using the entire program budget as a proxy for cost would bias cost per beneficiary estimates by incorporating costs that are irrelevant to the research questions of concern to decision makers.Cost should match the estimand. To be valid, the estimate of cost per beneficiary should match the estimand that is the focus of the impact evaluation. Attention to the cost implications of sample attrition and non-compliance is needed to improve the accuracy of cost per beneficiary estimates.Implementation fidelity and costing accuracy. The real-world challenges of implementing a randomized evaluation complicates its costing. For example, a common assumption is that control groups incur no cost. However, this assumption fails when there is contamination between treatment and control groups. It is important to proactively plan the costing and track the intervention's implementation fidelity so that we can quickly identify anydata challenges that affect the accuracy of the costing.Variation in cost per beneficiary. A simple estimate of budget per beneficiary ignores a lot of important variation in cost per beneficiary. Beneficiaries who are more remote or more disadvantaged may incur a higher cost to reach. It might also prevent understanding how specific activities contribute to cost. A pre-analysis plan may help to plan out how to identify these differences.A completed costing pre-analysis plan template explains what the costing involves, how it fits with the impact evaluation research, and what data is needed to make it operational. The structure of this tool facilitates coordination not only within evaluation research teams but also with implementing partners and donors.Leaders need cost evidence to support the scale-up of effective interventions. For researchers to provide these data and insights, the field needs to develop and disseminate more open and transparent high quality tools for costing. We hope this new tool accelerates these efforts. Please join us by getting involved in the Costing Community of Practice.A New Public Tool For Planning Cost-Effectiveness Research was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Jack Twyman is an intern at the ASI.Take a look at any national newspaper and, as an alien from outer space, you'd be forgiven for thinking that the United Kingdom was under siege by an aggressive foe. Constant news headlines decry the government to "Send in the army to halt migrant invasion", adding "Rescue boats? I'd use gunships to stop migrants". The Express is desperate saying "We can't stop migrant chaos", and that "Migrants take all new jobs in Britain."It comes as no surprise to say that is not remotely the case. In 2022, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) recorded the highest ever net migration to the UK at 606,000 people. The ONS also recorded the 45,746 people who arrived illegally. Of those, 25,119 would be allowed to stay in the UK as refugees. Accounting for this, illegal arrivals accounted for just under 8 per cent of the total of net migration. In 2023, as of 13th June,  there have been 9,062 illegal arrivals so far.  So what is leading the current UK government to assert that passing one of its five main targets is to pass new laws to stop small boats, and ensuring the swift detainment and removal of illegal entrants? Looking at opinion polls, the picture distorts further. An IPOS UK poll from March 2023 found that only 19 per cent of the public have passing new l was to stop small boats crossings as one of their top four priorities. Easing the cost of living, 67 per cent, reducing NHS waiting lists, 50 per cent, growing the economy, 36 per cent, halving inflation, 31 per cent, all out pace in importance for the public. Additionally, a Poll by the Law Society of England and Wales of 1,954 people in March 2022 found that almost two thirds of people said refugees who arrive in the UK illegally should have the same rights as those who come legally. However, it is still clear that a great deal of voters care deeply about the issue. Since government rhetoric has increased, and the Rwanda policy became more likely, trust in the Conservatives on asylum and immigration increased to 1 in 3 in March, up since February. POLITICO found that among 2019 Tory voters, 41 per cent see illegal migration routes are a priority. 'Why are my hard-earned taxes, in a time of rising inflation and economic uncertainty, being used to put migrants up in 4 star hotels?' voters argue. Rishi Sunak is so convinced that he claimed "stopping the boats is not just my priority, it's the people's priority." The government of course has the resources and funds available to continue allocating efforts into sustaining the refugees, but the impasse of claim processing has exacerbated the issue further. Data from The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford shows that decisions had already failed to keep pace with applications before the huge increase in claims in 2021 and 2022. This gap has only widened further, with outstanding cases awaiting final decision at the end of 2022 at 132,000 asylum applications.So there is a real issue is in processing, where slow rates have created a backlog that has created a situation where asylum processing centres are overwhelmed and overfilled. The government now spends on average £4,300 per asylum seeker per month in private-provided housing for refugees, equivalent to a £6.2m daily cost of housing asylum seekers in hotels. Last year, the UK spent £3.7 billion, or 29% of its aid budget, supporting refugees within the UK, drawing criticism from aid groups, international NGOs and domestic politicians alike. Surely there must be a better way? The obvious choice would be to train more civil servants to process the claims, but this is costly, currently inefficient, and would be a lengthy process. I propose that we procure private firms as processors, paying them per asylum claim processed. This outsourcing and privatisation will create a healthier competition and increase diligence and duty of care as the claim assessor stands to lose more than if they were in a non-commercial, government position. It will also avoid the currently concerning plans to house refugees in former military bases and so-called "rudimentary accommodation" in the words of Immigration Minister Rober Jenrick. Private firms are proven to respond quicker to market demands, and there will surely be a host of providers created overnight if this scheme was put forward. But there is still more to be done. We must ask ourselves the question why we currently prohibit asylum seekers from working whilst their claim is being processed? In an era of high job vacancies, should these migrants not be seen as an opportunity, or gift for the country? A proactive approach would see these migrants start contributing from the offset, giving the government the opportunity to recuperate some of the funds used to support them, and allowing the migrants to bring benefit to the economy. I would also propose allowing asylum seeker applications to be made in embassies abroad. Sure, there are foreseeable issues with this proposal in countries where there are a high number of prospective applications, but allowing application in France or other similar countries will prevent the need to dagerous journeys to be made overseas, and the subsequent strain on the emergency services responding the the dire humanitarian results. I am not alone in this proposal as in fact 68 per cent respondents for an Ipsos  poll of the UK public support this proposal. Ultimately, I am sureI align with the vast majority of my fellow countryfolk in not sharing Jenrick's belief  that Asylum seekers who arrive in the UK by crossing the Channel in small boats "cannibalise" communities.  Certainly he is correct that the continued uncontrolled situation threatens "the compassion that marks out the British people." Yet claiming that the protestors outside migrant hotels are a "warning to be heeded, not a phenomenon to be managed" is at best a reach. The Daily Express Editor Gary Jones recently claimed that after concerted effort by Stop Funding Hate was a signficiant factor in rethinking editorial direction around sensitive topics like the Channel migrants. This serves as a reminder how the public can exercise non-political rights to enact change and achieve a voice irrespective on whether elected representatives are in agreement. Sure, the UK is in danger of neglecting necessary action on the issue, however this is not equivalent with a mutli-million pound deal to ship arrivals to Rwanda and elsewhere, nor pay huge sums to house migrants in hotels, or former military bases. With a pragmatic approach that reaches out of government and into enterprise the situation can be more effectively dealt with, and far faster that without. Election ploy or not, securing the stability of UK society must be a priority.

Climate change is one of, if not the, most important issues faced by the global society in the 21st century. The effects of climate change are visible on all continents and oceans already today and a business-as-usual will lead to severe consequences on the earth system, the economy and public health. Keeping these risks in check, the international community signed the Paris Agreement, stating the goal to limit the global mean temperature rise at the end of the century to well below 2 \degree Celsius above pre-industrial levels pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5\degree C. This is one of the first incidents of human kind acknowledging that the current development is not sustainable and the earth's limits would be reached in a time span of a few generation. Achieving the Paris Agreement goals requires greenhouse gas emission net neutrality around mid century, implying a limited remaining greenhouse gas emission budget. This necessitates an unprecedented transformation of the energy system, land-use sector and, if economic development and energy demand are not decoupled, deprioritization of economic growth. However, the remaining emission budget is currently over-exploited by countries acting independently according to their own self-interest, free-riding on the mitigation efforts of the others, a case of the Tragedy of the Global Commons. In this context, climate change has also been called the biggest market failure since the emitters of greenhouse gases seldom face the associated cost. In the absence of a price reflecting climate change impacts, climate policies are required. Policymakers establish policies to achieve the transformation, crucially informed by scenarios from integrated energy-economy-climate models. The common approach is to model economically optimal scenarios while constraining greenhouse gas emissions to meet a set radiative forcing target. This transformation intersects with other sustainability goals which can lead to positive, called co-benefits, or negative effects, called adverse side effects. However, the common approach lacks accounting for other co-benefits and adverse side effects associated with the infrastructure and the operation of the energy system. These include air pollution - public health effects, water–energy–land nexus and biodiversity conservation. Consequently, for a holistic sustainability assessment it is necessary to endeavour beyond an isolated consideration of greenhouse gas emissions as the unique metric. The research question this dissertation is tackling is therefore: What are the co-benefits and adverse side effects of energy and climate policy? The three main chapters assess this topic with different foci. The first chapter focuses on the specific consideration of one of the most important externality of the energy system, air pollution induced public health effects. In the second chapter a comprehensive life cycle based assessment of impacts for a subsystem, the electricity system in Germany, is performed. Here, the sustainability dimension is evaluated against the economic cost through a multi criteria optimization. Finally we do a comprehensive analysis of different global climate policy scenarios with the focus on the policy of a global coal exit. Our main result is that the co-benefits of climate policy are in the same order of magnitude as the mitigation cost, if a comprehensive analysis is applied, confirming its relevance. Especially major emitters of greenhouse gas emissions such as India and China benefit the most from climate mitigation efforts, this can function as an early entry point for climate mitigation policies. In contrast to climate policies the human health and environmental co-benefits are local and intra-generational. This can help tackle the described Tragedy of the Global Commons of climate mitigation. We show that renewable energies not only emit the lowest greenhouse gases they also outperform fossil fuel based technologies on most of the other sustainability criteria. However, our results show that the co-benefits consideration needs to be comprehensive as climate policies can lead to challenges for example in land-use and resource depletion that need further attention. We further show that including the whole life cycle and a system wide analysis are crucial as impacts are shifted from direct to indirect emissions and unintended substitution effects need to be accounted for. Finally we give an outlook for future research directions which should mainly focus on a more detailed modeling of environmental and human health impacts as well as the question on how to integrate the impact assessment into the modeling of transition pathways. ; Der Klimawandel ist eine der, wenn nicht gar die wichtigste Herausforderung der Menschheit im 21. Jahrhundert. Die Auswirkungen des Klimawandels sind auf allen Kontinenten und Ozeanen bereits heute sichtbar und ein weiter wie bisher hätte schwerwiegenden Folgen für die Umwelt, Wirtschaft und öffentliche Gesundheit. Um diese Risiken in Schach zu halten, unterzeichnete die internationale Gemeinschaft das Pariser Übereinkommen, in dem sie sich darauf einigte, den globalen Anstieg der mittleren Temperatur bis zum Ende des Jahrhunderts auf deutlich unter 2◦Celsius über dem vorindustriellen Niveau zu begrenzen und Anstrengungen zu unternehmen, um ihn auf 1,5◦C zu begrenzen. Dies ist einer der ersten Ereignisse in der die Menschheit anererkennt, dass die gegenwärtige Entwicklung nicht nachhaltig ist und die Grenzen der Erde in einer Zeitspanne von wenigen Generationen erreicht werden würden. Um die Pariser Ziele zu erreichen, muss um die Mitte des Jahrhunderts netto Neutralität von Treibhausgasen erreicht werden was ein verbleibendes Emissionsbudget impliziert. Dies erfordert eine beispiellose Transformation des Energiesystems, des Landnutzungssektors und, wenn wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Energienachfrage nicht entkoppelt werden, die Entpriorisierung vonWirtschaftswachstum. Das verbleibende Emissionsbudget wird derzeit von Ländern übermäßig ausgeschöpft, die nach ihrem eigenen Eigeninteresse handeln und von Minderungsbemühungen der anderen profitieren, ein Fall der Tragödie der Global Commons. Folglich wird der Klimawandel auch als das größte Marktversagen bezeichnet, da die Emittenten von Treibhausgasen selten mit den damit verbundenen Kosten konfrontiert sind. Dem Marktversagen zu begegnen erfordert das Eingreifen der Politik. Die politischen Entscheidungsträger legen dazu Maßnahmen fest, die auf detaillierten Abschätzungen ihrer Auswirkungen basieren. Dabei werden sie durch Szenarienanalysen von Integrated Assessment und Energiesystemmodellen informiert. Der gängige Ansatz besteht darin, wirtschaftlich optimale Szenarien zu modellieren und gleichzeitig die Treibhausgasemissionen zu begrenzen, um ein festgelegtes Erwärmungsziel zu erreichen. Die Dekarbonisierung unseres Wirtschaftens überschneidet sich aber mit einer Vielzahl anderen Nachhaltigkeitszielen, was zu Zusatznutzen oder negativen Effekten führen kann. Dem gängigen Ansatz fehlt es jedoch an der Berücksichtigung dieser Zusatznutzen und Nebenwirkungen im Zusammenhang mit der Infrastruktur und dem Betrieb des Energiesystems. Dazu gehören unter anderem die durch Luftverschmutzung verursachten Auswirkungen auf die öffentliche Gesundheit, der Nexus zwischenWasser, Energie und Land und der Schutz der biologischen Vielfalt. Für eine ganzheitliche Nachhaltigkeitsbewertung ist es daher notwendig, über eine isolierte Betrachtung der Treibhausgasemissionen als alleinige Kennzahl hinauszugehen. Die Forschungsfrage, der sich diese Dissertation widmet, ist daher: Was sind die Zusatznutzen und negativen Effekte von Energie- und Klimapolitik? Die drei Hauptkapitel beleuchten diese Themenfeld mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten. Das zweite Kapitel konzentriert sich auf die spezifische Berücksichtigung einer der wichtigsten Externalität des Energiesystems, durch Luftverschmutzung induzierte Auswirkungen auf die öffentliche Gesundheit. Im dritten Kapitel wird eine umfassende lebenszyklusbasierte Bewertung der Auswirkungen für ein Subsystem, das Elektrizitätssystem in Deutschland, durchgeführt. Die Nachhaltigkeitsdimension wird hierbei durch eine multikriterielle Optimierung mit den wirtschaftlichen Kosten verglichen. Schließlich führen wir eine umfassende Analyse verschiedener globaler klimapolitischer Szenarien durch, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der Politik eines globalen Kohleausstiegs liegt. Unser Hauptergebnis ist, dass die Zusatznutzen der Klimapolitik bei einer umfassende Analyse in der gleichen Größenordnung liegen wie die Minderungskosten. Vor allem große Emittenten von Treibhausgasemissionen wie Indien und China profitieren am meisten von den Bemühungen um den Klimaschutz, dies kann als früher Einstieg in Klimaschutzpolitik dienen. Im Gegensatz zur Klimapolitik sind die Vorteile für die menschliche Gesundheit und die Umwelt lokal und zeitnah. Dies kann dazu beitragen, die beschriebene Tragödie der Global Commons von Klimapolitik zu bewältigen. Wir zeigen weiter, dass erneuerbare Energien nicht nur die niedrigsten Treibhausgasemissionen ausstoßen, sondern auch einen geringere Auswirkung auf die meisten anderen Nachhaltigkeitskriterien als auf fossilen Brennstoffen basierenden Technologien haben. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass die Betrachtung der Zusatznutzen umfassend sein muss, da Klimapolitik zu Herausforderungen zum Beispiel bei der Landnutzung und der Ressourcenverknappung führen kann, die weitere Aufmerksamkeit erfordern. Wir zeigen ferner, dass die Einbeziehung des gesamten Lebenszyklus und eine systemweite Analyse entscheidend sind, da die Auswirkungen von direkten auf indirekte Emissionen verlagert werden und unbeabsichtigte Substitutionseffekte berücksichtigt werden müssen. Schließlich geben wir einen Ausblick auf zukünftige Forschungsfelder, die sich vor allem auf eine detaillierterere Modellierung der Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt und die menschliche Gesundheit sowie auf die Frage konzentrieren sollten, wie die Folgenabschätzung in die Modellierung von Transformationspfaden integriert werden kann.

The stock of national debt is now larger than our annual national income in the United States. Is this something to worry about? Does it matter how big the debt-to-GDP ratio gets? Is there any limit to how large it can grow and, if so, what is it this limit and what factors determine it? A lot of people have been asking these questions lately. John Cochrane is the latest to opine on these questions here: Debt Matters. I'm not even sure where to begin. I suppose we can start with the famous debt clock pictured on the right. Whenever I look at the debt clock, I'm reminded of James Tobin who, in 1949 remarked:   The peace of mind of a conscientious American must be disturbed every time he is reminded that his government is 250 billion dollars in debt. He must be shocked by the frequent announcement that every newborn baby is burdened, not with a silver spoon, but with a debt of $1700. The national debt is now 100 times larger than it was in 1949. Society has somehow managed to hold itself together since then. At the very least, this suggests we need not pay attention to the debt clock. It does not, however, not mean we shouldn't pay attention to managing the debt. Ironically, worrying about the debt is, in a way, what permits us not to worry about it. The time to start worrying is when we and our elected representatives stop worrying about it. According to John, "The notion that debt matters, that spending must be financed sooner or later by taxes on someone, and that those taxes will be economically destructive, has vanished from Washington discourse on both sides of the aisle." That is, it may be time to start worrying. I think there's an element of truth to this. For example, while it's true that the Reagan deficits were large, it's also true that there was strong bipartisan support for "doing something about the growing debt." And it wasn't just words. As Justin Fox reminds us, Congress increased taxes seven times between 1982-93. Well, what about Japan? As I explain here, Japan is a poster child for "worrying about the debt." To make a long story short, the debt-to-GDP ratio in Japan has stabilized (pre-Covid, at least), inflation is below target, and the fiscal authority keeps raising the sales tax. Rightly or wrongly, the Japanese "care" about the national debt--the effect of which is to keep fiscal policy "anchored." But what exactly is there to fear if fiscal policy becomes "unanchored?" For a country like the United States, it seems clear that outright default will never happen. U.S. Treasury securities (USTs) are too important for global financial markets. A default may very well trigger a global financial meltdown. The only practical option is to continue rolling over the debt, principal and interest (the latter of which is very low these days). Is there a danger of "bond vigilantes" sending the yields on USTs skyward? Not if the Fed stands ready to keep yields low (related post here on yield curve control). And, in any case, even if the Fed raises (or is expected to raise) its policy rate, the U.S. Treasury can just continue to issue the bills necessary to make the scheduled payments. Treasury securities and Federal Reserve reserves are just different forms of interest-bearing money. To put things another way, the national debt need never be paid back--like money, it can be held in private wealth portfolios forever. The only question is on what terms it will be willingly held.This last point gets to the question of what can be expected to happen if the debt gets too large (say, because the fiscal authority plans to run large primary budget deficits off into the indefinite future). Much will depend on the evolution of the global demand for USTs. If that demand stops growing while fiscal deficits run unabated, surely we can expect the U.S. dollar to weakened and the domestic price-level to rise. The former is likely to contribute to an export boom, which should serve to close the trade deficit (mitigating the adverse consequences of global imbalances). The latter is likely to promote the growth of nominal GDP.  Needless to say, an export boom and higher NGDP growth don't sound like disaster scenarios, especially in the current economic environment. John seems to worry that whatever happens, it's likely to happen suddenly and without warning. We know Naples is going down (in the manner of Pompeii c. 79AD), we just don't know when. But how does the lava flow correspond to the economic consequences of a debt crisis? (Keep in mind, we're not talking about a country that issues foreign-denominated debt.)Should we be worried about hyperinflation? Evidently not, as John does not mention it (see also this nice piece by Francis Coppola). But he does mention something about fiscal capacity (the ability of the fiscal authority to exert command over resources). As I explain here, there are limits to how much seigniorage can be extracted in this manner. To put things another way, there are economic limits to how large the debt-to-GDP ratio can get. But reaching this limit simply means that the required tax (whether direct or indirect via inflation) is high--it does not mean disaster. John concludes with the following warning: "The closer we are to that limit, the closer we are to a real crisis when we need that fiscal capacity and its no longer there." This is one of those sentences that starts your head off nodding in agreement. But then you think about it for a minute and wonder what type of "real crisis" he has in mind? If it's a financial crisis, the implied positive money-demand shock (flight-to-safety) is likely to increase fiscal capacity, not diminish it. A war perhaps? In these types of emergencies, the nation bands together and governments use other means to gather the resources necessary (e.g., conscription). So, to conclude, I'm not saying that John is wrong. It's just not very clear in my mind how he imagines a U.S. debt crisis to unfold exactly. What is missing here is a model. This is odd because one of John's great strengths is model building. And so my conclusion is that it would be very interesting to follow the logic of his argument through the lens of one of his models. Let's see the model, John!