Suchergebnisse

Oil demand in the 1990s, George Kowalski -- A world energy outlook, Lowell C.Reed -- The energy demand impact of conservation technology, John Chesshire -- Non-OPEC crude production, Andrew Gordon -- Middle East oil supplies in the 1990s, Paul Stevens -- Transport costs and capacity adjustment in the tanker market, David Hawdon -- Oil prices - a conflict of views, Eric Price et al -- Changing oil price expectations, David Hawdon.

The price of oil just keeps collapsing — and the fate of Alberta's revenues is buckling with it. Going into March 2015, it seemed as if prices might have finally found a bottom, somewhere between US$48 and US$52. By the second week of March, they began falling again, to the low forties. These are prices the Alberta government had not even ventured to fathom when first putting together its forecasts for the impact of falling oil prices on the province's finances. Come the fourth quarter of the Alberta government's 2014/15 fiscal year, the province's finances will begin to really feel the blow from the plunge in oil, as royalty payments dry up significantly. Come the 2015/16 fiscal year, the situation becomes even bleaker. In fact, the current fiscal year will seem pleasant compared to the next one. Due to a stronger than expected first half of the year, actual bitumen and crude oil royalties collected in Alberta from April to September 2014 exceeded estimates by $1.3 billion. That will mitigate some of the damage that the continuing slide in prices will cause by the year's end, with the government's third quarter update showing expected year-end crude oil and bitumen royalty revenues falling short of the budget target by $549 million. So severe has the fall in oil prices been that, in March 2015, the number of barrels of conventional oil that the government collects in royalties could plummet by up to 53,000 barrels from the 2014/15 budget forecast, declining to just 4,100 barrels per day. This suggests that prices may be nearing a point where royalty collection from conventional crude oil production is at risk of being virtually eliminated. Bitumen royalties are not faring much better. Relative to July 2014, per barrel royalties in February 2015 have potentially declined by 60 to 90 per cent. All told, the combined effect of the changing exchange rate, lower prices, and the lower royalty rates that take effect in this low-price environment, will lead to a potential decline in crude oil and bitumen royalty revenues of 42 to 74 per cent in the 2015/16 fiscal year. This corresponds to a monetary decline of roughly $3.3 billion to $5.8 billion. If oil prices stay below US$45 per barrel, that decline will become even more severe. The pain for Alberta revenues does not end there. The government will be facing additional losses in land sale revenues, natural gas royalties, and tax revenues. Still, even the surprisingly strong revenues for the first half of the year suggest a serious problem with government forecasts. By the end of September, the government had collected $5.198 billion in crude oil and bitumen royalties, 33 per cent higher than originally forecast. That government estimates could be so far off the mark raises serious questions about the methods the province is using to forecast royalties. In a province so dependent on resource royalties for its revenues, adding the unpredictability of unreliable forecasting methods can only put its fiscal planning at that much greater risk of instability.

The governments of oil-importing countries are worried about the recent high oil prices. They worry about possible macro-economic effects: inflation, recession, balance-of-payments deficits. The consumers of energy in those countries where fuels are not subsidised are angry about the higher prices of oil, gas and electricity. Unfortunately these higher prices have coincided with increases in the cost of food and other items of vital expenditures. Those who use fuels in significant quantities, such as fishermen or truck drivers, are protesting through strikes or motorway blockades in some European countries. Governments of importing countries could not remain indifferent to events too quickly labelled as the new oil price shock or the new oil crisis. Comparisons with the previous crises of the 1970s were hastily made but were more misleading than illuminating.

One of the main elements of economic sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear and military programs is crude oil exportation restrictions in addition to investment in Iranian energy related projects. Senders of such sanction are interested in understanding the impacts of such embargos on international oil prices. We apply unrestricted Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model, using impulse response (IRF) and variance decomposition (VDA) tools with annual data from 1965 to 2012 to analyze the dynamic response of international oil prices to Iranian oil export sanction. Controlling for the supply of non-Iranian oil and the world GDP per capita, we show that international oil prices respond positively to negative changes of the Iranian oil exports, our proxy of Iran oil sanctions. However, the increasing response of oil prices to the Iranian oil sanction is only significant in the first year after negative shock in Iran oil exports. Beyond the first year following shock, we do not observe a statistically significant response of oil prices.

Energy is the most abundant resource in the universe. While energy supplies are unbounded, useful energy is not. To convert naturally occurring energy resources into useful work, mankind must invest capital and labor–resources that normally are scarce. To produce or use primary energy, both producers and consumers must invest in specialized and often inflexible equipment. In calculating the perceived value of present and future oil supplies, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and almost everyone else mistook for economic rent the windfall profits associated with short‐term rigidities in energy use. Attention focused on the cost of manufacturing a synthetic crude oil, rather than on the incremental cost of changing consumption patterns in end‐use markets. Mis judgments on the future value of oil were compounded by ill‐conceived government policies and inaccurate forecasts. Substitution of oil for other energy commodities can occur at nearly every point along the chain downstream from the production of primary resources, but it occurs most abundantly and importantly at the point of final consumption. Liquid petroleum remains the cheapest fuel to transport, chiefly because a vast infrastructure already exists to handle it. The steady advance of technology explains the long‐term decline in the real prices of most products, including retail energy prices. Often, the increasing unit costs of harvesting or extracting a finite scarce natural resource have been more than offset by improvements in manufacturing or end‐use technology. The mix of commodities bought and sold in the next generation may be unrecognizable to today's consumer. Thus, the cost of any one primary resource or intermediate product may be irrelevant.