Suchergebnisse

AbstractWith the prevalence of cloud computing emerges the challenges of pricing cloud computing services. There are various characteristics of cloud computing which make the problem unique. We study an abstract model which focuses on one such aspect – the sale of a homogeneous and fully divisible good. We cast onto our model the idea of bundling, studied within the context of monopolist pricing of indivisible goods. We demonstrate how selling a divisible good as an indivisible one may increase seller revenues and characterize when this phenomenon occurs, and the corresponding gain factors.

This paper examines the role of cash transfers as a screening device when combined with in-kind transfers. It shows that linking in-kind to cash transfers makes first-best redistribution possible despite the government's inability to tell rich and poor individuals apart. Moreover, the maximal attainable welfare for the poor can be pushed beyond its first-best level by distorting downward the quality of the indivisible good the poor receive relative to the cash value of their net transfers. Using in-kind transfers alone, as in Besley and Coate (1991), leads to a third-best solution. (JEL D31, H23, H41)

Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice -- Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory -- Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference -- Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting -- Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure -- Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation -- Selecting winners in multiple elections -- Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament -- Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament -- Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst off or avoid envy? -- Allocating a single divisible good : divide-the-dollar -- Allocating multiple divisible goods : adjusted winner -- Allocating a single heterogeneous good -- Allocating divisible and indivisible goods -- Summary and conclusions

Allocation of scarce heterogeneous life-saving goods confronts society with profound challenges that are analytically complex and morally laden. Deceased-donor kidneys for transplant are heterogeneous in terms of relational and intrinsic quality. In 2014, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network implemented a new allocation system that more explicitly takes account of intrinsic quality. We trace the evolution of the new allocation system with particular attention to the role of evidence and the ways that concerns about equity were solicited, assessed, and taken into account in modifying the original proposal. These deliberations show the potential for stakeholder rulemaking to integrate evidence and values.

Playing, Voting, and Dividing -- Playing Successfully: Noncooperative Game Theory -- Cooperative Game Theory -- Voting and Judging: Preference Aggregation by Voting -- The Complexity of Manipulative Actions in Single-Peaked Societies -- Multiwinner Voting -- Judgment Aggregation -- Fair Division: Cake-Cutting - Fair Division of Divisible Goods -- Fair Division of Indivisible Goods.

AbstractWe consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Under approval votes, we propose two variants of the extended justified representation (EJR) notion from multiwinner voting, a stronger one called EJR for mixed goods (EJR-M) and a weaker one called EJR up to 1 (EJR-1). We extend three multiwinner voting rules to our setting—GreedyEJR, the method of equal shares (MES), and proportional approval voting (PAV)—and show that while all three generalizations satisfy EJR-1, only the first one provides EJR-M. In addition, we derive tight bounds on the proportionality degree implied by EJR-M and EJR-1, and investigate the proportionality degree of our proposed rules.

A critique of Anthony de Jasay's Social Contract, Free Ride (1990), which argues that, since there may be enough people willing to finance public-goods production voluntarily, public goods can be provided privately without loss of efficiency. It is argued that Jasay's claim rests on the implausible assumption that the public goods in question are completely indivisible -- an assumption that forces persons interested in obtaining a given public good either to finance it themselves or do without it, since they lack the option of financing smaller or poorer qualities of the good. Adapted from the source document.

A government would like to subsidize an indivisible good. Consumers' valuations of the good vary according to their wealth and benefits from the good. A subsidy scheme may be based on consumers' wealth or benefit information. We translate a wealth-based policy to a benefit-based policy, and vice versa, and give a necessary and sufficient condition for the pair of policies to implement the same assignment: consumers choose to purchase the good under the wealth-based policy if and only if they choose to do so under the translated benefit-based policy. General taxation allows equivalent policies to require the same budget.