Suchergebnisse

The rebound in tourism experienced since August 2009 seems to have been sustained, auguring well for a sizeable recovery this year from the slump of 2009. Despite having posted better-than-expected fiscal results in the first half of the year, the country will be hard-pressed to sustain this in the medium term. However, despite the challenges, the government remains steadfastly committed to fiscal consolidation. Monetary policy has been made more conducive to sustaining both domestic stability and external stability. Inflation pressures remain modest, with the introduction of non-monetary financing of the deficit. However, the country's turbulent political environment persists, complicating forecasts of future outcomes. The ambitious task of fiscal consolidation and the establishment of macro stability require much political bi-partisanship and cooperation.

Because agriculture is the economic backbone of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Ethiopia, any meaningful sustainable development program in the continent must therefore be anchored in the sector. The concept for this study on agribusiness indicators was based on the vital role that agribusiness plays in agricultural development. The study focuses on agribusiness indicators (ABI) to identify and isolate the determining factors that lead private investors and other stakeholders to participate in agribusiness and to engage in discourse regarding its development. A more thorough empirical understanding of these determinants in turn can usefully inform the types of policy reforms that can promote agribusiness in Africa. In Ethiopia, the ABI team focused on the following success factors: a) access to critical factors of production of certified hybrid seeds, fertilizer, and mechanical input; b) enabling environment in terms of access of credit and transportation; and c) government expenditures on agriculture, and trade and regulatory policies that currently influence the agribusiness environment. The factors and indicators that the research team has included in this study are not exhaustive but rather are intended to serve as a pilot that could be scaled up to include more variables and countries. The findings of the study revealed the dominant role of the government in the seed and fertilizer markets. In the seed sub-sector, perennial shortages of both basic and certified seeds have greatly limited agricultural productivity in Ethiopia.

Based on preliminary estimates, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) economy grew by 7.5 percent in 2014, compared to an average of 8 percent over 2011-13. Looking forward, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth is projected to slow further in 2015 before accelerating in the medium term. Average annual inflation in 2014 decelerated to 4.2 percent from 6.4 percent a year earlier, driven primarily by slower growth in food prices and a decline in fuel prices. In response to a widened fiscal deficit in FY2012-13, the government embarked on much needed fiscal corrective measures in FY2013-14 and FY2014-15. Foreign exchange reserves coverage remains low as compared with prudential benchmarks. While the nominal exchange rate remained relatively stable within the band set by the Bank of Laos (BOL), the real exchange rate continued to appreciate. Indications in 2014 are that bank credit growth is slowing down sharply compared to its previous rapid pace over several years. In order to grasp new opportunities and enjoy the benefits of regional integration, it is necessary for Lao PDR to take steps to create a conducive business environment. In order to achieve broad-based, inclusive growth and poverty reduction in Lao PDR, channeling greater resources toward tackling key workforce skills and productivity challenges is of significant importance.

The Jordan economic monitor provides an update on key economic developments and policies over the past six months. It also presents findings from recent World Bank work on Jordan. It places them in a longer-term and global context, and assesses the implications of these developments and other changes in policy for the outlook for the country. Its coverage ranges from the macro-economy to financial markets to indicators of human welfare and development. It is intended for a wide audience, including policy makers, business leaders, financial market participants, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in Jordan.

В даній статті розкрито особливості підвищення якості молочної продукції товаровиробників України згідно Європейських стандартів якості. Здійснено аналіз відповідності молоко-сировини товаровиробників високим стандартам забезпеченості та якості, які являються нормою для провідних виробників світу, досліджено якість молоко-сировини закупленого переробними підприємствами від аграрних підприємств та ціновий механізм молокопереробних підприємств. За результатами досліджень виявлено, що найважливішими проблемами в Україні на ринку молочної продукції є недостатність пропозиції молока та переважною мірою низька його конкурентоспроможність та якість. Проведено комплексну оцінку виробництва молочної продукції підприємствами України і виявлено, що представлені підприємства мають потенціал щодо виробництва молоко-сировини, проте потребують інвестицій та державної допомоги. Встановлено, що ефективність молочних фермерів залежить від конкурентоспроможності продуктів, пропонованих споживачам. Оцінка конкурентоспроможності сировинного молока необхідна для прийняття обґрунтованих рішень щодо виробництва та реалізації молочної продукції в Україні та за кордоном, зменшення закупівлі аналогічної імпортної продукції з підвищення якості та конкурентоспроможності продукції у виробників сировини. Доведено, що національний ринок молока можливо утримати лише високоефективним товаровиробникам, які мають можливість створювати всі необхідні технологічні умови для його виробництва, та вести постійний контроль щодо його якості, а також необхідно взяти напрям на створення високотоварних та технологічних молочних ферм, які б відповідали сучасним вимогам виробництва молока. Кооперація сільськогосподарських підприємств, організація сімейних ферм і переробників молочної сировини, з урахуванням досвіду розвинутих країн світу, вирішить проблему виробництва якісної молочної сировини і дасть можливість отримати їй прибутки. ; These scientists point out that the market situation in Ukraine is favorable for the dairy industry functioning and the country has the appropriate prerequisites for its development: favorable climate, large areas of agricultural land, soil fertility, historical experience in farming, qualified staff and significant dairy market capacity. However, the authors reveal the presence of significant problems in the development of Ukrainian dairy subcomplex enterprises which requires further research in the industry development in the current conditions. The aim of the paper is to analyze and assess the main factors of raw milk competitiveness in accordance with the European quality requirements on the dairy complex of Ukraine, as well as analyze the problems of its development and ways to solve them.Currently, dairy enterprises production in Ukraine meet the high quality standards of the EU only partially. Therefore, the main task for Ukrainian producers is to ensure the high quality of both raw milk and the processed products. In addition, antibiotics and palm oil, pesticides, plant substitutes, milk substitution with water, etc. must be excluded from dairy products. According to the statistics, the total consumption fund in Ukraine, including exports and imports, is 9.33 million tons of milk. If we divide this figure by 42 million people of Ukraine, we get 221 kg of milk per capita. But if we divide the real figures - 6.68 million tons - by the real figure for the Ukrainian population - 36 million people - we will see that the consumption level is much lower - 185 kg per capita. Milk production decreased by almost 3.6% in Ukraine during the year. This drop was the most noticeable in cream and butter production, so it is not surprising that this niche was quickly filled by the importers.But what impedes Ukrainian milk industry development in the domestic market and its entering the foreign market? The only reason is low level of milk production. In Ukraine, the volumes in 2019 fell below 10 million tons for the first time. These data are confirmed by the recently published "Forecast of milk production in Ukraine by 2030: methods and calculations" submitted by Olha Kozak, a researcher at the Department of Economics of Agricultural Production and International Integration of the National Research Center "Institute of Agrarian Economics". According to the expert, the internal shortage of the product in 2019 was indicated primarily by the growth of the purchase price for raw milk, which for the last three months of 2019 was almost in line with the world prices or 10-15% higher than in the previous year. In October 2019, the price reached the maximum in hryvnia for the period of Ukraine's independence. Some experts in this field claim that our milk is more expensive than in Belgium, and this is nonsense.The experts predict a record decline in raw materials for 2020. In 2020, these processes will only intensify, causing structural changes in all components of the dairy food system. The situation will also be complicated by the abolition of the Second Grade milk since January 1, 2020, which is provided by the new DSTU "3662: 2018" Raw cow's milk. Specifications". This implies that processing companies will not receive about 1 million tons of second-grade milk.Dairy food producers are embarrassed as they can not compete with the UE plants in terms of prices. Recently, which was attended by Vadym Chagarovsky, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Dairy Enterprises Union spoke at the Forum Dairy Business 2019 held in Kyiv. The expert claimed that it is necessary to work out a special development strategy for the period until 2025 in order to save the industry. The document will provide for a change in marketing strategies and, in particular, the definition of target export markets.Currently, Ukraine has implemented a system of food safety and quality control focused on the ultimate result. That is, individual product samples are selected for analysis by the controller. In case of positive results, the good quality of products is confirmed and the whole batch is subject to sale [1]. However, this approach does not guarantee complete safety and absolute product quality. 19 million tons of milk were produced by Ukrainian enterprises and about 5 tons were produced by the population20 years ago. According to these indicators, we were among the top ten world milk producers and, despite the problems with its quality, milk was suitable for processing. Therefore, development of dairy farming in Ukraine requires, above all, operating with real numbers. This is the only way the government can see the real state of this sector. And, by the way, the biggest error is in the amount of milk supplied by the population. The identification of cattle kept in small private farms could settle this problem and provide tracking real numbers and exercising effective control.Thus, the main problems of the milk market in Ukraine are insufficient milk supply and, above all, its low competitiveness and quality. According to some experts, the competitiveness of milk depends on its quality by 80%. At present, raw milk producers are not responsible for the microbiological and hygienic indicators of the EU countries. Since 2004, the quality of milk supplied to processing plants in Ukraine is regulated by the requirements of DSTU 3662-97 "whole cow's milk". Procurement requirements. In 2007, this standard was changed and a additional Extra grade was introduced. In the EU, the main document which sets requirements for food quality and safety is the Regulation (EU) № 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 defining specific rules for the hygiene of foodstuffs.The growing demands on dairy products quality has been an important trend in milk production: in July 2018 DSTU 3662: 2015 "Raw cow's milk. Specifications" was adopted. According to the document, there are three types of milk on the market: "extra", "higher" and "first". However, it was decided afterwards to leave the "second" grade until early 2020 to give farmers time to modernize production [6]. Over the next two years, it will be approved for processing into animal feed, casein, etc.Milk price has not only to reimburse the costs of its production, but to stimulate the growth of its production and contribute to increasing the profitability of its production as well. In addition, raw milk prices include the costs of milk processing enterprises, which cannot increase the price for milk and dairy products due to low solvency of consumers. More than that, the price increase may lead to a reduction in consumption.Increasing the competitiveness of raw milk producers is an important direction in the development of dairy industry enterprises in Ukraine. To achieve this aim they need to develop a set of measures aimed at increasing the productivity of cows, gradual increasing the livestock, especially in agricultural enterprises, increasing milk production and improving its quality characteristics through highly efficient technologies on an innovative basis, taking into account world experience. For this purpose the following steps must be taken: to restore and reconstruct the existing large livestock farms and complexes; increase the efficiency of selection work; to improve the conditions of the animals farming, milking and raw milk cooling system; set up modern large dairy complexes with highly productive animals and a well-established system of raw milk quality assurance; to consolidate raw milk producers with milk processing enterprises which will contribute to pricing policy regulation; to provide effective state support for producers; to introduce resource saving technologies into production in order to reduce resource costs and improve milk quality; to create a new technical and technological base that will meet the modern requirements for milk production; to learn from the experience of other countries; to improve the quality of milk by combating counterfeiting. Thus, the сurrent problems of raw milk producers competitiveness increase are challenging and relevant, and government measures aimed to meet high standards of dairy products safety and quality are the rule for the world's leading producers.

Perfluoroalkyl substances (PFASs) are man-made chemicals. Their unique properties make them beneficial for a wide range of industrial and consumer product applications, such as in aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), durable water repellent clothing, hydraulic oils and food packaging materials. Perfluoroalkyl acids (PFAAs), a class of PFASs, are highly persistent in the environment, and long chain PFAAs are bioaccumulative and toxic. International regulation and voluntary actions by the industry have been implemented and led to a recent reduction of primary emissions of PFAAs to the environment. However, point sources such as AFFF training sites as well as diffuse sources continue to contaminate water bodies, soil and biota. Reducing environmental pollution with PFAAs has therefore become a regulatory priority. Designing successful measures to reduce the PFAA contamination requires an understanding of the sources, transport and fate of PFAAs in the environment. Four scientific publications are included in this PhD thesis, which aimed at increasing the holistic understanding of the fate of PFAAs in aquatic systems. This was achieved by chemical trace analysis combined with mass balance modeling. The following topics were covered: Dispersion and fate of PFAAs from an AFFF-impacted site (Paper I), recirculation of PFAAs in the aquatic environment with focus on waste water treatment plants (WWTPs, Paper II), mass balance of PFAAs in the Baltic Sea (Paper III) and transport and fate of PFAAs in two pristine boreal stream catchments (Paper IV). Results from Paper I showed that AFFF-impacted sites at a former military airfield, which was abandoned for more than 30 years, continue to be point sources of PFAAs to recipients. The sum of PFAAs in the ground water and surface waters ranged from 740 to 51000 ng L-1 and <0.5 to 79 ng L-1, respectively. PFOS in muscle tissue of European perch from a nearby lake ranged from 77 to 370 ng g-1 wet weight, representing among the highest values reported worldwide for fish muscle. In Paper II the relative importance of environmental recirculation of PFAAs versus new releases from the technosphere was investigated for PFAAs in WWTP influents. It was shown that tap water can be an important source of PFAAs to WWTPs in areas with elevated environmental levels. This needs to be taken into account when calculating emissions via WWTP effluents. PFAA mass balances over the WWTPs suggested that PFHxA and PFOA were formed from precursor compounds within the plants. Assembled PFAA mass balances for the Baltic Sea (Paper III) showed that river inflow and atmospheric deposition were the dominant input pathways, while wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) effluents discharging directly into the Baltic Sea made a minor contribution. The inputs of PFAAs were estimated to be higher than the outputs, suggesting a current increase of the PFAA inventory in the Baltic Sea. Also the mass balance study of PFAAs in two remote stream catchments presented in Paper IV revealed that inputs dominated over outputs for both catchments, indicating that a considerable portion of the PFAAs deposited from the atmosphere is retained in soil or in deep ground water and may be released to surface and marine water environments in the future ; Perfluoralkilne tvari (PFASs) su umjetne kemikalije. Zbog svojih jedinstvenih svojstava široko su primjenjive u industriji i izradi proizvoda krajnje potrošnje kao što su pjena za gašenje požara (AFFF), vodootporna odjeća, hidraulična ulja i pakiranja za hranu. Perfluoralkilna kiselina (PFAAs) iz skupine perfluoralkilnih tvari iznimno je dugotrajna u okolišu, a dugolančane PFAAs su bioakumulativne i otrovne. Poduzeta međunarodna regulativa i dobrovoljne akcije vodile su nedavno smanjenoj primarnoj emisiji PFAAs u okoliš. Unatoč tome, primarni izvori, kao što su mjesta na kojima se provode treninzi za gašenje požara i difuzni izvori i dalje zagađuju vode, tlo i biotu. Zbog toga, smanjenje onečišćenja okoliša izazvanog PFAAs predstavlja regulatorni prioritet. Stvaranje uspješnih mjera kojima bi se smanjilo onečišćenje izazvano PFAAs zahtjeva razumijevanje izvora, prijenosa i sudbine tih tvari u okolišu. U ovaj doktorat uključena su četiri znanstvena članka kojima je cilj povećati sveukupno razumijevanje sudbine PFAAs u vodenim sustavima. To je postignuto kemijskom analizom elemenata u tragovima u kombinaciji s modeliranjem masene ravnoteže. Obrađene su sljedeće teme: Širenje i sudbina PFAAs na područjima zahvaćenim AFFF (Članak I), ponovna cirkulacija PFAAs u vodenom okolišu s naglaskom na postrojenja za pročišćavanje otpadnih voda (Članak II), masena ravnoteža PFAAs u Baltičkom moru (Članak III) te prijenos i sudbina PFAAs u dva udaljena sjeverna vodena toka (Članak IV). Rezultati iz Članka I pokazali su da su područja zahvaćena AFFF na bivšem vojnom aerodromu napuštenom prije 30 godina i dalje je glavni izvor PFAA zagadenja okolisa. Zbroj PFAAs u podzemnim i površinskim vodama kreće se u rasponu od 740 do 51000 ng L-1 i <0.5 do 79 ng L-1. PFOS u mišićnom tkivu grgeča iz obližnjeg jezera kreće se od 77 do 370 ng g-1 mokre težine, predstavljajući jednu od najviših vrijednosti u svijetu za riblje mišiće. Članak II istražuje relativnu važnost ponovne cirkulacije PFAAs imajući na umu novu emisiju PFAAs iz tehnosfere u postrojenjima za pročišćavanje otpadnih voda. Cirkulacija/kruženje u okolišu može se pojaviti kada PFAAs iz sustava pitke voda (rijeka, bunara i jezera) odlaze u otpadne vode. Prikazano je kako voda iz slavine može biti važan izvor PFAAs sustavima za pročišćavanje otpadnih voda u područjima s povišenim razinama zaštite okoliša. To se treba uzeti u obzir pri računanju emisije putem strojeva koji se koriste za pročišćenje otpadnih voda. Masena ravnoteža PFAA u postrojenjima za pročišćavanje otpadnih voda upućuje na to da su PFHxA i PFOA stvoreni kao prethodni spojevi unutar postrojenja. Prikupljene masene ravnoteže PFAA za Baltičko more (Članak III) pokazale su da su pritoke rijeka i atmosfersko taloženje dominantni ulazni putovi, dok postrojenja za pročišćenje otpadnih voda pridonose tek u manjoj mjeri. Ulaz PFAAs je procijenjen višim od izlaza, što objašnjava trenutno povećanje sadržaja PFAA u Baltičkom moru. Masena ravnoteža PFAAs u dva udaljena riječna toka predstavljena u Članku IV otkriva da ulaz dominira nad izlazom za oba riječna toka, što upućuje na značajan udio PFAAs koji je iz atmosfere zadržan u tlu ili podzemnim vodama te može biti ispušten u područja površinskih voda i mora. ; Perfluorerade alkylsyror (PFAA) är kemikalier som är producerade av människan. Deras unika egenskaper gör att de kan användas i många olika industriella applikationer. PFAAs används i brandsläckningsskum, vattenavvisande kläder, hydrauliska oljor och matförpackningar. PFAAs har visat sig vara persistenta i miljön, och långkedjiga PFAA-homologer har visat sig vara bioackumulerbara samt ha en toxisk verkan. Reglering på internationell nivå tillsammans med initiativ från industrin har lett till minskning av direkta utsläpp. Punktkällor som brandövningsplatser samt andra diffusa källor fortsätter att förorena omgivande vattendrag, jordlager och fauna. Den utbredda föroreningen av PFAAs har därför blivit prioriterad för reglering. För att förstå utsläppen av PFAAs i miljön, hur de transporteras samt deras öde i miljön, är det viktigt att utföra studier som belyser dessa områden. Denna doktorsavhandling inkluderar fyra vetenskapliga publikationer. Syftet med de underliggande studierna var att öka den holistiska förståelsen av PFAAs rörelse i akvatiska system. Studierna gjordes genom att kombinera kemiska analysmetoder med modellering. Följande studier genomfördes; Transport och spridning av PFAAs från en brandövningsplats (Paper I), recyklering av PFAAs i den akvatiska miljön med fokus på vattenreningsverk (Paper II), massbalans av PFAAs i Östersjön (Paper III), transport och öde av PFAAs i två pristina vattendrag (Paper IV). Resultat från (Paper I) visade att brandövningsplatser vid en flygplats som inte har varit i bruk i mer än 30 år, fortfarande är punktkällor av PFAAs till omgivande vattendrag. Summan av PFAAs koncentrationer i grundvattnet och ytvattnet sträckte sig från 740 till 51000 ng L-1 och <0.5 till 79 ng L-1 i respektive vattendrag. Koncentrationen av PFOS i muskelvävnad från aborre i en av sjöarna var 77 till 370 ng g-1 våtvikt. Dessa värden representerar några av de högsta uppmätta koncentrationerna i världen. I Paper II testades betydelsen av PFAAs från recirkulering i miljön i jämförelse med nya utsläpp från teknosfären. Recirkulering av PFAAs i miljön kan förekomma då PFAAs i inkommande vatten till reningsverk kommer från dricksvatten. Denna studie visar att dricksvatten kan vara en påtaglig källa av PFAAs till vattenreningsverk i områden med förhöjda halter av PFAAs i miljön. Detta måste tas hänsyn till när man beräknar emissioner med utgående vatten från vattenreningsverk. Massbalanser av PFAAs i reningsverken visar att PFHxA och PFOA bildades av prekursorämnen i vattenreningsverken. I Paper III beräknades massbalanserna av PFAAs i Östersjön, beräkningarna visar att floder och atmosfärisk nedebörd var de viktigaste källorna medan utsläppen från vattenreningsverk var markant lägre. Importen av PFAAs estimerades vara högre än exporten, varför vi tror att PFAAs mängden I Östersjön kommer att öka över tid. Vidare gjordes en mass balans av PFAAs i två avlägsna avrinningsområden (Paper IV). Resultaten visar att importen av PFAAs dominerar över exporten från båda avrinningsområdena. Detta indikerar att en stor del av PFAAs som kommer ner via nederbörd kommer att ansamlas i jorden eller i grundvattnet. Dessa PFAAs kan vid senare tillfälle komma att släppas ut till floder som rinner ut i marina vatten. ; At the time of the doctoral defense, the following paper was unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Manuscript.

The political and security transition continues to take a heavy toll on Afghanistan's economy. Economic growth is estimated to have fallen further to 2 percent in 2014 from 3.7 percent in 2013 and an average of 9 percent during 2003-12. Political uncertainty combined with weak reform progress dealt a further blow in 2014 to investor and consumer confidence, already in a slump from uncertainty building since 2013. As a result, growth in the non-agricultural sectors (manufacturing, construction, and services) is estimated to have fallen further in 2014. The agricultural harvest in 2014 was strong for the third year in a row, but was up only marginally from the bumper year of 2012. Agriculture benefited from robust cereals production thanks both to well distributed, timely rainfall and an increase in irrigated area for wheat cultivation. The growth outlook for 2015 remains weak. Afghanistan faces the dual challenge of restoring confidence in its economic prospects and addressing formidable medium term development challenges. The new government articulated its development vision and a bold reform program through its paper 'realizing self-reliance: commitments to reforms and renewed partnership' presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan in December 2014. The paper presents the government's plans for tackling corruption and building better governance, restoring fiscal sustainability, bolstering private sector confidence, promoting growth, and improving security and political stability. Successful implementation of this bold reform program under difficult circumstances is the major challenge facing Afghanistan.

Costa Rica stands out for being among the most politically stable, progressive, prosperous, and environmentally conscious nations in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. Its development model has brought important economic, social, and environmental dividends, with sustained growth, upward mobility for a large share of the population, important gains in social indicators, and significant achievements in reforestation and conservation. However, there are a number of development challenges that need to be addressed to maintain the country's successful development path. This Systematic Country Diagnostic takes stock of the poverty, inequality, and growth trends, addressing the following questions: To what extent has the Costa Rican development model been inclusive? What has driven growth in Costa Rica in recent years, and what are the bottlenecks that need to be addressed? How sustainable is the development model of Costa Rica economically, socially, and environmentally?

The end of the year saw a radical shift in Ukraine's European integration. On November 8 the European Commission proposed opening EU accession talks with Kyiv, an important step for Ukraine; the European Council subsequently approved this decision. As a further step on the path to Europeanization, Ukraine completed synchronizing its power system with the European system, and the country's transmission system operator became a member of the European network, ENTSO-E.Despite heavy combat, the front line did not move. There was some concern about future military aid, the availability of which would affect war developments and Ukraine's abilities to hold off Russian forces on the battlefield and thwart Russian air strikes on civilian targets. The concern mostly arose from the position of the United States, which has been driven by internal U.S. politicking, and the corresponding delay in providing new aid packages. The lack of weapons supplies, Kyiv claimed, slowed the counteroffensive operation, which, despite expectations, did not result in rapid and wide-scale advances. Nonetheless, there were positive achievements of the counteroffensive, particularly in taking out Russia's naval vessels and port supplies.1. ROLLOUT OF THE WARGeneral Developments during October–DecemberThe last quarter of 2023 was another period of heavy, intense fighting without tangible territorial advances on either side. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) kept up pressure along the entire front, with key battles taking place in the vicinity of Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Kupiansk, Lyman, Mariinka, and Robotyno. The battle for Avdiivka, in Donetsk oblast, a city Russian forces have tried to capture since early October, was perhaps the costliest of the war for the AFRF, with little achieved there. At the same time, delays in supplies of military aid from Ukraine's Western allies affected military operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which had to curtail some operations because of ammunition shortages.Despite high expectations, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the last quarter of the year did not result in rapid and wide-scale advances. Nonetheless, there were some critical developments. In mid-November the AFU took back some positions of the left bank of the Dnipro river in occupied Kherson oblast. Establishing bridgeheads there is a step toward being able to move forces and supplies across the river, thence to the south on a land route to Crimea. It also allows the AFU to better protect the residents of Kherson, who have been under relentless attack.Ukrainian forces also continued their successful attacks on Russian vessels in the Black Sea: 20 percent of the Russian Black Sea fleet was destroyed during the last four months of 2023, an important achievement for a country that is not a major naval power. On land, the Ukrainian army continued successful attacks on Russian military facilities in Crimea and other occupied territories, often using unmanned drones and missiles.President Zelensky and other top Ukrainian officials have attributed the lack of more impressive results from the counteroffensive to slow weapons deliveries, which gave the Russians time to build more fortifications and to mine territories densely. This was the opinion of Western military experts as well. Ultimately, the situation pushed the army chiefs to change tactics and emphasize building defense fortifications. At the same time, the AFU did not retreat, despite unprecedented pressure from Russian forces along the front line. Overall, the counteroffensive was successful in many respects: Russian casualties mounted, and the AFRF failed to advance, despite strenuous efforts. According to the AFU General Staff, from the start of the invasion to the end of 2023, the Russian army lost over 360,000 soldiers, thousands of tanks and combat vehicles, and hundreds of aircraft and helicopters. The figure on human losses is close to the UK's intelligence bureau's assessment. Spokesperson for Ukraine's military intelligence agency Andrii Yusov said in mid-December that around 450,000 Russian troops were deployed in Ukraine, many fewer than the 617,000 that Vladimir Putin claimed.Ukraine's commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, warned about the risk of a positional war, "where both sides are dug in and not moving much." To avoid such a deadlock and return to a war of maneuvers, he said, Ukraine would need additional weapons.POW ExchangesDuring the last quarter of the year, there was little public information about POW exchanges. In mid-November, Kyiv blamed Moscow for halting the exchanges and blocking negotiations over POWs. The previous exchange had taken place on August 7, when twenty-two Ukrainians returned home. In early December, President Zelensky said exchanges were happening without public announcements, while recognizing that Russia was throwing up barriers to the exchanges. In some cases, POW exchanges were occurring right on the battlefields. As of mid-November, according to official data, 4,337 Ukrainians were imprisoned in Russia, including 3,574 military personnel. The actual number of Ukrainian civilians imprisoned in Russia, according to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, may reach 25,000.Russian Disinformation Campaigns and CyberattacksRussia's disinformation campaign in Ukraine during the quarter including disseminating deep-fake videos featuring the Ukrainian army's commander-in-chief, fake stories about political and army leaders, and lies about Russian forces' success on the battlefield. Russia has also continued its anti-Ukrainian information campaigns in other countries, especially Poland. These disinformation efforts are designed to spread mistrust of Ukrainians and of Ukraine's reasons for fighting, and to decrease support. On December 12, one of the biggest Ukrainian mobile operators, Kyivstar, which provided cellular connection for 25 million customers and broadband internet connection for one million, came under a cyberattack that resulted in the total suspension of services for a few days. Earlier, in October, a court in Kyiv had seized the corporate rights in Kyivstar of three sanctioned businessmen, including the Russian oligarch Mikhail Fridman, in part to prevent them from setting up dummy corporations and moving assets there. Kyivstar was part of a larger holding group controlling similar businesses in Russia. The Russian hacking group Solntsepek claimed responsibility for the attack, but the company and Ukrainian officials said the hackers overstated their achievements, and SBU cybersecurity department head Ilya Vitiuk thought it was more likely the work of the Russian military intelligence unit Sandworm. In an interview with Reuters, Vitiuk expressed concern that the hackers had been inside Kyivstar at least since May. A big Ukrainian bank came under cyberattack at the same time as well. More than 4,000 cyberattacks have been reported since the invasion, which is three times the frequency of such attacks before the war began. Russia's Position on the WarThe Kremlin continued denying chances for the Ukrainian peace formula and said there was no basis for bilateral peace negotiations. The Kremlin has not changed its narrative on the targets of the war against Ukraine, which abounds in falsehoods and manipulative statements. Putin continues asserting that Russia did not start the war in Ukraine and expounding on the need to consider how to stop "the tragedy" in Ukraine. Russia has seen more of its armory and vehicles destroyed than it likely anticipated, but it relies on the West's potential fatigue in supporting Ukraine when spreading misinformation about Ukraine in Western countries. Attacks on Critical InfrastructureIn the fourth quarter, Ukraine did not face massive damage to the energy infrastructure. This could have resulted either from an effective air defense or from Russia not yet starting its expected winter assaults on the energy system. Still, there were numerous attacks on the power grid as early as November, and some energy assets were damaged by shelling and air strikes. Among them were power plants, coal mines, oil refineries, and fuel depots. One of the thermal power plants located close to the front was shelled ten times in two months. Some other critical infrastructure facilities also came under attack during the fourth quarter, including river port infrastructure and shipyard and railway facilities. Nonetheless, the scale of the damage was much less than in the fourth quarter of 2022. Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureAt the end of the year, Russians resumed massive drone and missile strikes on civil and critical infrastructure, hitting a record of such attacks in late December. Kyiv was a key target. Russia continued attacking civil infrastructure, including residential buildings, killing and wounding civilians. Among these were grain storage facilities, postal service infrastructure, kindergarten, the Odesa Fine Arts Museum, river and seaport infrastructure, foreign civil cargo ships, medical institutions, and so on.Numerous civilians have been killed or wounded in these attacks. A particularly heinous attack on a café hosting a funeral reception in Kharkiv oblast that resulted in the deaths of fifty-nine civilians became the biggest crime against civilians in the region. On December 29, Russia launched wide-scale missile and drone attacks that resulted in the largest number of civilians killed and injured in Kyiv since the start of invasion. Russia continued such attacks in the following days, some of which were on the same massive scale. Many residential buildings were damaged during attacks at the end of the year. Kyiv officially confirmed the unlawful deportation of almost 20,000 Ukrainian children since the start of the war. Thousands have been taken to Belarus. Fewer than 400 children had been returned as of the end of the year, in some cases through the efforts of parents and family. During the last quarter of the year the media reported fewer than twenty children returned. Analysts assess that over 8,300 Ukrainian children taken to Russia in 2023 had been sent to "reeducation camps."2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSA key issue in foreign affairs in the fourth quarter was the uncertainty of international military aid to Ukraine at the level the country needs to withstand Russia's attacks. The concern arose mostly because of internal U.S. politicking and the corresponding delay in providing new aid packages. Another factor was the rise of populist parties in parliamentary elections in some European states. Most of these populist parties, including those in Slovakia and the Netherlands, are against providing further aid to Ukraine. News that the EU was behind schedule in supplying artillery rounds did not give grounds for optimism. These various factors combined meant a critical drop in aid: between August and October, the amount of newly committed aid to Ukraine decreased by 87 percent compared to the same period in 2022.At the same time, the leaders of some European states and the EU itself declared themselves ready to continue supporting Ukraine. European leaders warned that Ukraine's defeat would mean serious damage to the project of United Europe and that Russia would be on the EU's doorstep and would later move forward with war against other European states, as it has threatened.In the larger picture, Ukraine's inability to defend itself would mean democracy losing to tyranny. A door would open for a global parade of more powerful states annexing less powerful neighbors, and war-oriented Russia would have more resources to conduct war in the future. Prominent Western media have also spoken out on the necessity of providing support to Ukraine. A Financial Times article described the humanitarian disaster that would occur should Russia win, and an editorial in Bloomberg called on Western governments to continue supporting Ukraine.President Zelensky's Diplomatic ToursIn the last quarter of the year, President Zelensky made a few visits to allies and partner countries. In early October, he visited Spainto attend the European Political Community Summit, a forum of more than forty countries established after Russia's invasion to cope with critical challenges and threats, including Russia's war in Ukraine. At the summit, he met with Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez and Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni to discuss new military aid packages. He met the Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan for the first time ever, as Russia-Armenia relations had cooled after another Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in September 2023. In September, Armenia provided Ukraine with humanitarian aid for the first time since the full-scale invasion, and in late October, Armenia participated in Ukraine's Peace Formula summit for the first time.On October 10, President Zelensky visited Romania to meet his counterpart, Klaus Iohannis, to discuss Black Sea regional security and the transit of Ukrainian grain, an issue that has prompted some harsh tit-for-tat threats in the past. The two presidents signed a joint declaration on bilateral cooperation, including on such matters as security, Ukrainian grain exports, promoting the Ukrainian Peace Formula, and others matters related to Ukraine's defense. The next day Zelensky made an unannounced visit to Brussels to attend a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Council and a meeting of NATO defense ministers in the Ramstein Format, a group of more than fifty countries organized to provide collective support to Ukraine. The key topic during the meetings was providing weapons and air defense systems before the winter. The UK and Norway agreed to address strengthening security in the Black Sea region, and France and Germany committed to leading a new ground-based air defense coalition. In December, President Zelensky visitedArgentina to attend the inauguration of the country's president-elect, Javier Milei, who has expressed support for Ukraine in Russia's war. He also met with the leaders of a few other South American states. Following this trip, he visited the United States to meet with President Biden and address U.S. senators to enlist further U.S. support for Ukraine in the war against Russia. Zelensky then made a surprise visit to Germany and later Norway to attend the Nordic States summit. The Nordic leaders committed to supporting Ukraine "for as long as it takes."United StatesThe key feature of U.S.-Ukraine relations in the last quarter of the year was uncertainty over future U.S. aid to Ukraine. Internal U.S. politicking has resulted in deferred agreement on the U.S. federal budget for 2024, and the precipitous start of Israel's war with Hamas has confounded any consideration of aid to Ukraine as a stand-alone issue. The Ukraine aid fund was expected to run out by the end of the year.Relations with the EU and European StatesOn November 8 the European Commission adopted the 2023 Enlargement package, which recommended inviting Kyiv to start talks on Ukraine's accession to the EU. The decision was based on an assessment of Ukraine's progress toward reforms in different areas, as detailed in a separate report. According to the report, Ukraine had taken the necessary steps and fulfilled its commitments sufficiently to be ready for negotiations. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, called this "excellent progress." On December 14 the European Council agreed to open Ukraine membership talks, even though Hungary and Austria expressed an intent to vote against Ukraine's membership.Most of the European states continued supporting Ukraine. Germany remained among the largest supporters and aid providers, with a few packages of aid provided in the last quarter of the year. Among other articles, Germany supplied some air defense systems that are crucial during the winter to protect critical infrastructure against Russian missile strikes and bombings. Ukraine and Germany agreed on a joint venture to produce armored military vehicles in Ukraine. Berlin made available funds to restore and support the Ukrainian power system before the winter. German chancellor Olaf Scholz called on the country to be prepared to increase its support for Ukraine "when others are faltering."As expected, parliamentary elections in Slovakia were won by Robert Fico, who had promised to end military support for Ukraine should he prevail. Immediately after the elections, Slovakia halted its military aid to Ukraine, and, after being appointed prime minister, Fico confirmed this decision and canceled previously approved aid packages. Fico took the position that the war was a "frozen conflict" and Kyiv and Moscow needed to negotiate. However, he confirmed his intention to continue supplying humanitarian aid.The pro-Russia Fico had held anti-Ukrainian views before the election. The newly appointed country's foreign affairs minister, Juraj Blanár, in the past was known for purveying misinformation about Ukraine and repeating Russia's propaganda narratives. Bilateral relations between Slovakia and Ukraine are likely to become strained in the near future. In October, Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte visited Ukraine, promising to supply extra Patriot missiles before the winter, along with another aid package announced shortly before. Another prominent event happened in early December when the Netherlands finally returned to Ukraine some ancient Scythian artifacts the country had held on to for almost ten years. These items had previously been kept in Crimea before being sent out for exhibition. When Russia annexed Crimea, it also claimed ownership of the artifacts. In June 2023 a Dutch court ruled the gold treasures should go to Ukraine, not Crimea. In late December, the Netherlands started preparing F-16 fighter jets to be delivered to Ukraine.The Netherlands is among Ukraine's most significant military aid providers and is committed to continuing support in 2024. But there is a risk of a Slovakia-style development: in November a far-right politician, Geert Wilders, whose platform included halting support for Ukraine, unexpectedlywon parliamentary elections. Wilders's party, which was anti-Ukrainian ten years ago, will not have a majority, so the future country's policy toward Ukraine may depend on what kind of political coalition gets put together.Relations with Hungary remained strained. There was little progress in solving the agriculture export ban other than a waiver for sugar. Budapest continued creating obstacles within the EU to the vote granting Ukraine support, and the country's prime minister, Viktor Orbán, personally criticized providing aid to Ukraine. Hungary threatened to block EU accession negotiations with Kyiv and even filed a corresponding claim with the European Commission. Prime Minister Orbán, who has maintained ties with Moscow despite the EU's policy, said Kyiv was not ready to begin EU accession negotiations. Ukraine's EU membership aspirations do not coincide with Hungary's national interests, he said. Orbán might take the desire of most EU member states to support Ukraine as an opportunity to negotiate more for Hungary, both from the EU and from Ukraine. Budapest demands that Ukraine amend its law on education, and Kyiv says it is ready to do so. Kyiv's position is to negotiate with countries whose minorities live in Ukraine, to fulfill the European criteria, but without making special exceptions for any minority.Despite the threats, Hungary did not veto the vote on starting Ukraine-EU membership negotiations, but on the same day it blocked the EU's decision for €50 billion in long-term aid for Ukraine. Romania became a more important partner of Ukraine, and bilateral relations grew thicker in the fourth quarter. President Zelensky visited Bucharest and signed a bilateral memorandum of cooperation with his Romanian counterpart. Romania continued taking steps to expand Ukrainian agricultural transit, which faced a potential blockade by some other neighboring states. The two countries settled the dispute over the construction of a deep-water navigation route, in which Bucharest had accused Kyiv of violating environmental standards. Bucharest welcomed amendments to the Ukrainian law on national minorities and Kyiv's decision not to use the term "Moldovan language."The concept of the "Moldovan language" was established by Moscow when Moldova was one of the Soviet socialist republics; it is not recognized by Bucharest, despite the large number of Moldovan immigrants in Romania. The relationship between Romania and Moldova is long and complicated, and President Zelensky felt the language issue was of less importance in a time of war.After the dispute regarding agricultural exports and transit between Ukraine and Poland, top officials from both countries ratcheted down the tension in their public statements. The presidents of Ukraine and Poland reaffirmed good bilateral relations. Even as the agricultural dispute awaits an adequate resolution, however, a new one has cropped up: some Polish carriers started blocking border-crossing points with Ukraine (described below). The new Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, appointed in December, gives hope for better bilateral relations with fewer conflicts. A former president of the European Council and staunchly pro-Ukraine, Tusk has demanded full mobilization of the West to help Ukraine. Poland's new foreign affairs minister, Radosław Sikorski, paid his first official visit to Kyiv on December 22. Developments in Agricultural Exports DisputesThe dispute over agricultural exports with some neighboring countries was only partly solved. In early October, Kyiv suspended its complaints to the World Trade Organization against Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, anticipating that a constructive attitude would work better toward finding a solution. During the dispute, most of the overland grain exports, 60 percent, were rerouted through Romania. Increased deliveries through Moldova also became part of the solution. In mid-October the Romanian government approved an import permit system to protect local farmers. In late November, Ukraine and Bulgaria approved a joint mechanism for agrarian exports that would avoid market distortions in the countries of transit, which feared lower prices for their own products.At the same time, the new Slovak government announced its intention to extend the ban on the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products beyond the time permitted by the EU, which ended September 15. Slovakia also added to the list of agricultural products banned for transit. The Hungarian government amended its own ban to allow sugar imports, as the country intensely depends on imports. These unilateral country bans are against EU regulations, which maintain federated oversight of product transit.Carriers' Strike and Blockade of Border-Crossing PointsIn November, Polish haulers started a protest and a blockade of Ukraine border crossings. Later, some carriers from Slovakia occasionally joined them. Because Ukraine suffers from lack of transportation capabilities through the Black Sea, the blockade created huge lines of thousands of vehicles at the borders and complicated the transportation of goods from and to Ukraine, including military aid. The Polish strikers demanded the restoration of permits for Ukrainian carriers, a ban on the issuance of licenses to non-EU transport companies, and a waiver for empty Polish trucks to register with the Ukrainian electronic queue when returning to Poland from Ukraine. Kyiv argued that restoration of the permits is impossible as in 2022, Ukraine and the EU signed an Agreement on the Carriage of Freight by Road that stipulates bilateral and transit traffic without permits. A representative of the European Commission called the blockade "unacceptable." One of the organizers of the protest is Rafal Mekler, a member of the Polish far-right National Movement Party, also known as the Confederation party, which is skeptical toward the EU and less friendly toward Ukraine. For this reason, some believe the transport blockade was politically inspired. Despite the agreement of representatives of Ukraine and Poland on an action plan to unblock the border and the participation of the European Commission, the dispute had not been resolved as of the end of the year. The next step is agreement at the ministry level.Ukrainian Peace Formula DevelopmentsIn late October, Malta hosted a meeting of representatives of sixty-five states to discuss the implementation of the Ukrainian peace formula. The meeting was focused on nuclear safety, energy, and food security, the liberation of POWs and deported persons, and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity.3. INTERNAL AFFAIRSThe Economic SituationAccording to the IMF's assessments, in 2023 the Ukrainian economy grew faster than expected. Annual growth is expected to come to 4.5 percent, compared to the 1−3 percent previously forecasted. But high growth rates cannot be guaranteed for the future, as the prospects of export capacities in the next year are unclear. Economic growth will also depend on the continued provision of aid, and that is also obscure. In early October the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) suspended the fixed exchange rate regime and introduced a flexible one. Despite concerns, the national currency rate remained stable, though it started weakening a little toward the end of the year. Naturally, the strength of the national currency in the current circumstances is deeply dependent on international aid. Later, the NBU also lifted all restrictions on sales of foreign currencies to the public. The NBU also decreased a key policy rate twice in the last quarter of 2023 after a two-stage decrease earlier in the year. This was possible because inflation was low—just 5.1 percent in November.At the end of the year, parliament approved the state budget for 2024, which is oriented toward strengthening the army but has a huge deficit: expenditures are expected to be almost double revenues. Likely as a result of this situation, parliament passed some laws stipulating steps that may increase budget incomes or funds to finance the army. These are laws on resuming tax inspections for businesses and on raising the tax rate for banks to 50 percent. A Focus Ukraine (Kennan) piece on Ukraine's budget for 2024 is available here.On December 11, the IMF approved releasing the third tranche of Extended Fund Facility funds, about U.S. $900 million, to Ukraine. Ukraine needs financing, but at the same time, there are risks to deepening the loan burden. The IMF expects Ukraine's public debt to exceed 100 percent of GDP in two years.The Energy SituationDuring the summer, the energy companies undertook major maintenance campaigns to restore capacities before the winter and the anticipated onslaught of Russian air attacks. As of October, available power generation and transmission capacities, together with electricity import capacities, could barely cover peak demand. In November the power system started experiencing a deficit such that Ukraine had to rely on electricity imports, chiefly from Romania and Poland, to meet demand. At the same time, price regulations restricted commercial imports, and the power system had to turn to technical emergency assistance, which is a specific import but usually more expensive, and without predictable availability. Government ReshufflesIn early November, Ukraine's Youth and Sports Minister Vadym Gutzeit submitted his resignation, which parliament later approved. Some civil actors had criticized Gutzeit's efficacy as a minister and were concerned about allegations of his possible involvement in embezzlement of state funds before becoming minister, although his attorney said he was not a suspect and no charges had been brought against him. Gutzeit was succeeded by his vice-deputy as acting minister, while Gutzeit himself continues in his role as head of Ukraine's National Olympic Committee. 4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIESImportant Legislative ChangesIn the fourth quarter of 2024, parliament passed some important initiatives. In December the Verkhovna Rada legalized medical cannabis. In addition, parliament amended the law on minorities to be in accord with the Council of Europe's recommendations, which was a part of Ukraine's obligations on its path to European integration. The amendments broaden the use of EU languages, including in an educational context, while requiring the study of Ukrainian as a state language; the minority languages affected are chiefly Romanian and Hungarian. Two other laws that parliament passed as part of the EU integration commitments deal with battling corruption. Both laws expand the capacities of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and the National Corruption Prevention Agency. The president of the European Commission positively assessed these legislative changes well.Successful Completion of Synchronization of Ukrainian and European Power SystemsOn November 28 the Continental European TSOs (transmission service operators), a regional group of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E), said that the Ukrainian transmission system operator, Ukrenergo, had achieved compliance with the key technical requirements necessary to enable a permanent interconnection between the power systems of continental Europe and Ukraine. The process formally started in 2017, when Ukrenergo and ENTSO-E signed a roadmap for integrating the Ukrainian power system into the electricity system of continental Europe. In addition, the continental European TSOs have decided to increase the capacity limit for electricity trade from continental Europe to Ukraine and Moldova to 1,700 megawatts, based on system security and the results of stability simulations, reflecting an increase of 500 MW from the previous limit.Based on this compliance, on December 14, ENTSO-E accepted Ukrenergo as the fortieth member of the association as of January 1, 2024. This means that the Ukrainian power system has become an integral part of the European system, and Ukrenergo will have equal rights with the European TSOs. The next stage is market coupling, which requires full unification of Ukrainian energy market regulation with the European set of regulations. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

The end of the year saw a radical shift in Ukraine's European integration. On November 8 the European Commission proposed opening EU accession talks with Kyiv, an important step for Ukraine; the European Council subsequently approved this decision. As a further step on the path to Europeanization, Ukraine completed synchronizing its power system with the European system, and the country's transmission system operator became a member of the European network, ENTSO-E.Despite heavy combat, the front line did not move. There was some concern about future military aid, the availability of which would affect war developments and Ukraine's abilities to hold off Russian forces on the battlefield and thwart Russian air strikes on civilian targets. The concern mostly arose from the position of the United States, which has been driven by internal U.S. politicking, and the corresponding delay in providing new aid packages. The lack of weapons supplies, Kyiv claimed, slowed the counteroffensive operation, which, despite expectations, did not result in rapid and wide-scale advances. Nonetheless, there were positive achievements of the counteroffensive, particularly in taking out Russia's naval vessels and port supplies.1. ROLLOUT OF THE WARGeneral Developments during October–DecemberThe last quarter of 2023 was another period of heavy, intense fighting without tangible territorial advances on either side. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) kept up pressure along the entire front, with key battles taking place in the vicinity of Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Kupiansk, Lyman, Mariinka, and Robotyno. The battle for Avdiivka, in Donetsk oblast, a city Russian forces have tried to capture since early October, was perhaps the costliest of the war for the AFRF, with little achieved there. At the same time, delays in supplies of military aid from Ukraine's Western allies affected military operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which had to curtail some operations because of ammunition shortages.Despite high expectations, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the last quarter of the year did not result in rapid and wide-scale advances. Nonetheless, there were some critical developments. In mid-November the AFU took back some positions of the left bank of the Dnipro river in occupied Kherson oblast. Establishing bridgeheads there is a step toward being able to move forces and supplies across the river, thence to the south on a land route to Crimea. It also allows the AFU to better protect the residents of Kherson, who have been under relentless attack.Ukrainian forces also continued their successful attacks on Russian vessels in the Black Sea: 20 percent of the Russian Black Sea fleet was destroyed during the last four months of 2023, an important achievement for a country that is not a major naval power. On land, the Ukrainian army continued successful attacks on Russian military facilities in Crimea and other occupied territories, often using unmanned drones and missiles.President Zelensky and other top Ukrainian officials have attributed the lack of more impressive results from the counteroffensive to slow weapons deliveries, which gave the Russians time to build more fortifications and to mine territories densely. This was the opinion of Western military experts as well. Ultimately, the situation pushed the army chiefs to change tactics and emphasize building defense fortifications. At the same time, the AFU did not retreat, despite unprecedented pressure from Russian forces along the front line. Overall, the counteroffensive was successful in many respects: Russian casualties mounted, and the AFRF failed to advance, despite strenuous efforts. According to the AFU General Staff, from the start of the invasion to the end of 2023, the Russian army lost over 360,000 soldiers, thousands of tanks and combat vehicles, and hundreds of aircraft and helicopters. The figure on human losses is close to the UK's intelligence bureau's assessment. Spokesperson for Ukraine's military intelligence agency Andrii Yusov said in mid-December that around 450,000 Russian troops were deployed in Ukraine, many fewer than the 617,000 that Vladimir Putin claimed.Ukraine's commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, warned about the risk of a positional war, "where both sides are dug in and not moving much." To avoid such a deadlock and return to a war of maneuvers, he said, Ukraine would need additional weapons.POW ExchangesDuring the last quarter of the year, there was little public information about POW exchanges. In mid-November, Kyiv blamed Moscow for halting the exchanges and blocking negotiations over POWs. The previous exchange had taken place on August 7, when twenty-two Ukrainians returned home. In early December, President Zelensky said exchanges were happening without public announcements, while recognizing that Russia was throwing up barriers to the exchanges. In some cases, POW exchanges were occurring right on the battlefields. As of mid-November, according to official data, 4,337 Ukrainians were imprisoned in Russia, including 3,574 military personnel. The actual number of Ukrainian civilians imprisoned in Russia, according to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, may reach 25,000.Russian Disinformation Campaigns and CyberattacksRussia's disinformation campaign in Ukraine during the quarter including disseminating deep-fake videos featuring the Ukrainian army's commander-in-chief, fake stories about political and army leaders, and lies about Russian forces' success on the battlefield. Russia has also continued its anti-Ukrainian information campaigns in other countries, especially Poland. These disinformation efforts are designed to spread mistrust of Ukrainians and of Ukraine's reasons for fighting, and to decrease support. On December 12, one of the biggest Ukrainian mobile operators, Kyivstar, which provided cellular connection for 25 million customers and broadband internet connection for one million, came under a cyberattack that resulted in the total suspension of services for a few days. Earlier, in October, a court in Kyiv had seized the corporate rights in Kyivstar of three sanctioned businessmen, including the Russian oligarch Mikhail Fridman, in part to prevent them from setting up dummy corporations and moving assets there. Kyivstar was part of a larger holding group controlling similar businesses in Russia. The Russian hacking group Solntsepek claimed responsibility for the attack, but the company and Ukrainian officials said the hackers overstated their achievements, and SBU cybersecurity department head Ilya Vitiuk thought it was more likely the work of the Russian military intelligence unit Sandworm. In an interview with Reuters, Vitiuk expressed concern that the hackers had been inside Kyivstar at least since May. A big Ukrainian bank came under cyberattack at the same time as well. More than 4,000 cyberattacks have been reported since the invasion, which is three times the frequency of such attacks before the war began. Russia's Position on the WarThe Kremlin continued denying chances for the Ukrainian peace formula and said there was no basis for bilateral peace negotiations. The Kremlin has not changed its narrative on the targets of the war against Ukraine, which abounds in falsehoods and manipulative statements. Putin continues asserting that Russia did not start the war in Ukraine and expounding on the need to consider how to stop "the tragedy" in Ukraine. Russia has seen more of its armory and vehicles destroyed than it likely anticipated, but it relies on the West's potential fatigue in supporting Ukraine when spreading misinformation about Ukraine in Western countries. Attacks on Critical InfrastructureIn the fourth quarter, Ukraine did not face massive damage to the energy infrastructure. This could have resulted either from an effective air defense or from Russia not yet starting its expected winter assaults on the energy system. Still, there were numerous attacks on the power grid as early as November, and some energy assets were damaged by shelling and air strikes. Among them were power plants, coal mines, oil refineries, and fuel depots. One of the thermal power plants located close to the front was shelled ten times in two months. Some other critical infrastructure facilities also came under attack during the fourth quarter, including river port infrastructure and shipyard and railway facilities. Nonetheless, the scale of the damage was much less than in the fourth quarter of 2022. Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureAt the end of the year, Russians resumed massive drone and missile strikes on civil and critical infrastructure, hitting a record of such attacks in late December. Kyiv was a key target. Russia continued attacking civil infrastructure, including residential buildings, killing and wounding civilians. Among these were grain storage facilities, postal service infrastructure, kindergarten, the Odesa Fine Arts Museum, river and seaport infrastructure, foreign civil cargo ships, medical institutions, and so on.Numerous civilians have been killed or wounded in these attacks. A particularly heinous attack on a café hosting a funeral reception in Kharkiv oblast that resulted in the deaths of fifty-nine civilians became the biggest crime against civilians in the region. On December 29, Russia launched wide-scale missile and drone attacks that resulted in the largest number of civilians killed and injured in Kyiv since the start of invasion. Russia continued such attacks in the following days, some of which were on the same massive scale. Many residential buildings were damaged during attacks at the end of the year. Kyiv officially confirmed the unlawful deportation of almost 20,000 Ukrainian children since the start of the war. Thousands have been taken to Belarus. Fewer than 400 children had been returned as of the end of the year, in some cases through the efforts of parents and family. During the last quarter of the year the media reported fewer than twenty children returned. Analysts assess that over 8,300 Ukrainian children taken to Russia in 2023 had been sent to "reeducation camps."2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSA key issue in foreign affairs in the fourth quarter was the uncertainty of international military aid to Ukraine at the level the country needs to withstand Russia's attacks. The concern arose mostly because of internal U.S. politicking and the corresponding delay in providing new aid packages. Another factor was the rise of populist parties in parliamentary elections in some European states. Most of these populist parties, including those in Slovakia and the Netherlands, are against providing further aid to Ukraine. News that the EU was behind schedule in supplying artillery rounds did not give grounds for optimism. These various factors combined meant a critical drop in aid: between August and October, the amount of newly committed aid to Ukraine decreased by 87 percent compared to the same period in 2022.At the same time, the leaders of some European states and the EU itself declared themselves ready to continue supporting Ukraine. European leaders warned that Ukraine's defeat would mean serious damage to the project of United Europe and that Russia would be on the EU's doorstep and would later move forward with war against other European states, as it has threatened.In the larger picture, Ukraine's inability to defend itself would mean democracy losing to tyranny. A door would open for a global parade of more powerful states annexing less powerful neighbors, and war-oriented Russia would have more resources to conduct war in the future. Prominent Western media have also spoken out on the necessity of providing support to Ukraine. A Financial Times article described the humanitarian disaster that would occur should Russia win, and an editorial in Bloomberg called on Western governments to continue supporting Ukraine.President Zelensky's Diplomatic ToursIn the last quarter of the year, President Zelensky made a few visits to allies and partner countries. In early October, he visited Spainto attend the European Political Community Summit, a forum of more than forty countries established after Russia's invasion to cope with critical challenges and threats, including Russia's war in Ukraine. At the summit, he met with Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez and Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni to discuss new military aid packages. He met the Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan for the first time ever, as Russia-Armenia relations had cooled after another Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in September 2023. In September, Armenia provided Ukraine with humanitarian aid for the first time since the full-scale invasion, and in late October, Armenia participated in Ukraine's Peace Formula summit for the first time.On October 10, President Zelensky visited Romania to meet his counterpart, Klaus Iohannis, to discuss Black Sea regional security and the transit of Ukrainian grain, an issue that has prompted some harsh tit-for-tat threats in the past. The two presidents signed a joint declaration on bilateral cooperation, including on such matters as security, Ukrainian grain exports, promoting the Ukrainian Peace Formula, and others matters related to Ukraine's defense. The next day Zelensky made an unannounced visit to Brussels to attend a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Council and a meeting of NATO defense ministers in the Ramstein Format, a group of more than fifty countries organized to provide collective support to Ukraine. The key topic during the meetings was providing weapons and air defense systems before the winter. The UK and Norway agreed to address strengthening security in the Black Sea region, and France and Germany committed to leading a new ground-based air defense coalition. In December, President Zelensky visitedArgentina to attend the inauguration of the country's president-elect, Javier Milei, who has expressed support for Ukraine in Russia's war. He also met with the leaders of a few other South American states. Following this trip, he visited the United States to meet with President Biden and address U.S. senators to enlist further U.S. support for Ukraine in the war against Russia. Zelensky then made a surprise visit to Germany and later Norway to attend the Nordic States summit. The Nordic leaders committed to supporting Ukraine "for as long as it takes."United StatesThe key feature of U.S.-Ukraine relations in the last quarter of the year was uncertainty over future U.S. aid to Ukraine. Internal U.S. politicking has resulted in deferred agreement on the U.S. federal budget for 2024, and the precipitous start of Israel's war with Hamas has confounded any consideration of aid to Ukraine as a stand-alone issue. The Ukraine aid fund was expected to run out by the end of the year.Relations with the EU and European StatesOn November 8 the European Commission adopted the 2023 Enlargement package, which recommended inviting Kyiv to start talks on Ukraine's accession to the EU. The decision was based on an assessment of Ukraine's progress toward reforms in different areas, as detailed in a separate report. According to the report, Ukraine had taken the necessary steps and fulfilled its commitments sufficiently to be ready for negotiations. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, called this "excellent progress." On December 14 the European Council agreed to open Ukraine membership talks, even though Hungary and Austria expressed an intent to vote against Ukraine's membership.Most of the European states continued supporting Ukraine. Germany remained among the largest supporters and aid providers, with a few packages of aid provided in the last quarter of the year. Among other articles, Germany supplied some air defense systems that are crucial during the winter to protect critical infrastructure against Russian missile strikes and bombings. Ukraine and Germany agreed on a joint venture to produce armored military vehicles in Ukraine. Berlin made available funds to restore and support the Ukrainian power system before the winter. German chancellor Olaf Scholz called on the country to be prepared to increase its support for Ukraine "when others are faltering."As expected, parliamentary elections in Slovakia were won by Robert Fico, who had promised to end military support for Ukraine should he prevail. Immediately after the elections, Slovakia halted its military aid to Ukraine, and, after being appointed prime minister, Fico confirmed this decision and canceled previously approved aid packages. Fico took the position that the war was a "frozen conflict" and Kyiv and Moscow needed to negotiate. However, he confirmed his intention to continue supplying humanitarian aid.The pro-Russia Fico had held anti-Ukrainian views before the election. The newly appointed country's foreign affairs minister, Juraj Blanár, in the past was known for purveying misinformation about Ukraine and repeating Russia's propaganda narratives. Bilateral relations between Slovakia and Ukraine are likely to become strained in the near future. In October, Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte visited Ukraine, promising to supply extra Patriot missiles before the winter, along with another aid package announced shortly before. Another prominent event happened in early December when the Netherlands finally returned to Ukraine some ancient Scythian artifacts the country had held on to for almost ten years. These items had previously been kept in Crimea before being sent out for exhibition. When Russia annexed Crimea, it also claimed ownership of the artifacts. In June 2023 a Dutch court ruled the gold treasures should go to Ukraine, not Crimea. In late December, the Netherlands started preparing F-16 fighter jets to be delivered to Ukraine.The Netherlands is among Ukraine's most significant military aid providers and is committed to continuing support in 2024. But there is a risk of a Slovakia-style development: in November a far-right politician, Geert Wilders, whose platform included halting support for Ukraine, unexpectedlywon parliamentary elections. Wilders's party, which was anti-Ukrainian ten years ago, will not have a majority, so the future country's policy toward Ukraine may depend on what kind of political coalition gets put together.Relations with Hungary remained strained. There was little progress in solving the agriculture export ban other than a waiver for sugar. Budapest continued creating obstacles within the EU to the vote granting Ukraine support, and the country's prime minister, Viktor Orbán, personally criticized providing aid to Ukraine. Hungary threatened to block EU accession negotiations with Kyiv and even filed a corresponding claim with the European Commission. Prime Minister Orbán, who has maintained ties with Moscow despite the EU's policy, said Kyiv was not ready to begin EU accession negotiations. Ukraine's EU membership aspirations do not coincide with Hungary's national interests, he said. Orbán might take the desire of most EU member states to support Ukraine as an opportunity to negotiate more for Hungary, both from the EU and from Ukraine. Budapest demands that Ukraine amend its law on education, and Kyiv says it is ready to do so. Kyiv's position is to negotiate with countries whose minorities live in Ukraine, to fulfill the European criteria, but without making special exceptions for any minority.Despite the threats, Hungary did not veto the vote on starting Ukraine-EU membership negotiations, but on the same day it blocked the EU's decision for €50 billion in long-term aid for Ukraine. Romania became a more important partner of Ukraine, and bilateral relations grew thicker in the fourth quarter. President Zelensky visited Bucharest and signed a bilateral memorandum of cooperation with his Romanian counterpart. Romania continued taking steps to expand Ukrainian agricultural transit, which faced a potential blockade by some other neighboring states. The two countries settled the dispute over the construction of a deep-water navigation route, in which Bucharest had accused Kyiv of violating environmental standards. Bucharest welcomed amendments to the Ukrainian law on national minorities and Kyiv's decision not to use the term "Moldovan language."The concept of the "Moldovan language" was established by Moscow when Moldova was one of the Soviet socialist republics; it is not recognized by Bucharest, despite the large number of Moldovan immigrants in Romania. The relationship between Romania and Moldova is long and complicated, and President Zelensky felt the language issue was of less importance in a time of war.After the dispute regarding agricultural exports and transit between Ukraine and Poland, top officials from both countries ratcheted down the tension in their public statements. The presidents of Ukraine and Poland reaffirmed good bilateral relations. Even as the agricultural dispute awaits an adequate resolution, however, a new one has cropped up: some Polish carriers started blocking border-crossing points with Ukraine (described below). The new Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, appointed in December, gives hope for better bilateral relations with fewer conflicts. A former president of the European Council and staunchly pro-Ukraine, Tusk has demanded full mobilization of the West to help Ukraine. Poland's new foreign affairs minister, Radosław Sikorski, paid his first official visit to Kyiv on December 22. Developments in Agricultural Exports DisputesThe dispute over agricultural exports with some neighboring countries was only partly solved. In early October, Kyiv suspended its complaints to the World Trade Organization against Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, anticipating that a constructive attitude would work better toward finding a solution. During the dispute, most of the overland grain exports, 60 percent, were rerouted through Romania. Increased deliveries through Moldova also became part of the solution. In mid-October the Romanian government approved an import permit system to protect local farmers. In late November, Ukraine and Bulgaria approved a joint mechanism for agrarian exports that would avoid market distortions in the countries of transit, which feared lower prices for their own products.At the same time, the new Slovak government announced its intention to extend the ban on the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products beyond the time permitted by the EU, which ended September 15. Slovakia also added to the list of agricultural products banned for transit. The Hungarian government amended its own ban to allow sugar imports, as the country intensely depends on imports. These unilateral country bans are against EU regulations, which maintain federated oversight of product transit.Carriers' Strike and Blockade of Border-Crossing PointsIn November, Polish haulers started a protest and a blockade of Ukraine border crossings. Later, some carriers from Slovakia occasionally joined them. Because Ukraine suffers from lack of transportation capabilities through the Black Sea, the blockade created huge lines of thousands of vehicles at the borders and complicated the transportation of goods from and to Ukraine, including military aid. The Polish strikers demanded the restoration of permits for Ukrainian carriers, a ban on the issuance of licenses to non-EU transport companies, and a waiver for empty Polish trucks to register with the Ukrainian electronic queue when returning to Poland from Ukraine. Kyiv argued that restoration of the permits is impossible as in 2022, Ukraine and the EU signed an Agreement on the Carriage of Freight by Road that stipulates bilateral and transit traffic without permits. A representative of the European Commission called the blockade "unacceptable." One of the organizers of the protest is Rafal Mekler, a member of the Polish far-right National Movement Party, also known as the Confederation party, which is skeptical toward the EU and less friendly toward Ukraine. For this reason, some believe the transport blockade was politically inspired. Despite the agreement of representatives of Ukraine and Poland on an action plan to unblock the border and the participation of the European Commission, the dispute had not been resolved as of the end of the year. The next step is agreement at the ministry level.Ukrainian Peace Formula DevelopmentsIn late October, Malta hosted a meeting of representatives of sixty-five states to discuss the implementation of the Ukrainian peace formula. The meeting was focused on nuclear safety, energy, and food security, the liberation of POWs and deported persons, and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity.3. INTERNAL AFFAIRSThe Economic SituationAccording to the IMF's assessments, in 2023 the Ukrainian economy grew faster than expected. Annual growth is expected to come to 4.5 percent, compared to the 1−3 percent previously forecasted. But high growth rates cannot be guaranteed for the future, as the prospects of export capacities in the next year are unclear. Economic growth will also depend on the continued provision of aid, and that is also obscure. In early October the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) suspended the fixed exchange rate regime and introduced a flexible one. Despite concerns, the national currency rate remained stable, though it started weakening a little toward the end of the year. Naturally, the strength of the national currency in the current circumstances is deeply dependent on international aid. Later, the NBU also lifted all restrictions on sales of foreign currencies to the public. The NBU also decreased a key policy rate twice in the last quarter of 2023 after a two-stage decrease earlier in the year. This was possible because inflation was low—just 5.1 percent in November.At the end of the year, parliament approved the state budget for 2024, which is oriented toward strengthening the army but has a huge deficit: expenditures are expected to be almost double revenues. Likely as a result of this situation, parliament passed some laws stipulating steps that may increase budget incomes or funds to finance the army. These are laws on resuming tax inspections for businesses and on raising the tax rate for banks to 50 percent. A Focus Ukraine (Kennan) piece on Ukraine's budget for 2024 is available here.On December 11, the IMF approved releasing the third tranche of Extended Fund Facility funds, about U.S. $900 million, to Ukraine. Ukraine needs financing, but at the same time, there are risks to deepening the loan burden. The IMF expects Ukraine's public debt to exceed 100 percent of GDP in two years.The Energy SituationDuring the summer, the energy companies undertook major maintenance campaigns to restore capacities before the winter and the anticipated onslaught of Russian air attacks. As of October, available power generation and transmission capacities, together with electricity import capacities, could barely cover peak demand. In November the power system started experiencing a deficit such that Ukraine had to rely on electricity imports, chiefly from Romania and Poland, to meet demand. At the same time, price regulations restricted commercial imports, and the power system had to turn to technical emergency assistance, which is a specific import but usually more expensive, and without predictable availability. Government ReshufflesIn early November, Ukraine's Youth and Sports Minister Vadym Gutzeit submitted his resignation, which parliament later approved. Some civil actors had criticized Gutzeit's efficacy as a minister and were concerned about allegations of his possible involvement in embezzlement of state funds before becoming minister, although his attorney said he was not a suspect and no charges had been brought against him. Gutzeit was succeeded by his vice-deputy as acting minister, while Gutzeit himself continues in his role as head of Ukraine's National Olympic Committee. 4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIESImportant Legislative ChangesIn the fourth quarter of 2024, parliament passed some important initiatives. In December the Verkhovna Rada legalized medical cannabis. In addition, parliament amended the law on minorities to be in accord with the Council of Europe's recommendations, which was a part of Ukraine's obligations on its path to European integration. The amendments broaden the use of EU languages, including in an educational context, while requiring the study of Ukrainian as a state language; the minority languages affected are chiefly Romanian and Hungarian. Two other laws that parliament passed as part of the EU integration commitments deal with battling corruption. Both laws expand the capacities of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and the National Corruption Prevention Agency. The president of the European Commission positively assessed these legislative changes well.Successful Completion of Synchronization of Ukrainian and European Power SystemsOn November 28 the Continental European TSOs (transmission service operators), a regional group of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E), said that the Ukrainian transmission system operator, Ukrenergo, had achieved compliance with the key technical requirements necessary to enable a permanent interconnection between the power systems of continental Europe and Ukraine. The process formally started in 2017, when Ukrenergo and ENTSO-E signed a roadmap for integrating the Ukrainian power system into the electricity system of continental Europe. In addition, the continental European TSOs have decided to increase the capacity limit for electricity trade from continental Europe to Ukraine and Moldova to 1,700 megawatts, based on system security and the results of stability simulations, reflecting an increase of 500 MW from the previous limit.Based on this compliance, on December 14, ENTSO-E accepted Ukrenergo as the fortieth member of the association as of January 1, 2024. This means that the Ukrainian power system has become an integral part of the European system, and Ukrenergo will have equal rights with the European TSOs. The next stage is market coupling, which requires full unification of Ukrainian energy market regulation with the European set of regulations. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

This is a key time to protect global forests. While pressure is still strong on many key global ecosystems, such as the Amazon and Borneo, the significant results of governments such as Lula's in Brazil, as well as the ambitious vision of policies such as the recently enacted EU's Deforestation-Free Regulation (EUDR),[1] show that the devastating trend of deforestation of the past decades can indeed be reversed. Yet, a set of tools needs to be delivered to support this new wave of action to protect global forests, which has been triggered by raising awareness of the climate and biodiversity crises – a mix of social, economic and political, but also technological instruments. New technologies can indeed be a game changer in protecting global forests, if adequately understood and implemented: while some can significantly reduce the costs of once expensive activities, such as monitoring large territories, others can achieve what was otherwise impossible in the past, such as easily checking the origin of legal or illegal timber. It will be however necessary to address a series of obstacles – from a policy, legal, but also cultural perspectives – as well as to understand the interaction of such technologies with social and political aspects, for them to be fully effective.Technologies to fight deforestation
While deforestation is almost entirely caused by the expansion of global agriculture (up to 90 per cent of total clearings),[2] failure to prevent it has been due to a number of issues: the cost of monitoring vast or inaccessible territories, such as the core of the Amazon or Indonesia's islands, the lack of effectiveness of enforcement by authorities at all levels, corruption and the relative easiness in evading national and international regulations (also due to their complexity, as in the case of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species – CITES). Technology helps in a number of ways: it reduces the need for specialisation, as many activities can be automatised (such as checking documents through QR codes). It also provides incontrovertible proof of deforestation, raising global awareness on the issue: this has been the case of the sharp increase in the Amazon deforestation under the Bolsonaro administration, which was accurately documented through satellite imagery analysis.[3] It can significantly reduce the cost of monitoring activities and the need for personnel in often understaffed entities, such as NGOs or environmental agencies; drones can cover in a few hours areas that would take entire days to teams on foot. New, experimental technologies also allow for results that were once considered impossible: scanners being now developed by the Spanish police SEPRONA will allow customs officers to trace the origin of wood and eventually declare its legal or illegal origin only by using mobile phones.[4]
While the technologies being applied in the sector are many indeed, a few are particularly promising. Satellite imagery analysis is by far the most relevant and most extensively used. While natural photos are now being coupled with artificial intelligence (AI) to monitor deforestation patterns on a weekly or even daily basis (as in the case of the Forest Watcher app),[5] multispectral images offer new insights that were once impossible even to think of. Drones have helped with patrolling, but they also have other applications, especially if they use advanced instruments (as in the case of the thermal and multispectral cameras now available also on commercial agricultural drones). Among experimental technologies, scanners for the recognition of the origin of timber are instead using DNA and isotope technologies – two methods that can trace the timber sample to the specific region where the tree grew and was harvested. While DNA and isotope technologies are relatively consolidated and, if used in conjunction, have an extremely low margin of error,[6] they also require a significant mapping of forest areas to create the database that will be used to determine the actual origin of timber. This in turn requires a solid collaboration between different authorities – particularly between those in the countries producing the timber and those in the countries buying it – which has historically proved complicated.
While all these methods proved effective over the years, many are indeed the obstacles still ahead. Authorities sometimes do not accept them as valid proof in investigations – this has been the case of several environmental investigations in France, for instance – while their implementation is sometimes impeded by bureaucracy or outdated legislation. This is the case for commercial drones: their technology has made giant leaps in the past ten years, but laws and environmental applications by national authorities are generally based on the low-autonomy drones of the 2010s. Sometimes obstacles are also cultural: technologies are perceived as expensive or inaccessible, even if quick advancements have remarkably changed the landscape in recent years (as again in the case of drones, but also concerning the availability and definition of satellite images). Politics also plays a role: data supplied from sensors, satellite images or drones have in many cases been denied or disregarded by public authorities. Bolsonaro's administration even tried to accuse its own National Institute for Spatial Research, the INPE, of manipulation.[7]The case of Indonesia
Indonesia is alternatively the first or second country for deforestation rates (depending on the year) globally, and has long faced issues in addressing the problem; agriculture (palm oil production in particular) has been the main cause for the clear cutting of its forests, but also the main driver for the country's economic growth since the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998. The management of forests and the landscape has been thus entangled with significant political and economic interests, some even dating back to the dictatorship time.[8] Technology is thus key for Indonesia to fight an issue that is still plaguing its ample and often inaccessible forest. The tools being applied in the country are mostly three: satellite imagery analysis, drones and apps.
Satellite images have been extensively used in the past decade and are an established tool throughout all levels of analysis – institutions, international NGOs such as the World Conservation Society (WCS), but also local NGOs. Professors such as Bambang Hero Saharjo from the IPB University have been using satellite data also to conduct investigations and produce evidence for criminal trials against companies illegally clearing forests to plant palm oil (and other crops). Local NGOs such as Jikalahari (based in the Riau province of Sumatra) or Titian (in West Kalimantan, part of the Indonesian Borneo) use a mix of the NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) and the ESA Copernicus Sentinel-2 data to detect "hotspots" – that is, large fires on agricultural or forest land – in real time. The staff from these NGOs then selects the most relevant locations and tries to understand the entity of the fire first through a network of local informers, and then perform a final check on the field using drones. Photos and videos are then used as evidence in investigations run by national agencies. Technologies are also supporting the sustainable production of commodities. Apps such as KoltiTrace by the agri service provider Koltiva[9] allow for the geolocalisation of the production of coffee, so that buyers can trace the origin of the commodity to legal plantations outside protected forests (this being also one of the key legal requirements of the EUDR). Farms on mountainous terrain, such as those in South Sumatra, are testing drones to map large areas in a short time.
While all these tools are promising and are already bringing results, it is worth noting that they do not exist in a vacuum: politicians and agencies can ignore the data provided by satellites and drones, for instance. This is an ongoing issue in Indonesia, where the government often overestimated the impact of its regulations against deforestation and underestimated the rate of cutting, in contrast with data supplied from satellite imagery. Concerns about government-supplied data have for example been raised in relation to the debate over the 2020 payments under the REDD+ platform (a UN system to compensate countries that limit deforestation)[10] or the estimations for the devastating 2019 forest fires[11] – the research associate David Gaveau, of the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), had even to depart from Indonesia over disagreement with authorities on the data.[12] Similarly, farmers can also find ways to trick the geolocalisation systems – by, for instance, stating that the apps don't work in their area because of lack of signal, or using farms on unprotected land as their own. Corruption can also represent a significant obstacle, the issue being still highly relevant across the country; corrupted officers can avoid reporting what drones or sensors helped them spot, and automatic monitoring systems can be put offline by simulating a malfunction.Looking ahead
In order for the anti-deforestation technologies to be fully effective, it will be necessary to implement a series of complementary measures: economic incentives should be provided for sustainable farming, while the cost of using these technologies should not fall entirely on farmers, but be equally distributed throughout the supply chain. In theory this is already the case with most certification schemes and policies such as the EUDR – the final buyer of the commodity has the duty to perform training and tracing, and to bear the cost for this, while also giving farmers a premium price for their sustainability efforts. However, in many cases this extra budget is absorbed by intermediaries in the supply chain and little actually comes to producers, particularly when they are smallholders. At a more general level, international regulations and treaties, such as the EUDR and the CITES, should push for the integration of satellite data into national policies to define a common understanding of the magnitude and causes of deforestation – so far, they only give general recommendations. Integration of regulations is also essential: countries such as Indonesia have worked on providing guidelines for the sustainable production of key commodities in previous years, but these efforts have rarely been integrated into European policies. Particularly from a technology perspective, such integration could instead solve many of the issues being currently debated around EUDR compliance (particularly tracing and geolocalisation). In this sense, technologies can become a key component of a new, holistic approach to the protection of global forests that the world now needs more than ever.Lorenzo Colantoni is researcher of the Energy, Climate and Resources programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).
This Commentary has been produced under the PRODIGEES project, which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 873119. The research reported from Indonesia has been witnessed directly by the author, who participated in a number of missions with local experts and NGOs and conducted interviews with them with informed consent.[1] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of 31 May 2023 on the Making Available on the Union Market and the Export from the Union of Certain Commodities and Products Associated with Deforestation and Forest Degradation, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1115/oj.[2] FAO, "FRA 2020 Remote Sensing Survey", in FAO Forestry Papers, No. 186 (2022), p. 47, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb9970en.[3] M. Cecilia Oliveira and Leandro Siqueira, "Digitalization between Environmental Activism and Counter-Activism: The Case of Satellite Data on Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon", in Earth System Governance, Vol. 12 (April 2022), Article 100135, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2022.100135.[4] Lorenzo Colantoni, Giulia Sofia Sarno and Margherita Bianchi, Fighting Illegal Logging in Europe. An Overview of Trends, Players and Action, Rome, IAI and Ambitus, September 2022, p. 35, https://www.iai.it/en/node/15859.[5] ITU News, How AI Can Help Protect Forest Ecosystems, 9 November 2022, https://www.itu.int/hub/?p=23702.[6] David Abrahamson, "It's Time Forensic Timber Tracing Became Mainstream", in DAI Developments Blog, May 2022, https://dai-global-developments.com/articles/its-time-forensic-timber-tracing-became-mainstream.[7] Karla Mendes, "Experts Deny Alleged Manipulation of Amazon Satellite Deforestation Data", in Mongabay, 16 July 2019, https://news.mongabay.com/?p=220464.[8] Tom Johnson, "It's Time to Confront the Collusion Between the Palm Oil Industry and Politicians that Is Driving Indonesia's Deforestation Crisis (Commentary)", in Mongabay, 18 April 2018, https://news.mongabay.com/?p=205867.[9] Koltiva website: KoltiTrace, https://www.koltiva.com/koltitrace.[10] Hans Nicholas Jong, "Experts Question Integrity of Indonesia's Claim of Avoided Deforestation", in Mongabay, 8 September 2020, https://news.mongabay.com/?p=234649.[11] Hans Nicholas Jong, "2019 Fires in Indonesia Were Twice as Bad as the Government Claimed, Study Shows", in Mongabay, 16 December 2021, https://news.mongabay.com/?p=250761.[12] Dyna Rochmyaningsih, "Wildfire Researcher Deported amid Growing Rift between Indonesian Government and Scientists", in Science, 12 February 2020, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb2763.

Distintas formas de populismo se han consolidado en la última década en América Latina. La génesis del fenómeno es similar: desencanto con los resultados del proceso de reforma de los 90´, auge de los precios de las commodities y baja calidad de la democracia. Las dos últimas condiciones se encuentran relacionadas.La dinámica que se ha consolidado entre altos precios de las commodities y debilidad democrática es una versión política de "la maldición de los recursos naturales" o "enfermedad holandesa". Este concepto económico fue primero desarrollado por el Semanario The Economist en 1977 a partir del descubrimiento de gas hecho por Holanda en el Mar del Norte. La mencionada publicación lo define de la siguiente manera: "…This malady involves commodity exports driving up the value of the currency, making other parts of the economy less competitive, leading to a current-account deficit and even greater dependence on commodities. This matters all the more because mining and hydrocarbons are capital-intensive businesses, generating relatively few jobs."(1)A su vez, otros analistas han introducido el concepto relacionando recursos naturales y debilidad institucional. Por ejemplo, Thomas Friedman ha estudiado la incidencia del petróleo en las autocracias de Medio Oriente. Para el autor "La primera ley de la petropolítica postula lo siguiente: el precio del crudo y el ritmo de la libertad siempre se mueven en direcciones opuestas en Estados petroleros ricos en crudo. Cuanto más alto sea su precio medio global, más se erosionan la libertad de expresión, la de prensa, las elecciones libres y justas, la independencia del poder judicial y de los partidos políticos y el imperio de la ley. Y estas tendencias negativas se refuerzan por el hecho de que cuanto más sube el precio, menos sensibles son los gobernantes con petróleo a lo que el mundo piensa o dice de ellos."(2)Paso seguido, mientras por un lado Friedman menciona la relación entre ingresos extraordinarios del petróleo y fortalecimiento de autocracias, es necesario remarcar la relación entre ingresos extraordinarios de las commodities y debilitamiento de las democracias. La diferencia es relevante: mientras que en el primer caso Friedman ha descrito un fenómeno que busca la permanencia de un régimen, los populismos describen un proceso que busca distorsionar y deteriorar otro régimen, la democracia liberal.Así, un punto analítico importante que ha introducido la versión populista basada en los ingresos extraordinarios es la paulatina distorsión en una regla básica del juego democrático: la vigencia de elecciones realmente competitivas. Definimos elecciones competitivas como la disputa en un pie de igualdad entre dos o más partidos o coaliciones. Si uno de ellos utiliza recursos públicos ordinarios para financiar su campaña estará bastardeando un precepto central de la democracia. El problema actual en distintos países de América Latina es el sistemático uso de recursos extraordinarios.¿Por qué el populismo se ha beneficiado particularmente de esta nueva dinámica? En parte porque el fracaso de las reformas de los 90´ ha contribuido a la generación de un marco donde ha sido más sencillo señalar ganadores, perdedores y los supuestos responsables de ello. Por ejemplo en Argentina, el traumático final de la convertibilidad (diciembre 2001) ha supuesto para los nuevos populistas la oportunidad de articular una coalición política de los perdedores. Sumado a ello, se ha dado posteriormente (desde 2004 en adelante) una coyuntura económica inédita en la historia contemporánea. Si concatenamos el fracaso de las reformas, la existencia de un grupo definido de perdedores, la posibilidad de señalar ganadores y culpables y los altos precios internacionales, es posible concluir que la calidad de la democracia no solo está amenazada sino que esa amenaza posee condiciones para mantenerse en el tiempo.Paso seguido, es necesario preguntarse como salir de este círculo vicioso entre ingresos extraordinarios y debilidad institucional. Siguiendo esta lógica, podríamos pensar que una caída en los precios de las materias primas debiesen repercutir en una mayor fortaleza institucional. Este razonamiento lineal es obviamente falso: la hipotética caída de los precios dejaría menos recursos para profundizar determinadas políticas pero no ayudaría a modificar prácticas anteriores consolidadas.El corto-mediano plazo posee más interrogantes que respuestas para los países envueltos en la dinámica maniquea del populismo contemporáneo. Un dato principal de las experiencias del pasado es que determinados modelos económicos tarde o temprano terminan por colapsar, pero eso no conlleva necesariamente que los actores involucrados aprendan de sus errores. Las personas o grupos aprenden de sus errores cuando poseen una referencia histórica, es decir, cuando tienen la posibilidad de comparar distintos episodios. Una de las características de los populismos contemporáneos es la capacidad que han desarrollado para re-fundar, simbólica o realmente, la vida política en países tan disímiles como Venezuela, Bolivia o Ecuador, haciendo más difícil el necesario ejercicio de la comparación. Las elecciones presidenciales en Argentina en octubre del 2011 develarán hasta que punto el neo-populismo y los ingresos extraordinarios han transformado una sociedad otrora compleja en una pobre versión del maniqueísmo.(1) El mencionado semanario ha publicado un reporte sobre las oportunidades que el inédito crecimiento económico ofrece a la región. Uno de los artículos del reporte hace mención al papel de los recursos naturales y los posibles problemas que ello conllevaria. Ver "Special Report on Latin America". The Economist. 9 de septiembre de 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/16964094(2) Friedman, Thomas. Foreign Policy. Ley de Petropolitica. 2006. Version online en español en http://www.fp-es.org/la-primera-ley-de-la-petropolitica. En este trabajo se citan libros y papers anteriores que desarrollan la relación entre recursos naturales y crecimiento. Por ejemplo, "…Daniel Yergin The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (Simon & Schuster, Nueva York, 1991), A su vez,. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (Routledge, Nueva York, 1993), de Richard Auty, explica por qué los países dotados de recursos naturales con frecuencia no logran desarrollarse. Jeffrey Sachs y Andrew Warner dan cuerpo a esta tesis en Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth(National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington, 1995)…" *Profesor adjunto de Ciencia Política en la Universidad Abierta Interamericana de Buenos Aires.Master en Filosofía Política de London School of Economics and Political Science.

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has managed to overcome most of the strict sanctions imposed by Western economies, largely due to its ability to maintain economic relations with emerging powers in the field of energy, particularly oil, gas and nuclear. The atomic sector is spearheaded by the worldwide presence of Rosatom – a Russian company that heads a conglomerate of more than 300 companies responsible for the manufacture and sale of nuclear technologies for both civilian and military uses.
In recent years, Russia has emerged as a partner in providing nuclear technologies to countries in the Global South, gradually expanding its presence in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. This strategy hinges on Moscow's ability to find new diplomatic and trade partners by negotiating with these countries without imposing severe non-proliferation conditionality (such as the United States' 123 Agreements[1]) and selling a wide range of nuclear-related technologies – being the only supplier worldwide of all the necessary elements to establish a nuclear programme.[2]
For Global South countries, Russia has become a potential provider of nuclear-related technologies. Therefore, Moscow employs Rosatom as a diplomatic tool to garner support within the United Nations to avoid further sanctions – what the literature calls "international clientelism" where Russia builds diplomatic ties and partnerships with countries to receive support for its positions during global governance negotiations.[3]
Rosatom has won numerous bids for the sale of reactors, positioning itself as the leader in terms of the number of simultaneously implemented nuclear reactor construction projects, with 3 units in Russia and 33 abroad at various stages of implementation.[4] Likewise, it controls approximately 20 per cent of the global market of conversion and enriched-related materials, something that made it an important partner of scientific groups from the US and European countries regardless of the Russia-Ukraine War[5] – for example, participating in the ongoing construction of the Facility for Antiproton and Ion Research (FAIR), an international accelerator facility to perform cutting-edge research in Germany.[6]
Similarly, since 2023 Rosatom has been the exclusive supplier of enriched uranium-related products to Brazilian nuclear facilities.[7] This landmark agreement is the first long-term partnership with Brasília, replacing previous imports from Canada and European consortiums. These factors come precisely at a time when Rosatom seeks to expand its relations with BRICS countries to increase its participation in the sale of nuclear subsidies for the production of radioisotopes in these nations and to secure financing from the BRICS New Development bank.[8]The increasing presence of Rosatom in the Global South
Rosatom currently controls approximately 70 per cent of the global export market for the construction of nuclear power plants.[9] Its expansion in the Global South occurs within the context of emerging powers seeking to boost their energy production through nuclear means.Middle Eastern and North Africa (MENA) region
On 27 April 2023, Turkish President Erdoğan expressed gratitude to Putin regarding the inauguration of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant – Turkey's first nuclear power reactor.[10] It will start operating in 2025 with four VVER 1200 pressurised-water reactors and will be responsible for around 10 per cent of the total national production of electricity. Located in Turkey's southern Mersin province, the nuclear power plant was constructed by Rosatom – whose subsidiaries financed 93 per cent of the project.[11] This development has had created tension with the Western bloc, as Turkey, a member of NATO, sought Russian technology to advance its civil nuclear programme regardless of the sanctions imposed because of the Russia-Ukraine War. Likewise, Rosatom has provided Egypt with four VVER reactors for the construction of its first nuclear power plant – the second on the African continent – in a contract worth approximately 30 billion US dollars. The Russian government has also agreed to provide funding for 85 per cent of the cost.[12]
In North Africa, a region grappling with rapid population growth and a growing need for sustainable energy sources, Russia has initiated strategic dialogues to bolster nuclear cooperation. Countries like Morocco, Libya (whose nuclear reactor – temporarily shut down – was produced by the Soviet Union) and Tunisia, seeking to diversify their energy portfolios away from fossil fuels, have become focal points for these discussions.[13]
Rosatom has been at the forefront of these dialogues, leveraging memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and commercial negotiations to explore potential nuclear projects and collaborations. While aiming to address the region's energy demands, these engagements also align with Russia's broader geopolitical and economic interests in the MENA region.Sub-Saharan Africa
In a similar vein, different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia, have nuclear-related diplomatic and commercial agreements with Russia. Rosatom has actively engaged in the region, offering scholarship opportunities for local students to complete engineering studies in Russia.[14] In this regard, Russia seeks diplomatic rapprochement with Nigeria based on cooperation in uranium exploration and the establishment of a nuclear power plant financed through Russian credit lines.
Moscow has pursued preferential access to rare earth and uranium mines on the continent, as seen in agreements with Tanzania and Namibia. South Africa, a key member of the BRICS, is another notable case. The ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), has close relations with the Kremlin since the Cold War, and the country needs to generate more electricity to address the recurrent blackouts. In 2023, Pretoria decided to boost nuclear energy production, with Rosatom poised as a top contender. Plans for new nuclear plants, however, face opposition, also due to corruption allegations surrounding a previously cancelled agreement.[15]
In all, Sub-Saharan countries have drawn closer to Russia, serving as both a diplomatic support and a market for Russian products.[16] While financing the growth of these nations by supplying nuclear technology, Russia receives diplomatic support in return, especially in the United Nations General Assembly. For instance, South Africa has supported Russia in UN votes, casting votes against several resolutions condemning Moscow and becoming embroiled in controversies regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict.[17]South Asia
Russia's nuclear diplomacy has extended to the Asian continent too – especially South Asia. In the case of India, the construction of Units 3, 4, 5 and 6 at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant revives a long-standing partnership dating back to agreements with the Soviet Union.[18] Likewise, the Russian company operates in Bangladesh, with preparations underway for the construction of the Rooppur nuclear power plant, the country's first nuclear power facility. In Sri Lanka too, Russia is a potential candidate for building nuclear reactors as part of a recently released long-term project to boost local energy production in the country.[19] Hence, in South Asia, Russia aims to leverage historical ties by offering technology and energy opportunities in the nuclear field to sustain commercial ties. Indeed, despite Western pressures, South Asia maintains significant trade with Moscow, thus mitigating the impact of sanctions on its economy.Latin America
Finally, in Latin America, Russia is strategically pursuing expanded partnerships and seeking increased access to raw material markets. Notably, in Bolivia, a 450 million US dollars contract with Rosatom will lead to the construction of a lithium carbonate mining and production complex – a material that is essential for nuclear reactors' cooling and containment systems. Concurrently, Russia has extended nuclear collaborations with Brazil.[20]
Once again, Russia clearly aims to bolster its diplomatic ties with these countries through nuclear energy. Former Brazilian President Bolsonaro, known for his right-wing policies, travelled to Moscow in 2022 to meet with Putin, signalling his intention to deepen diplomatic relations in the nuclear sector. Bolsonaro treated the information discussed during the trip as confidential, but the Brazilian press reported conversations with Russian companies to promote the interests of the navy and seek assistance with the certification of the fuel to be used in reactors for nuclear submarines.The challenges that lie ahead, and how to address them
Russia has found in the nuclear market a means to buttress ties with countries in the Global South by providing high-technology elements to these nations. Through partnerships in the nuclear sector, Russia has not only strengthened its presence in the global energy landscape but has also enhanced its geopolitical influence, particularly in regions where emerging economies seek technological advancements and energy solutions.
Russia's strategic use of nuclear partnerships with countries in the Global South does not only increase its global influence, but also poses challenges related to technology transfer and economic dependency. Indeed, these partnerships often rely heavily on Russian technology and financing, raising concerns about recipient countries' autonomy and economic vulnerability.
To mitigate the risk of Russia leveraging nuclear partnerships to augment its influence in the Global South, Western partners could offer alternative innovative solutions aligned with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines – such as the 2009 US agreement with the United Arab Emirates. Encouraging technology transfer and local capacity building based on the existing rules, Western assistance may empower recipient countries to develop their nuclear expertise while reducing dependency on a single supplier. For their part, adhering to IAEA standards and developing diversified partnerships, countries in the Global South could better navigate challenges and foster sustainable nuclear development in the long term.João Paulo Nicolini Gabriel holds a PhD in Political Science from the Catholic University of Louvain (UCLouvain) and the Federal University of Minas Gerais.[1] The 123 Agreements are bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between the United States and other countries, facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation while ensuring non-proliferation through safeguards.[2] Kacper Szulecki and Indra Overland, "Russian Nuclear Energy Diplomacy and Its implications for Energy Security in the Context of the War in Ukraine", in Nature Energy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (April 2023), p. 413-421 at p. 414, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-023-01228-5.[3] Thales Carvalho and Dawisson Belém Lopes, "International Clientelistic Networks: The Case of Venezuela at the United Nations General Assembly, 1999–2015", in Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 64, No. 3 (August 2022), p. 37-66, DOI 10.1017/lap.2022.11.[4] Rosatom website: Projects, https://www.rosatom.ru/en/investors/projects.[5] Darya Dolzikova, "Atoms for Sale: Developments in Russian Nuclear Energy Export", in RUSI Special Reports, 14 February 2023, p. 7-8, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/atoms-sale-developments-russian-nuclear-energy-exports.[6] "Russia to Supply Unique Equipment for FAIR Research Accelerator Being Built in Germany", in TASS, 16 November 2015, https://tass.com/science/836929.[7] Ivan Dybov, "Opening New Horizons for Cooperation", in Rosatom Newsletter, No. 262 (February 2023), https://rosatomnewsletter.com/?p=16907.[8] "Rosatom to Get Financing for Projects from BRICS Bank", in Interfax, 31 July 2023, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/93126.[9] Alexandra Prokopenko, "Rosatom: A Difficult Target", in EIRP Russia's Global Energy Role Working Papers, No. 1 (May 2023), p. 3, https://innovationreform.org/?p=3049.[10] "Erdogan Thanks Putin for His Help on Turkish Nuclear Plant", in Al Jazeera, 27 April 2023, https://aje.io/tm54z9.[11] Rosatom, "Investment Management", in Public Report of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom for 2016, 2017, https://ar2016.rosatom.ru/?/en/162-investment-management.[12] Marina Lorenzini, "Why Egypt's New Nuclear Plant is a Long-term Win for Russia", in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 20 December 2023, https://thebulletin.org/?p=109481.[13] Chiponda Chimbelu, "African Countries Start Mulling Nuclear Energy", in Die Welt, 22 October 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/a-50872702.[14] Rosatom, "Rosatom: Bringing Better Education to Africa", in Rosatom Newsletter, No. 223 (December 2019), https://rosatomnewsletter.com/?p=11863.[15] Gerald Imray, "South Africa to Build New Nuclear Plants. The Opposition Attacked the Plan over Alleged Russia Links", in AP News, 12 December 2023, https://apnews.com/article/83f81ae6efd328a532b0f0b16370f730.[16] Aanu Adeoye, "UN Vote on Russia Invasion Shows a Changing Africa", in Chatham House Expert Comments, 7 March 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/node/28423.[17] Crystal Orderson, "A 'Russian Love Affair': Why South Africa Stays 'Neutral' on War", in Al Jazeera, 2 June 2023, https://aje.io/5o8re2.[18] Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Visit of External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar to Russia (December 25-29, 2023), 30 December 2023, https://fsi.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37489.[19] "Sri Lanka Seeks Investors for Nuclear Power Plants", in Reuters, 18 November 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sri-lanka-seeks-investors-nuclear-power-plants-2023-11-17.[20] Brazilian Government, ENBPar e Rosatom buscam cooperação para novas fontes de energia verde, 3 October 2022, https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/enbpar-e-rosatom-buscam-cooperacao-para-novas-fontes-de-energia-verde.

This article employs established techniques from the spatial economics literature to identify regional patterns of income and growth in Mexico and to examine how they have changed over the period spanned by trade liberalization and how they may be linked to the income divergence observed following liberalization. The article first shows that divergence has emerged in the form of several income clusters that only partially correspond to traditional geographic regions. Next, when regions are defined by spatial correlation in incomes, a south clearly exists, but the north seems to be restricted to the states directly on the United States (U.S.) border and there is no center region. Overall, the principal dynamic of both the increased spatial dependency and the increased divergence lies not on the border but in the sustained underperformance of the southern states, starting before the North American free-trade agreement, and to a lesser extent in the superior performance of an emerging convergence club in the north-center of the country.

Russia's most recent invasion of Ukraine is fast approaching its two-year anniversary, with no end in sight. Russia continues to put on a brave face on this military and economic quagmire,[1] with Prime Minister Mishustin recently claiming that many countries still want to pursue business, trade, and investment in Russia.[2] Such bravado does not do justice to President Putin's ambitious foreign policy. He is contemplating no less than a new global security architecture, downgrading the U.S. and Europe while pursuing what he obliquely terms the new "multipolar world." In the process, Putin has lost sight of Russia's traditional allies and partnerships in the post-Soviet space, revealing major fault lines in current Russian foreign policy.More BRICSMishustin's sunny presentation of Russia's international portfolio primarily relies upon Russia's leading role in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Not only does BRICS represent a major share of the world's economy and population, but Mishustin also emphasized the recent expansion of the BRICS (Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Argentina) as emblematic of Russia's rising global stature. With the additional members, Russian diplomats claim that the world is a step closer to ending Western dominance of international trade rules and the U.S. dollar as the primary currency of exchange.The BRICS started out as a singular BRIC in 2001, designed as a marketing ploy by a Goldman Sachs banker. It expanded to include South Africa and then morphed into a genuine organization, complete with yearly summits and its own infrastructure bank. Russia views the BRICS as a potential rival to the West and uniter of the global south. It even has proposed creating its own internet. [3] Such grand plans, however, require the resolution of several structural obstacles, including the question of what currency will unite the organization and how to create an internal payment system.[4]What the new members bring to the table, aside from oil wealth from a few countries, is unclear. Iran was the most sanctioned country in the world until Russia surpassed it. Both countries unilaterally renounced the use of the dollar,[5] which Russia views as a weapon of the U.S. [6] The new president of Argentina, however, immediately deviated from the BRICS playbook by pledging to abandon the peso in favor of the dollar. Russia has bet its global reputation and economic future on the BRICS. It recently assumed the leadership of the organization, although the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a formal strategy will not be introduced until 2025.[7] Perhaps the most notable sign of potential weakness in Russia's bet on BRICS concerns restrictions on Putin's international travel. Putin was unable to attend the summit in South Africa because of an outstanding warrant from the International Criminal Court. President Lulu of Brazil issued a similar warning if Putin decided to travel to Brazil for the upcoming G20 meeting. [8]Russia's Cacophony ofPartnershipsWhile the BRICS aspires to be a global player, most of Russia's long-standing pacts and associations are more regional in focus. The oldest of these groups is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an improvised attempt to somehow keep the post-Soviet states aligned after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not much has been heard from the CIS since the early days of its founding. Although its most recent gathering occurred on October 13, 2023, it seems that membership remains in a state of confusion, with three countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) disavowing membership.[9] Putin still has great hopes for the CIS. He wants the security services of each member state to act collectively to ensure the social stability and cultural values of the region.[10]One of the most promising post-Soviet initiatives (on paper) was the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This coupling of former Soviet states began its existence as a customs union and emerged in 2014 as a coalition to encourage free trade among its members (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia). Yet the EEU has never lived up to expectations, and the most recent meeting in August 2023 showed an organization adrift.[11] The original incentive for joining the Union centered on providing its members with favorable access to the Russian market. But at this recent gathering, several members highlighted the need to become an economic bloc that deals with transfers of technology, pharmaceuticals, machine construction, and so forth. Other countries wanted to discuss the new economic reality of the region, most notably how the imposition of sanctions against Russia had affected the Union.[12] Finally, members called for new institutions to be built, like a single system of credit ratings and regional financial regulations. But no concrete reforms emerged from this meeting; instead, members agreed to kick the can down the road and create a new strategy to be implemented between 2030 and 2045.[13]One other problem hangs over these regional affiliations. The lingua franca of the EEU and CIS has always been Russian, the language of the former imperial power. Mishustin wants this to continue to remain the case.[14] A new law in Kyrgyzstan, however, recognized two state languages: Russian and Kyrgyz, which Mishustin considered problematic for the region's overall economic integration. Putin subsequently weighed in to reinforce the use of the Russian language in the post-Soviet space.[15]The Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCA), a Eurasian security, economic, and defense organization, similarly has fallen short of expectations. Its membership includes Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, and the nations of Central Asia (excluding Turkmenistan). The cohesion of this organization, however, remains in doubt. India has long considered Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism, while there is a growing rift between China and India because of the latter's increased ties with the U.S. The group has not weighed in on Russia's continuing aggression in Ukraine. Indeed, Russia's most recent contribution to the SCA was a visit by Russian procurator Igor Krasnov to organize increased cooperation between prosecutors in Russia, China, Iran, and Mongolia (a candidate member of the SCA), with a distinct whiff of revived Soviet legal practice.[16]In many ways, Kazakhstan stands as the bellwether for all of Russia's regional configurations. Over the long months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan has emerged as one of the weakest links in the Western sanctions regime, primarily through soaring parallel imports entering Russia via Kazakhstan.[17] values Kazakhstan as a firm ally and assisted its government during recent unrest.[18] But Kazakhstan has publicly agreed to observe Western sanctions.[19] Other Central Asian countries have promised to follow suit.[20] The most recent public meeting between Putin and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev did not end well. Putin flubbed Tokayev's name four times, prompting the Kazakh president to finish his speech in Kazakh, a clear diplomatic slight against President Putin.[21]Armenia Opts Out If the EEU and the SCA are struggling, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is on life support.[22] The CSTO's members include Russia, Armenia, and several Central Asian states, and it serves as a counter to NATO, without the mutual Article 5-style security guarantees. The main internal dispute within the CSTO concerns Armenia in the aftermath of Azerbaijan's assault on and capture of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia's Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinian, accused Russian peacekeepers of not fulfilling their responsibility (in his eyes) to prevent Azeri aggression. Armenia's reaction was swift and decisive. It has offered humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, skipped the November 23 meeting of the CSTO in Minsk, and boycotted a meeting of the CIS.[23] Even more egregiously, Armenia recently ratified the Rome statutes, thereby placing itself under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Thus, like Russia's BRICS partners South Africa and Brazil, Armenia is required to detain Putin if he enters Armenian territory.[24] Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that Armenia's decision would have negative consequences for bilateral relations.[25]The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan did not end with the defeat of Nagorno Karabakh. The Azeris are demanding the return of several international border crossings to an Azeri enclave that Armenia is currently blocking. Azerbaijan declares that this obstruction is damaging prospects for peace.[26] So the possibility of Russia being further dragged into this dispute is real. And Pashinian has only increased his rhetoric against Russia, accusing Russian television of destabilizing his country.[27] Even positive developments, like Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's recent announcement that the joint CSTO air defense system has been all but completed, does not change the perception of an organization in free fall.[28]With Friends Like This??? Russia's most important diplomatic relationship remains its partnership with China. Plenty of ink has been spilled analyzing both the threats and potential consequences their relationship represents. Both Russia and China consistently and confidently proclaim that a future multipolar world awaits global governance.[29] They further have declared that there will be "no limits" to the Russia-China relationship, and Beijing has surreptitiously aided the Kremlin's war effort.[30] Nevertheless, Putin's recent trip to China to mark the 10-year anniversary of China's Belt and Road initiative did not go well for the Russian president. He procured no new trade deals on energy or agriculture.[31] Oil and gas exports from Russia are up, although China is allegedly receiving these products at a sharp discount. Russia has grand designs for the relationship, including increasing trade in yuan while pursuing a global policy of de-dollarization.[32]President Xi remained circumspect when talking about future bilateral relations with Russia. He mentioned that the two leaders have formed good relations and a personal friendship. But one Russian analyst admitted that China "always acts in its own interest,"[33] confirmed by a recent meeting between the EU and China.[34]Putin's trip to China also reinforced the impression of Russia's junior partner status in this relationship, a fact brought home by the recent China-U.S. summit in San Francisco. Xi proclaimed that the world was big enough for two powers.[35] He made no mention of a third. Finally, from Russia's standpoint, the most stable international pact remains the Union State of Russia and Belarus. This pact dates back to the 1990s and was signed by Russia's Boris Yeltsin and Belarus's Alexander Lukashenko. The nature of this agreement (a commonwealth, confederation, a supranational state) has always been rather murky. After 24 years of existence, Prime Minister Mishustin just announced that a joint tax committee is almost in place.[36] Nevertheless, Belarus has been Russia's staunchest supporter during the war in Ukraine, while Russia has long been Belarus's main trade and energy partner. These longstanding ties, however, have not stopped Lukashenko from demanding compensation from Rosatom for the delay in the construction of a nuclear power plant, although the plant was only built thanks to a $10 billion loan from the Russian Federation.[37] Belarus also appears to be pursuing its own China policy, so even Russia's most loyal partner seems willing to play international powers against Russia itself.[38] ConclusionRussian foreign policy and its parade of confusing acronyms continues to churn. Moldova officially announced that it would no longer be a part of the CIS.[39] In a surprise move, Prime Minister Pashinian agreed to be head of the EEU, with the proviso that it remains a purely economic and not a political organization.[40]The UAE, the newly appointed member of BRICS that was theoretically to help lead the BRICS' (and Russia's) overture to the global south, refused to open a bank account in the country for Rosneft to facilitate energy payments to India.[41] Finally, Argentina announced it would not in fact be joining the BRICS.[42]Putin's revolving door of coalition partners, however, cannot distract from his disastrous invasion of Ukraine. Putin finds itself in a war of attrition while trying to mobilize new troops just to keep this stalemate going. Putin may have scratched the imperial itch and annexed Ukrainian territory, but he must now defend a 600-mile front that is grinding down his military forces. His annexations in Ukraine have only added to Russia's demographic crisis, since it has not added a younger population but merely a new crop of pensioners. In addition, his actions have alarmed his neighbors and, with Finland's accession to NATO, more than doubled Russia's border with the NATO alliance.Putin still possesses substantial sources of revenue from gas and oil, but without the top prices that European customers previously paid. Instead, Russia has been forced to limit its exports of benzine and diesel, to stabilize the domestic market.[43] Even more disturbing, Russia has been forced to accept energy payments from India in rupees, a non-convertible currency that does not improve Russia's balance sheet. Finally, the Russian economy has begun to feel the effect of global sanctions, with a host of problems (inflation, high interest rates, low investment, labor shortages, lack of access to Western technology and spare parts) that will eat at the Russian economy for years to come.[44] The impact of sanctions can also be swift and severe. On November 28, the U.S. imposed sanctions on the St. Petersburg stock exchange. The exchange immediately spiraled downwards and declared bankruptcy. .[45]Criminal indictments are most likely to follow.[46] International law may catch up to Putin as well, on such charges as war crimes and reparations.[47]Russia still has resources to prop up its economy and keep the war effort going. How wisely Putin uses them remains an open question. Since the war (and before), Putin's economic program can be summarized in the idea of "economic sovereignty."[48] Moreover, in terms of domestic spending, Putin appears to be focused on several grand projects and potential boondoggles, such a new railroad from Murmansk to the Amur district [49]and from Lugansk to Donetsk.[50] Putin professes the need to support small and medium-sized business, but only through a centralized national project.[51] Putin also likes to promote Russian technology, although the IT sector is facing a steep decline in wages[52] and significant brain drain.[53]To counter these economic and geopolitical challenges, Russia must rely on a disparate group of partners cobbled together through past historical links, empty slogans, and long-standing resentments. Moreover, all of the problems confronting Russia—economic, military, social—are linked and have the potential of cascading into each other during any crisis. Alas, the West has no time to gloat, since the test of all these global alliances—both in Russia and the U.S.—lies just around the corner. If the U.S Congress decides not renew aid for Ukraine in early 2024, it will invariably weaken the Euro-Atlantic alliance while giving Putin a golden opportunity to increase the pressure on Ukraine. Moreover, there will be no second chances if Ukraine becomes a casualty of Western division and Putin's aggression. We may not be sleepwalking into a major crisis; the facts are there for anyone who wants to see them. But if we don't want to find out what Putin's vision of a multipolar world actually looks like, we must support Ukraine now. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.[1] "В Кремле заявили о готовности жить под санкциями еще десять лет" [In the Kremlin, readiness was declared to live under sanctions for another ten years], The Moscow Times, October 24, 2023, https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/10/24/v-kremle-zayavili-o-gotovnosti-zhit-pod-sanktsiyami-esche-desyat-let-a110957. [2] Дмитрий Гончарук [Dmitry Goncharuk], "Мишустин: Очень многие государства хотят с нами вести дела, торговать, инвестировать в Россию" [Mishustin: Many countries want to do business, trade, invest in Russia], Российская газета (rg.ru), October 19, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/10/19/znaj-nashe.html. [3] The Moscow Times, Telegram post, November 10, 2023, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/16935. [4] Анастасия Швецова [Anastasia Shvetsova], "Putin продолжит работу BRICS" [Putin will continue working with BRICS], Ведомости [Vedomosti], August 24, 2023, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2023/08/24/991672-putin-prodolzhit-rabotu-briks. [5] Jai Hamid, "Russia, Iran finally dump the US dollar for good", Cryptopolitan, December 27, 2023, https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/russia-iran-finally-dump-the-us-dollar-for-good/ar-AA1m7fSH?ocid=entnewsntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=87129b6eeb504d87a2fdc44b5a46913e&ei=61 [6] Александр Ленин [Alexander Lenin] "Лавров: США используют доллар в качестве оружия" [Lavrov: The US is using the dollar as a weapon], Российскаягазета [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], November 27, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/11/27/lavrov-ssha-ispolzuiut-dollar-v-kachestve-oruzhiia.html?ysclid=lqy89mzo5c127104876[7] Иван Сысоев [Ivan Sysoev] "МИД: Партнеры по БРИКС поддержали планы председательства РФ в организации" [MFA: BRICS partners supported the plans of the Russian Federation's chairmanship in the organization], Российская газета [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], December 3, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/12/03/mid-partnery-po-briks-podderzhali-plany-predsedatelstva-rf-v-organizacii.html [8] "Бразилия отказалась гарантировать Путину, что его не арестуют на саммите G20" [Brazil Refused to Guarantee Putin That He Won't Be Arrested at G20 Summit], The Moscow Times, April 12, 2023, https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/12/04/braziliya-otkazalas-garantirovat-putinu-chto-ego-ne-arestuyut-na-sammite-g20-a115163. [9] Айсель Герейханова [Aysel Gereyhanova], "Putin высказался про Грузию, Украину и Молдавию, которые числятся в СНГ" [Putin Spoke About Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Which Are Part of the CIS], Российская газета [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], October 13, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/10/13/putin-vyskazalsia-pro-gruziiu-ukrainu-i-moldaviiu-kotorye-chisliatsia-v-sng.html.[10] The Moscow Times, Telegram post, November 8, 2023, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/16875. [11] Evgeny Troitskiy, "The Eurasian Economic Union: Five Great Expectations and Hard Times," The Russia File, Kennan Institute, January 14, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/eurasian-economic-union-five-great-expectations-and-hard-times. [12] David Pierson, Anatoly Kurmanaev, and Sameer Yasir, "Putin, Xi and Modi Meet at Shanghai Summit," The New York Times, July 4, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/04/world/asia/putin-xi-modi-shanghai-summit.html. [13] "Главы стран ЕАЭС провели итоговое в этом году заседание" [The heads of the EAEU countries held this year's final meeting], Коммерсантъ [Kommersant], December 25, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6426560. [14] "Кому — второй родной, кому — первый иностранный" [For Some, It's the Second Nature, for Others, the First Foreign], Коммерсантъ [Kommersant], October 27, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6298863?from=main. [15] Владимир Кузьмин [Vladimir Kuzmin], "Путин призвал страны СНГ решить практические вопросы работы международной организации по русскому языку" [Putin Called on CIS Countries to Resolve Practical Issues of the International Organization for the Russian Language], Российская газета [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], December 18, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/12/18/putin-prizval-strany-sng-reshit-prakticheskie-voprosy-raboty-mezhdunarodnoj-organizacii-po-russkomu-iazyku.html. [16] Иван Егоров [Ivan Yegorov], "Игорь Краснов провел переговоры об укреплении сотрудничества с Китаем, Ираном и Монголией" [Igor Krasnov Held Talks on Strengthening Cooperation with China, Iran, and Mongolia], Российская газета [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], November 7, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/11/07/igor-krasnov-provel-peregovory-ob-ukreplenii-sotrudnichestva-s-kitaem-iranom-i-mongoliej.html. [17] Rahimbek Abdrahmanov and Kamshat Zhumagulova, "How Kazakhstan Helps Russia Bypass Western Sanctions," The Diplomat, October 25, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/how-kazakhstan-helps-russia-bypass-western-sanctions/. [18] "Отношения России и Казахстана проверены временем и развиваются по восходящей" [Relations Between Russia and Kazakhstan Have Been Tested by Time and Are Developing on the Rise], Российская газета [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], November 8, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/11/08/putin-otnosheniia-rossii-i-kazahstana-provereny-vremenem-i-razvivaiutsia-po-voshodiashchej.html.[19] Токаев: Казахстан будет следовать санкционному режиму в отношении России [Tokayev: Kazakhstan will follow the sanctions regime against Russia], September 28, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6239653. [20] "Торговля есть торговля: в Киргизстане заявили, что Бишкек соблюдает санкции против РФ по возможности" [Trade is Trade: In Kyrgyzstan, They Stated That Bishkek Observes Sanctions Against Russia as Much as Possible], The Moscow Times, July 12, 2023, https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/12/07/torgovlya-est-torgovlya-v-kirgizstane-zayavili-chto-bishkek-soblyudaet-sanktsii-protiv-rf-po-vozmozhnosti-a115558. [21] Nick Mordowanec, "Putin Struggling to Pronounce Ally's Name Raises Eyebrows," Newsweek, November 9, 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/putin-struggling-pronounce-ally-name-raises-eyebrows-1842404.[22] "Участники министерской встречи констатировали плачевное состояние ОБСЕ" [Participants of the ministerial meeting noted the deplorable state of the OSCE], Коммерсантъ [Kommersant], December 1, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6378375?from=main. [23] The Moscow Times, Telegram post September 6, 2023, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/15513.; "Пашинян не будет участвовать в саммите ОДКБ в Минске" [Pashinyan Will Not Participate in the CSTO Summit in Minsk], The Moscow Times, November 14, 2023, https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/11/14/pashinyan-nebudet-uchastvovat-vsammite-odkb-vminske-a113089 . , "Армения ждет помощи с дальше" [Armenia Awaits Assistance from Abroad], Коммерсантъ [Kommersant], September 7, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6199536?from=main. [24] Максим Цуланов [Maxim Tsulanov], "Парламент Армении ратифицировал Римский" [Armenian Parliament Ratifies the Rome Statute], Ведомости [Vedomosti], October 3, 2023, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/10/03/998478-parlament-armenii-ratifitsiroval-rimskii. [25] Юрий Когалов [Yuri Kogalov], "МИД: Ратификация Арменией Римского статута будет иметь негативные последствия для отношений" [MFA: Armenia's Ratification of the Rome Statute Will Have Negative Consequences for Relations], Российская газета [Rossiyskaya Gazeta], September 28, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/09/28/mid-ratifikaciia-armeniej-rimskogo-statuta-budet-imet-negativnye-posledstviia-dlia-otnoshenij.html. [26] The Moscow Times, Telegram post November 9, 2023, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/16916. [27] "Пашинян обвинил российское телевидение в попытке дестабилизировать Армению" [Pashinyan Accused Russian Television of Attempting to Destabilize Armenia], The Moscow Times, November 24, 2023, https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/11/24/pashinyan-obvinil-rossiiskoe-televidenie-v-popitke-destabilizirovat-armeniyu-a114182. 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[37] Илья Лакстыгал [Ilya Lakstygal], Александр Волобуев [Alexander Volobuev]. "Лукашенко потребовал у России компенсации за задержку с АЭС" [Lukashenko Demanded Compensation from Russia for Delay with the Nuclear Power Plant]. Ведомости [Vedomosti]. November 1, 2023, https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2023/11/01/1003606-lukashenko-potreboval-u-rossii-kompensatsii-za-zaderzhku-s-aes. [38] Алексей Рыбин [Alexey Rybin]. "Си Цзиньпин предложил Лукашенко сменять систему глобального управления" [Xi Jinping Proposed Lukashenko Change the Global Governance System]. Российская газета [Rossiyskaya Gazeta]. December 4, 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/12/04/si-czinpin-predlozhil-lukashenko-soobshcha-meniat-sistemu-globalnogo-upravleniia.html. 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"Ограничило экспорт бензина" [Restricted the Export of Gasoline]. Ведомости [Vedomosti]. September 21, 2023, https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2023/09/21/996417-ogranichilo-eksport-benzina. [44] Anders Aslund, "Why the Russian Economy's Luck Is Running Out," The Moscow Times, November 21, 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/11/21/why-the-russian-economys-luck-is-running-out-a83165. [45] На СПБ Бирже поторговали банкротством [Bankruptcy was traded on the St. Petersburg Exchange]." Коммерсантъ [Kommersant]. November 27, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6364966?from=main. [46] ЦБ сравнил с преступлением ситуацию вокруг ложного банкротства «СПБ биржи» [The Central Bank compared the situation around the false bankruptcy of St. Petersburg Exchange to a crime] Ведомости [Vedomosti]. November 28, 2023 https://www.vedomosti.ru/investments/news/2023/11/28/1008152-tsb-spb-birzhi [47] "Страны G7 договорились не возвращать России активы без компенсаций Украине [G7 Countries Agreed Not to Return Assets to Russia Without Compensation to Ukraine]." Коммерсантъ [Kommersant], November 8, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6322464?query=G7. [48] Гринкевич, Дмитрий [Grinkevich, Dmitry], Антон Козлов [Anton Kozlov], and Ярослава Костенко [Yaroslava Kostenko]. "Как будет работать представленная Путиным новая модель развития России [How Putin's Newly Presented Model for Russia's Development Will Work]." Ведомости [Vedomosti], June 19, 2023. https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2023/06/19/981092-kak-budet-rabotat-predstavlennaya-putinim-novaya-model-razvitiya-rossii?ysclid=lq9gx1h6dp890990133 [49] Герейханова, Айсель [Aysel Gereyhanova]. 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