Suchergebnisse

The essays to be comprised in this thesis are approaches to the problem of modeling the notion of aggregate liquidity as a potential driver of asset returns and of macroeconomic dynamics. The main thrust of this work is empirical, using methods ranging from econometric studies of the interconnection between asset returns and their degree of liquidity to estimating dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with Bayesian methods to establish evidence for the effectiveness of quantitative easing policies. In general, liquidity refers to the ease of trading an asset and to an asset's ability to be sold without having to accept a considerably large drop in the price or value. Therefore, bid-ask spreads are a common measure for an asset's degree of market liquidity. Authors like Canzoneri et al. (2013) point out that U.S. Treasuries might carry a liquidity premium which is induced by nonpecuniary returns to investors. Specifically, U.S. Treasuries are used to facilitate transactions in a number of ways: they serve as collateral in financial markets, banks hold them to manage the liquidity of their portfolios, individuals hold them in money market accounts that offer checking services, and importers and exporters hold them as transaction balances. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) formalize the notion that the investors obtain such liquidity services by assuming that holding U.S. Treasury securities directly contributes to their utility. The essays presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis investigate whether there is empirical evidence for household preferences where liquidity services are gained not only from U.S. Treasuries but from a variety of liquid assets. Chapter 2 investigates whether an asset pricing model which is based on such investors' preferences can contribute to explain observed corporate-U.S. Treasury yield spreads. Chapter 3 seeks to provide a complete specification and parameterization of a utility function with liquidity services. This is done by providing a set of microfoundations, ranging from nonparametric hypothesis tests of revealed preference conditions for utility maximization, to parameter estimates for suitable specifications of utility functions. Chapter 4 (coauthored with Andreas Schabert and Roland Winkler) employs a monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to identify the effects of the U.S. Federal Reserve's (Fed) large-scale longer-term Treasury purchase program (LSAP 2) on the U.S. economy. In this model a bank sector relies on liquidity services which are gained from holdings of government bonds when providing financial intermediation between households and firms. Chapter 5 investigates whether liquidity premia can explain deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP). For that purpose forward premium regression models are modified by assuming that investors value U.S. Treasuries' liquidity services which are induced by the U.S. dollar's role as a key currency. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.

Expecting an appreciation of the Chinese currency seems to be a safe bet. There is a mounting pressure from U.S. representatives, and a majority of economists seem to believe that the Chinese economy is overheating and that the dollar peg should be loosened as soon as possible. Indeed, a nominal appreciation may help reduce reserve inflows and allow for a more autonomous monetary policy in the case of overheating. A plausible strategy would be a small one-step revaluation, which would bring the renminbi to parity with the Hong Kong dollar. However, such an adjustment may provoke additional speculative capital inflows and is not even necessary to bring about the real appreciation. Overheating should lead to an increase in domestic inflation rates above the U.S. level, which – given the fixed nominal exchange rate – delivers the real appreciation. There are certain signs that the Chinese economy is not characterized by overheating but rather by overinvestment. Indications for overinvestment are the strong expansion of investment above 40 percent of GDP, the increase in real estate prices in high-growth regions, and the lack of a strong increase in consumer prices. In that case, the present restrictive policy mix of the Chinese authorities is preserving the situation of excess supply and undervaluation. A nominal appreciation would even increase the internal imbalance, as claimed by Chinese authorities. Whereas the diagnosis is controversial with respect to overheating versus overinvestment, undervaluation can be taken as a stylized fact. Hence, short-run adjustment could be achieved by less restrictive monetary and fiscal policies conditional on the development of the consumer price inflation which should be allowed to show a positive differential versus the U.S. consumer price inflation. Apart from such short-run consideration, the more general question is how to sequence the shift to a flexible exchange rate regime, which seems to be adequate for a large country like China. On the one hand, it is plausible that China should learn to float while the capital account is relatively closed. On the other hand, both opening up the capital account and introducing exchange rate flexibility need a certain degree of capital market development. Additionally, one-side bets on the direction of exchange rate movements when giving up a peg should be avoided. Both preconditions are currently not given in the case of China. The priorities for balancing short-run adjustment and long-run optimality are (1) a real appreciation via higher consumer price inflation and (2) speeding up domestic capital market reform as long as capital controls are effective to some extent. This should allow phasing in an augmented inflation targeting regime and avoiding a hard landing, which otherwise may be the consequence of lifting a solid exchange rate anchor in stormy waters.

We analyse the impact of government spending shocks on the real effective exchange rate and net exports in the Euro Area within a standard structural VAR framework. We employ a new database that contains quarterly fiscal variables for the Euro Area as a whole. We show that higher government spending leads to real exchange rate appreciation and to a fall in net exports, jointly with lower primary budgetary surpluses, which turns out to be fully consistent with the "twin deficits" hypothesis. The different components of public spending, namely wage and non-wage consumption expenditure, overall public consumption expenditure and public investment, bring about real appreciations. Our results are therefore also consistent both with the home-bias hypothesis of public expenditure and with public investment contributing to generating relative productivity gains in the traded goods sector. Contrary to what is observed in the Euro Area, the real effective exchange rate depreciates in the US in response to higher government spending. This discrepancy can ultimately be explained by the reaction of nominal interest rate spreads and the uncovered interest parity condition. The dissimilar reaction of short-term nominal interest rate spreads is attributed to two factors, namely the role of the US dollar as a "safe haven" currency and the countercyclical behaviour of discretionary government spending in the US ; En este trabajo se analiza el efecto de las variaciones de gasto público sobre el tipo de cambio efectivo real y sobre las exportaciones netas en el conjunto del área del euro con un VAR estructural estándar. Con este fin se utiliza una nueva base de datos fiscal trimestral para el área del euro. Nuestros resultados muestran que los aumentos de gasto público directo provocan una apreciación del tipo de cambio efectivo real y un deterioro del saldo por cuenta corriente, así como un empeoramiento del saldo primario de las Administraciones Públicas, resultado que está en consonancia con la hipótesis de «déficits gemelos». Los principales componentes del gasto público directo, (a saber, gastos de personal y consumo público en compras de bienes y servicios, el consumo público total y la inversión pública) generan apreciaciones reales. Así pues, nuestros resultados están también en consonancia con la hipótesis de existencia de un sesgo nacional en el gasto público y con la hipótesis de que la inversión pública da lugar a ganancias de productividad relativa en el sector de bienes comerciables. Contrariamente a lo que se observa en el área del euro, el tipo de cambio efectivo real en Estados Unidos se deprecia como respuesta a incrementos del gasto público. Tal discrepancia puede explicarse por la reacción del diferencial del tipo de interés con respecto al resto del mundo y la condición de la paridad no cubierta del tipo de interés. La diferente respuesta del diferencial de tipos de interés a corto plazo entre ambas áreas geográficas puede atribuirse a la conjunción de dos elementos de distinta naturaleza: el papel de moneda refugio del dólar y el comportamiento contracíclico del gasto público discrecional en Estados Unidos

The author empirically investigates the monetary impact of banking crises in Colombia, Chile, Denmark, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, and Uruguay. She uses co-integration analysis and error correction modeling to research: 1) Whether money demand stability is threatened by banking crises. 2) Whether crises bring about structural breaks in the relationship between monetary indicators and prices. Overall, she finds no systematic evidence that banking crises cause money demand instability. Nor do the results consistently support the notion that the relationship between monetary indicators and prices undergoes structural breaks during crises. However, although individual coefficients in price equations do not seem to be severely affected by crises, crises can sometimes give rise to variance instability in price or inflation equations.

PurposeWhile monetary autonomy is self-explanatory for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin with predetermined supply path, it is of great interest to probe into the monetary structures of Stablecoins. In these supply contracts and expands and capital restrictions apply due to the existence of reserves as the exchange rate arrangement adheres to a price rule.Design/methodology/approachEver since the launch of Bitcoin and its offspring, examination of cryptocurrencies' trading activity from the empirical finance viewpoint has received much attention and continues to do so. The particular monetary arrangements found in Stable cryptocurrencies (colloquially referred to as Stablecoins), however, have not been properly (1) classified and (2) studied within an empirical international finance and banking context. This paper provides an empirical framework analogous to Impossible Trinity for exploring monetary arrangements across Stablecoins wherein reserves are held as price stability is targeted.FindingsThe study findings of existence of the degree of achievement along the three dimensions of the Impossible Trinity hypothesis, namely monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial openness for a representative sample able to cover all varieties of Stablecoins, provide fresh empirical insights and arguments to this growing literature with respect to the success of their embedded exchange rate stabilization mechanisms. While the hypothesis can be supported for all cryptocurrencies in question, the trade-off combination among exchange rate stability, capital openness and monetary independence varies with the categorical types of Stablecoins.Research limitations/implicationsIf Stable cryptocurrencies, therefore, claim the role of global monetary assets freed from sovereign limits and national boundaries, it is critical to explore whether they adhere to traditional monetary frameworks. It goes without saying that in this work the author does not use a complete catalogue of all the available Stablecoins, rather a complete catalogue of all the possible asset classes of Stablecoins. While there is a significant difficulty in finding Algorithmic Stablecoins and, so far, there is plethora of Stable Token initiatives, a broader sample to further examine these under this paper's empirical framework is suggested. Enrichment of the robustness analysis by constructing additional proxies, possibly building time series for the proposed cmo1 subindex and using additional estimation methods is encouraged.Practical implicationsStablecoins have been developed aiming to address the issue of excessive price variation in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Holders of Stablecoins enjoy the combined advantages of using a blockchain-based digital infrastructure in fulfilling the functions of store of value and media of exchange and of using a traditional currency, which merely plays the role of the unit of account (and in some circumstances the trusted reserve to which is convertible to). Understanding the varieties of Stablecoins and quantifying the components for success of their price stabilization may result in designing better Stablecoins.Social implicationsBlockchain and cryptocurrencies have introduced new challenges to money and banking. Cryptocurrencies, which independently float such as Bitcoin, have gained the interest so far due to price variation that allows for gains. But these should be by far not considered to be a substitute to traditional means of payment. Lately, Stablecoins have increasingly gained attention for that USD Tether/Bitcoin pair (a Stablecoin pegged to the US dollar at parity) has outrun the US dollar/Bitcoin pair as the most traded pair in digital exchanges marking the strong position and high demand for Stablecoins.Originality/valueThis approach uncovers the varieties of Stablecoins with respect to their monetary constraints compared to the rest of the cryptocurrencies, which independently float. In this paper, the author provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of the exchange rate mechanisms conditional on Stablecoin asset classes accompanied with an empirical study from the monetary viewpoint. This is the first work in this attempt. The empirical framework employed is analogous to the traditional theory of international monetary economics referred to as Impossible Trinityz.Peer reviewThe peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/JES-06-2020-0279

Il lavoro prende in considerazione i principali avvenimenti che hanno influenzato l'evoluzione economica finanziaria del nostro Paese nella crisi del cambio 1992,ho voluto concentrare l'attenzione sugli avvenimenti a partire dal 1979 e analizzando l'intervento delle autorità monetarie. Allora non esisteva l'Euro, esisteva il Sistema Monetario Europeo con una sorta di valuta di riferimento, l'ECU, a cui le varie valute nazionali aderenti al sistema dovevano stare agganciate, entro una percentuale di scostamento non superiore al 2,25% per alcune e al 6% per altre, fra cui la lira. La Germania vantava di un'economia più solida di altri, con un sistema produttivo di avanguardia e con una moneta forte che faceva da riferimento per tutte le economie. L'Italia aveva un' economia che si doveva adattare continuamente alle conseguenze di una gestione del paese sconsiderata, miope e orientata al breve termine, frutto di una incompetenza della classe politica. Nel marzo 1979, l'Italia aveva aderito al Sistema Monetario Europeo, una decisione orientata, insieme con la politica estera, al rafforzamento dei vincoli comunitari nell'intento di dar luogo alla creazione di un'Europa Unita; consapevoli che questa sarebbe stata una scelta più di carattere politico che economica. L'adesione allo Sme avvenne in un clima di divergenza, Paolo Baffi allora governatore della Banca d'Italia, faceva infatti presente che una valuta debole come la lira, avrebbe trovato difficoltà ad abbandonare il regime delle svalutazioni facile. diversi economisti, oltre a Baffi,al di là di dove sedessero, se in Parlamento come Luigi Spaventa o alla direzione della Banca d'Italia o ancora all'interno del governo come Rinaldo Ossola, sostenevano la loro contrarietà all'ingresso nel Sistema Monetario Europeo, esponendo motivazioni tra loro eterogenee. Tutti si attendevano che il vincolo esterno dei cambi stabili costringesse il paese a seguire una politica di rigorosa stabilità monetaria. L'Italia aveva ottenuto il privilegio di una banda di oscillazione del 6%, contro il 2,5% degli altri paesi, ma tutti intendevano che l'adesione all'accordo di cambio avrebbe imposto una politica di rientro all'inflazione. Contro le aspettative generali, l'inflazione proseguì invece più violenta di prima. Il tasso di cambio, assunse con l'avanzare del progetto unitario una significatività crescente, aggiungendo alla sua funzione di strumento di orientamento, quella di fattore di credibilità. Le autorità monetarie italiane non accettarono mai una svalutazione esterna della lira pari a quella interna. Fra il 1980 e il 1987, i riallineamenti di parità nell'ambito dello Sme si susseguirono numerosi e coinvolsero numerose valute. Ogni riallineamento segnò una svalutazione della lira rispetto al marco. Dopo il 1987, i riallineamenti vennero sospesi e il corso della lira subì un solo ritocco al ribasso, in occasione del rientro della banda stretta. La politica di fatto seguita fu dunque quella di una graduale rivalutazione della lira, in termini reali, rispetto al marco. All'inizio degli anni novanta venne firmato il trattato di Maastricht, il contenuto degli accordi si inseriva in un contesto politico- sociale interno altamente critico, nel quale le energie politiche a lungo represse dalla guerra fredda si erano liberate, grazie al crollo del Muro di Berlino, spingendo quindi gli equilibri del sistema politico e economico con una rottura che si verificò del tutto nel 1992. Se il processo d'integrazione europeo era stato spesso rappresentato dalla classe politica come una sorta di panacea alle tare italiane, a Maastricht, si celebrò l'innocenza dell'europeismo italiano che vide stravolgere e crollare la visione retorica con la quale aveva guardato alla costruzione europea a partire degli anni '70. Per la storia dell'integrazione europea, il trattato di Maastricht rappresenta una pietra miliare, anche se con l'entrata in vigore ha creato ancora più instabilità, in quanto caratterizzato da uno scarso realismo degli obiettivi di convergenza delle variabili macroeconomiche, da mancanza flessibilità e insieme da asimmetrie dei comportamenti possibili delle banche centrali. La scena economica internazionale era segnata da: tendenze divergenti dei tassi di interesse, al ribasso negli Stati Uniti per rilanciare l'economia, al rialzo in Germania per gli effetti dell'unificazione tedesca, con conseguenti indebolimenti del dollaro, rafforzamento del marco, tensione nello Sme; le incertezze circa il completamento della unificazione monetaria in Europa, quale è stata sancita nel trattato di Maastricht. Questi sviluppi esterni coglievano l'economia italiana in una fase di attività produttiva debole, inflazione in lenta discesa, squilibri irrisolti nella finanza pubblica. Tra gli accadimenti che sono susseguiti, sono da richiamare i seguenti: l'esito negativo del referendum danese sul trattato di Maastricht del 2 giugno, infatti il referendum di Copenaghen si conclude al fotofinish (50,7%) di no contro il (49,3%) di si; mancata riduzione dei tassi di interesse in Germania; voci di svalutazione della lira; rialzo dei tassi ufficiali in Germania. Nel corso dell'anno 1992 si assiste a una piena recessione, infatti con il debito pubblico al 105,5 del Pil, con un fabbisogno attorno al 10,4 del Pil, con il passivo della bilancia dei pagamenti di parte corrente in crescita, la crisi era alle porte. Il 6 giugno la Banca d'Italia aumenta il tasso sulle anticipazioni a scadenza fissa di mezzo punto percentuale, irrigidendo così la politica monetaria, Moody's mise sotto controllo l'Italia per la sua incapacità nella riduzione del debito pubblico. Il 29 giugno il cambio contro il marco arrivò a 756,54 a fronte di una sostanziale stabilità nei confronti della sterlina e della peseta, Amato per effettuare un risanamento economico annunciò il 5 luglio la manovra da 30000 miliardi di lire, e con quella successiva di 100000 miliardi dà inizio al risanamento finanziario del Paese. Le vicende relative alle turbolenze che hanno sconvolto le parità valutarie dei paesi aderenti allo Sme hanno avuto inizio con la svalutazione del 7% della lira, la quale appariva quasi un riallineamento da manuale. Il 21 settembre, la Banca d'Italia, annunciò che le autorità monetarie si sarebbero astenute all'effettuare la quotazione ufficiale della lira. Questo fu un colpo durissimo per l'Italia che fino a quella data, aveva fatto del cambio della lira l'architrave della sua politica economica e finanziaria, sostenendo pesanti oneri in termini di riserve valutarie, infatti tra il giugno e il settembre vennero impiegate 53000 miliardi di riserve; colpo durissimo anche per la Comunità, colpita al cuore proprio nello strumento fondamentale, lo SME, investito nel ruolo di preparare e garantire le condizioni di stabilità, generalizzata e consolidata, che avrebbero dovuto, poi consentire quel salto di qualità dell'Europa, con il decollo della Unione Economica e monetaria, la moneta unica e il sistema delle banche centrali europee. Successivamente le tensioni speculative investono la lira , la sterlina e la peseta: momento in cui Italia e Gran Bretagna annunciano di uscire dagli Accordi europei di cambio. Subito dopo la svalutazione del 1992, si aprì un periodo di svalutazione generale della lira rispetto alle altre monete, periodo che si protrasse all'incirca fino al marzo 1993. Tra il 1992 e 1993 vennero firmati due accordi triangolari il protocollo Amato 31 luglio 1992 che abolì il sistema di scala mobile, completato da Ciampi nel luglio 1993, con la quale si fissarono gli obiettivi comuni di politica di reddito. Dopo di allora la lira rimase agganciata al dollaro. Il legame fra lira e dollaro potrebbe essere frutto dell'agire spontaneo dei mercati, ma potrebbe anche essere scaturito dalla decisione delle autorità monetarie italiane di ritornare alla vecchia linea di cambio differenziato, già seguita negli anni prima del 1979, fino all'ingresso dello Sme. Il problema essenziale delle autorità di governo era quello di evitare che la svalutazione esterna della lira si traducesse in inflazione importata, l'aver agganciato la lira al dollaro può essere inteso come una misura ragionevolmente coerente con l'obiettivo della stabilità monetaria. Di certo che la svalutazione della lira non ha contribuito alla soluzione del problema economico italiano, ha rischiato di aggravarlo producendo perdita di credibilità per il Paese. La crisi del sistema monetario europeo ha favorito una ripresa dei dibattiti teorici sui modelli di crisi valutarie, che si distinguono tra prima e seconda generazione, quelli di prima collegano l'emergere della crisi all'incompatibilità tra politiche macroeconomiche e stabilità del cambio; quelli di seconda, il cui sviluppo è stato stimolato dagli stessi fatti del 1992, nella quale l'emergere di una crisi appare come una scelta endogena, effettuata dalle autorità in base alle proprie preferenze e all'interazione con gli agenti economici privati. Analizzando i modelli si può concludere che mentre la rappresentazione di un regime di cambio fisso per mezzo di un livello puntuale del cambio non rappresenta un limite interpretativo rilevante, le ipotesi relative al processo di espansione del credito e all'esistenza di un livello di soglia delle riserve, nei modelli di Krugman, non sembrano dar conto adeguatamente della realtà dei fenomeni economici. I modelli di prima generazione danno una spiegazione "fondamentalista" delle crisi nel senso che fanno risalire la crisi allo sfasamento dei fondamentali macroeconomici dell'economia, in particolare l'esistenza di politiche fiscali espansive e prolungati deficit di bilancio incompatibili con un impegno di cambio fisso. I modelli di seconda generazione sottolineano il comportamento ottimizzante del policy-maker che non subisce più la crisi, ma decide di avviarla perché tale scelta minimizza i costi, nel senso che i costi in termini di reputazione a cui il governo va incontro uscendo dall'impegno sono comunque minori dei costi di rimanere in termini di incremento dei tassi di interesse e riduzione delle riserve valutarie. I modelli di terza generazione pongono enfasi sulla presenza di squilibri di natura finanziaria con la conseguenza che delle crisi valutarie non sono più viste come fenomeni a sé stanti ma come parte di una crisi sistemica in cui le crisi valutarie e bancarie si autoalimentano. Le ipotesi di perfetta previsione, d'altra parte, implicano che la razionalità degli agenti sia tale da non permette il realizzarsi di peso problem, i quali invece vengono osservati nella realtà. (Riassunto tradotto in inglese) Labour takes into account the main events that influenced the financial economic development of our country in the 1992 exchange rate crisis, I wanted to focus on the events since 1979 and analysing the intervention of the monetary authorities. At that time there was no euro, there was the European Monetary System with a kind of reference currency, the ECU, to which the various national currencies participating in the system had to be hooked, within a variance rate of no more than 2.25% for some and 6% for others, including the lira. Germany boasted of an economy stronger than others, with a state-of-the-art production system and a strong currency that was the benchmark for all economies. Italy had an economy that had to adapt continuously to the consequences of a reckless, short-sighted and short-term management of the country, the result of an incompetence of the political class. In March 1979, Italy had joined the European Monetary System, a decision aimed, together with foreign policy, at strengthening EU ties in order to create a united Europe; aware that this would be a more political than an economic choice. The accession to the Sme took place in a climate of divergence, Paolo Baffi then governor of the Bank of Italy, in fact, pointed out that a weak currency such as the lira, would find it difficult to abandon the regime of devaluations easy. several economists, in addition to Baffi, beyond where they sat, whether in Parliament as Luigi Spaventa or at the management of the Bank of Italy or even within the government as Rinaldo Ossola, argued their opposition to entry into the European Monetary System, exposing heterogeneous motivations among themselves. Everyone expected that the external constraint of stable exchange rates would force the country to follow a policy of strict monetary stability. Italy had obtained the privilege of a 6% swing band, compared with 2.5% in the other countries, but all wanted that accession to the exchange agreement would impose a policy of returning to inflation. Against general expectations, however, inflation continued more violent than before. The exchange rate, as the unitary project progressed, became increasingly significant, adding to its role as a guideline, that of a credibility factor. The Italian monetary authorities never accepted an external devaluation of the lira equal to the internal one. Between 1980 and 1987, the realignments of parity within the Sme followed numerous and involved numerous currencies. Each realignment marked a devaluation of the lira against the mark. After 1987, the realignments were suspended and the course of the lira underwent only one downward adjustment, on the occasion of the return of the narrow band. The policy followed was therefore that of a gradual revaluation of the lira, in real terms, with respect to the mark. At the beginning of the 1990s the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the content of the agreements was part of a highly critical internal political-social context, in which political energies long repressed by the Cold War had been freed, thanks to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, thus pushing the balance of the political and economic system with a break that occurred entirely in 1992. If the process of European integration had often been portrayed by the political class as a kind of panacea to the Italian tare, in Maastricht, the innocence of Italian Europeanism was celebrated, which saw the rhetorical vision with which it had looked to the construction of Europe since the 1970s, overturned and collapsed. For the history of European integration, the Maastricht Treaty represents a milestone, although with the entry into force it has created even more instability, as it is characterized by a lack of realism in the convergence objectives of macroeconomic variables, lack of flexibility and at the same time as asymmetries of the possible behaviour of central banks. The international economic scene was marked by: divergent trends in interest rates, downwards in the United States to boost the economy, up in Germany due to the effects of unification Germany, resulting in a weakening of the dollar, a strengthening of the mark, tension in the SME; The uncertainty about the completion of monetary unification in Europe, as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, is. These external developments caught the Italian economy in a period of weak production activity, slow-falling inflation, unresolved imbalances in public finances. Among the events that have followed, the following are to be recalled: the negative outcome of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty of 2 June, in fact the Copenhagen referendum ends at photofinish (50.7%) no versus (49.3%) yes; failure to reduce interest rates in Germany; rumours of the valuation of the lira; official interest rates in Germany. During the year 1992 there is a full recession, in fact with public debt at 105.5 of GDP, with a requirement around 10.4 of GDP, with the passive of the current account balance growing, the crisis was upon us. On 6 June, the Bank of Italy increased the rate on fixed-term advances by half a percentage point, thus tightening monetary policy, and Moody's brought Italy under control for its inability to reduce public debt. On 29 June, the exchange rate against the mark reached 756.54 in the face of substantial stability against the pound and the peseta, Amato to carry out an economic recovery announced on 5 July the maneuver of 30000 billion lre, and with the next one of 100000 billion begins the financial consolidation of the country. The events surrounding the turmoil that have disrupted the currency parities of the SME member countries began with the devaluation of 7% of the lira, which appeared to be almost a textbook realignment. On 21 September, the Bank of Italy announced that the monetary authorities would refrain from making the official listing of the lira. This was a very serious blow for Italy, which until that date had made the lira change the backbone of its economic and financial policy, bearing heavy burdens in terms of foreign exchange reserves, in fact between June and September 53 trillion reserves were used; It is also a very serious blow for the Community, which has been struck at the heart by the fundamental instrument, the EMS, which has been invested in the role of preparing and guaranteeing the conditions of stability, generalised and consolidated, which should have allowed Europe to jump in quality, with the take-off of the Economic and Monetary Union, the single currency and the system of European central banks. Subsequently, speculative tensions hit the lira, sterling and peseta, when Italy and Great Britain announced they were leaving the European Exchange Agreements. Immediately after the devaluation of 1992, a period of general devaluation of the lira against the other currencies opened up, which lasted approximately until March 1993. Between 1992 and 1993, two triangular agreements were signed, the Amato protocol on 31 July 1992, which abolished the escalator system, which was completed by Ciampi in July 1993, which set common income policy objectives. After that, the lira remained pegged to the dollar. The link between the lira and the dollar may be the result of the spontaneous action of the markets, but it could also have stemmed from the decision of the Italian monetary authorities to return to the old differentiated exchange line, which was already followed in the years before 1979, until the entry of the Sme. The main problem of the government authorities was to prevent the external devaluation of the lira from translating into imported inflation, the having pegged the lira to the dollar can be understood as a measure reasonably consistent with the objective of monetary stability. Certainly the devaluation of the lira did not contribute to the solution of the Italian economic problem, it risked aggravating it, producing a loss of credibility for the country. The crisis in the European monetary system has encouraged a resumption of theoretical debates on currency crisis patterns, which stand out between the first and second generations, those of first generation link the emergence of the crisis to the incompatibility between macroeconomic policies and exchange rate stability; Second, the development of which was stimulated by the same events of 1992, in which the emergence of a crisis appears to be a choice "It's not just a way of using private economic agents," he said. By analysing the models, it can be concluded that while the representation of a fixed exchange rate regime by means of a timely exchange rate does not represent a relevant interpretive limit, assumptions about the credit expansion process and the existence of a level of reserve threshold, in Krugman's models, do not seem to adequately account for the reality of economic phenomena. First-generation models give a "fundamentalist" explanation of crises in the sense that the crisis is traced back to the shift in macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy, in particular the existence of expansionary fiscal policies and prolonged budget deficits incompatible with a fixed exchange rate commitment. The second-generation models emphasize the optimising behaviour of the policy-maker who is no longer suffering from the crisis, but decides to start it because this choice minimizes costs, in the sense that the reputation costs that the government faces by exiting the commitment are still lower than the costs of staying in terms of raising interest rates and reducing currency reserves. Third-generation models place emphasis on financial imbalances, with the consequence that currency crises are no longer seen as stand-alone phenomena but as part of a systemic crisis in which currency and banking crises feed themselves. The hypotheses of perfect prediction, on the other hand, imply that the rationality of the agents is such that it does not allow the realization of weight problem, which instead are observed in reality.

Africa Development Indicators 2011 is the most detailed collection of data on Africa. It contains macroeconomic, sectoral, and social indicators for 53 countries. A companion CD-ROM has additional data, with some 1,700 indicators covering 1961-2009.-Basic indicators-National and fiscal accounts-External accounts and exchange rates-Millennium Development Goals-Private sector development-Trade and regional integration-Infrastructure-Human development-Agriculture, rural development, and the environment-Labor, migration, and population-HIV/AIDS and malaria-Capable states and partnership-Paris Decl

Russia's economy experienced two shocks in 2014. On top of the structural crisis that began in 2012, Russia had to deal with cyclical and idiosyncratic challenges to the economy. One of the new shocks illustrates Russia s integration into the world economy through its natural resource exports, and thus its dependence on the global commodity cycle: oil prices more than halved between July and December 2014, giving Russia a terms-of-trade shock. The ruble lost 46 percent of its value against the US dollar, which worsened already eroded business and consumer confidence. The monetary tightening in response made credit expensive, further dampening domestic demand. The other, more idiosyncratic, shock was related to the geopolitical tensions that began in March 2014 and led to economic sanctions. The tensions not only heightened perceptions that Russian investments had become riskier, they also dramatically increased the costs of external borrowing for Russian banks and firms. Spreads on Russian credit default swaps peaked in December at 578 basis points, compared to 159 a year ago. Together with the financial sanctions imposed on Russia in late July, which have restricted the access of Russia s largest state-connected banks and firms to Western international finance markets, this all but extinguished investment. The current World Bank baseline outlook, however, sees the national poverty rate increasing from 10.8 percent in 2013 to 14.2 percent in 2015 and 2016. Poverty is expected to increase because real disposable income and consumption will decline. This would be the first significant increase in poverty rates since the 1998-1999 crises. Russia weathered the 2008- 2009 crisis well as disposable incomes continued to grow slightly. Given the current limited fiscal space, additional support for the poor and vulnerable is likely to be less generous than it was during the 2008-2009 crisis. Although people at the bottom of the income distribution are the most vulnerable, there will be less opportunity for an increase in shared prosperity in 2015-2016, and there is a worrisome possibility that recent achievements might be reversed.

From the introduction: As the foreign exchange rate market operates twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week it can be described as a global marketplace trading in continuous time. The importance of this market place on weal and woe of economies and agents cannot be overestimated. Long lasting disputes about exchange rate over- and under-evaluation between countries (as most prominently the case between China and the USA) and its implications for international trade, growth rates of economies, unemployment levels, financial money flows, and so forth illustrate this point. As reported by the Bank of International Settlement in its triennial Central Bank Survey 2007, covering 54 countries and jurisdictions, the daily average foreign exchange turnover as of April 2007 has reached a mind-staggering $3.21 trillion. This amount marks an increase of 69 percent compared to the $1.97 trillion three years earlier and highlights the still increasing importance of the exchange rate markets. The U.S. dollar is by far the most important currency as it is involved in 86 percent of all transactions amounting to some $2.7 trillion per day. This is by far bigger than the volume of U.S. international trade in goods and services which for the month April 2007 amounted to (imports + exports) $317.5 billion.1 Indeed, only 17 percent of exchange market turnover has been reported to occur with non-financial customer counterparties, while 43 percent of transactions occur between reporting dealers (i.e. the interbank market) and 40 percent occur between reporting and non-reporting financial institutions (e.g. hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies). Accordingly, more than 2/3 of the turnover was traded as derivatives such as foreign exchange swaps, outright forwards, or options, while only 1/3 constituted spot rate transactions. These are important facts to consider when talking about forces of exchange rate determination. On ground of these figures one may reasonably explain why old-fashion standard models like the monetary model or purchasing power parity may only hold in the very long run and exchange rate movements may be much more subject to trades based on heterogeneous expectations incurred by investors, speculators and market makers. Particularly at the short-run exchange rates exhibit considerably greater volatility than macroeconomic time series leaving an impression of noisy and chaotic behavior. Throughout this work it will become evident that heterogeneous beliefs and actions of market participants are the key to understand short-run exchange rate dynamics from daily to monthly horizons. Over longer horizons of one month and longer standard fundamentals like money, inflation, productivity, interest rates and output will shimmer through and push the exchange rate towards a fair equilibrium value. This thesis is structured as to firstly looking at exchange rate driving forces over longer periods. Afterwards in chapter 3 it will start by examining the low predictive power of standard macroeconomic exchange rate models and present more recent successes in forecasting and explaining exchange rates. It continues with analyses of chart-technique, impact of news, and order flow which all constitute important building blocks of exchange rate determination and prediction over shorter horizons. Part 4 presents some more evidence on the non-linear behavior of exchange rates and the relationships between today's exchange rate and its historical movements as well as fundamentals (particularly interest rates) at different frequencies. Chapter 5 concludes.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: 1.Introduction3 2.Long-Run Exchange Rate Behavior4 2.1Purchasing Power Parity4 2.2The Simple Monetary Exchange Rate Model9 2.3Long-Term Cycles13 2.4The Macroeconomic-Balance Approach17 3.Short-Run Exchange Rate Dynamics19 3.1Only Random Dynamics?19 3.2Technical Traders and Speculators26 3.2.1Evidence of the Role of Chartists and Modeling Their Behavior26 3.2.2Views of Practitioners30 3.2.3Chart-Technique Predicting Future Movements?32 3.3The Impact of News36 3.3.1Immediate Response36 3.3.2Delayed Response41 3.4Order Flow and Investor Heterogeneity45 3.4.1Empirical Evidence45 3.4.2Modeling Order Flow51 3.4.3Uncovered Equity Parity53 4.Spectral Analysis58 4.1The Approach and Numerical Analysis58 4.2Graphical Analysis63 5.Conclusion 69 Appendix73 References110 Auxiliary Means and Declaration of Honor115Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.4.1, Empirical Evidence: It has become clear in the previous chapter that not all information is publicly available. Apart from the macroeconomic-related news there exists microeconomic-related information only available to some agents. Institutional portfolio rebalancing, hedging and liquidity demands, as well as shifts in risk appetite and expectations are examples and consequences of such private information which leaks out to the market via order flow and can, therefore, only be observed indirectly and delayed by all agents on the market. Generally, order flow is defined as the net difference between buyer-initiated trades and seller-initiated trades during some interval. Consequently, it can indicate a direction of trade for a currency. In fact, it is not even necessary that private agents possess superior information. If they only trade out of allocational motives like export transactions or earnings repatriation, the resulting cumulated transaction flow will convey information about the economy and cause agents to revise their expectations about fundamentals. A survey among professional traders and fund managers conducted by Gehrig and Menkhoff provides evidence that after technical analysis (attached weight of importance: 40.2%) and fundamental analysis (36.3%), the analysis of order flow (23.5%) is a third type of information widely used.In addition, more than 62 percent of participants believe that order flow delivers useful information for exchange rate movement from intraday to a few days only, while 15 percent do so for horizons longer than 2 months. Lately, various order flow data sets have been examined and overwhelmingly contributed to the understanding of short-run exchange rate behavior. For example, Evans and Lyons (2002) analyze a four-month sample between May 1st and August 31st, 1996 which covers worldwide direct interdealer trades on Reuters Dealing 2000-1 trading system2 for DM/USD and JPY/USD. For each 24 hours order flow is expressed as a cumulated unit value. For instance, if a purchase (sale) for the DM/USD ask (bid) quote is initiated, then order flow is +1 (-1). Specifically they regress where is the change of interdealer order flows between yesterday and today. The results can be seen in table 28. Indeed, order flow is able to explain 64 percent of daily changes in log mark/dollar and 46 percent of log yen/dollar exchange rate movement. The positiveindicates that net dollar purchases lead to a higher exchange rate, i.e. a dollar appreciation. Alsois significant and positively signed and, therefore, in line with UIP. The magnitude of 2.14 forof the DM/USD exchange rate means that if on any particular day there occur 1,000 more dollar purchases than sales, the dollar will on average appreciate by 2.14 percent. In absolute terms, considering an average trading size of $3.9 million, this means that a $1 billion excess of dollar purchases leads to an exchange rate appreciation of 0.54 percent (=2.1/3.9). Different versions of equation 34 (as also shown in table 28) show that order flow really is a driving force of short run exchange rate dynamics, and that, generally, the absolute nominal interest rate differential (but not its change) turns out to be insignificant. The finding that prices increase with buying pressure is a seemingly natural and causal relationship. However, for exchange rates it has conceptual implications since traditional macro models do not necessarily or sufficiently demand actual trades for exchange rate movement! Evans and Lyons present research work over an extended period of time and a different data set. It spans from 1993:1 to 1999:6 and comprehends all of Citibank's end-user order flow, meaning nonfinancial corporations, investors, and leveraged traders (such as hedge funds or proprietary trading desks) in the USD/EUR exchange rate spot and forward market. Citibank's market share is in the 10-15 percent range. Before attempting to forecast exchange rates over one to twenty trading days based on order flow, Evans and Lyons basically confirm the results of Meese and Rogoff over their considered time horizon. They find that forecasting with help of the interest rate differential produces larger MSE than the naïve random walk. However, they clearly beat the random walk with help of two different order flow based microstructure models. The first model is based on aggregated order flow from the six end-user segments of U.S. and non-U.S. market transactions by the three end-users mentioned earlier: The second microstructure model is based on disaggregated order flow from each segment : The results, as shown in table 29, show that the aggregated model beats the random walk at forecast horizons of 10 trading days or longer at the one percent significance level with a minimum MSE-ratio of 0.90 at 20 days. The disaggregated model even beats the random walk from one day forecast horizon onwards with a minimum MSE-ratio of 0.81 at 20 days. Generally, (as always) the predictability accuracy increases as the horizon rises. At 20 days, the disaggregated model accounts for almost 16 percent of the sample variance. Rime et al. (2007) contribute further evidence in line with Evans and Lyons. They analyze a data set which is obtained from the Reuters trading platform (D2000-2) but which covers a whole year from 2004:02:13 to 2005:02:14 for the USD versus the three major currencies EUR, JPY, and GBP during the main trading hours between 07:00 and 17:00 GMT. In a regression equal to equation (34), they find highly significant and positivefor the contemporaneous order flow of all currencies, among which the impact is highest for the JPY with a coefficient of 12.4 and smallest for GBP with a coefficient of 1.36. A detailed overview can be found in table 30. Further on, they show that innovative shocks to fundamentals (as calculated from the Money Market Survey, MMS) have mostly significant (at ten percent) effects on order flow, explaining up to 18 percent of its daily variance. Also, this news has significant effects on the exchange rate itself, confirming earlier presented evidence in chapter 3.3.1. Interestingly, regressing both news and order flow onto the daily change of the exchange rate significantly enhances the explanatory value by up to 7.7 times (as in case of the JPY) as opposed to regressing them individually. Precise results can be found in table 31. Once again, this indicates that macroeconomic news influence exchange rates not only directly but also indirectly because order flow gradually conveys information on heterogeneous beliefs about these fundamentals. Noticeably, order flow and exchange rates also show high cross-correlation across currencies. As table 32 shows, daily exchange rate returns correlate positively with changes of other currency pairs in a range between 0.20 (for ) and 0.53 (for ). Partly, of course, this is due to the same denomination in U.S.-dollars. In further analysis, Rime et al. test if three different micro forecast models can outperform the random walk and if positive out-of-sample returns could have been generated after correcting for transaction cost and risk aversion.

Latin America's historically low saving rates and sub-par growth performance raise the question of whether the region should save more to grow faster. Economists generally resist acknowledging a policy-exploitable causal connection going from saving to growth because domestic saving is perceived to be fully endogenous, optimally determined, or fully substitutable by foreign saving. However, to the extent that these three assumptions do not hold, three channels can be established through which higher domestic saving—by curbing persistent current account deficits—can promote medium-term growth. The channels are first, a real interest rate channel, whereby higher saving reduces the cost of capital and enhances macro sustainability; second, a real exchange rate channel, through which higher saving leads to a more competitive real exchange rate; and third, an endogenous saving channel, whereby saving follows growth and, hence, subsequently compounds the effect of the first two channels. Econometric evidence supports all three channels and suggests that the lower-saving countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially those with recurrently weak balance of payments and persistent domestic demand pressures on the non-tradable sector, would benefit the most from boosting their saving rates.

This paper presents new data on the micro structure of the export sector for 45 countries and studies how exporter behavior varies with country size and stage of development. Larger countries and more developed countries have more exporters, larger exporters, and a greater share of exports controlled by the top 5 percent. The extensive margin (more firms) plays a greater role than the intensive margin (average size) in supporting exports of larger countries. In contrast, the intensive margin is relatively more important in explaining the exports of richer countries. Exporter entry and exit rates are higher and entrant survival is lower at an early stage of development. The paper discusses the results in light of trade theories with heterogeneous firms and the empirical literature on resource allocation, firm size, and development. An implication from the findings is that developing countries export less because the top of the firm-size distribution is truncated.

The Lao PDR economy continues to grow vigorously at 8 percent this year despite the impact of typhoons and slower growth in the global economy. That being said, the country's growth estimate was revised slightly downwards to 8 percent from an early estimate of 8.6 percent to account for (i) the adverse impact on agriculture by the typhoons Haima and Nock ten during the second half of the year as well as the adverse impact of the current flooding in Thailand on Lao PDR's tourism and trade sectors; (ii) an upward revision of 2010 Goss Domestic Product (GDP) due to a higher than anticipated output of electricity generation from the Nam Theun 2 project; and (iii) the commencement of operations at the Nam Ngum 2 hydropower dam. The mining sector's contribution to growth in 2011 is expected to slow according to company production plans and actual outputs in the first 3 quarters of this year. The manufacturing sector is projected to grow at 15 percent driven by garment, construction materials, and food and beverage production. The garment sector started shifting production towards higher value-added products and began benefiting this year from the European Union (EU) relaxing material sourcing regulations for LDCs. The services sector is also benefiting from higher domestic demand, particularly for wholesale, retail trading and telecommunications. With significant challenges and risks ahead - increasing uncertainties, particularly on signs of spreads of debt concerns in Europe, over-heating in emerging economies (high inflation) and price volatility, global economic growth is projected to slow in 2011 and 2012. Emerging and developing economies are projected to experience healthy growth in the near term. Challenges lie on two main fronts, i.e. rebalancing from public to private demand, particularly in advanced economies and rebalancing domestic demand, particularly in emerging and developing economies in order to promote resilience to external shocks and further reduce inflationary pressures. This paper bases its country-level projections for Lao PDR's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and export demand on International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank's projections (EAP Update Nov-2011) for the regional and global economic outlook and commodity prices.

The corporate scorecard is designed to provide a snapshot of the Bank's overall performance, including its business modernization, in the context of development results. It facilitates strategic dialogue between management and the Board on progress made and areas that need attention. With the results measurement system, which was adopted for the 13th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA13) in 2002, the Bank became the first multilateral development institution to use a framework with quantitative indicators to monitor results and performance. The corporate scorecard expands this approach to the entire World Bank covering both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and IDA. The corporate scorecard uses an integrated results and performance framework, which is organized in a four-tier structure that groups indicators along the results chain. Tier one is development context. Tier two is development results supported by the Bank. Whether the Bank is managing its operations and services effectively is shown in tier three. Tier four focuses on whether the Bank is managing skills, capacity, resources, and processes efficiently; and is business modernization on track?

The Indonesian economic quarterly reports on and synthesizes the past three months' key developments in Indonesia's economy. Its coverage ranges from the macro economy to financial markets to indicators of human welfare and development. It is intended for a wide audience, including policy makers, business leaders, and financial market participants, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in Indonesia's evolving economy. The challenge for Indonesia is to maximize the opportunities that this brings, in terms of enhancing future growth and making investments that can improve the welfare of the entire population, while managing the associated risks. Strong capital inflows, particularly portfolio, have been seen across emerging markets, including Indonesia. These inflows are driven by yield differentials and the stronger growth prospects, and improved creditworthiness, of emerging economies relative to heavily indebted, higher-income economies. Further quantitative easing in the US has provided an additional, cyclical boost to this trend. Global commodity prices also picked up in recent months. In November, the US dollar price of non-energy commodities rose by 3.4 percent over the month with food and raw material prices up by 4.9 percent and 7.6 percent, respectively. The underlying drivers were strong growth in demand from emerging economies, particularly China, and also supply disruptions in the agriculture sector.

Capital account liberalization, it is fair to say, remains one of the most controversial and least understood policies of our day. One reason is that different theoretical perspectives have very different implications for the desirability of liberalizing capital flows. Another is that empirical analysis has failed to yield conclusive results. The answer, another influential strand of thought contends, is that this efficient-markets paradigm is fundamentally misleading when applied to capital flows. Limits on capital movements are a distortion. It is an implication of the theory of the second best that removing one distortion need not be welfare enhancing when other distortions are present.