Suchergebnisse

2007/2008 ; L'inizio di secolo 21 a rivelato al mondo intero l'inizio di una guerra di piccoli dimensioni. La geopolitica e un gigante formato da una serie di 2 giocatori di scacchi , di cui questi giocatori cercano di ottenere vantaggi di posizione. In questo gioco e cruciale di conoscere le regole attuali che governano questi movimenti. I cavalieri non può muoversi in diagonale. Dal 1945 fino al 1989, il gioco principale sulla scacchiere e stato tra gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica, è stato chiamato "La Guerre Fredda". Oggi, il gioco e tra l'Unione Europea e Russia , e metaforicamente è stato chiamato "La Guerre Fredda del Gas". La sicurezza energetica europea confronta una serie di sfide per quanto riguarda la dipendenza dell'Unione Europea delle risorse energetiche russe e della necessità di diversificazione dei mezzi di trasporto su le risorse energetiche, si fa riferimento principalmente a gas naturale. Lo scopo di questa tesi di dottorato e quello di indagare la situazione attuale, a partire da l'idea che ci sono gravi preoccupazioni in Europa per quanto riguarda il fatto che la Russia potrebbe utilizzare le sue esportazioni di energia come arma politica per poter finalizzare la sua supremazia politica . Questa tesi si concentra sull'identificazione di una soluzione per quanto riguarda le maggiori preoccupazioni dei europei - la sicurezza dell'approvvigionamento energetico, iniziando a sviluppare nuovi vie di acceso alle risorse energetiche. Per una migliore comprensione, ho pensato la mia tesi come una scacchiera, avendo come scommessa - il sviluppo di nuovi gasdotti, con due giocatori principali (l'Unione Europea e la Russia), un giocatore chiave - La Regione del Mar Nero - e, naturalmente, con una soluzione. Le principale domande di questa ricerca sono: Nell'Unione Europea allargata può essere vero che la Russia potrebbe tentare di utilizzare le sue esportazioni di energia come un'arma politica per raggiungere la supremazia? Per vincere sarà utilizzato il prezzo dell'energia per ottenere questo vantaggio? Per poter rispondere a queste due domande se deve prima capire le relazioni tra l'Unione Europea e la Russia, e qual è il ruolo che il Mar Nero svolge in questo problema. Questo tipo di ricerca proporre un quadro teorico d'analisi, avendo come metodo di analisi, un metodo quantitativo ( di contenuto ) e un metodo qualitativo ( le discussioni informali con gli esperti di questo settore ). Per poter essere più precisa, per quanto riguarda l'ipotesi della tesi, ho avuto alcune discussioni informale con gli esperti del settore energetico e dei affari europee, in Europa, della zona del Mar Nero e della zona Caspio, paesi che sono direttamente coinvolti nel problema energetico, per discutere e analizzare l'impatto che ha la politica estera energetica russa, che se trova in pieno sviluppo sul Europa e sulla sicurezza europee, a partire dalla crisi del gas provocata dalla Russia, che ha avuto un impatto reale, influenzando considerevole l'economie europee a partire dal 2006 fino ad oggi. Il mio punto di vista è che la Russia cercherà attraverso vari mezzi di consolidare la dominazione come Leader Mondiale, usando i mezzi che gli ha - il prezzo d'energia, e il mio parere e che l'unico modo per risolvere questo problema e di cominciare a diversificare l'accesso alle risorse energetiche, sviluppando una strategia in piano energetico che collegano l'Europa dal bacino del Mar Caspio attraverso la regione del Mar Nero. Se questa strategia avrà successo, l'Europa sarà in grado di ridurre l'influenza della Russia e di creare un clima sicuro dal punto di vista energetico. Per quanto riguarda il metodo di analisi quantitativo, la teoria è basata sulla lettura di alcuni libri di riferimento dal settore energetico e quello di relazioni internazionali, con la partecipazione a conferenze e seminari sia in Romania e all'estero, compreso uno stage di formazione alla Direzione di Energia e Trasporti della Commissione Europea , il monitoraggio delle notizie e degli articoli di stampa di questo settore ( Mediafax ,Journal of European Public Policy , Euractiv , Eurobserver , Eupolitix , CNN , BBC , Euronews ). A partire da una ricca esperienza in questo settore energetico e da una cooperazione transfrontaliera, la mia tesi desidera sottolineare l'importanza di una sicurezza energetica europea in quello che riguarda l'approvvigionamento dell'Europa con l'energie. Nei seguenti capitoli di questa tesi ho studiato alcuni aspetti guardando la dipendenza energetica europea nei confronti della Russia e il ruolo dalla regione del Mar Nero, come un ponte di accesso alle fonti alternative di energia, diverse da quelle russe. Il primo capitolo inizia con due opinioni sulla sicurezza energetica e economica europea,che rivela la vulnerabilità dell'Europa, pero anche il suo potenziale che si divide tra l'Europa e gli stati dell'Eurasia Centrale. La tesi discuterà del ruolo di Gasprom sia nella politica interna e nella estera russa, che rivela una cattiva immagine della diplomazia energetica russe. Seguendo questa rotta, il obiettivo si muove da sud a est. Un capitolo parla del ruolo determinato che lo ha la regione del Mar Nero come un ponte di accesso nella sicurezza energetica europea , seguita da capitoli destinati a rivelare il ruolo specifico della Turchia in questo problema. Nel piano secondario, due progetti specifici di infrastrutture sono studiati - Nabucco e Il Gasdotto South Stream, finendo con una soluzione su un gasdotto Trans-Caspian. La tesi si conclude con l'indicazione di una strategia sulla diversificazione delle vie d'accesso energetiche. In questo momento, possiamo dire che lo scopo di questa ricerca è stato quello di definire una possibile soluzione per poter uscire da sotto la dominazione russa, quella di sviluppare una strategia comune al livello europeo sulla diversificazione del accesso alle risorse energetiche dalla regione Caspio al Mar Nero in Europa. In questo senso, la strategia energetica europea si prevede di continuare a raggiungere di tali obiettivi promuovendo nuove rotte di trasporto sicuro e al sviluppo economico territoriale, trasformando l'Europa più sicura nel accesso alle risorse energetiche. L'Unione Europea detiene in questo momento tutti gli strumenti di una politica estera per promuovere la stabilità politica e la riforma economica, per il sviluppo e il rafforzamento della democrazia e delle legislazioni nazionali, e aumentare i diritti e le libertà umane nei paesi della regione del Mar Caspio. Il più importante, le relazioni europeo - Mar Caspio , dovrebbero essere estese per quanto riguarda le dimensioni bilaterale e regionale dal punto di visto economico e commerciale e al livello diplomatico. L'ultimi eventi che sono stati sulla scacchiera energetica fornisce una vera e propria importanza alla regione del Mar Caspio per esercitare una notevole importanza come uno centrale geo-strategico, e all'Unione Europea per poter esercitare il ruolo del Leader Mondiale nella regione . Comunque per rendere reale ( per effettuare ) questo compito difficile, l'Europa deve rispettare alcuni consigli per poter formulare una strategia energetica comune nella zona del Mar Caspio , come :  di eliminare gradualmente la dominazione Gasprom da Azerbaijan .  di offrire supporto economico e politico allo scopo di costruire il progetto Nabucco e di costringere alla costruzione di un gasdotto Trans-Capian , intervenire sul mercato per assicurare la diversità e di impedire il monopolio della fornitura delle risorse energetiche verso l'est d'Europa .  di garantire la stabilità e la sicurezza nei paesi di transito e di risolvere il conflitto di Nagorno Karahbak , e imporre dei impegni più grandi sul processo di Minsk  di pensare seriamente come negoziare con Turkmenistan, mettendo nella bilancia l'apertura energetica con una generosa offerta, pero senza un coinvolgimento troppo grande sulle riforme politiche e economiche. Questo farà una chiamata alla diplomazia e tatto, e alla superiorità tecnologica e tecnica del ovest di poter pagare. Come una conclusione finale, l'Ovest , incluso l'Unione Europea e gli Stati Uniti, deve ripensare il più rapido possibile le sue politiche energetiche e non-energetiche nei confronti di Russia . Cosi come possiamo osservare in questa tesi , l'Ovest detiene veramente il vantaggio economico e politico di poter costringere la Russia per diventare più trasparente e commerciale nei confronti delle sue politiche energetiche estere . Non può più permettere a Mosca di minacciare la sicurezza energetica d'Europa , avendo la possibilità insieme al entrata dalla Romania e Bulgaria nell'Unione Europea in gennaio 2007 di sviluppare nuove rotte sul accesso alle risorse di gas dalla zona Caspio attraverso il Mar Nero in Europa. ; The beginning of 21st century revealed to the world the beginning of a small war proportion. Geopolitics is a gigantic series of two player chess games, in which the players seek positional advantage. In these games it is crucial to know the current rules that govern the moves. Knights are not allowed to move diagonally. From 1945 to 1989, the principal chess game was the one between the United States and the Soviet Union and it was called the "Cold War". Nowadays, the chess game is between European Union and Russia and it is called metaphorically the "Gas Cold War". European energy security is facing a set of serious challenges connected to Europe's dependence on Russian energy and the need for diversifying energy supply sources. Now days, European Union and Russia arrived at a crossroad regarding their agreements on energy matters. The target of this PhD is to explore the current situation, leaving from the fact that are serious concerns in Europe that Russia may try to use its energy exports as a political lever in order to settle its supremacy on the political board. This thesis focuses on finding a solution towards the European's major concern – energy security of supply, by start building new routes of gas supply. For a better understanding, I structured my paper like a chase board, with a stake – new routes of gas supply, with two major players – European Union and Russia, one key actor – The Black Sea Region and of course with a solution. The main research questions of this thesis are: In the enlarged European Union it could be true that Russia may try to use its energy exports as a political lever in order to settle its supremacy? And, in order to be successful it will use the energy price to obtain the leverage? To answer these questions a first step is to understand the relations between EU and Russia and the role that, the Black sea region plays in this meter. The research proposes a theoretical framework, using a quantitative analyze method (analysis of content) and a qualitative analyze method (informal discussions with experts from this area). In order to be more precisely with my thesis assumption, I carry out some informal discussions with experts from energy and international affairs area, from Europe, Black sea and the Caspian region, countries who were involved in the energy case, to discuss and to analyze the impact of Russia's increasingly assertive foreign energy policy on Europe and European security, started from the gas crises launched by Russia that have a real affect on Europe economy from 2006 till nowadays. My point of view is that Russia will try through different ways to consolidate its dominance as a Global leader, using its most convenient means – the "energy price" and my believes were that the only way to solve the problem is by start building a diversification supply strategy that could link Europe to the Caspian basin through the Black sea region. If this strategy will succeed, Europe will be able to reduce the Russian influence and to create a safer life climate. Regarding the quantitative analyze method, the theoretical framework was foundated by reading some record books in the international relations and energy field, by participating to conference and seminars in Romania and outside the country, including a stage at the European Commission on energy matters, monitoring the news and the press articles in this field (Mediafax, Journal of European Public Policy, Euractiv, Eurobserver, Eupolitix, CNN, BBC, Euronews). Starting from the successful work experience in the energy field and cross-border cooperation, my thesis aims to deepen the understanding of the European Union energy security of supply. In the fallowing chapters of my thesis, I studied several aspects of Europe's energy dependence on Russia, and the role of the Black Sea region as a source of alternative supplies. The first chapter begins with two overviews of Europe's economic and energy security, which show Europe's vulnerability, but also the potential lying in the complementarities between Europe and the states of Central Eurasia. The paper then proceeds to discuss the role of Gazprom in both Russian domestic and foreign policy, respectively, which provide a disturbing picture of the emerging Russian energy diplomacy. Following this, the focus shifts south and east. A chapter puts forward the role of the emerging Black Sea region as a hub in European energy security, followed by chapters devoted to the specific role of Turkey. Subsequently, two specifically important infrastructural projects are studied – the Nabucco and the South stream pipelines, ending with a pipeline solution as a Trans-Caspian pipeline. The paper final concludes with the outlining of a supply diversification strategy. At this point we can say that the aim of this paper-study was to define what might be a solution to get out under the Russian dominance and to offer as a possible solution the developing of a common European energy supply strategy from the Caspian region thorough the Black Sea into the European Union. In this sense, the EU energy supply strategy is expecting to contribute to achieving these objectives by promoting new safe routes of supply and a balanced and sustainable development of the territory, making European Union safer concerning its energy supplies. The EU holds all the foreign policy instruments required to promote political stability and economic reform, develop and straighten democracy and the rule of law, and enhance the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries of the Caspian region. Most importantly, the EU-Caspian relations need to be further expanding in the bilateral and regional dimensions of economy and trade, as well as at diplomatic level. The last events that occurred in the energy chess board had give a real chance to the Caspian region to exert its importance as a significant geo-strategic pivot, as well as to the EU to play a global role in the region. However, making this a reality is fraught with difficulty and Europe must respect some recommendations in order to formulate a common energy strategy in the Caspian area, such as:  move swiftly to thwart Gazprom's overtures to Azerbaijan.  give the political and economic backing to get Nabucco built and push for the creation of the trans-Caspian, intervening in the market to ensure diversity and prevent a monopoly of supply to Eastern Europe.  ensure stability of transit countries, push to resolve Nagorno Karahbak, greater commitment to the Minsk process.  think seriously about how to deal with Turkmenistan, balancing energy overtures with generous but not overbearing support for political and economic reforms. This will require concerted diplomacy and reassertion of western technological and technical superiority and ability to pay. As a final conclusion, the West, including the EU and the United States, needs to quickly rethink its energy and non-energy policies towards Russia. As we can see in this paper, the West does have the economic and political leverage to force Russia to become more transparent and commercial in its foreign energy policies. It cannot allow Moscow to threaten the energy security of Europe anymore, having the possibility since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in January 2007 to develop new routes of gas supply from the Caspian area through the Black sea into Europe ; XX Ciclo

The cost of transitioning economies towards net-zero will be immense. According to the Commission, the European Union will need around 620 billion euros annually,[1] with Italy and Germany requiring respectively up to 3.5 and 2.3 trillion euros in additional investment by 2050 to reach their climate targets.[2] Since the 2015 Paris Agreement, attention to the financial aspects of the transition has grown both at European and national levels.
In parallel, the private financial sector has also committed to decarbonisation, with the largest Italian and German banks and insurance companies, like Intesa SanPaolo, UniCredit, Generali, Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, becoming members of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, pledging to align their operations with carbon neutrality.[3] The private financial sector will be crucial to mobilise the necessary funds for the transition, and Italy and Germany should encourage collaboration between public and private financial actors, promoting guarantees and incentives for investing in green projects. At the same time, they should increase cooperation at the European and bilateral levels to increase market stability and develop common financing solutions.Public finance in Germany and Italy
In the last years, Italy and Germany's finances have been burdened by several factors, from the economic slowdown caused by the pandemic and the energy crisis to the consequent increased spending on emergency measures to support households and businesses. Despite these events, national and European recovery plans have significantly boosted investment in green projects.[4] In Italy, 71.7 billion euros of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (37.5 per cent of the total national fund) were allocated to green projects;[5] similarly, in Germany, 12.5 billion euros (42.7 per cent of the total national fund) were designated for the energy transition.[6] Furthermore, the EU allocated additional 20 billion euros in REPowerEU grants to support clean energy initiatives.[7] However, both governments may not be able to sustain these levels of funding in the long run without resorting to increasing debt. Furthermore, the time horizon of NextGenerationEU is approaching and there is uncertainty about the realisation of a similar tool for non-emergency times.
The 2023 German debt crisis further aggravated its public financial fatigue. The crisis began when the German Federal Constitutional Court found the proposed government's 60 billion euros climate fund in violation of the Schuldenbremse, the constitutional rule aimed at limiting deficit under 0.35 per cent of the GDP.[8] The Court's decision blocked the implementation of the fund, forcing the Government to revise its budget, downplaying the role of climate action investment.[9] The crisis arrived at a moment when German industries estimated the necessity of 213 billion euros in additional public investment over the next ten years for the energy-efficient modernisation of buildings, grid expansion for electricity, hydrogen infrastructures, and production and storage of renewable energies.[10] Similarly, Italy is experiencing some financial strain due to the slowdown in economic activities and the high cost of emergency measures implemented in recent years, as shown by the decision not to extend the tax cuts on fuels.[11] Italy has proven itself more fragile than Germany, with persistently low productivity growth and slow administrative procedures contributing to low investment attraction in all sectors.[12] In 2023, investment slowed down even further due to rising financing costs and the phasing out of the so-called Superbonus programme, the housing renovation tax credits.[13] The limits of public finance in both countries show the necessity to involve private financial actors to carry part of the cost of the energy transition.Aligning climate objectives and profitability
Profitability remains the main indicator of the private financial sector's willingness to invest in sustainable projects. However, there are ways to sustain green projects while increasing returns. First, thanks to their proficiency in risk assessments and market trends predictions, commercial banks and investment funds may have an advantage in evaluating future demand for green sectors beforehand. This may help them identify opportunities that will be increasingly profitable in a future net-zero scenario. Similarly, they may be able to identify and provide loans to businesses developing sustainable technologies that are not particularly competitive in current markets but that are expected to thrive in a post-transition world. Insurance companies can also support the transition by addressing risks of climate-induced disasters, such as floods and drought damages, and limiting large-scale losses. Financial products, like green bonds, can also enable capital raising for sustainable projects while maintaining profitability.
In Italy and Germany, green bonds segments of the national stock exchanges have been extremely profitable, reaching total outstanding amounts of 261 billion euros in Germany and 161 billion euros in Italy, with insurance companies and commercial banks like Deutsche Hypothekenbank, Commerzbank and DZ Bank in Germany,[14] and Intesa SanPaolo and Unicredit in Italy being the largest private financial green bond issuers.[15] Green bonds have been an effective tool to finance adaptation strategies and preventive measures, like increasing food and water systems' resilience against climate-induced disasters, which generally attract less private funding.[16] Indeed, financial actors may benefit from promoting adaptation strategies in their portfolios, as they would be exposed to decreasing returns if they invest in or lend to companies with low resilience to climate-induced events.[17] The 2021 floods in Germany were estimated to have caused up to 44 billion euros of damages, while the losses related to the 2023 Italian floods were recorded to be around 40 billion euros.[18] In both cases, spillover losses from the real economy to financial markets have been difficult to quantify, but the disasters have halted planned investment, impacted investors' confidence to fund future projects in those areas, and even increased borrowing costs.[19]
Financial actors may address these situations by expanding their role as advisors, helping customers to develop adaptation plans. Allianz, for example, thanks to its propensity to assess scenarios, has established a service to advise customers on climate-related risks and to help them adapt their operations to climate change.[20] Unaddressed climate consequences may also increase insurance costs, leading to unaffordable premiums for some customers. If insurance markets become too expensive for customers and offering coverage becomes too risky for insurers, the entire sector could be paralysed. A solution could be to offer adaptation discounts for those customers who have spent part of their budget on building resilience. This would effectively lower risk-return calculations for insurers that would be able to lower prices.Regulatory framework
Market disruption caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine has lowered investors' confidence, as Germany and Italy were among the most vulnerable economies to natural gas shocks. Additionally, persistent high interest rates in Europe have limited financial actors' capacity to invest in clean energy projects. Therefore, to promote private investments, there is a need for regulators to enact measures to increase market stability and to derisk green projects.
Monetary policies are the main tool to channel private capital where it is needed. Following the energy crisis, the European Central Bank's actions to slow down inflation have had a particularly negative impact on the energy transition. While high borrowing costs are an obstacle for any investment, renewable projects are more capital-intensive and are therefore more susceptible to high interest rates.[21] While the ECB's recent interest rate cut may lead to some improvement in investments,[22] national action is still necessary. Banca d'Italia and Deutsche Bundesbank should increase their bilateral coordination through the alignment of their macroprudential measures and stronger information exchange, which might have a positive impact on building investors' confidence and increasing financial stability for companies that operate in both countries.[23]
Regulators may also attract capital by increasing clarity related to green projects. The main instrument to do so is the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, which establishes a common framework to define sustainability for investors and companies. However, a possible reform could expand its classification to comprehend a "brown" taxonomy, which would define criteria to classify high-emissions activities as harmful to the environment. It could be instrumental in helping financial institutions in their assessment of the environmental impact of companies they are involved with.[24]
A sustainability reference framework should also be applied to private green bond issuance. Indeed, while most green bonds in Italy and Germany have been issued by public development or central banks, there has been a rising tendency for private companies to develop their own fixed-income instruments promoting the development of environmental projects.[25] Currently, both Borsa Italiana and Börse Frankfurt, respectively the two countries' largest stock exchanges, bundle in their green segments exclusively bonds that meet the voluntary guidelines of the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA).[26] Linking private green bond issuance to the EU taxonomy could stimulate capital-raising for the transition and avoid greenwashing. An initiative on this matter is the European Green Bond Standard (EUGBS), a certification that attests that bond issuers are aligned with taxonomy criteria. However, the Standard is also voluntary and there is no obligation for an issuer to adhere to it to market its financial products as green bonds.[27] A better solution would be the establishment of the EUGBS as binding to define bonds as green. This would guarantee a harmonisation of green bonds across the EU that would lead to a more coherent language for financial operations for Italian and German actors.Looking ahead
It is becoming increasingly urgent to direct financial flows toward the transition. Public finance in Germany and Italy is facing difficulties, and market instability has made it riskier for private financial actors in both countries to invest in green projects. Both the German and Italian financial sectors have been more focused on lowering risks than increasing returns, resulting in lower-than-average profitability, which has directly impacted available resources for new investments.[28]
To attract capital toward net-zero opportunities, there is a need for collaboration between public and private actors, as well as bilateral coordination between the two countries. The recent Italian German Action Plan offers a positive model to strengthen coordination, as it includes the establishment of a bilateral macroeconomic forum to discuss financial and economic issues, and it could be an ideal platform to align the two countries' positions on EU-wide reforms, such as proposals on how to adjust the Economic and Monetary Union and the Capital Market Union in ways compatible with sustainability goals. Public efforts should also be spent to strengthen regulatory frameworks to facilitate and de-risk investment for private financial companies, with Germany and Italy coordinating to develop common financing instruments and derisking strategies. Blended finance models should be explored as a way to promote capital raising. A relatively small amount of public funds, constituting a risk cover guarantee, can help catalyse additional private investment. This can take various forms, such as Germany's two auctions model. The initiative consists of two auctions organised by the Federal Government. The first is a descending price auction held between producers to secure long-term contracts for hydrogen supply. The second is an ascending price auction to sell the purchased hydrogen to the highest bidder. Typically, the price requested by the producers in the first auction is higher than what the final buyers offer in the second one and, as a result, the Federal Government bears the additional cost as a form of indirect subsidy to bridge the gap between them.[29] In this way, 900 million euros were provided for the purchase of hydrogen above market prices which allowed the ramp-up of private hydrogen companies, contributing to lower the perceived risk of investing in them and attracting risk-averse private investments.[30]
As Germany and Italy navigate market instability, blended finance offers a promising solution, as it may alleviate both the burden on public funds and mitigate risks for private investors. However, to ensure long-term success, both countries must prioritise wider strategies that enhance profitability for investors committed to decarbonisation. This could be achieved through enhanced bilateral coordination to review regulatory gaps not addressed by broader EU frameworks. Tailored bilateral solutions between Germany and Italy will be essential to develop stable market conditions that align with both countries' financing needs and climate goals.Alessio Sangiorgio is Junior Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).
This commentary presents some of the key issues discussed during a workshop organised by IAI, which brought together financial sector representatives from both Germany and Italy. The event is part of a broader IAI project, "An Italian-German Dialogue on Energy Security and Transition amid Russia's War on Ukraine", supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.[1] European Commission, Questions and Answers on the Sustainable Finance Package, 13 June 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_3194.[2] "Quanto ci costerà la transizione verso un mondo a emissioni zero? Spoiler: molto più del previsto", in Il Sole 24 Ore, 11 February 2022, https://www.infodata.ilsole24ore.com/2022/02/11/quanto-ci-costera-la-transizione-verso-mondo-a-emissioni-zero-spoiler-molto-piu-del-previsto; Federal Association of German Industry (BDI), Klimapfade für Deutschland, 18 January 2018, https://bdi.eu/publikation/news/klimapfade-fuer-deutschland.[3] Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), 2023 Progress Report, December 2023, https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/63/2023/11/GFANZ-2023-Progress-Report.pdf.[4] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Investment 2023, May 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2023.[5] Italian Government, Recovery and Resilience Plan, 12 January 2021, https://www.mef.gov.it/export/sites/MEF/en/focus/documents/PNRR-NEXT-GENERATION-ITALIA_ENG_09022021.pdf.[6] German Federal Ministry of Finance, German Recovery and Resilience Plan, January 2021, https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Press_Room/Publications/Brochures/2021-01-13-german-recovery-and-resilience-plan.pdf.[7] European Commission, REPowerEU – 2 Years on, 13 May 2024, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/node/5357_en.[8] Shahin Vallée, "Germany Has Narrowly Swerved Budget Disaster – But Its Debt Taboo Still Threatens Europe", in The Guardian, 13 December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/p/pfzhb.[9] Ibid.[10] Sebastian Dullien et al., "Herausforderungern für die Schuldenbremse. Investitionsbedarfe in der Infrastruktur und für die Transformation", in IW-Policy Papers, No. 2/2024 (14 May 2024), p. 8-9, https://www.iwkoeln.de/en/studies/simon-gerards-iglesias-michael-huether-investment-needs-in-infrastructure-and-for-the-transformation.html.[11] Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy's Stability Programme 2023. Abridged Version, 28 April 2023, p. 23-27, https://www.dt.mef.gov.it/en/attivita_istituzionali/analisi_programmazione_economico_finanziaria/documenti_programmatici/index.html?selezione-anno=2023.[12] Banca d'Italia, Financial Stability Report, No. 1/2024 (April 2024), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/rapporto-stabilita/index.html.[13] Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy's Stability Programme 2024. Abridged Version, 9 April 2024, p. v-vii, https://www.dt.mef.gov.it/en/attivita_istituzionali/analisi_programmazione_economico_finanziaria/documenti_programmatici/index.html?selezione-anno=2024.[14] Climate Bonds Initiative, Germany: Green Finance State of the Market, July 2019, https://www.climatebonds.net/node/38227.[15] Danilo Liberati and Giuseppe Marinelli, "Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Green Bonds (But Were Afraid to Ask)", in Questioni di Economia e Finanza, No. 654 (November 2021), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2021-0654/index.html.[16] Ujala Qadir and Kamleshan Pillay, Green Bonds for Climate Resilience. State of Play and Roadmap to Scale, Rotterdam, Global Center on Adaptation, 2021, https://gca.org/?p=6754.[17] Nicola Ranger, Olivier Mahul and Irene Monasterolo, Assessing Financial Risks from Physical Climate Shocks: A Framework for Scenario Generation, Washington, World Bank, 2022, p. 19, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/760481644944260441.[18] European Environment Agency (EEA), Economic Losses from Weather- and Climate-related Extremes in Europe, 6 October 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/economic-losses-from-climate-related.[19] EEA, European Climate Risk Assessment, 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/european-climate-risk-assessment.[20] Kristin Stechemesser, Jan Endrikat and Edeltraud Guenther, "Insurance Companies' Responses to Climate Change: Adaptation, Dynamic Capabilities and Competitive Advantage", in The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 2015), p. 557-584, DOI 10.1057/gpp.2015.1.[21] Peter Martin et al., "Conflicts of Interest: The Cost of Investing in the Energy Transition in a High Interest-rate Era", in Wood Mackenzie Horizons, April 2024, p. 2, https://www.woodmac.com/horizons/energy-transition-investing-in-a-high-interest-rate-era.[22] Martin Arnold, "European Central Bank Cuts Interest Rates for First Time in 5 Years", in Financial Times, 6 June 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/97543fe0-32cb-4427-a1d2-aac2ea5180fc.[23] Banca d'Italia, Decision to Reciprocate a German Macroprudential Measure Pursuant to Recommendation ESRB/2022/4 of the European Systemic Risk Board, 20 October 2022, https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/stabilita-finanziaria/politica-macroprudenziale/esrb-20221020/index.html.[24] European Central Bank, Eurosystem Reply to the European Commission's Public Consultations on the Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy and the Revision of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, 8 June 2020, p. 20, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.eurosystemreplyeuropeancommissionpubliconsultations_20200608~cf01a984aa.en.pdf.[25] Danilo Liberati and Giuseppe Marinelli, "Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Green Bonds", cit.[26] Deutsche Börse, Segment for Green Bonds, June 2019, https://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/en/wissen/wertpapiere/anleihen/green-bonds; and International Capital Market Association, The Green Bond Principles. Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Green Bonds, June 2021, https://www.icmagroup.org/sustainable-finance/the-principles-guidelines-and-handbooks/green-bond-principles-gbp.[27] European Parliament and Council of the EU, Regulation (EU) 2023/2631 of 22 November 2023 on European Green Bonds and Optional Disclosures for Bonds Marketed as Environmentally Sustainable and for Sustainability-linked Bonds, point 20, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2631/oj.[28] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Germany: Financial Sector Assessment Program. Technical Note–The Determinants of Bank Profitability", in IMF Country Reports, No. 22/273 (August 2022), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2022/08/10/Germany-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-Technical-Note-The-Determinants-of-Bank-522098; and IMF, "Italy: Financial Sector Assessment Program. Technical Note–Banking Regulation and Supervision and Bank Governance", in IMF Country Reports, No. 20/236 (August 2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/08/03/Italy-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-Technical-Note-Banking-Regulation-and-Supervision-49633.[29] German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, "What Exactly Is H2Global?", in Energiewende direkt, No. 01/2022 (4 February 2022), https://www.bmwk-energiewende.de/EWD/Redaktion/EN/Newsletter/2022/01/Meldung/direkt-account.html.[30] German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, Roadmap on Expected Hydrogen Off-take in Germany in the German-Norwegian Context, 23 April 2024, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/P-R/240424-roadmap-deu-nor-hydrogen-task-force.pdf.

The study includes: glossary; references; and annexes. A number of countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region have been severely hit by food-price crises in 2008 and are still very vulnerable to food-price volatility experienced since late 2010. Humanitarian responses to high food prices, crises, shocks, or emergency situations should help the poor avoid the consequences of the reduced affordability of a basic food basket. This is especially crucial in the first 1,000 days of life (that is, children from pregnancy until they reach 2 years of age and breastfeeding women), since most of the physical and cognitive damages due to improper nutrition in this period are irreversible. The World Bank is leading a regional study on how to improve LAC country responses so as to protect the nutritional status of the poorest and most vulnerable in times of crises and emergencies.

Seventy percent of West Bank and Gaza's population is under the age of 30, and their share will continue to grow in the years ahead. The aspirations and ambitions of this large and growing population of children and youth have the potential to define the future of the West Bank and Gaza. This assessment seeks to contribute to the understanding of factors driving the choices of young men and women at this critical juncture of their lives, with a particular emphasis on the roles that changing gender norms and the conflict environment are having on their aspirations for education, jobs, and forming families. Young Palestinians are moving into adulthood in a world surrounded by roadblocks and barriers, and gripped by soaring unemployment and uncertainty about what their futures may hold. Still, this generation remains optimistic and ambitious. They are pursuing high school and college degrees, and hanging on to expectations for better jobs and better lives than was possible for their parent's generation. In the face of such bleak prospects, why? What is driving these youth's aspirations for high levels of education and good jobs? To provide a broad context for the youth's testimonies, this report first takes stock of developments affecting the West Bank and Gaza over the past decade. In this period, the Palestinian territories witnessed two major episodes of conflict: the second intifada beginning in 2000 and the crisis in Gaza in 2007. Both episodes had severe and wide-ranging economic repercussions, and were accompanied by restrictions on internal and external mobility of people and goods. As a result, in the last decade, the West Bank and Gaza has witnessed economic volatility without parallel (even in comparison to countries affected by large financial crises), massive spikes in poverty, and some of the highest rates of unemployment in the world. Young people's unemployment rates are even higher, and much more so for young women. The youth's focus groups indicate that traditional gender norms remain very strong in their society, and mainly seem to be reinforced by the difficult conflict environment. Men's status as the breadwinners means that boys, especially from poor families, are likely to withdraw from school sooner than girls in order to take up income earning roles; and the weak economy intensifies these pressures.

The end of the year saw a radical shift in Ukraine's European integration. On November 8 the European Commission proposed opening EU accession talks with Kyiv, an important step for Ukraine; the European Council subsequently approved this decision. As a further step on the path to Europeanization, Ukraine completed synchronizing its power system with the European system, and the country's transmission system operator became a member of the European network, ENTSO-E.Despite heavy combat, the front line did not move. There was some concern about future military aid, the availability of which would affect war developments and Ukraine's abilities to hold off Russian forces on the battlefield and thwart Russian air strikes on civilian targets. The concern mostly arose from the position of the United States, which has been driven by internal U.S. politicking, and the corresponding delay in providing new aid packages. The lack of weapons supplies, Kyiv claimed, slowed the counteroffensive operation, which, despite expectations, did not result in rapid and wide-scale advances. Nonetheless, there were positive achievements of the counteroffensive, particularly in taking out Russia's naval vessels and port supplies.1. ROLLOUT OF THE WARGeneral Developments during October–DecemberThe last quarter of 2023 was another period of heavy, intense fighting without tangible territorial advances on either side. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) kept up pressure along the entire front, with key battles taking place in the vicinity of Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Kupiansk, Lyman, Mariinka, and Robotyno. The battle for Avdiivka, in Donetsk oblast, a city Russian forces have tried to capture since early October, was perhaps the costliest of the war for the AFRF, with little achieved there. At the same time, delays in supplies of military aid from Ukraine's Western allies affected military operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which had to curtail some operations because of ammunition shortages.Despite high expectations, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the last quarter of the year did not result in rapid and wide-scale advances. Nonetheless, there were some critical developments. In mid-November the AFU took back some positions of the left bank of the Dnipro river in occupied Kherson oblast. Establishing bridgeheads there is a step toward being able to move forces and supplies across the river, thence to the south on a land route to Crimea. It also allows the AFU to better protect the residents of Kherson, who have been under relentless attack.Ukrainian forces also continued their successful attacks on Russian vessels in the Black Sea: 20 percent of the Russian Black Sea fleet was destroyed during the last four months of 2023, an important achievement for a country that is not a major naval power. On land, the Ukrainian army continued successful attacks on Russian military facilities in Crimea and other occupied territories, often using unmanned drones and missiles.President Zelensky and other top Ukrainian officials have attributed the lack of more impressive results from the counteroffensive to slow weapons deliveries, which gave the Russians time to build more fortifications and to mine territories densely. This was the opinion of Western military experts as well. Ultimately, the situation pushed the army chiefs to change tactics and emphasize building defense fortifications. At the same time, the AFU did not retreat, despite unprecedented pressure from Russian forces along the front line. Overall, the counteroffensive was successful in many respects: Russian casualties mounted, and the AFRF failed to advance, despite strenuous efforts. According to the AFU General Staff, from the start of the invasion to the end of 2023, the Russian army lost over 360,000 soldiers, thousands of tanks and combat vehicles, and hundreds of aircraft and helicopters. The figure on human losses is close to the UK's intelligence bureau's assessment. Spokesperson for Ukraine's military intelligence agency Andrii Yusov said in mid-December that around 450,000 Russian troops were deployed in Ukraine, many fewer than the 617,000 that Vladimir Putin claimed.Ukraine's commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, warned about the risk of a positional war, "where both sides are dug in and not moving much." To avoid such a deadlock and return to a war of maneuvers, he said, Ukraine would need additional weapons.POW ExchangesDuring the last quarter of the year, there was little public information about POW exchanges. In mid-November, Kyiv blamed Moscow for halting the exchanges and blocking negotiations over POWs. The previous exchange had taken place on August 7, when twenty-two Ukrainians returned home. In early December, President Zelensky said exchanges were happening without public announcements, while recognizing that Russia was throwing up barriers to the exchanges. In some cases, POW exchanges were occurring right on the battlefields. As of mid-November, according to official data, 4,337 Ukrainians were imprisoned in Russia, including 3,574 military personnel. The actual number of Ukrainian civilians imprisoned in Russia, according to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, may reach 25,000.Russian Disinformation Campaigns and CyberattacksRussia's disinformation campaign in Ukraine during the quarter including disseminating deep-fake videos featuring the Ukrainian army's commander-in-chief, fake stories about political and army leaders, and lies about Russian forces' success on the battlefield. Russia has also continued its anti-Ukrainian information campaigns in other countries, especially Poland. These disinformation efforts are designed to spread mistrust of Ukrainians and of Ukraine's reasons for fighting, and to decrease support. On December 12, one of the biggest Ukrainian mobile operators, Kyivstar, which provided cellular connection for 25 million customers and broadband internet connection for one million, came under a cyberattack that resulted in the total suspension of services for a few days. Earlier, in October, a court in Kyiv had seized the corporate rights in Kyivstar of three sanctioned businessmen, including the Russian oligarch Mikhail Fridman, in part to prevent them from setting up dummy corporations and moving assets there. Kyivstar was part of a larger holding group controlling similar businesses in Russia. The Russian hacking group Solntsepek claimed responsibility for the attack, but the company and Ukrainian officials said the hackers overstated their achievements, and SBU cybersecurity department head Ilya Vitiuk thought it was more likely the work of the Russian military intelligence unit Sandworm. In an interview with Reuters, Vitiuk expressed concern that the hackers had been inside Kyivstar at least since May. A big Ukrainian bank came under cyberattack at the same time as well. More than 4,000 cyberattacks have been reported since the invasion, which is three times the frequency of such attacks before the war began. Russia's Position on the WarThe Kremlin continued denying chances for the Ukrainian peace formula and said there was no basis for bilateral peace negotiations. The Kremlin has not changed its narrative on the targets of the war against Ukraine, which abounds in falsehoods and manipulative statements. Putin continues asserting that Russia did not start the war in Ukraine and expounding on the need to consider how to stop "the tragedy" in Ukraine. Russia has seen more of its armory and vehicles destroyed than it likely anticipated, but it relies on the West's potential fatigue in supporting Ukraine when spreading misinformation about Ukraine in Western countries. Attacks on Critical InfrastructureIn the fourth quarter, Ukraine did not face massive damage to the energy infrastructure. This could have resulted either from an effective air defense or from Russia not yet starting its expected winter assaults on the energy system. Still, there were numerous attacks on the power grid as early as November, and some energy assets were damaged by shelling and air strikes. Among them were power plants, coal mines, oil refineries, and fuel depots. One of the thermal power plants located close to the front was shelled ten times in two months. Some other critical infrastructure facilities also came under attack during the fourth quarter, including river port infrastructure and shipyard and railway facilities. Nonetheless, the scale of the damage was much less than in the fourth quarter of 2022. Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureAt the end of the year, Russians resumed massive drone and missile strikes on civil and critical infrastructure, hitting a record of such attacks in late December. Kyiv was a key target. Russia continued attacking civil infrastructure, including residential buildings, killing and wounding civilians. Among these were grain storage facilities, postal service infrastructure, kindergarten, the Odesa Fine Arts Museum, river and seaport infrastructure, foreign civil cargo ships, medical institutions, and so on.Numerous civilians have been killed or wounded in these attacks. A particularly heinous attack on a café hosting a funeral reception in Kharkiv oblast that resulted in the deaths of fifty-nine civilians became the biggest crime against civilians in the region. On December 29, Russia launched wide-scale missile and drone attacks that resulted in the largest number of civilians killed and injured in Kyiv since the start of invasion. Russia continued such attacks in the following days, some of which were on the same massive scale. Many residential buildings were damaged during attacks at the end of the year. Kyiv officially confirmed the unlawful deportation of almost 20,000 Ukrainian children since the start of the war. Thousands have been taken to Belarus. Fewer than 400 children had been returned as of the end of the year, in some cases through the efforts of parents and family. During the last quarter of the year the media reported fewer than twenty children returned. Analysts assess that over 8,300 Ukrainian children taken to Russia in 2023 had been sent to "reeducation camps."2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSA key issue in foreign affairs in the fourth quarter was the uncertainty of international military aid to Ukraine at the level the country needs to withstand Russia's attacks. The concern arose mostly because of internal U.S. politicking and the corresponding delay in providing new aid packages. Another factor was the rise of populist parties in parliamentary elections in some European states. Most of these populist parties, including those in Slovakia and the Netherlands, are against providing further aid to Ukraine. News that the EU was behind schedule in supplying artillery rounds did not give grounds for optimism. These various factors combined meant a critical drop in aid: between August and October, the amount of newly committed aid to Ukraine decreased by 87 percent compared to the same period in 2022.At the same time, the leaders of some European states and the EU itself declared themselves ready to continue supporting Ukraine. European leaders warned that Ukraine's defeat would mean serious damage to the project of United Europe and that Russia would be on the EU's doorstep and would later move forward with war against other European states, as it has threatened.In the larger picture, Ukraine's inability to defend itself would mean democracy losing to tyranny. A door would open for a global parade of more powerful states annexing less powerful neighbors, and war-oriented Russia would have more resources to conduct war in the future. Prominent Western media have also spoken out on the necessity of providing support to Ukraine. A Financial Times article described the humanitarian disaster that would occur should Russia win, and an editorial in Bloomberg called on Western governments to continue supporting Ukraine.President Zelensky's Diplomatic ToursIn the last quarter of the year, President Zelensky made a few visits to allies and partner countries. In early October, he visited Spainto attend the European Political Community Summit, a forum of more than forty countries established after Russia's invasion to cope with critical challenges and threats, including Russia's war in Ukraine. At the summit, he met with Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez and Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni to discuss new military aid packages. He met the Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan for the first time ever, as Russia-Armenia relations had cooled after another Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in September 2023. In September, Armenia provided Ukraine with humanitarian aid for the first time since the full-scale invasion, and in late October, Armenia participated in Ukraine's Peace Formula summit for the first time.On October 10, President Zelensky visited Romania to meet his counterpart, Klaus Iohannis, to discuss Black Sea regional security and the transit of Ukrainian grain, an issue that has prompted some harsh tit-for-tat threats in the past. The two presidents signed a joint declaration on bilateral cooperation, including on such matters as security, Ukrainian grain exports, promoting the Ukrainian Peace Formula, and others matters related to Ukraine's defense. The next day Zelensky made an unannounced visit to Brussels to attend a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Council and a meeting of NATO defense ministers in the Ramstein Format, a group of more than fifty countries organized to provide collective support to Ukraine. The key topic during the meetings was providing weapons and air defense systems before the winter. The UK and Norway agreed to address strengthening security in the Black Sea region, and France and Germany committed to leading a new ground-based air defense coalition. In December, President Zelensky visitedArgentina to attend the inauguration of the country's president-elect, Javier Milei, who has expressed support for Ukraine in Russia's war. He also met with the leaders of a few other South American states. Following this trip, he visited the United States to meet with President Biden and address U.S. senators to enlist further U.S. support for Ukraine in the war against Russia. Zelensky then made a surprise visit to Germany and later Norway to attend the Nordic States summit. The Nordic leaders committed to supporting Ukraine "for as long as it takes."United StatesThe key feature of U.S.-Ukraine relations in the last quarter of the year was uncertainty over future U.S. aid to Ukraine. Internal U.S. politicking has resulted in deferred agreement on the U.S. federal budget for 2024, and the precipitous start of Israel's war with Hamas has confounded any consideration of aid to Ukraine as a stand-alone issue. The Ukraine aid fund was expected to run out by the end of the year.Relations with the EU and European StatesOn November 8 the European Commission adopted the 2023 Enlargement package, which recommended inviting Kyiv to start talks on Ukraine's accession to the EU. The decision was based on an assessment of Ukraine's progress toward reforms in different areas, as detailed in a separate report. According to the report, Ukraine had taken the necessary steps and fulfilled its commitments sufficiently to be ready for negotiations. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, called this "excellent progress." On December 14 the European Council agreed to open Ukraine membership talks, even though Hungary and Austria expressed an intent to vote against Ukraine's membership.Most of the European states continued supporting Ukraine. Germany remained among the largest supporters and aid providers, with a few packages of aid provided in the last quarter of the year. Among other articles, Germany supplied some air defense systems that are crucial during the winter to protect critical infrastructure against Russian missile strikes and bombings. Ukraine and Germany agreed on a joint venture to produce armored military vehicles in Ukraine. Berlin made available funds to restore and support the Ukrainian power system before the winter. German chancellor Olaf Scholz called on the country to be prepared to increase its support for Ukraine "when others are faltering."As expected, parliamentary elections in Slovakia were won by Robert Fico, who had promised to end military support for Ukraine should he prevail. Immediately after the elections, Slovakia halted its military aid to Ukraine, and, after being appointed prime minister, Fico confirmed this decision and canceled previously approved aid packages. Fico took the position that the war was a "frozen conflict" and Kyiv and Moscow needed to negotiate. However, he confirmed his intention to continue supplying humanitarian aid.The pro-Russia Fico had held anti-Ukrainian views before the election. The newly appointed country's foreign affairs minister, Juraj Blanár, in the past was known for purveying misinformation about Ukraine and repeating Russia's propaganda narratives. Bilateral relations between Slovakia and Ukraine are likely to become strained in the near future. In October, Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte visited Ukraine, promising to supply extra Patriot missiles before the winter, along with another aid package announced shortly before. Another prominent event happened in early December when the Netherlands finally returned to Ukraine some ancient Scythian artifacts the country had held on to for almost ten years. These items had previously been kept in Crimea before being sent out for exhibition. When Russia annexed Crimea, it also claimed ownership of the artifacts. In June 2023 a Dutch court ruled the gold treasures should go to Ukraine, not Crimea. In late December, the Netherlands started preparing F-16 fighter jets to be delivered to Ukraine.The Netherlands is among Ukraine's most significant military aid providers and is committed to continuing support in 2024. But there is a risk of a Slovakia-style development: in November a far-right politician, Geert Wilders, whose platform included halting support for Ukraine, unexpectedlywon parliamentary elections. Wilders's party, which was anti-Ukrainian ten years ago, will not have a majority, so the future country's policy toward Ukraine may depend on what kind of political coalition gets put together.Relations with Hungary remained strained. There was little progress in solving the agriculture export ban other than a waiver for sugar. Budapest continued creating obstacles within the EU to the vote granting Ukraine support, and the country's prime minister, Viktor Orbán, personally criticized providing aid to Ukraine. Hungary threatened to block EU accession negotiations with Kyiv and even filed a corresponding claim with the European Commission. Prime Minister Orbán, who has maintained ties with Moscow despite the EU's policy, said Kyiv was not ready to begin EU accession negotiations. Ukraine's EU membership aspirations do not coincide with Hungary's national interests, he said. Orbán might take the desire of most EU member states to support Ukraine as an opportunity to negotiate more for Hungary, both from the EU and from Ukraine. Budapest demands that Ukraine amend its law on education, and Kyiv says it is ready to do so. Kyiv's position is to negotiate with countries whose minorities live in Ukraine, to fulfill the European criteria, but without making special exceptions for any minority.Despite the threats, Hungary did not veto the vote on starting Ukraine-EU membership negotiations, but on the same day it blocked the EU's decision for €50 billion in long-term aid for Ukraine. Romania became a more important partner of Ukraine, and bilateral relations grew thicker in the fourth quarter. President Zelensky visited Bucharest and signed a bilateral memorandum of cooperation with his Romanian counterpart. Romania continued taking steps to expand Ukrainian agricultural transit, which faced a potential blockade by some other neighboring states. The two countries settled the dispute over the construction of a deep-water navigation route, in which Bucharest had accused Kyiv of violating environmental standards. Bucharest welcomed amendments to the Ukrainian law on national minorities and Kyiv's decision not to use the term "Moldovan language."The concept of the "Moldovan language" was established by Moscow when Moldova was one of the Soviet socialist republics; it is not recognized by Bucharest, despite the large number of Moldovan immigrants in Romania. The relationship between Romania and Moldova is long and complicated, and President Zelensky felt the language issue was of less importance in a time of war.After the dispute regarding agricultural exports and transit between Ukraine and Poland, top officials from both countries ratcheted down the tension in their public statements. The presidents of Ukraine and Poland reaffirmed good bilateral relations. Even as the agricultural dispute awaits an adequate resolution, however, a new one has cropped up: some Polish carriers started blocking border-crossing points with Ukraine (described below). The new Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, appointed in December, gives hope for better bilateral relations with fewer conflicts. A former president of the European Council and staunchly pro-Ukraine, Tusk has demanded full mobilization of the West to help Ukraine. Poland's new foreign affairs minister, Radosław Sikorski, paid his first official visit to Kyiv on December 22. Developments in Agricultural Exports DisputesThe dispute over agricultural exports with some neighboring countries was only partly solved. In early October, Kyiv suspended its complaints to the World Trade Organization against Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, anticipating that a constructive attitude would work better toward finding a solution. During the dispute, most of the overland grain exports, 60 percent, were rerouted through Romania. Increased deliveries through Moldova also became part of the solution. In mid-October the Romanian government approved an import permit system to protect local farmers. In late November, Ukraine and Bulgaria approved a joint mechanism for agrarian exports that would avoid market distortions in the countries of transit, which feared lower prices for their own products.At the same time, the new Slovak government announced its intention to extend the ban on the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products beyond the time permitted by the EU, which ended September 15. Slovakia also added to the list of agricultural products banned for transit. The Hungarian government amended its own ban to allow sugar imports, as the country intensely depends on imports. These unilateral country bans are against EU regulations, which maintain federated oversight of product transit.Carriers' Strike and Blockade of Border-Crossing PointsIn November, Polish haulers started a protest and a blockade of Ukraine border crossings. Later, some carriers from Slovakia occasionally joined them. Because Ukraine suffers from lack of transportation capabilities through the Black Sea, the blockade created huge lines of thousands of vehicles at the borders and complicated the transportation of goods from and to Ukraine, including military aid. The Polish strikers demanded the restoration of permits for Ukrainian carriers, a ban on the issuance of licenses to non-EU transport companies, and a waiver for empty Polish trucks to register with the Ukrainian electronic queue when returning to Poland from Ukraine. Kyiv argued that restoration of the permits is impossible as in 2022, Ukraine and the EU signed an Agreement on the Carriage of Freight by Road that stipulates bilateral and transit traffic without permits. A representative of the European Commission called the blockade "unacceptable." One of the organizers of the protest is Rafal Mekler, a member of the Polish far-right National Movement Party, also known as the Confederation party, which is skeptical toward the EU and less friendly toward Ukraine. For this reason, some believe the transport blockade was politically inspired. Despite the agreement of representatives of Ukraine and Poland on an action plan to unblock the border and the participation of the European Commission, the dispute had not been resolved as of the end of the year. The next step is agreement at the ministry level.Ukrainian Peace Formula DevelopmentsIn late October, Malta hosted a meeting of representatives of sixty-five states to discuss the implementation of the Ukrainian peace formula. The meeting was focused on nuclear safety, energy, and food security, the liberation of POWs and deported persons, and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity.3. INTERNAL AFFAIRSThe Economic SituationAccording to the IMF's assessments, in 2023 the Ukrainian economy grew faster than expected. Annual growth is expected to come to 4.5 percent, compared to the 1−3 percent previously forecasted. But high growth rates cannot be guaranteed for the future, as the prospects of export capacities in the next year are unclear. Economic growth will also depend on the continued provision of aid, and that is also obscure. In early October the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) suspended the fixed exchange rate regime and introduced a flexible one. Despite concerns, the national currency rate remained stable, though it started weakening a little toward the end of the year. Naturally, the strength of the national currency in the current circumstances is deeply dependent on international aid. Later, the NBU also lifted all restrictions on sales of foreign currencies to the public. The NBU also decreased a key policy rate twice in the last quarter of 2023 after a two-stage decrease earlier in the year. This was possible because inflation was low—just 5.1 percent in November.At the end of the year, parliament approved the state budget for 2024, which is oriented toward strengthening the army but has a huge deficit: expenditures are expected to be almost double revenues. Likely as a result of this situation, parliament passed some laws stipulating steps that may increase budget incomes or funds to finance the army. These are laws on resuming tax inspections for businesses and on raising the tax rate for banks to 50 percent. A Focus Ukraine (Kennan) piece on Ukraine's budget for 2024 is available here.On December 11, the IMF approved releasing the third tranche of Extended Fund Facility funds, about U.S. $900 million, to Ukraine. Ukraine needs financing, but at the same time, there are risks to deepening the loan burden. The IMF expects Ukraine's public debt to exceed 100 percent of GDP in two years.The Energy SituationDuring the summer, the energy companies undertook major maintenance campaigns to restore capacities before the winter and the anticipated onslaught of Russian air attacks. As of October, available power generation and transmission capacities, together with electricity import capacities, could barely cover peak demand. In November the power system started experiencing a deficit such that Ukraine had to rely on electricity imports, chiefly from Romania and Poland, to meet demand. At the same time, price regulations restricted commercial imports, and the power system had to turn to technical emergency assistance, which is a specific import but usually more expensive, and without predictable availability. Government ReshufflesIn early November, Ukraine's Youth and Sports Minister Vadym Gutzeit submitted his resignation, which parliament later approved. Some civil actors had criticized Gutzeit's efficacy as a minister and were concerned about allegations of his possible involvement in embezzlement of state funds before becoming minister, although his attorney said he was not a suspect and no charges had been brought against him. Gutzeit was succeeded by his vice-deputy as acting minister, while Gutzeit himself continues in his role as head of Ukraine's National Olympic Committee. 4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIESImportant Legislative ChangesIn the fourth quarter of 2024, parliament passed some important initiatives. In December the Verkhovna Rada legalized medical cannabis. In addition, parliament amended the law on minorities to be in accord with the Council of Europe's recommendations, which was a part of Ukraine's obligations on its path to European integration. The amendments broaden the use of EU languages, including in an educational context, while requiring the study of Ukrainian as a state language; the minority languages affected are chiefly Romanian and Hungarian. Two other laws that parliament passed as part of the EU integration commitments deal with battling corruption. Both laws expand the capacities of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and the National Corruption Prevention Agency. The president of the European Commission positively assessed these legislative changes well.Successful Completion of Synchronization of Ukrainian and European Power SystemsOn November 28 the Continental European TSOs (transmission service operators), a regional group of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E), said that the Ukrainian transmission system operator, Ukrenergo, had achieved compliance with the key technical requirements necessary to enable a permanent interconnection between the power systems of continental Europe and Ukraine. The process formally started in 2017, when Ukrenergo and ENTSO-E signed a roadmap for integrating the Ukrainian power system into the electricity system of continental Europe. In addition, the continental European TSOs have decided to increase the capacity limit for electricity trade from continental Europe to Ukraine and Moldova to 1,700 megawatts, based on system security and the results of stability simulations, reflecting an increase of 500 MW from the previous limit.Based on this compliance, on December 14, ENTSO-E accepted Ukrenergo as the fortieth member of the association as of January 1, 2024. This means that the Ukrainian power system has become an integral part of the European system, and Ukrenergo will have equal rights with the European TSOs. The next stage is market coupling, which requires full unification of Ukrainian energy market regulation with the European set of regulations. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

The end of the year saw a radical shift in Ukraine's European integration. On November 8 the European Commission proposed opening EU accession talks with Kyiv, an important step for Ukraine; the European Council subsequently approved this decision. As a further step on the path to Europeanization, Ukraine completed synchronizing its power system with the European system, and the country's transmission system operator became a member of the European network, ENTSO-E.Despite heavy combat, the front line did not move. There was some concern about future military aid, the availability of which would affect war developments and Ukraine's abilities to hold off Russian forces on the battlefield and thwart Russian air strikes on civilian targets. The concern mostly arose from the position of the United States, which has been driven by internal U.S. politicking, and the corresponding delay in providing new aid packages. The lack of weapons supplies, Kyiv claimed, slowed the counteroffensive operation, which, despite expectations, did not result in rapid and wide-scale advances. Nonetheless, there were positive achievements of the counteroffensive, particularly in taking out Russia's naval vessels and port supplies.1. ROLLOUT OF THE WARGeneral Developments during October–DecemberThe last quarter of 2023 was another period of heavy, intense fighting without tangible territorial advances on either side. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF) kept up pressure along the entire front, with key battles taking place in the vicinity of Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Kupiansk, Lyman, Mariinka, and Robotyno. The battle for Avdiivka, in Donetsk oblast, a city Russian forces have tried to capture since early October, was perhaps the costliest of the war for the AFRF, with little achieved there. At the same time, delays in supplies of military aid from Ukraine's Western allies affected military operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which had to curtail some operations because of ammunition shortages.Despite high expectations, the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the last quarter of the year did not result in rapid and wide-scale advances. Nonetheless, there were some critical developments. In mid-November the AFU took back some positions of the left bank of the Dnipro river in occupied Kherson oblast. Establishing bridgeheads there is a step toward being able to move forces and supplies across the river, thence to the south on a land route to Crimea. It also allows the AFU to better protect the residents of Kherson, who have been under relentless attack.Ukrainian forces also continued their successful attacks on Russian vessels in the Black Sea: 20 percent of the Russian Black Sea fleet was destroyed during the last four months of 2023, an important achievement for a country that is not a major naval power. On land, the Ukrainian army continued successful attacks on Russian military facilities in Crimea and other occupied territories, often using unmanned drones and missiles.President Zelensky and other top Ukrainian officials have attributed the lack of more impressive results from the counteroffensive to slow weapons deliveries, which gave the Russians time to build more fortifications and to mine territories densely. This was the opinion of Western military experts as well. Ultimately, the situation pushed the army chiefs to change tactics and emphasize building defense fortifications. At the same time, the AFU did not retreat, despite unprecedented pressure from Russian forces along the front line. Overall, the counteroffensive was successful in many respects: Russian casualties mounted, and the AFRF failed to advance, despite strenuous efforts. According to the AFU General Staff, from the start of the invasion to the end of 2023, the Russian army lost over 360,000 soldiers, thousands of tanks and combat vehicles, and hundreds of aircraft and helicopters. The figure on human losses is close to the UK's intelligence bureau's assessment. Spokesperson for Ukraine's military intelligence agency Andrii Yusov said in mid-December that around 450,000 Russian troops were deployed in Ukraine, many fewer than the 617,000 that Vladimir Putin claimed.Ukraine's commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, warned about the risk of a positional war, "where both sides are dug in and not moving much." To avoid such a deadlock and return to a war of maneuvers, he said, Ukraine would need additional weapons.POW ExchangesDuring the last quarter of the year, there was little public information about POW exchanges. In mid-November, Kyiv blamed Moscow for halting the exchanges and blocking negotiations over POWs. The previous exchange had taken place on August 7, when twenty-two Ukrainians returned home. In early December, President Zelensky said exchanges were happening without public announcements, while recognizing that Russia was throwing up barriers to the exchanges. In some cases, POW exchanges were occurring right on the battlefields. As of mid-November, according to official data, 4,337 Ukrainians were imprisoned in Russia, including 3,574 military personnel. The actual number of Ukrainian civilians imprisoned in Russia, according to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, may reach 25,000.Russian Disinformation Campaigns and CyberattacksRussia's disinformation campaign in Ukraine during the quarter including disseminating deep-fake videos featuring the Ukrainian army's commander-in-chief, fake stories about political and army leaders, and lies about Russian forces' success on the battlefield. Russia has also continued its anti-Ukrainian information campaigns in other countries, especially Poland. These disinformation efforts are designed to spread mistrust of Ukrainians and of Ukraine's reasons for fighting, and to decrease support. On December 12, one of the biggest Ukrainian mobile operators, Kyivstar, which provided cellular connection for 25 million customers and broadband internet connection for one million, came under a cyberattack that resulted in the total suspension of services for a few days. Earlier, in October, a court in Kyiv had seized the corporate rights in Kyivstar of three sanctioned businessmen, including the Russian oligarch Mikhail Fridman, in part to prevent them from setting up dummy corporations and moving assets there. Kyivstar was part of a larger holding group controlling similar businesses in Russia. The Russian hacking group Solntsepek claimed responsibility for the attack, but the company and Ukrainian officials said the hackers overstated their achievements, and SBU cybersecurity department head Ilya Vitiuk thought it was more likely the work of the Russian military intelligence unit Sandworm. In an interview with Reuters, Vitiuk expressed concern that the hackers had been inside Kyivstar at least since May. A big Ukrainian bank came under cyberattack at the same time as well. More than 4,000 cyberattacks have been reported since the invasion, which is three times the frequency of such attacks before the war began. Russia's Position on the WarThe Kremlin continued denying chances for the Ukrainian peace formula and said there was no basis for bilateral peace negotiations. The Kremlin has not changed its narrative on the targets of the war against Ukraine, which abounds in falsehoods and manipulative statements. Putin continues asserting that Russia did not start the war in Ukraine and expounding on the need to consider how to stop "the tragedy" in Ukraine. Russia has seen more of its armory and vehicles destroyed than it likely anticipated, but it relies on the West's potential fatigue in supporting Ukraine when spreading misinformation about Ukraine in Western countries. Attacks on Critical InfrastructureIn the fourth quarter, Ukraine did not face massive damage to the energy infrastructure. This could have resulted either from an effective air defense or from Russia not yet starting its expected winter assaults on the energy system. Still, there were numerous attacks on the power grid as early as November, and some energy assets were damaged by shelling and air strikes. Among them were power plants, coal mines, oil refineries, and fuel depots. One of the thermal power plants located close to the front was shelled ten times in two months. Some other critical infrastructure facilities also came under attack during the fourth quarter, including river port infrastructure and shipyard and railway facilities. Nonetheless, the scale of the damage was much less than in the fourth quarter of 2022. Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureAt the end of the year, Russians resumed massive drone and missile strikes on civil and critical infrastructure, hitting a record of such attacks in late December. Kyiv was a key target. Russia continued attacking civil infrastructure, including residential buildings, killing and wounding civilians. Among these were grain storage facilities, postal service infrastructure, kindergarten, the Odesa Fine Arts Museum, river and seaport infrastructure, foreign civil cargo ships, medical institutions, and so on.Numerous civilians have been killed or wounded in these attacks. A particularly heinous attack on a café hosting a funeral reception in Kharkiv oblast that resulted in the deaths of fifty-nine civilians became the biggest crime against civilians in the region. On December 29, Russia launched wide-scale missile and drone attacks that resulted in the largest number of civilians killed and injured in Kyiv since the start of invasion. Russia continued such attacks in the following days, some of which were on the same massive scale. Many residential buildings were damaged during attacks at the end of the year. Kyiv officially confirmed the unlawful deportation of almost 20,000 Ukrainian children since the start of the war. Thousands have been taken to Belarus. Fewer than 400 children had been returned as of the end of the year, in some cases through the efforts of parents and family. During the last quarter of the year the media reported fewer than twenty children returned. Analysts assess that over 8,300 Ukrainian children taken to Russia in 2023 had been sent to "reeducation camps."2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSA key issue in foreign affairs in the fourth quarter was the uncertainty of international military aid to Ukraine at the level the country needs to withstand Russia's attacks. The concern arose mostly because of internal U.S. politicking and the corresponding delay in providing new aid packages. Another factor was the rise of populist parties in parliamentary elections in some European states. Most of these populist parties, including those in Slovakia and the Netherlands, are against providing further aid to Ukraine. News that the EU was behind schedule in supplying artillery rounds did not give grounds for optimism. These various factors combined meant a critical drop in aid: between August and October, the amount of newly committed aid to Ukraine decreased by 87 percent compared to the same period in 2022.At the same time, the leaders of some European states and the EU itself declared themselves ready to continue supporting Ukraine. European leaders warned that Ukraine's defeat would mean serious damage to the project of United Europe and that Russia would be on the EU's doorstep and would later move forward with war against other European states, as it has threatened.In the larger picture, Ukraine's inability to defend itself would mean democracy losing to tyranny. A door would open for a global parade of more powerful states annexing less powerful neighbors, and war-oriented Russia would have more resources to conduct war in the future. Prominent Western media have also spoken out on the necessity of providing support to Ukraine. A Financial Times article described the humanitarian disaster that would occur should Russia win, and an editorial in Bloomberg called on Western governments to continue supporting Ukraine.President Zelensky's Diplomatic ToursIn the last quarter of the year, President Zelensky made a few visits to allies and partner countries. In early October, he visited Spainto attend the European Political Community Summit, a forum of more than forty countries established after Russia's invasion to cope with critical challenges and threats, including Russia's war in Ukraine. At the summit, he met with Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez and Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni to discuss new military aid packages. He met the Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan for the first time ever, as Russia-Armenia relations had cooled after another Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in September 2023. In September, Armenia provided Ukraine with humanitarian aid for the first time since the full-scale invasion, and in late October, Armenia participated in Ukraine's Peace Formula summit for the first time.On October 10, President Zelensky visited Romania to meet his counterpart, Klaus Iohannis, to discuss Black Sea regional security and the transit of Ukrainian grain, an issue that has prompted some harsh tit-for-tat threats in the past. The two presidents signed a joint declaration on bilateral cooperation, including on such matters as security, Ukrainian grain exports, promoting the Ukrainian Peace Formula, and others matters related to Ukraine's defense. The next day Zelensky made an unannounced visit to Brussels to attend a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Council and a meeting of NATO defense ministers in the Ramstein Format, a group of more than fifty countries organized to provide collective support to Ukraine. The key topic during the meetings was providing weapons and air defense systems before the winter. The UK and Norway agreed to address strengthening security in the Black Sea region, and France and Germany committed to leading a new ground-based air defense coalition. In December, President Zelensky visitedArgentina to attend the inauguration of the country's president-elect, Javier Milei, who has expressed support for Ukraine in Russia's war. He also met with the leaders of a few other South American states. Following this trip, he visited the United States to meet with President Biden and address U.S. senators to enlist further U.S. support for Ukraine in the war against Russia. Zelensky then made a surprise visit to Germany and later Norway to attend the Nordic States summit. The Nordic leaders committed to supporting Ukraine "for as long as it takes."United StatesThe key feature of U.S.-Ukraine relations in the last quarter of the year was uncertainty over future U.S. aid to Ukraine. Internal U.S. politicking has resulted in deferred agreement on the U.S. federal budget for 2024, and the precipitous start of Israel's war with Hamas has confounded any consideration of aid to Ukraine as a stand-alone issue. The Ukraine aid fund was expected to run out by the end of the year.Relations with the EU and European StatesOn November 8 the European Commission adopted the 2023 Enlargement package, which recommended inviting Kyiv to start talks on Ukraine's accession to the EU. The decision was based on an assessment of Ukraine's progress toward reforms in different areas, as detailed in a separate report. According to the report, Ukraine had taken the necessary steps and fulfilled its commitments sufficiently to be ready for negotiations. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, called this "excellent progress." On December 14 the European Council agreed to open Ukraine membership talks, even though Hungary and Austria expressed an intent to vote against Ukraine's membership.Most of the European states continued supporting Ukraine. Germany remained among the largest supporters and aid providers, with a few packages of aid provided in the last quarter of the year. Among other articles, Germany supplied some air defense systems that are crucial during the winter to protect critical infrastructure against Russian missile strikes and bombings. Ukraine and Germany agreed on a joint venture to produce armored military vehicles in Ukraine. Berlin made available funds to restore and support the Ukrainian power system before the winter. German chancellor Olaf Scholz called on the country to be prepared to increase its support for Ukraine "when others are faltering."As expected, parliamentary elections in Slovakia were won by Robert Fico, who had promised to end military support for Ukraine should he prevail. Immediately after the elections, Slovakia halted its military aid to Ukraine, and, after being appointed prime minister, Fico confirmed this decision and canceled previously approved aid packages. Fico took the position that the war was a "frozen conflict" and Kyiv and Moscow needed to negotiate. However, he confirmed his intention to continue supplying humanitarian aid.The pro-Russia Fico had held anti-Ukrainian views before the election. The newly appointed country's foreign affairs minister, Juraj Blanár, in the past was known for purveying misinformation about Ukraine and repeating Russia's propaganda narratives. Bilateral relations between Slovakia and Ukraine are likely to become strained in the near future. In October, Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte visited Ukraine, promising to supply extra Patriot missiles before the winter, along with another aid package announced shortly before. Another prominent event happened in early December when the Netherlands finally returned to Ukraine some ancient Scythian artifacts the country had held on to for almost ten years. These items had previously been kept in Crimea before being sent out for exhibition. When Russia annexed Crimea, it also claimed ownership of the artifacts. In June 2023 a Dutch court ruled the gold treasures should go to Ukraine, not Crimea. In late December, the Netherlands started preparing F-16 fighter jets to be delivered to Ukraine.The Netherlands is among Ukraine's most significant military aid providers and is committed to continuing support in 2024. But there is a risk of a Slovakia-style development: in November a far-right politician, Geert Wilders, whose platform included halting support for Ukraine, unexpectedlywon parliamentary elections. Wilders's party, which was anti-Ukrainian ten years ago, will not have a majority, so the future country's policy toward Ukraine may depend on what kind of political coalition gets put together.Relations with Hungary remained strained. There was little progress in solving the agriculture export ban other than a waiver for sugar. Budapest continued creating obstacles within the EU to the vote granting Ukraine support, and the country's prime minister, Viktor Orbán, personally criticized providing aid to Ukraine. Hungary threatened to block EU accession negotiations with Kyiv and even filed a corresponding claim with the European Commission. Prime Minister Orbán, who has maintained ties with Moscow despite the EU's policy, said Kyiv was not ready to begin EU accession negotiations. Ukraine's EU membership aspirations do not coincide with Hungary's national interests, he said. Orbán might take the desire of most EU member states to support Ukraine as an opportunity to negotiate more for Hungary, both from the EU and from Ukraine. Budapest demands that Ukraine amend its law on education, and Kyiv says it is ready to do so. Kyiv's position is to negotiate with countries whose minorities live in Ukraine, to fulfill the European criteria, but without making special exceptions for any minority.Despite the threats, Hungary did not veto the vote on starting Ukraine-EU membership negotiations, but on the same day it blocked the EU's decision for €50 billion in long-term aid for Ukraine. Romania became a more important partner of Ukraine, and bilateral relations grew thicker in the fourth quarter. President Zelensky visited Bucharest and signed a bilateral memorandum of cooperation with his Romanian counterpart. Romania continued taking steps to expand Ukrainian agricultural transit, which faced a potential blockade by some other neighboring states. The two countries settled the dispute over the construction of a deep-water navigation route, in which Bucharest had accused Kyiv of violating environmental standards. Bucharest welcomed amendments to the Ukrainian law on national minorities and Kyiv's decision not to use the term "Moldovan language."The concept of the "Moldovan language" was established by Moscow when Moldova was one of the Soviet socialist republics; it is not recognized by Bucharest, despite the large number of Moldovan immigrants in Romania. The relationship between Romania and Moldova is long and complicated, and President Zelensky felt the language issue was of less importance in a time of war.After the dispute regarding agricultural exports and transit between Ukraine and Poland, top officials from both countries ratcheted down the tension in their public statements. The presidents of Ukraine and Poland reaffirmed good bilateral relations. Even as the agricultural dispute awaits an adequate resolution, however, a new one has cropped up: some Polish carriers started blocking border-crossing points with Ukraine (described below). The new Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, appointed in December, gives hope for better bilateral relations with fewer conflicts. A former president of the European Council and staunchly pro-Ukraine, Tusk has demanded full mobilization of the West to help Ukraine. Poland's new foreign affairs minister, Radosław Sikorski, paid his first official visit to Kyiv on December 22. Developments in Agricultural Exports DisputesThe dispute over agricultural exports with some neighboring countries was only partly solved. In early October, Kyiv suspended its complaints to the World Trade Organization against Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, anticipating that a constructive attitude would work better toward finding a solution. During the dispute, most of the overland grain exports, 60 percent, were rerouted through Romania. Increased deliveries through Moldova also became part of the solution. In mid-October the Romanian government approved an import permit system to protect local farmers. In late November, Ukraine and Bulgaria approved a joint mechanism for agrarian exports that would avoid market distortions in the countries of transit, which feared lower prices for their own products.At the same time, the new Slovak government announced its intention to extend the ban on the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products beyond the time permitted by the EU, which ended September 15. Slovakia also added to the list of agricultural products banned for transit. The Hungarian government amended its own ban to allow sugar imports, as the country intensely depends on imports. These unilateral country bans are against EU regulations, which maintain federated oversight of product transit.Carriers' Strike and Blockade of Border-Crossing PointsIn November, Polish haulers started a protest and a blockade of Ukraine border crossings. Later, some carriers from Slovakia occasionally joined them. Because Ukraine suffers from lack of transportation capabilities through the Black Sea, the blockade created huge lines of thousands of vehicles at the borders and complicated the transportation of goods from and to Ukraine, including military aid. The Polish strikers demanded the restoration of permits for Ukrainian carriers, a ban on the issuance of licenses to non-EU transport companies, and a waiver for empty Polish trucks to register with the Ukrainian electronic queue when returning to Poland from Ukraine. Kyiv argued that restoration of the permits is impossible as in 2022, Ukraine and the EU signed an Agreement on the Carriage of Freight by Road that stipulates bilateral and transit traffic without permits. A representative of the European Commission called the blockade "unacceptable." One of the organizers of the protest is Rafal Mekler, a member of the Polish far-right National Movement Party, also known as the Confederation party, which is skeptical toward the EU and less friendly toward Ukraine. For this reason, some believe the transport blockade was politically inspired. Despite the agreement of representatives of Ukraine and Poland on an action plan to unblock the border and the participation of the European Commission, the dispute had not been resolved as of the end of the year. The next step is agreement at the ministry level.Ukrainian Peace Formula DevelopmentsIn late October, Malta hosted a meeting of representatives of sixty-five states to discuss the implementation of the Ukrainian peace formula. The meeting was focused on nuclear safety, energy, and food security, the liberation of POWs and deported persons, and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity.3. INTERNAL AFFAIRSThe Economic SituationAccording to the IMF's assessments, in 2023 the Ukrainian economy grew faster than expected. Annual growth is expected to come to 4.5 percent, compared to the 1−3 percent previously forecasted. But high growth rates cannot be guaranteed for the future, as the prospects of export capacities in the next year are unclear. Economic growth will also depend on the continued provision of aid, and that is also obscure. In early October the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) suspended the fixed exchange rate regime and introduced a flexible one. Despite concerns, the national currency rate remained stable, though it started weakening a little toward the end of the year. Naturally, the strength of the national currency in the current circumstances is deeply dependent on international aid. Later, the NBU also lifted all restrictions on sales of foreign currencies to the public. The NBU also decreased a key policy rate twice in the last quarter of 2023 after a two-stage decrease earlier in the year. This was possible because inflation was low—just 5.1 percent in November.At the end of the year, parliament approved the state budget for 2024, which is oriented toward strengthening the army but has a huge deficit: expenditures are expected to be almost double revenues. Likely as a result of this situation, parliament passed some laws stipulating steps that may increase budget incomes or funds to finance the army. These are laws on resuming tax inspections for businesses and on raising the tax rate for banks to 50 percent. A Focus Ukraine (Kennan) piece on Ukraine's budget for 2024 is available here.On December 11, the IMF approved releasing the third tranche of Extended Fund Facility funds, about U.S. $900 million, to Ukraine. Ukraine needs financing, but at the same time, there are risks to deepening the loan burden. The IMF expects Ukraine's public debt to exceed 100 percent of GDP in two years.The Energy SituationDuring the summer, the energy companies undertook major maintenance campaigns to restore capacities before the winter and the anticipated onslaught of Russian air attacks. As of October, available power generation and transmission capacities, together with electricity import capacities, could barely cover peak demand. In November the power system started experiencing a deficit such that Ukraine had to rely on electricity imports, chiefly from Romania and Poland, to meet demand. At the same time, price regulations restricted commercial imports, and the power system had to turn to technical emergency assistance, which is a specific import but usually more expensive, and without predictable availability. Government ReshufflesIn early November, Ukraine's Youth and Sports Minister Vadym Gutzeit submitted his resignation, which parliament later approved. Some civil actors had criticized Gutzeit's efficacy as a minister and were concerned about allegations of his possible involvement in embezzlement of state funds before becoming minister, although his attorney said he was not a suspect and no charges had been brought against him. Gutzeit was succeeded by his vice-deputy as acting minister, while Gutzeit himself continues in his role as head of Ukraine's National Olympic Committee. 4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIESImportant Legislative ChangesIn the fourth quarter of 2024, parliament passed some important initiatives. In December the Verkhovna Rada legalized medical cannabis. In addition, parliament amended the law on minorities to be in accord with the Council of Europe's recommendations, which was a part of Ukraine's obligations on its path to European integration. The amendments broaden the use of EU languages, including in an educational context, while requiring the study of Ukrainian as a state language; the minority languages affected are chiefly Romanian and Hungarian. Two other laws that parliament passed as part of the EU integration commitments deal with battling corruption. Both laws expand the capacities of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and the National Corruption Prevention Agency. The president of the European Commission positively assessed these legislative changes well.Successful Completion of Synchronization of Ukrainian and European Power SystemsOn November 28 the Continental European TSOs (transmission service operators), a regional group of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E), said that the Ukrainian transmission system operator, Ukrenergo, had achieved compliance with the key technical requirements necessary to enable a permanent interconnection between the power systems of continental Europe and Ukraine. The process formally started in 2017, when Ukrenergo and ENTSO-E signed a roadmap for integrating the Ukrainian power system into the electricity system of continental Europe. In addition, the continental European TSOs have decided to increase the capacity limit for electricity trade from continental Europe to Ukraine and Moldova to 1,700 megawatts, based on system security and the results of stability simulations, reflecting an increase of 500 MW from the previous limit.Based on this compliance, on December 14, ENTSO-E accepted Ukrenergo as the fortieth member of the association as of January 1, 2024. This means that the Ukrainian power system has become an integral part of the European system, and Ukrenergo will have equal rights with the European TSOs. The next stage is market coupling, which requires full unification of Ukrainian energy market regulation with the European set of regulations. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

Russia's war against Ukraine has brought back to the spotlight the question of China's (officially the People's Republic of China, PRC) potential attack on Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC). Beijing claims that the island is one of its provinces, whereas the current Taiwanese government maintains that it is already an independent country. A conflict over Taiwan – or even a Chinese blockade of the island – would have immediate economic and political implications for Europe which will likely impose sanctions on the PRC, the EU's second-largest trading partner.[1] The EU is not a security actor in East Asia, but has some formidable – and unique – soft power assets that could be leveraged to promote dialogue and understanding between China and Taiwan, with the objective of reducing tensions in the area and maintaining the status quo.In search of a thaw in Cross-Strait relations
Cross-Strait relations – the relations between the PRC and ROC – have worsened in recent years.[2] Official lines of communication have been interrupted. Travel links between the two countries were frequent before the Covid-19 pandemic era – but no longer. Many Taiwanese are now avoiding the mainland, though they can still enter there by showing their identity card (the Taiwanese passport is not recognised by the PRC), while for many Chinese citizens it is almost impossible to travel to Taiwan for work, study or even tourism. A wall has been erected between the two sides, and each blames the other for this situation.
On 20 May 2024, Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, who won the presidential election in January, will inaugurate his Presidency. As a member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and vice-president under Tsai Ing-wen – the first female president of the country in power from 2016 to 2024 – Lai is known for his pro-independence stance. No wonder that his election has been met with uneasiness by Chinese leaders who were betting on the victory of the Kuomintang (KMT – or Guomindang, the Chinese Nationalist Party), a conservative party whose origin goes back to the establishment of the ROC and that traditionally seeks to promote dialogue and reconciliation with the mainland.
In the last parliamentary elections also held in January, the KMT won 52 seats, making it the largest single party in the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan's Parliament). The DPP, having won 51 seats, declined to the second largest party while the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) – a recently created centre-left political force – ranked third with eight seats. In other words, while DPP candidate William Lai won the presidential race, his party failed to obtain the majority in a Parliament now controlled by the opposition. Thus, many analysts have suggested that while the Taiwanese continue to support the DPP pro-independence position, they also want to de-escalate tensions with China – hence the slight majority given to the KMT.[3]
On the other side of the Strait, the PRC's leadership seems to recognise that it can no longer use economics to bring about unification and that the so-called 'one country, two systems' approach, after its failure in Hong Kong and the clear hostility toward it in Taiwan, no longer works. Although the possibility of an invasion of the island remains, it entails serious risks for the Chinese leadership, as the US and its allies would likely impose harsh sanctions on China. An economic downturn would undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly among the urban middle classes: having enjoyed rising standards of living in recent decades, the latter have then become the staunchest supporters of the Chinese regime – but they have much to lose from a war. The survival of the party is the top priority in Beijing, thus reunification with Taiwan by force can wait for the moment. In the meantime, President Xi Jinping has allegedly tasked Wang Huning, a member of the powerful CCP Politburo Standing Committee and the CCP's 'chief ideologue' as well as China's most senior official in charge of Taiwan's policy, to come up with a new framework for unification.[4]
A new CCP approach to Taiwan seems to be emerging, one that emphasises "shared roots" – as seen during the meeting between Xi and former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou on 10 April 2024. On that occasion, Xi declared that "nobody can stop family reunion" with Taiwan, highlighting the importance of common history and culture between the two sides.[5] A similar tone was used at the end of April, when a delegation of 17 KMT lawmakers went to Beijing to meet Wang Huning in what was called an "ice breaker trip".[6] Yet, during the discussions between the two sides, more than 30 People's Liberation Army military aircraft were detected near Taiwan – one of the highest daily incursions in 2024, signalling that Beijing, while wanting to reset ties with Taiwan, continues however to maintain pressure over the island.
In the current tense situation, it is not only the KMT which seeks dialogue with Beijing. President Lai has also repeatedly expressed his hope to re-establish communication with Beijing, based on equality and mutual respect. During the electoral campaign, Lai even said he hoped to meet with Xi Jinping over beef noodles and bubble tea.[7]
As both China and Taiwan seek a thaw in their bilateral relations, it could be a perfect time for the EU to step up its involvement in Cross-Strait affairs to see whether dialogue and understanding can be increased, and tensions defused. The EU is not perceived as a threatening force and its image in East Asia is that of, mainly, a civilian and soft power actor. The EU could thus act as a facilitator of dialogue in a way that other major players cannot.Think trilateral: China-EU-Taiwan
European governments continue to officially abide by the "One China" policy – that is, the acknowledgement of Beijing's position that there is only one Chinese government. Under this policy, the EU and its member states recognise and have formal ties with the PRC rather than Taiwan. In practice, however, EU institutions and European governments are treating Taiwan as a "de facto" independent state with which they are entitled to entertain economic and political relations.[8]
The European Parliament is leading efforts aimed at upgrading relations with Taiwan. In December 2023, EU lawmakers unanimously passed a resolution on promoting EU-Taiwan trade and investment ties, calling for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo by force.[9] European lawmakers – both at the national and EU levels – continue to travel to the island to show support for Taiwan. Many EU member states regularly send government delegations notwithstanding criticism from Beijing.
The Europeans, however, tend to avoid being confrontational vis-à-vis Beijing when it comes to Taiwan, contrary to the United States which does not shy away from openly provoking China. The EU has little real leverage on both Beijing and Washington regarding Cross-Strait relations. While the maintenance of the status-quo is in the long-term interest of the EU, the defence of the island from an attack – or blockade – from the mainland is left to the care of the US and its Asian allies. What the EU can instead do is to leverage its soft power assets in the region.
The Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence scattered in many countries, including in China and Taiwan, are an asset that Brussels could use to promote dialogue and understanding between the two sides of the Strait. These centres are focal points of competence and knowledge on EU issues.[10] Managed by the European Commission, but with close links with the EU Delegation in the host country, they aim to promote knowledge of the EU, its policies and values, through academic research, partnerships and programmes of public activities. Until last year, Chinese and Taiwanese scholars working at the Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence in their respective countries regularly met to discuss – using the Chinese language – issues related to the EU, its history of reconciliation and the process of European integration. This year, due to heightened tensions, no such meeting is planned. It would be in the strategic interest of the EU to step in and facilitate such a meeting among EU experts located on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. And should such meeting be impossible to be held in either China or Taiwan for political reasons, the EU should offer to host it in Singapore, where there is a very active EU Centre.
It would not be the first time that the EU Centres would be leveraged by the EU to promote the reasons of dialogue and mutual understanding in the region. For instance, the EU delegation in Seoul has consistently backed the Trilateral Cooperation process, a consultative mechanism which involves China-Japan-South Korea, by supporting, both politically and financially, various workshops and initiatives organised for young students with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and the sense of friendship among future leaders of the three countries. These activities are often supported by – and held at – the Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence located in the three North-East Asian nations.
Recent developments inside China and Taiwan should thus invite the EU to consider doing something similar in the context of Cross-Strait relations. The EU should seriously start thinking 'trilateral': China-EU-Taiwan, finding ways to facilitate dialogue between Chinese and Taiwanese experts of the EU. A concrete step in this direction could be the establishment of a Think Tank Forum on China-EU-Taiwan relations. By keeping it at the level of scholars and by focusing on EU studies (avoiding, at least officially, sensitive issues) it may overcome resistance from various quarters. By doing that, the EU would make strategic use of some of its soft power capabilities. With little investment in terms of time and resources, it may contribute to dialogue and understanding in a region where, should tensions spiral out of control, the result could be very damaging not only for the EU, but for the entire world.Nicola Casarini is Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Taiwan Fellowship Program Visiting Scholar at the EU Centre, National Taiwan University, Taipei.[1] Niklas Swanström, Agust Börjesson and Yi-Chieh Chen (eds), "Why Taiwan Matters to Europe", in ISDP Special Papers, May 2024, https://www.isdp.eu/publication/why-taiwan-matters-to-europe.[2] Lindsay Maizland, "Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense", in CFR Backgrounders, 8 February 2024, https://www.cfr.org/node/227980.[3] Brian Hart et al., "Taiwan's 2024 Elections: Results and Implications", in CSIS Critical Questions, 19 January 2024, https://www.csis.org/node/108968.[4] John Dotson, "Wang Huning's First Year Supervising the United Front System: Taiwan Policy and Discourse", in Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 2024), p. 8-11, https://globaltaiwan.org/?p=25078.[5] "China's Xi Says Nobody Can Stop 'Family Reunion' with Taiwan", in Reuters, 10 April 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-president-xi-meets-former-taiwan-president-ma-beijing-2024-04-10.[6] "KMT Lawmakers' Trip to China Receives Mixed Responses in Taiwan", in Focus Taiwan, 29 April 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202404290022.[7] Courtney Donovan Smith, "Could China Employ an Insidious Boiled Frog Approach to Improve Taiwan Ties?", in Taipei Times, 14 May 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2024/05/14/2003817824.[8] Nicola Casarini, "Brussels–Taipei: Changing the Game?", in IAI Commentaries, No. 22|43 (September 2022), p. 1, https://www.iai.it/en/node/16049.[9] European Parliament, Resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Relations, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0472_EN.html.[10] For more information see the Erasmus+ website: Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence, https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/node/515.

This article was co-published with the Guardian.Nine of the 12 members of a high-level congressional committee charged with advising on the U.S.'s nuclear weapons strategy have direct financial ties to contractors that would benefit from the report's recommendations or are employed at think tanks that receive considerable funding from weapons manufacturers, the Guardian and Responsible Statecraft can reveal.While the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (CCSPUS) purports to recommend steps to avoid nuclear conflict, it does nothing to disclose its own potential conflicts of interest with the weapons industry in its final report or at rollout events at think tanks in Washington.The United States will soon face "a world where two nations [China and Russia] possess nuclear arsenals on par with our own," warned the commission's final report, released in mid-October. "In addition," the report charged, "the risk of conflict with these two nuclear peers is increasing. It is an existential challenge for which the United States is ill-prepared."According to the CCSPUS, this potential doomsday scenario requires the U.S. to make "necessary adjustments to the posture of US nuclear capabilities – in size and/or composition," a policy shift that would steer billions of taxpayer dollars to the Pentagon and nuclear weapons contractors."What we've consistently seen is the nuclear weapons industry buying influence and that means we cannot make serious decisions about our security when the industry is buying influence through think tanks and commissioners they are skewing the debate," said Susi Snyder, program coordinator at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons."Instead of having a debate about the tools and materials we need to make ourselves safe," she added, "we're having a debate about which company should get the contracts. And that doesn't make the American people safe or anyone else in the world."The CCSPUS was established two years ago via the annual defense policy bill, and conflicts of interest on the commission were apparent from the beginning. But an analysis by the Guardian and Responsible Statecraft found deep ties between the commission and the weapons industry.The most recognizable member of the CCSPUS is its vice-chair, Jon Kyl, who served as a senator from Arizona from 1995 to 2013 and again in 2018, after the death of John McCain. While this, and more, is included in his biography in the commission's report, what's left out is his more recent employment as a senior adviser with the law firm Covington & Burling, whose lobbying client list includes multiple Pentagon contractors that would benefit from the commission's recommendations.In 2017 Kyl, personally, was registered to lobby for Northrop Grumman, which manufactures the B-21 nuclear bomber that the commission recommends increasing the number the U.S. plans to buy, at a cost to taxpayers of nearly $700 million each.Kyl did not respond to questions about his employment status with Covington & Burling, but the former senator was listed as a "senior adviser" on the firm's website until at least December 1, 2022, nearly 10 months after the commissioner selections for the CCSPUS were announced in March 2022.Another commissioner, Franklin Miller, is a principal at the Scowcroft Group, a business advisory firm that describes Miller as having expertise in "nuclear deterrence," and acknowledges its work in the weapons sector."The Scowcroft Group successfully advised a European defense leader on a strategic acquisition opportunity," says the consulting firm in the "Defense/Aerospace" section of its website. "We have also assisted a major defense firm in pursuing global partnerships and co-production opportunities."Miller did not respond to a request for comment about the identity of the Scowcroft Group's clients.Kyl and Miller are joined on the CCSPUS by retired general John E Hyten, who previously served as the vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the second-highest-ranking member of the U.S. military.While Hyten's biography in the commission's report lauds his extensive military service, in retirement he has worked closely with a number of firms that could benefit immensely from the commission's recommendations.This March he was appointed as special adviser to the CEO of C3 AI, an artificial intelligence company that boasts of working with numerous agencies at the Department of Defense. In June 2022, Hyten was named executive director of the Blue Origins foundation, called the Club for the Future, and as a strategic adviser to Blue Origin's senior leadership. Blue Origin is wholly owned by Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, and works directly with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the air force and the space force on space launch-related capabilities.Hyten's ties to these firms are notable given the CCSPUS report's repeated overtures for improving and investing in space and artificial intelligence capabilities. Specifically, the report recommends the United States "urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture" and take steps to ensure it is "at the cutting edge of emerging technologies – such as big data analytics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI)."Hyten did not respond to a request for comment.The CCSPUS also included think tank scholars whose employers receive significant funding from the arms industry. Two commission members work at the Hudson Institute, which, according to its most recent annual report, received in excess of $500,000 from Pentagon contractors in 2022. This includes six-figure donations from some of the Pentagon's top contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems.On Monday, October 23, the Hudson Institute held an event to highlight the CCSPUS's report that included the two Hudson Institute employees who also served as commissioners. The event unabashedly promoted recommendations from the report that would be a financial windfall for Hudson's funders. The landing page for the event features a photo of a B-21 stealth bomber, the same photo used in the commission report that also recommended that the U.S. strategic nuclear posture be modified to "increase the planned number of B-21 bombers and tankers an expanded force would require."Neither at the event nor in the report is it noted that the plane's manufacturer, Northrop Grumman, is in the Hudson Institute's highest donor tier, contributing in excess of $100,000 in 2022.The Hudson Institute staff who served as commissioners did not respond to requests for comment.Another commissioner, Matthew Kroenig, is a vice-president at the Atlantic Council, a prominent DC think tank which, according to the organization's most recent annual report, is funded by several top Pentagon contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon (now RTX), General Atomics, Saab and GM Defense. The Atlantic Council also receives more than $1 million a year directly from the Department of Defense and between $250,000 and $499,999 from the Department of Energy, which helps manage the nation's nuclear arsenal.These seeming conflicts of interest were not mentioned at any point in the CCSPUS's report or at an Atlantic Council event promoting the report and featuring the same photo of the B-21 used by the Hudson Institute and the commission.Kroenig did not respond to a request for comment.Even commissioners whose careers had included positions that were notably critical of nuclear weapons had recently established ties with firms that profit from the nuclear and conventional weapons industry.Commissioner Lisa Gordon-Hagerty worked for years at the pinnacle of nuclear weapons policy in the U.S., including positions on the national security council, the U.S. House of Representatives and the Department of Energy. She was also the director of the Federation of American Scientists, a non-profit organization known for advocating for reductions in nuclear weapons globally. Her last government position prior to joining the commission was serving as the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is responsible for military applications of nuclear science. She resigned from the post in 2020, allegedly after heated disagreements with the secretary of energy, who tried to cut NNSA funding.While much of her career is mentioned in the commission report, what's left out is that Gordon-Hagerty has also been cashing in on her nuclear expertise. After leaving the NNSA, in 2021 she joined the board and became director of strategic programs at Westinghouse Government Services, a nuclear weapons contractor that has been paid hundreds of millions of dollars for work with the Department of Defense and Department of Energy.Gordon-Hagerty did not respond to a request for comment.Like Gordon-Hagerty, fellow commissioner Leonor Tomero had a distinguished career at the highest levels of nuclear weapons policy. According to her bio in the commission report, she was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy and served for over a decade on the House Armed Services Committee as counsel and strategic forces subcommittee staff lead, where her portfolio included the establishment of the U.S. space force, nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear cleanup, arms control and missile defense.Outside government, Tomero was Director of Nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, an organization that has repeatedly called for reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Tomero is also on the board of the Council for a Livable World, which explicitly states that its goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons.Yet, in September, Tomero became a vice president of government Relations at JA Green & Company, a lobbying firm whose client list includes a host of military contractors that could see revenues soar if the CCSPUS's recommendations are adopted. Space X, for example — which pays $50,000 every three months to JA Green for lobbying related to "issues related to national security space launch" — would probably benefit mightily from the commission recommendation that "the United States urgently deploy a more resilient space architecture and adopt a strategy that includes both offensive and defensive elements to ensure US access to and operations in space.""No clients of JA Green & Company sought to influence the work of the Commission or the Commission's recommendations in any way," said Jeffrey A Green, president of JA Green, in an email. "We follow all applicable ethics rules and there are no conflicts of interest."None of the potential conflicts of interest between commissioners' financial interests and the policy proposals laid out in their final report were disclosed by the CCSPUS itself within its final report or at any public event highlighting its findings.While many commissioners did not respond to requests for comment, the commission's executive director, William A Chambers, provided a statement on behalf of the CCSPUS and its members."Members of [the commission] were chosen and appointed by Members of Congress based on their national recognition and significant depth of experience in such professions as governmental service, law enforcement, the Armed Forces, law, public administration, intelligence gathering, commerce, or foreign affairs," wrote Chambers. "Before they began performing their role as Commissioners, they were instructed on the ethics rules that govern congressional entities and were required to comply with rules set forth by the Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate and the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives."Chambers did not respond to a request for a copy of the ethics rules.But the opacity about potential conflicts of interest leaves some experts questioning the CCSPUS's recommendations."There's a huge argument raging over what is security, how much does it rely on transparency and, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons, there is a call for greater transparency," said Snyder of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. "That light they're asking to shine on China, North Korea and Iran is a light they also need to shine on their own decision-making."

The arms control stability between Pakistan and India is currently on wobbly grounds due to the increasing development of modern weaponry in South Asia. The already tense situation is intensified by the arms race, as well as by the enforcement of provocative military strategies, actions and speeches.[1] In 2019, an attempted Indian surgical strike on Pakistan after the Pulwama attack[2] and annexation of Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian Union by annulling article 370 of the Indian constitution further heightened tensions between the two countries. There is a rising concern that issues such as Kashmir, cross-border terrorism and disputes over shared management of watercourses could escalate into a conventional or even a nuclear war.[3]
The modernisation of militaries and expansion of nuclear weapons arsenals seem to be a distinguishing feature of both countries, which is arguably the result of the mutual and wider regional threats that they perceive.[4] The emerging realities of competition between the US and China, and China and India, have made the strategic environment very complex,[5] which has diminished dramatically the prospects of arms control.[6] Indeed, China's rise fuels Indian insecurity, while, in turn, India's hegemonic goals and dominance make Pakistan insecure.[7] Amidst these tensions, in 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh clearly stated that Indian No First Use nuclear policy can change into First Use.[8]National interests and arms control
In the past, Pakistan offered many arms control proposals to India – for instance, the Regional Test Ban Agreement (1987) and a South Asia Zero Missile Zone (1994) – to halt the arms race in South Asia,[9] but New Delhi rejected them, mainly due to its quest for a regional and potentially global power status on an equal footing with China. The most significant proposals pertained to the non-deployment of ballistic missiles, the non-operationalisation of nuclear-capable missile systems and a suspension on the acquisition or deployment of anti-ballistic missiles systems.
Islamabad endorses arms control agreements because it is in the country's interest due to its fragile economy, which poses a challenge to addressing national security threats.[10] However, arms control at the regional level cannot be achieved without New Delhi's involvement. Indeed, Pakistan has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) because India has not signed it either.[11] In a similar vein, Pakistan has not supported the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) because it does not include existing fissile material stockpiles,[12] and India has more stockpiles than Pakistan.[13] Without the inclusion of existing fissile material, FMCT would go to Pakistan's detriment because it would increase the asymmetry with India.
In addition, due to great powers' strategic interests, India has been granted a unique position in the current nonproliferation regime,[14] having received a special waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008.[15] India is the only state in the world that is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is de facto recognised as a nuclear weapon state. India's special position arguably challenges the overall credibility of the nonproliferation regime.[16]
As mentioned, wider strategic interests have a great bearing on this situation. Indeed, India is a strategic partner of the US and a member – along with the US, Australia and Japan – of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue against China in the Asia-Pacific region. Besides this, India signed many military modernisation agreements with the US, such as the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). In fact, India's plan is to involve Russia and the US to modernise its military, in order to balance the growing military power of China and establish hegemony in South Asia.[17] Consequently, Pakistan needs to adopt measures in order to maintain strategic parity with India and prevent war in the region.[18]The challenges of modern technologies
There is a real risk of a nuclear-level escalation in South Asia due to the incorporation/inclusion of new and emerging technologies – including ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems and hypersonic missiles[19] – in the respective militaries of Pakistan and India. Recent developments in the domain of artificial intelligence (AI) may especially affect the strategic stability of the region. Pakistan and India, as well as China, are exploring the use of AI in areas of strategic importance, such as command and control, early-caution, BMD, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and electronic and cyber warfare. AI allows performing high-level computing tasks with speed and precision that cannot be accomplished through other sources.[20] A nontraditional attack in the form of a cyber-attack, or a conventional attack with AI integration in weapons, can damage the nuclear capabilities of a state by undermining the second-strike capability.[21] New technologies pose new threats: in 2019, for example, India's largest reactor Kudankulam faced a cyber-attack which led to the theft of data.[22]
Since developments in emerging technologies are very fast and it is very difficult to regulate these technologies due to their speed and efficacy,[23] the militarisation of AI would ultimately enhance the position of powerful states, with weaker states being at pains to seek parity with them. Widespread application of AI to military affairs would thus increase the imbalance between Pakistan and India (due to Indian heavy investment in AI) and could also hinder the prospects of arms control. India – the third-largest military spender in the world, with an allocation of 72.6 billion US dollars for defence for 2023–24[24] – is indeed investing a considerable amount of financial resources in AI. For example, New Delhi has imported technologies such as 100 Heron TPUAVs from Israel Aerospace Industries for the promotion of indigenous production in 2020.[25] Against this backdrop, Pakistan is also expanding its own military to enhance its security.[26]Looking ahead
Relations between Pakistan and India are currently characterised by mistrust, mutual threats, enmity and misperceptions. Therefore, there is an urgent need to find ways for arms control talks in order to regulate the nuclear behaviour of both countries. Both are developing countries and their economies are not as robust as those of the US and China; thus, arms control would play a vital role in reducing their defence budgets and enabling them to invest their financial resources in more pressing sectors, such as the energy one.
In the current scenario, great powers are unlikely to be able to play a leading role in arms control in South Asia: Russia is engaged in the war against Ukraine, while the US is focused on containing the emerging power of China through QUAD and AUKUS in the Asia Pacific. Hence, there is a pressing need for the governments of Pakistan and India and their political leaders to take the initiative and resume the peace negotiation process to limit the development of weapons and new military technologies. What is ultimately at stake is the peace and stability of South Asia.Sonia Naz is a Visiting Lecturer at the International Relations Department of the Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi.[1] Sitara Noor, "Strategic Stability in South Asia: The Evolving Challenges and Potential Opportunities for India and Pakistan", in Strategic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2023), p. 64-94, https://doi.org/10.53532/ss.043.01.00272.[2] On 14 February 2019, a 19-year-old young Kashmiri resident from the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK) blew himself up killing more than 40 personnel of India's Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Within hours, India blamed Jaish-e-Muhammad, a militant group banned in Pakistan, and accused Pakistan of harbouring the terrorists. Pakistan denied its involvement and offered full cooperation to investigate the incident and bring to justice the perpetrators of the suicide attack. See Adil Sultan, "Pulwama' Crisis: Causes, Implications, and Lessons for the Future", in Strafasia, 10 April, 2019, https://strafasia.com/pulwama-crisis-causes-implications-and-lessons-for-the-future.[3] Mario E. Carranza, India Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy. Constructivism and the Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament in South Asia, London, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.[4] Abeer Iftikhar Tahirkheli, "India's Strategic Force Modernization and Its Implications on Strategic Environment of Pakistan", in Strategic Thought, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2022), p. 155-171, https://strategicthought.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/view/83; Mario E. Carranza, India Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy, cit.[5] Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia. New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace, London/New York, Routledge, 2020.[6] Aamna Rafiq, "Militarisation of Artificial Intelligence and Future of Arms Control in South Asia", in Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Summer 2021), p. 49-52, https://issi.org.pk/?p=30770.[7] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Strategic Risk Management in Southern Asia", in Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2022), p. 369-393, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2136878.[8] Sudhi Ranjan Sen and Rezaul H Laskar, "Rajnath Singh's Hint on 'No First Use' Change Is Message to Pakistan", in The Hindustan Times, 16 June 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/story-kzEZhswPwx0dnPefQTkZ3L.html.[9] Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", in Naeem Salik (ed.), Nuclear Pakistan. Seeking Security and Stability, Lahore, University of Lahore Press, 2018, p. 152-153, https://ciss.org.pk/PDFs/Nuclear-Pakistan.pdf.[10] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Arms Control: Risk Reduction Measures Between India and Pakistan", in SASSU Research Papers, No. 1 (June 2005), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99910/RP%20No%2001.pdf; Iftikhar A. Qureshi and Hassan Jalil Shah, "Deteriorating Economic Conditions and Their Impact on National Security", in ISSRA Papers, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2019), p. 29-44, https://issrapapers.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/view/20.[11] Ibid.; Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", cit., p. 153-154.[12] Sannia Abdullah, "Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Regime", cit., p. 158-160.[13] Tom Z. Collina and Daniel Horner, "The South Asian Nuclear Balance: An Interview with Pakistani Ambassador to the CD Zamir Akram", in Arms Control Today, Vol. 41, No. 10 (December 2011), p. 8-13, https://www.armscontrol.org/node/5163.[14] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures", in Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2010), Article 8, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/8.[15] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Contemporary Nuclear Debates", in Naeem Salik (ed.), Nuclear Pakistan. Seeking Security and Stability, Lahore, University of Lahore Press, 2018, p. 229, https://ciss.org.pk/PDFs/Nuclear-Pakistan.pdf.[16] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control", cit., p. 13.[17] Mujib Mashal and Karan Deep Singh, "India and Russia Expand Defense Ties, Despite Prospect of U.S. Sanctions", in The New York Times, 6 December 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/world/asia/india-russia-missile-defense-deal.html.[18] Rizwana Abbasi and Zafar Khan, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia, cit.[19] Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "The Missile Race Is Destabilizing South Asia's Strategic Environment", in Arab News, 6 November 2021, https://arab.news/bk48s.[20] Sam Guthrie, "Conventional and Nuclear Applications of Artificial Intelligence: A Brief Examination of India and Pakistan", in Sam Dudin and Chelsey Wiley (eds), The 2019 UK PONI Papers, London, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), December 2019, p. 39-42, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep37409.10.[21] Abdul Moiz Khan, "Emerging Technologies and the Nuclear Responsibilities Approach", in BASIC Analysis, 14 February 2022, https://wp.me/p9AKJD-3IE.[22] Palwasha Khan, "Building a Bilateral Framework for Cyber Security in South Asia", in South Asian Voices, 12 November 2021, https://www.stimson.org/?p=48238.[23] Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, Emerging Technologies and their Impact on Strategic Stability in South Asia, ISSI Seminar Report, 12 March 2020, https://issi.org.pk/?p=25819.[24] Sitara Noor, "Strategic Stability in South Asia", cit., p. 75.[25] Aamna Rafiq, "Militarisation of Artificial Intelligence and Future of Arms Control in South Asia", cit., p. 54.[26] Feroz Hassan Khan, "Strategic Risk Management in Southern Asia", cit., p. 379-382.

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Mit der Verabschiedung der Agenda 2030 wurden im Jahr 2015 siebzehn Ziele für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung, die sogenannten Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), festgelegt. Da die SDGs auf alle Ebenen der Regierung anwendbar sind, bilden diese Ziele auch für Kommunen einen wichtigen Rahmen zur Orientierung. Eine nachhaltige Entwicklung gewinnt somit auch auf kommunaler Ebene zunehmend an Bedeutung. Dies zeigt sich unter anderem anhand des Engagements, das in vielen Kommunen zu erkennen ist. Durch die SDGs haben auch Kommunen einen strategischen Orientierungsrahmen und können konkrete Ziele und Maßnahmen leichter festlegen. Nachhaltigkeit kann somit vor Ort wirkungsvoller in die Realität umgesetzt werden.Effektiver Klimaschutz und Nachhaltigkeitsmanagement auf kommunaler Ebene ist essenziell. Neben dem notwendigen Beitrag zur nationalen und internationalen nachhaltigen Entwicklung können Kommunen klare Vorteile aus einer Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie ziehen: Beispielsweise können Gebäude energieeffizienter gebaut und genutzt und das Verkehrssystem kann effizienter und umweltfreundlicher gestaltet werden und gleichzeitig die CO2-Belastung und Verkehrsdichte im urbanen Raum reduzieren. Was zum Klimaschutz beiträgt, kann demnach gleichzeitig die Attraktivität von Kommunen steigern. Des Weiteren schützen sich Kommunen so vor Wetterextremen und können sich an den Klimawandel anpassen.Nach wie vor bestehen Unterschiede. Während einige Kommunen bereits seit mehreren Jahrzehnten an einer möglichst nachhaltigen Stadtentwicklung arbeiten und bereits viele Erfahrungen sammeln und Erkenntnisse gewinnen konnten, haben andere Städte vergleichsweise spät damit begonnen. Weiterhin schlagen Kommunen teils sehr unterschiedliche Wege ein, um die festgelegten Nachhaltigkeitsziele zu verwirklichen. Dies kann beispielsweise an den örtlichen Gegebenheiten oder an unterschiedlichen Ziel- und Schwerpunktsetzungen liegen. Übergeordnet stellen sich die Fragen, wieso gerade auf kommunaler Ebene viel für den Klimaschutz und Nachhaltigkeit getan werden muss und seit wann dies konkrete Formen annimmt.Ziel dieser Ausarbeitung ist es, zwei europäische Großstädte bezüglich ihrer bisherigen Nachhaltigkeitsentwicklung zu untersuchen. Die Schwerpunktsetzung liegt dabei sowohl beim Bereich Mobilität als auch bei ausgewählten Maßnahmen im Bereich einer nachhaltigen Stadtplanung. Weitere Aspekte werden bei Bedarf hinzugezogen. Ein Vergleich zwischen beiden Städten soll anschließend erfolgen. Bei diesem Vergleich müssen die Besonderheiten der jeweiligen Stadt berücksichtigt werden. Auch wenn nicht alle Parameter berücksichtigt werden können und ein direkter Vergleich möglicherweise nicht in allen Bereichen zielführend ist, können dadurch Erkenntnisse, beispielsweise bezüglich des Fortschritts der jeweiligen Stadt, gewonnen werden.Bei den zu untersuchenden Kommunen handelt es sich um Kopenhagen und München. Beide Städte weisen unterschiedliche Ausgangslagen, Besonderheiten und geografische Gegebenheiten auf, was darauf schließen lässt, dass divergente Befunde auftreten. Dies macht einen Vergleich interessanter und aufschlussreicher als beispielsweise einen Vergleich auf nationaler Ebene. Es handelt sich um internationale Städte innerhalb der Europäischen Union. Weiterhin sind beide Städte Großstädte, die ihre jeweilige Region prägen. Trotz der verschiedenen Gegebenheiten werden dabei exemplarisch ähnliche Bereiche beleuchtet. Dies soll die Vergleichbarkeit gewährleisten. Neben der Mobilität werden die Bereiche der Energieversorgung und Extremwetter- beziehungsweise Klimaanpassung beleuchtet.Bevor die Kommunen untersucht werden, werden im Vorgriff die für diese Ausarbeitung notwendigen Grundlagen thematisiert. Hier werden zentrale Elemente untersucht, zum Beispiel, wie Nachhaltigkeit definiert wird, welche Rolle eine nachhaltige Stadt spielt, was eine nachhaltige Stadt ausmacht und wie der urbane Raum überhaupt zentral für internationale Klimaschutz- und Nachhaltigkeitsbestrebungen werden konnte. Da es sich hierbei um zentrale Aspekte handelt, die es auf dem Weg zu einer nachhaltigen Stadtentwicklung zu verstehen gilt, fällt dieser Teil verhältnismäßig umfangreich aus.GrundlagenIn diesem Kapitel werden relevante Grundlagen betrachtet. Dazu gehört neben Grundbegriffen und Faktoren, die sich auf nachhaltige Mobilität und Stadtplanung beziehen, ein kurzer Überblick, der beschreibt, wie das Thema Nachhaltigkeit historisch betrachtet für die kommunale Ebene relevant wurde. Darüber hinaus muss der Begriff Nachhaltigkeit vorab definiert werden, womit nachfolgend begonnen wird.Begriff NachhaltigkeitDer Begriff Nachhaltigkeit existiert seit mehr als drei Jahrhunderten und wurde ursprünglich in der Forstwirtschaft verwendet. Nachhaltigkeit stammt aus einem Bereich, in dem ressourcenschonendendes Wirtschaften äußerst relevant ist. Bezeichnend für das damalige Verständnis von Nachhaltigkeit ist die Vorgabe, innerhalb eines Jahres nicht mehr Holz zu fällen, als in derselben Zeitspanne nachwachsen kann (vgl. Weinsziehr/Verhoog/Bruckner 2014, S. 3). Die Forstwirtschaft arbeitete demzufolge dann nachhaltig, wenn der Verbrauch der Ressourcen und somit die Abholzung die Menge des nachwachsenden Holzes nicht übersteigt. Die heutige Auffassung von Nachhaltigkeit ist mit diesem Ursprungsgedanken eng verknüpft. Dies zeigt sich auch anhand der folgenden Definition:"Nachhaltigkeit oder nachhaltige Entwicklung bedeutet, die Bedürfnisse der Gegenwart so zu befriedigen, dass die Möglichkeiten zukünftiger Generationen nicht eingeschränkt werden" (vgl. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2023c, o.S.).In der heutigen Zeit bezieht sich der Begriff Nachhaltigkeit jedoch auf alle Wirtschaftsbereiche und beinhaltet einen weiteren Aspekt, die sogenannte "Triple Bottom Line" (TBL), welche drei Dimensionen einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung benennt (vgl. Weinsziehr/Verhoog/Bruckner 2014, S. 3f.): Die wirtschaftliche Effizienz, die soziale Gerechtigkeit und die ökologische Tragfähigkeit müssen gleichberechtigt betrachtet werden, und möglichst alle politischen Entscheidungen sollten Nachhaltigkeit als Grundlage beinhalten (vgl. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2023c, o.S.).Der Begriff Nachhaltigkeit wird heute teilweise inflationär verwendet (vgl. Aden 2012, S. 15). Im weiteren Verlauf dieser Arbeit spielt vor allem das Verständnis einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung eine Rolle, was wie folgt definiert werden kann:"Politik und menschliches Verhalten sollen sich an der langfristigen Erhaltung der Lebensgrundlagen orientieren" (ebd., S. 15).Nachhaltige Stadt: Eine ArbeitsdefinitionEs gilt, eine adäquate Arbeitsdefinition von Nachhaltigkeit im Sinne einer nachhaltigen Stadtentwicklung zu formulieren. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, vor allem den Bereich Mobilität innerhalb von München und Kopenhagen zu beleuchten. Nachhaltigkeit im weiteren Verlauf bezieht sich somit vermehrt auf eine ressourcenschonende und emissionsarme Verkehrsplanung. Neben der Verkehrsplanung sind jedoch weitere Elemente interessant. Eine in der Gesamtheit nachhaltige Stadt lässt sich wie folgt definieren:" […] ein gut ausgebautes Netz des Öffentlichen Personennahverkehrs, eine regelmäßige Müllentsorgung sowie architektonische Innovationen, die es der städtischen Bevölkerung erlauben, einen nachhaltigen Lebensstil zu pflegen" (Bildung für nachhaltige Entwicklung 2023, o.S.).Ein nachhaltiger Lebensstil wiederum bedeutet, dass Menschen durch ihren eigenen Lebensstil und den Verbrauch ihrer Ressourcen nachfolgenden Generationen dieselben Möglichkeiten bieten (vgl. Aachener Stiftung Kathy Beys 2015, o.S.). Eine nachhaltige Stadt ist gleichzeitig eine für ihre Bewohner:innen ansprechende Stadt, die eine saubere Umwelt, ein intaktes Verkehrssystem, erschwingliche Energie und ein gutes gesellschaftliches Miteinander gewährleistet (vgl. Dütz 2017, S. 15).Eine nachhaltige Stadtentwicklung kann somit eine Vielzahl verschiedener Themenbereiche beinhalten (vgl. Firmhofer 2018, S. 10). Aufgeteilt in zwei Oberbereiche muss sich eine Stadt bezogen auf die städtische Infrastruktur und auf das städtische Leben verändern. Die städtische Infrastruktur beinhaltet zum Beispiel das Transportwesen sowie die Energie- und Wasserversorgung. Das städtische Leben enthält unter anderem wohnliche, arbeitstechnische, soziale und kulturelle Elemente (vgl. ebd., S. 10). Der Begriff Stadtentwicklung selbst bezeichnet"die Steuerung der Gesamtentwicklung von Städten und Gemeinden und erfordert eine integrierte und zukunftsgerichtete Herangehensweise, die durch Stadtplanung […] umgesetzt wird" (Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 19).Folgende Handlungsfelder sind besonders relevant für eine nachhaltige Stadtentwicklung: Die Dekarbonisierung, die Förderung möglichst umweltfreundlicher Mobilität, das Ziel einer baulich und räumlich kompakten sowie sozial durchmischten Stadt, die Klimawandelanpassung und die Bekämpfung von Armut (vgl. ebd., S. 22).Diese Eingrenzung dient als Fokus dieser Ausarbeitung. Das Augenmerk liegt neben der städtischen Verkehrsinfrastruktur auf weiteren ausgewählten Aspekten, beispielsweise auf der Energieversorgung und baulichen Maßnahmen. Diese Aspekte werden hinsichtlich der Frage betrachtet, ob und in welchem Maße die städtische Bevölkerung dadurch einen nachhaltigen Lebensstil erreichen kann. Somit ist ebenso das städtische Leben relevant.Entwicklung nachhaltiger KlimaschutzzieleUm zu verstehen, wie sich ein Nachhaltigkeitskonzept auf kommunaler Ebene entwickeln konnte, wird ein historischer Überblick gegeben, der die Entwicklung nachhaltiger Klimaschutzziele von der globalen bis hin zur kommunalen Ebene zusammenfasst. Dabei werden vor allem relevante Eckpunkte benannt.Im Jahr 1997 wurde das Kyoto-Protokoll beschlossen und trat acht Jahre später in Kraft. Durch diese Vereinbarung verpflichteten sich die meisten Industriestaaten inklusive der damaligen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten dazu, die Emissionen von bestimmten Treibhausgasen innerhalb von vier Jahren um mindestens fünf Prozent, verglichen mit dem Jahr 1990, zu senken (vgl. Eppler 2023, o.S.).Im Jahr 2000 verständigten sich die Vereinten Nationen (UN) auf die Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (vgl. Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 6). Durch diese Erklärung verpflichteten sich die Staats- und Regierungschefs der jeweiligen Staaten neben der Bekämpfung von Armut, Hunger und Krankheiten auch gegen Umweltzerstörung vorzugehen. Um die Fortschritte messbar zu machen, wurden Zielvorgaben für das Jahr 2015 formuliert (vgl. Weltgesundheitsorganisation 2018, o.S.). Der Fokus lag auf der supranationalen, also auf der überstaatlichen Ebene. Eine nachhaltige Stadtentwicklung stand nicht im Fokus, war durch einige Zielformulierungen dennoch indirekt betroffen (vgl. Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 6).Im Jahr 2009 fand die Weltklimakonferenz in Kopenhagen statt. Das Ziel, die Erderwärmung auf weniger als zwei Grad Celsius im Vergleich zum vorindustriellen Niveau zu begrenzen, wurde als Absichtsziel erklärt, jedoch fehlten verpflichtende Regelungen (vgl. Schellnhuber u. a. 2010, S. 5). Der festgelegte Wert von zwei Grad Celsius kommt durch die Wissenschaft zustande. Diese geht davon aus, dass dieser Wert nicht überschritten werden darf, um drastische Konsequenzen zu vermeiden (vgl. Buhofer 2018, S. 83).Mit dem Pariser Klimaabkommen wurde das Zwei-Grad-Celsius-Ziel festgelegt (vgl. Edenhofer/Jakob 2017, S. 39). Dieses Mal handelt es sich um ein völkerrechtlich bindendes Abkommen, welches das Kyoto-Protokoll ablöste und zur Erreichung der Eckpunkte verstärkt die kommunale Ebene miteinbezieht (vgl. Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg 2023, o.S.). Weitere Ziele des Pariser Klimaabkommens, das Ende 2016 in Kraft trat, sind die Senkung von Emissionen und die Klimawandelanpassung (vgl. Watjer 2023, o.S.). Nationale Klimaschutzkonzepte sind in der Regel als Folge des Pariser Klimaabkommens entstanden (vgl. ebd. 2023, o.S.). Die Vereinten Nationen brachten im Jahr 2015 die Agenda 2030 auf den Weg, die klare Ziele für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung benennt (vgl. Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 7).Agenda 2030 und die Sustainable Development Goals"Transforming our world" (Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 6) - diese Formulierung verdeutlicht die ambitionierten Ziele, die mit der Agenda 2030 durch die Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung, die Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) festgelegt wurden. Die Agenda 2030 ist für alle Mitgliedsstaaten der Vereinten Nationen gültig. Kern der Agenda ist das Ziel einer nachhaltigen globalen Entwicklung auf allen dazugehörigen Ebenen, was durch die 17 Ziele erreicht werden soll (vgl. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2023a, o.S.). Diese Ziele ergänzen sich gegenseitig, haben den gleichen Stellenwert und beinhalten jeweils zwischen acht und zwölf Unterziele (vgl. Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 9). Auch wenn die Agenda 2030 von allen UN-Mitgliedsstaaten beschlossen wurde, ist diese rechtlich nicht bindend, was ebenfalls für die SDGs gilt (vgl. ebd. 2021, S. 12).Im Vergleich zu den MDG-Zielen sind die SDG-Zielsetzungen umfangreich formuliert und mit SDG-Ziel elf wird erstmals die regionale und lokale Ebene in den Blickpunkt genommen. Dieses Ziel betrachtet ausdrücklich die Entwicklung von Städten und Gemeinden mit dem Anspruch, diese neben einer nachhaltigen Gestaltung sicherer, inklusiver und widerstandsfähig zu gestalten (vgl. Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 7f.).Nachfolgend werden die wichtigsten Unterziele dargestellt. Neben der Sicherung von bezahlbarem Wohnraum soll das Verkehrssystem nachhaltig, sicher, zugänglich und bezahlbar ausgebaut werden (vgl. Vereinte Nationen 2023b, S. 24). Siedlungspläne sollen auf eine nachhaltige Entwicklung ausgerichtet werden (vgl. ebd., S. 24). Ziel hierbei ist es, die Verstädterung bis 2030 nachhaltiger und inklusiver zu organisieren. Ebenfalls bis 2030 soll die Zahl der durch Klimakatastrophen bedingten Todesfälle und Betroffenen deutlich gesenkt werden (vgl. Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 10). Von Städten ausgehende schädliche Umweltauswirkungen sollen verringert, die Luftqualität verbessert und Grünflächen als öffentliche Räume geschaffen und inklusiv, also für alle Menschen, zugänglich gemacht werden (vgl. Vereinte Nationen 2023b, S. 24).Weitere SDGs lassen sich nur durch städtische Maßnahmen verwirklichen und sind daher eng mit der urbanen Entwicklung verbunden. Ein Beispiel ist SDG 7, das auf nachhaltige beziehungsweise erneuerbare Energien fokussiert ist und nicht entkoppelt von der zukünftigen Energieversorgung in den Städten betrachtet werden kann (vgl. Koch/Krellenberg 2021, S. 11).Durch die Festlegung dieser Ziele ist Nachhaltigkeit ein zentraler Aspekt der Städteplanung und -entwicklung. Städte stehen somit spätestens seit der Agenda 2030 auch formell vor großen Herausforderungen und Transformationsprozessen. Die Zuspitzung von Umweltkatastrophen und Extremwetterereignissen zeigt, dass Städte darüber hinaus dazu gezwungen sind, Klimaanpassungsmaßnahmen und eine nachhaltige Stadtentwicklung zügig umzusetzen.Klimaschutz in der Europäischen Union, in Deutschland und in DänemarkWas haben diese internationalen Abkommen bewirkt? Da München und Kopenhagen im Fokus dieser Ausarbeitung stehen, müssen diese Städte betreffende Beschlüsse bezüglich der gesetzten Ziele einer nachhaltigen Stadtentwicklung auf weiteren Ebenen betrachtet werden. Trotz der Ähnlichkeit der festgelegten Klimaschutzprogramme in der EU, in Dänemark und in Deutschland, werden diese separat zusammengefasst. Im Jahr 2007 betrug der Anteil der EU an globalen CO2-Emissionen ein Sechstel und der Anteil der Treibhausgasemissionen der Industrieländer ein Fünftel (vgl. Dröge 2007, S. 2). Dies untermauert den Handlungsbedarf.Das Klimaschutzprogramm der aktuellen Fassung des deutschen Klimaschutzgesetzes hat an den ehrgeizigen Zielen nichts geändert. Nach wie vor soll Deutschland bis 2045 treibhausgasneutral sein und den Ausstoß von Treibhausgasen bereits bis 2030 um 65 Prozent gesenkt haben (vgl. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung 2023, o.S.).Dänemark hat eine Klimastrategie vorgelegt und sich das Ziel gesetzt, eine Vorreiterrolle einzunehmen. Bis 2030 will Dänemark seine Treibhausgasemissionen um 70 Prozent senken. Klimaneutralität soll bis 2050 erreicht sein (vgl. Außenministerium Dänemark 2020, S. 27). Ebenso will Dänemark dazu beitragen, die globalen Anstrengungen voranzutreiben. Hierfür soll mit anderen Ländern und mit nichtstaatlichen Akteur:innen zusammengearbeitet werden (vgl. Außenministerium Dänemark 2020, S. 6).Auf EU-Ebene sind die Zielsetzungen ähnlich, was sich durch den "Green Deal" der EU zeigt. Demzufolge sollen die Netto-Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2030 um 55 Prozent reduziert werden, bis 2050 soll Treibhausgasneutralität herrschen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2023, o.S.). Ziel ist es, durch diesen europäischen "Grünen Deal" der erste klimaneutrale Kontinent zu werden und dementsprechend die Verpflichtungen umzusetzen, die sich aus dem Pariser Klimaabkommen ergeben (vgl. Europarat 2023, o.S.). Folglich sind die Ziele von Deutschland und Dänemark bezüglich der Erreichung und der Höhe der Einsparungen teilweise höher angesetzt, als auf EU-Ebene beschlossen.Nachhaltige StadtentwicklungEs stellt sich die Frage, aus welchen Gründen gerade der urbane Raum eine zentrale Größe für Nachhaltigkeitsziele einnimmt. Aktuelle Berichte, Daten und Prognosen können dabei helfen, diese Frage zu beantworten.Relevanz einer nachhaltigen StadtentwicklungDer jüngste SDG-Fortschrittsbericht wurde im Mai 2023 veröffentlicht. Die Vereinten Nationen kommen darin zu dem Ergebnis, dass über die Hälfte der Weltbevölkerung momentan in städtischen Gebieten lebt. Dieser Anteil könnte bis 2050 auf etwa 70 Prozent steigen (vgl. Vereinte Nationen 2023a, S. 34). Verglichen mit dem Jahr 2020 wird die urbane Bevölkerung in Mitteleuropa und somit auch in Deutschland und Dänemark im Jahr 2050 um acht Prozent steigen (vgl. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2023b, S. 4).Im Vergleich zu anderen Kontinenten stellt dies einen geringen Anstieg dar. So wird die städtische Bevölkerung in Nordafrika im gleichen Referenzzeitraum voraussichtlich um 79 Prozent steigen (vgl. ebd. 2023b, S. 4). Zwei Aspekte dürfen jedoch nicht unbeachtet bleiben: Zum einem ist es eine globale Herausforderung, diesem Anstieg gerecht zu werden. Die Auswirkungen werden für viele mittelbar und unmittelbar spürbar sein. Weiterhin stehen bei einem Bevölkerungsanstieg von acht Prozent auch dicht besiedelte mitteleuropäische Städte vor einer Vielzahl an Aufgaben, was sich auch für Städte wie München und Kopenhagen bemerkbar machen wird. Beispielsweise lebten bereits im Jahr 2017 drei von vier Menschen in Deutschland innerhalb von Städten (vgl. Dütz 2017, S. 14). Dementsprechend sind auch europäische Städte zentral, was die Implementierung der Klimaschutzziele angeht (vgl. ebd., S. 13).Städte verbrauchen mit knapp 80 Prozent bereits heute einen Großteil der weltweiten Energie und Ressourcen, beispielsweise durch die großen Abfallmengen, das Heizen und den Schadstoßausstoß der vielen Fahrzeuge (vgl. Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2023d, o.S.). Gleichzeitig sind Städte für bis zu 76 Prozent der CO2-Emissionen weltweit verantwortlich (vgl. Climate Service Center Germany 2015, S. 1). Städte gehören somit zu den Hauptverursachern des Klimawandels, was durch folgende Worte deutlich wird:"Der Klimanotstand ist auch ein Notstand der Stadt" (Chatterton 2019, S. 275).Durch den prognostizierten Bevölkerungsanstieg wird die Relevanz von Städten bezogen auf die Realisierung von Klimaschutzzielen weiter steigen. Nicht zuletzt, da Städte bereits heute für den Großteil der CO2-Emissionen und des Energieverbrauchs verantwortlich sind. Städte nehmen eine zentrale Rolle in der Verwirklichung einer nachhaltigen Zukunft ein. Gleichzeitig sind gerade Städte durch den Klimawandel in erhöhtem Maße gefährdet (vgl. Climate Service Center Germany 2015, S. 1f.). Auch aus Gründen des Selbstschutzes sind Städte daher gezwungen, Strategien und Maßnahmen zur Klimaanpassung zu entwickeln. Nur so kann der urbane Raum dem Klimanotstand gerecht werden. Entwicklung einer nachhaltigen und klimaneutralen Stadt"Wie lässt sich die Entwicklung der Städte so steuern, dass diese den notwendigen Beitrag zu einer globalen nachhaltigen Entwicklung leisten können?" (Koch & Krellenberg 2021, S. 2).Diese zentrale Frage stellt sich in diesem Kapitel. Konkret wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie eine Stadtentwicklung aussehen muss, um notwendige Nachhaltigkeitsziele hinreichend zu erfüllen und den Erfordernissen einer nachhaltigen Stadt gerecht zu werden.Der aktuelle SDG-Fortschrittsbericht bilanziert die Hälfte der Zeit seit Inkrafttreten der SDG-Ziele. Die Halbzeitbilanz der Agenda 2030 liest sich bezogen auf die Fortschritte einer städtischen Nachhaltigkeitsentwicklung insgesamt ernüchternd: Lediglich die Hälfte der städtischen Bevölkerung hatte im Jahr 2022 annehmbaren Zugang zu öffentlichen Verkehrsmitteln, auch die Luftverschmutzung und der Mangel an Freiflächen sind anhaltende Probleme in Städten (vgl. Vereinte Nationen 2023a, S. 34).Gleichzeitig hält der Bericht fest, dass in Ländern mit hohem Einkommen viel für die Bekämpfung der Luftverschmutzung getan wurde, was dennoch nicht ausreichend ist. Darüber hinaus wird angemerkt, dass es sich bei der Luftverschmutzung um kein rein städtisches Problem handelt (vgl. ebd., S. 35). Allerdings muss sich gerade der Autoverkehr in der Stadt ändern. Paul Chatterton spielt dabei auf ein neues Mobilitätsparadigma an und fordert eine autofreie Stadt, da nur dies dem Klima wirklich gerecht werden und soziale Ungleichheit reduzieren kann (vgl. Chatterton 2019, S. 278).Ebenso muss der Aspekt berücksichtigt werden, dass Menschen in Großstädten häufig verschiedene Verkehrsmittel nutzen, um an ihr Ziel zu kommen (vgl. Kallenbach 2021, S. 33). Selbst wenn klimafreundliche Mobilität zur Verfügung steht, wird diese somit nicht ausschließlich genutzt. Hieran anknüpfend stellt sich die Frage, wie sich dies ändern lässt. Hierfür besteht bereits eine Vielzahl an Lösungsvorschlägen, unter anderem die Abkehr von der Vorstellung einer autogerechten Stadt, die effizientere Nutzung der vorhandenen Infrastruktur, die Verbesserung des Öffentlichen Personennahverkehrs (ÖPNV) zur Schaffung einer wirklichen Alternative oder eine kilometerabhängige Gebühr für die Nutzung von Straßen (vgl. Edenhofer/Jakob 2017, S. 101f. ).Ein Großteil des Energiebedarfs in Städten kommt durch die Verbrennung fossiler Brennstoffe, den Transport und die Heizung beziehungsweise Kühlung von Gebäuden zustande (vgl. Climate Service Center Germany 2015, S. 2). Sollen die Einsparziele gelingen, so ist eine Verkehrswende unumgänglich (vgl. Jakob 2023, S. 1). Gleichzeitig stehen durch den Klimawandel auch städtische Verkehrssysteme vor enormen Herausforderungen. Gerade in urbanen Gebieten hängen viele Infrastrukturnetze, die zum Funktionieren des städtischen Systems beitragen, mit dem Verkehrssystem zusammen (vgl. Climate Service Center Germany 2015, S. 6).Dabei bestehen mehrere Möglichkeiten, städtische Verkehrsnetze zu verbessern und gleichzeitig zukunftsfähig und nachhaltig zu gestalten: Die Fokussierung auf Fußgänger und nicht-motorisierten Verkehr sowie auf den ÖPNV kann einige Vorteile, wie zum Beispiel eine Reduzierung von Emissionen und wirtschaftlichen Wohlstand, bieten (vgl. ebd. 2015, S. 6). Die Verbesserung des öffentlichen Nahverkehrs und anderer emissionsarmer Infrastrukturen kann darüber hinaus zu Energieeinsparungen, Zeitersparnis und einer besseren Luftqualität beitragen (vgl. ebd., S. 6). Die Zukunftsgestaltung der städtischen Verkehrsinfrastruktur spielt daher in mehrfacher Hinsicht eine zentrale Rolle. Neben dem Verkehrsbereich sind weitere Sektoren, unter anderem das Abfallsystem und der Umgang mit Gebäuden entscheidend (vgl. ebd. 2015, S. 2).Der Energiesektor ist enorm wichtig, da hier das größte Potential für eine Reduzierung von Emissionen liegt. Parallel mit einer steigenden Energienachfrage, beispielsweise in Strom oder Brennstoffen, werden Treibhausgasemissionen ansteigen. Gerade Städte sind dazu gezwungen, den Energiebedarf zu senken, die Energieerzeugung sowie den -verbrauch effizienter zu gestalten, auf erneuerbare Energiequellen umzusteigen und gleichzeitig eine sichere Versorgung zu gewährleisten (vgl. Climate Service Center Germany 2015, S. 6).Im weiteren Verlauf werden nun die Städte Kopenhagen und München in Bezug auf ihre Anstrengungen untersucht. Fokus dabei bleibt der Bereich Verkehr und Mobilität. Ebenso wird exemplarisch der Bereich der Extremwetteranpassung sowie, für den Bereich der Energieversorgung, die kommunale Wärmeplanung untersucht.KopenhagenKopenhagen ist Sitz des dänischen Königshauses (vgl. Heidenreich 2019, o.S.). Die Stadt liegt auf der Insel Seeland (vgl. Britannica 2023, o.S.) und ist an der Meerenge Öresund gelegen, welche die Ost- und die Nordsee miteinander verbindet (vgl. Heidenreich 2019, o.S.). Gegründet wurde die Stadt im frühen zehnten Jahrhundert, seit 1445 ist Kopenhagen Dänemarks Hauptstadt (vgl. Britannica 2023, o.S.). Die Einwohnerzahl Kopenhagens ist in den letzten zehn Jahren um knapp 100.000 Einwohner:innen gewachsen Mit aktuell etwa 653.000 Einwohner:innen ist Kopenhagen die größte Stadt Dänemarks (vgl. Dyvik 2023, o.S.). Sie hat eine Fläche von ungefähr 88 Quadratkilometern, ist damit vergleichsweise klein und liegt 24 Meter über dem Meeresspiegel (vgl. Kallenbach 2021, S. 34).Grundlegende Informationen und BesonderheitenDie Stadt Kopenhagen hat eine bewegte Geschichte. Beispielsweise wurde die Stadt im Laufe der Jahrhunderte mehrmals von Großfeuern zerstört, war sehr umkämpft und im Zweiten Weltkrieg von deutschen Soldaten besetzt (vgl. Findeisen/Husum 2008, S. 146ff.). Damals blieb die Stadt jedoch überwiegend unbeschädigt, was sich auch heute im Stadtbild bemerkbar macht. Ein Beispiel hierfür ist Schloss Rosenborg (vgl. Heidenreich 2019, o.S.). Im Jahr 1996 wurde die Stadt zur Kulturhauptstadt ernannt (vgl. Findeisen/Husum 2008, S. 149).Das Klima in Kopenhagen ist mild und gemäßigt. Die durchschnittliche Jahrestemperatur beträgt 8,9 Grad Celsius (vgl. climate-data.org 2023, o.S.). In Kopenhagen fällt insgesamt viel Regen. Selbst in den trockenen Monaten ist die Niederschlagsmenge erheblich (vgl. ebd. 2023, o.S.). Aufgrund der Lage am Meer können Sturmfluten zu Überschwemmungen mit gravierenden Auswirkungen führen. Dieser Gefahr und der sich daraus ergebenden Notwendigkeit zu handeln, ist sich auch die Stadtverwaltung Kopenhagens bewusst (vgl. Stadtverwaltung Kopenhagen 2023, o.S.).Verkehr und MobilitätBetrachtet man die Verkehrsplanung Kopenhagens, so muss zwingend auf die Fahrradinfrastruktur eingegangen werden. Der Autoverkehr sowie der ÖPNV dürfen dennoch nicht außer Acht gelassen werden. Ziel dieser Betrachtung ist es, Aufschlüsse über die Beweggründe und konkreten Vorgehensweisen der Verkehrsplanung und -infrastruktur in Kopenhagen zu erhalten. Dabei soll eine Bestandsaufnahme der aktuellen Situation erfolgen.Regelmäßig liegt Kopenhagen auf dem ersten Platz der weltweit besten Fahrradstädte und dennoch wurden im Jahr 2021 knapp ein Drittel aller Fahrten mit dem Auto bewältigt (vgl. Kallenbach 2021, S. 5). In den 1950er und 1960er Jahren war die Verkehrsplanung auf das Auto ausgerichtet, was zu einer deutlichen Verringerung der Radfahrenden in den darauffolgenden Jahrzehnten führte. Während 1949 an der Nørrebrogade, einer zentralen Hauptstraße in Kopenhagen, an einem Tag durchschnittlich mehr als 62.000 Radfahrende gezählt wurden, waren es im Jahr 1978 nur etwa 8.000 (vgl. ebd. 2021, S. 5f.).In den 1970er Jahren kam es zu umfangreichen Fahrradprotesten und Forderungen nach mehr Fahrradwegen. Trotz der damals bereits vorhandenen Relevanz war der Umweltaspekt jedoch nicht ausschlaggebend. Vielmehr stand die Verkehrssicherheit für die Radfahrenden im Fokus der Fahrradproteste (vgl. ebd., S. 30f.). Im Jahr 2019 gab die deutliche Mehrheit aller Fahradfahrenden in Kopenhagen an, aufgrund der Zeitersparnis gegenüber anderen Verkehrsmitteln (46 Prozent) und aus praktischen Aspekten (55 Prozent) mit dem Fahrrad zu fahren. Ein deutlich geringerer Anteil von 16 Prozent gab Umweltschutzaspekte als Beweggrund an (vgl. ebd., S. 31). Ein weiterer Faktor war die Ölkrise in den 1970er Jahren, welche die Notwendigkeit alternativer Verkehrsmittel untermauerte und in der Folge die Anzahl der Fahrradfahrenden in Kopenhagen stark anstiegen ließ (vgl. Kallenbach 2021, S. 35).Trotz dieser Faktoren sind gerade die nicht-diskursiven, also die bereits vorhandenen Faktoren wesentlich für den Weg Kopenhagens zur Fahrradmetropole und für die Umsetzung entsprechender Maßnahmen. Zum einem sind es geographisch vorteilhafte Gegebenheiten, die Kopenhagen vorteilhaft für den Fahrradverkehr machen, was durch die geringe Größe und die flache Lage der Stadt sichtbar wird (vgl. Kallenbach 2021, S. 34). Dadurch bedingt ist auch die Geschichte Kopenhagens, in welcher der Radverkehr einen relevanten Teil einnimmt (vgl. ebd. 2021, S. 36). Der Sicherheitsaspekt beim Fahrradfahren ist sehr relevant. In Kopenhagen setzte man dementsprechend bereits früh auf vom Autoverkehr separierte Fahrradwege, was parallel zu einem Anstieg der Fahrradfahrenden führte (vgl. Søholt 2014, S. 1f.).Ein weiterer Faktor ist die ununterbrochene politische Richtung hinsichtlich der Mobilität in Kopenhagen, die durch Sozialdemokrat:innen und linke Parteien seit den 1970er Jahren besteht. Diese Kontinuität wirkte sich ebenso auf Investitionen für den Fahrradverkehr und die Fahrradinfrastruktur aus (vgl. Kallenbach 2021, S. 36f.). Zusammengesetzt aus solchen Faktoren konnte sich in Kopenhagen eine Kultur des Fahrradfahrens herausbilden. Neben den Umweltschutzaspekten ist Kopenhagen dadurch attraktiver für Menschen, aber auch für Unternehmen geworden (vgl. Søholt 2014, S. 1).Auch negative Effekte können auftreten. Beispielsweise kommt es vermehrt zu Staus auf den stark befahrenen Fahrradwegen. Die Stadt reagiert darauf mit dem Ausbau der Fahrradspuren und dementsprechend der Verkleinerung von Fahrbahnen für Autos (vgl. Søholt 2014, S. 2). Auch das Sperren von Straßen für den Autoverkehr wird in Erwägung gezogen. Ziel dabei ist es, mehr Platz für die Radfahrenden und den ÖPNV zu schaffen (vgl. ebd., S. 2). Kopenhagen versucht weiterhin umweltfreundliche Kraftstoffe und den Anteil von Elektroautos, auch unter den Taxen der Stadt, voranzutreiben (vgl. Stadt Kopenhagen 2020, S. 41).Der Klimaschutzplan der Stadt benennt den Bereich der Mobilität als eine von vier zentralen Säulen (vgl. Stadt Kopenhagen 2020, S. 13). Im Bericht aus dem Jahr 2020 wird festgestellt, dass CO2-Emissionen nach wie vor deutlich reduziert werden müssen. So sind trotz der Bemühungen und einiger Erfolge die Kohlenstoffemissionen im PKW-Bereich zwischen 2012 und 2018 um zehn Prozent gestiegen (vgl. ebd. 2020, S. 39f.). Parallel mit dem Bevölkerungsanstieg ist die Zahl der Autobesitzer:innen gestiegen. Dennoch sind die Pro-Kopf Emissionen im Straßenverkehr von 2010 bis 2018 um 16 Prozent gesunken (vgl. ebd. 2020, S. 41).Kopenhagen eröffnete im Herbst 2019 den "Cityring" und baut diesen nach und nach aus. Der damit verbundene Ausbau der U-Bahn soll die verschiedenen Stadteile an den öffentlichen Nahverkehr anbinden und effiziente öffentliche Verkehrsmittel gewährleisten (vgl. Stadt Kopenhagen 2019, S. 26). Langfristig soll der Ausbau immer weiter vorangetrieben werden, um auch während der Rushhour eine attraktive Alternative zum Autoverkehr darzustellen (vgl. ebd., S. 26).Die Stadt Kopenhagen zeigt, wie Mobilität in einer nachhaltigen Stadt der Zukunft aussehen kann. Im gleichen Zug müssen dabei jedoch die vorteilhaften Gegebenheiten berücksichtigt werden, beispielsweise die flache Lage und die geringe Größe der Stadt. Aus diesem Grund muss in größeren und hügligeren Städten beispielsweise der ÖPNV als Alternative gedacht werden und mit ähnlicher Entschlossenheit verbessert werden.Dennoch gibt es Faktoren aus Kopenhagen, die eine grüne Mobilität begünstigen und theoretisch in jeder Stadt umsetzbar sind. Ein Beispiel ist die politische Kontinuität bezogen auf die Förderung des Fahrradverkehrs. Umwelt- und Klimaschutz muss nicht zwingend die ausschlaggebende Motivation für den Beginn einer Verkehrswende sein. Trotz aller positiven Aspekte und der Vorreiterrolle der Fahrradstadt Kopenhagen wurden auch im Jahr 2021 noch einige Fahrten mit dem Auto zurückgelegt.Die dauerhafte Förderung der Alternative Fahrrad konnte das enorme Wachstum des Autoverkehrs jedoch eindämmen. Es liegt auf der Hand, dass durch die Verkleinerung beziehungsweise Sperrung von Fahrbahnen und Straßen für den Autoverkehr auch strittige Debatten entstehen können. Die Stadt Kopenhagen verfolgt jedoch den klaren Plan, das Rad und den ÖPNV als Mobilitätsmittel der Wahl weiter voranzutreiben. Bereits zur Mitte des vergangenen Jahrzehnts nutzen 45 Prozent der Einwohner:innen Kopenhagens das Fahrrad für den Schul- beziehungsweise Arbeitsweg (vgl. Diehn 2015, o.S.). Dennoch halten aktuelle Ergebnisse fest, dass die Anstrengungen bei weitem nicht genügen.Weitere Maßnahmen und HerausforderungenZiel dieses Kapitels ist es, weitere Maßnahmen in Kopenhagen zu untersuchen. Aufgrund des Umfangs handelt es sich dabei jedoch um Beispiele, die kompakt dargestellt werden. Dabei werden Beispiele aus dem Bereich der Extremwetteranpassung und der kommunalen Wärmeplanung untersucht. Mit der Stadt München wird ähnlich vorgegangen, die Kategorien werden gleich gewählt. Ziel dabei ist festzustellen, welche Anstrengungen in der jeweiligen Kommune unternommen werden, um Nachhaltigkeitsziele voranzubringen.Durch die örtlichen Gegebenheiten muss Kopenhagen Extremwetterereignisse bewältigen, die sich durch den Klimawandel verstärken. So gab es in der dänischen Hauptstadt allein zwischen 2010 und 2015 sechs Starkregenereignisse, die Straßen und Gebäudekeller überfluteten und für einen enormen finanziellen Schaden sorgten (vgl. Kruse 2016, S. 669). Dementsprechend ist vor allem die Anpassung der Stadt an solche Starkregenereignisse ein wichtiger Bestandteil, der im Klimaanpassungsplan festgehalten ist.Um das Überflutungsrisiko zu verringern und dieser Herausforderung gerecht zu werden, arbeitet die Stadt an der Verwirklichung fünf zentraler Aspekte. Dazu zählen Maßnahmen, die einen Beitrag zur Verringerung des Überflutungsrisikos leisten können, zum Beispiel eine qualitative und quantitative Erhöhung des städtischen Grünflächenbereichs (vgl. ebd. 2016, S. 669f.).Ein konkretes Beispiel ist der Kopenhagener Ortsteil Skt. Kjelds Kvarter, der nach und nach in einen klimagerechten Stadtraum der Zukunft umgewandelt werden soll. Zum einem soll sich die Natur in diesem Quartier weiter ausbreiten, gleichzeitig wird die Regulierung von Regenwasser verbessert (vgl. Technik- und Umweltverwaltung Kopenhagen 2023, o.S.). Konkret dienen die Grünflächen als Versickerungsbecken, wodurch das Wasser unabhängig von der Kanalisation zum Hafenbecken geleitet wird. Hierfür wurde auch die Straßenführung angepasst (vgl. Kruse 2016, S. 270). Neben der Risikoreduzierung durch Extremwetterereignisse wird die Stadt durch solche Projekte nachhaltiger. Zugunsten von Grünflächen wird die Verkehrsinfrastruktur verändert und der Natur wird mehr Raum innerhalb der Stadt gegeben.Die Gefährdung der Stadt durch Extremwetterereignisse soll durch weitere Maßnahamen reduziert werden. Dazu zählen beispielsweise die Bereitstellung von Pumpen und die Ausrüstung von Kellern, um gegen Überschwemmungen vorbereitet zu sein. Gleichzeitig macht der Klimaanpassungsplan deutlich, dass die Entwicklung eines grünen Wachstums gewünscht ist und parallel zur Klimaanpassung vollzogen wird (vgl. Stadtverwaltung Kopenhagen 2011, S. 5). So sollen Grün- und Freiflächen verbessert und ergänzt werden. Dort wo gebaut wird, ist dies entsprechend zu berücksichtigen (vgl. ebd. 2011, S. 12).Neben dem Schutz vor Extremwetterereignissen sollen diese grünen Maßnahmen dazu führen, den Energieverbrauch der Stadt zu senken, die Luftqualität zu verbessern und die Lärmbelästigung zu bekämpfen. Durch die Schaffung von Freiflächen kann beispielsweise die Temperatur gemäßigt und für Luftzirkulation gesorgt werden (vgl. ebd. 2011, S. 12).Kopenhagen benennt in seinem aktuellen Klimaschutzplan neben der Mobilität drei weitere Bereiche: Den Energieverbrauch, die Energieproduktion und Initiativen der Stadtverwaltung (vgl. Stadt Kopenhagen 2020, S. 13). Laut eigenen Worten will sich Kopenhagen, neben der Konzentration auf den öffentlichen Verkehr, auf den Energieausstoß, die kohlenstoffneutrale Fernwärme und Maßnahmen zur Verringerung von Kohlenstoffemissionen fokussieren (vgl. Stadt Kopenhagen 2019, S. 25).2014 wurde Kopenhagen von einem unabhängigen und internationalen Expertenteam zur Umwelthauptstadt ernannt. Es gibt eine Reihe von Kriterien, die hierfür erfüllt sein müssen. Neben dem Nahverkehr wird die Luftqualität, der Anteil sowie die Qualität des grünen Stadtgebietes und der Umgang mit dem Klimawandel berücksichtigt (vgl. Diehn 2015, o.S.).Dementsprechend wurden früh weitere Anstrengungen unternommen. Gerade das weit ausgebaute Fernwärmenetz Kopenhagens muss hierbei erwähnt werden. Dieses versorgt den Großteil der Gebäude und trägt damit maßgeblich zur Einsparung von C02-Emissionen in Kopenhagen bei (vgl. Burckhardt/Tappe/Rehrmann 2022, o.S.). Gleichzeitig bieten sich auch Vorteile für die dortigen Bewohner:innen: Die Preise werden staatlich kontrolliert und die Infrastruktur der Fernwärme ermöglicht einen einfachen und für Verbraucher:innen kostengünstigen Umstieg auf erneuerbare Energien, was ermöglicht, dass Kopenhagens Fernwärme bereits zu 80 Prozent aus erneuerbaren Energien erzeugt wird (vgl. ebd. 2022, o.S.).Das Fernwärmenetz der Stadt hat unter anderem mehrere Müllverbrennungsanlagen und Blockheizkraftwerke, die von verschiedenen Versorgungsunternehmen betrieben werden (vgl. Harrestrup/Svendsen 2014, S. 296). Dies gewährleistet die Nutzung von Abwärme als Heizquelle. Eine dieser Müllverbrennungsanliegen liegt nah am Zentrum Kopenhagens und trägt den Namen Amager Bakke. Das Dach der Müllverbrennungsanlage dient der Bevölkerung gleichzeitig als Skigebiet und steht somit sinnbildlich für die Innovation und entsprechende Nachhaltigkeitsbestrebungen innerhalb der Stadt (vgl. Kafsack 2023, o.S.).Um im Bereich Energie die gesetzten Ziele zu erreichen, setzt Kopenhagen auf eine Vielzahl weiterer Maßnahmen. Dazu zählt neben der Fernwärme der Einsatz erneuerbarer Energietechnologien und die entsprechende Förderung von Heizungspumpen, Erdwärme, Sonnenkollektoren und Windkraftanlagen. Auch Biomasse als Übergangstechnologie wird von der Stadt befürwortet (vgl. Stadt Kopenhagen 2019, S. 54).Kopenhagen wird häufig als grüne Stadt bezeichnet. Viele Maßnahmen der Stadt wurden bereits vor langer Zeit getroffen. Die Pläne der Stadt Kopenhagen sind weit vorangeschritten, äußerst detailliert und durchdacht. Um sich zukünftig besser vor Extremwetterereignissen schützen zu können, arbeitet die Stadt an verschiedenen Lösungen und setzt beispielsweise auf den Ausbau und die Entlastung der Kanalisation. Dass hierbei ebenfalls freie Grünflächen entstehen, ist nicht nur ein nützlicher Nebeneffekt, sondern gewolltes Ziel.Im Bereich der Energieversorgung muss vor allem die Fernwärme genannt werden. Diese wurde in Kopenhagen bereits sehr früh ausgebaut und versorgt dementsprechend fast alle Gebäude. Somit ist dies der wohl wichtigste Bereich der Energieversorgung und gleichzeitig das Hauptaugenmerk des Kopenhagener Klimaplans. Dennoch gibt es auch hier Verbesserungs- und Optimierungspotential. Auch Kritikpunkte sind berechtigt. Beispielsweise ist der Einsatz von Biomasse fraglich. Einen weiteren Rückschlag musste Kopenhagen kürzlich einstecken: Die Stadt gab bekannt, dass sie das Ziel der Klimaneutralität bis 2025 deutlich verfehlen wird (vgl. Wolff 2022, o.S.).MünchenMünchen wurde im Jahr 1158 erstmals urkundlich erwähnt und liegt am Fluss Isar, der im Stadtgebiet eine Länge von 13,7 Kilometern einnimmt (vgl. Stadt München 2023, o.S.). Die Stadt ist bereits seit Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts die bayrische Landeshauptstadt (vgl. Stahleder 2023, o.S.). Heute hat München mehr als 1,5 Millionen Einwohner und kann damit einen deutlichen Bevölkerungsanstieg verbuchen (vgl. Statistisches Amt München 2023, o.S.). Verglichen mit dem Jahr 2004 stieg die Anzahl der Einwohner:innen um 300.000 Menschen (vgl. Münchner Stadtmuseum 2004, S. 155). München liegt etwa 519 Meter über dem Meeresspiegel und hat eine Fläche von mehr als 310 Quadratkilometern, wodurch die Stadt flächenmäßig zu den größten Städten Deutschlands gehört (vgl. Stadt München 2023, o.S.).Grundlegende Informationen und BesonderheitenAnlass der Gründung Münchens war ein Konflikt zwischen Herzog Heinrich dem Löwen und Bischof Otto I. von Freising (vgl. Scholz 2004, S. 20). Das Bevölkerungswachstum stieg rasch an, was bereits zur Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts eine deutliche Vergrößerung der Stadt nötig machte (vgl. Scholz 2004, S. 22). Die Isar wurde in München bereits vor mehreren Jahrhunderten als Transportmittel für Waren genutzt und prägte daher die Entwicklung der Stadt maßgeblich (vgl. Scholz 2004, S. 31f.).Im Jahr 1795 begann eine neue Entwicklung. Die bisher genutzten Festigungsanlagen wurden aufgegeben und die dynamische, unbegrenzte Weiterentwicklung der Stadt konnte gelingen (vgl. Lehmbruch 2004, S. 38). Im Laufe der Jahrhunderte kam es zu mehreren Eingemeindungen (vgl. Münchner Stadtmuseum 2004, S. 155). Während des Zweiten Weltkriegs wurden 90 Prozent der historischen Altstadt Münchens zerstört und die Stadt verlor bis zum Ende des Krieges mehr als die Hälfte seiner Einwohner:innen (vgl. Stahleder 2023, o.S.).Münchens Grünanlagen nehmen etwa 13,4 Prozent der gesamten Stadtfläche ein. Den größten zusammenhängenden Teil bildet dabei der Englische Garten mit einer Größe von 374,13 Hektar (vgl. Stadt München 2023, o.S.). Die Jahresmitteltemperatur in München liegt im Durchschnitt bei 8,7 Grad Celsius und der Niederschlag beträgt circa 834 Millimeter im Jahr (vgl. Deutscher Wetterdienst 2023, o.S.). In jüngster Zeit hat München mit einigen Extremwetterereignissen zu kämpfen gehabt, unter anderem mit Starkregen (vgl. Handel 2023, o.S.) und Rekord-Hitzewellen (vgl. Harter 2023, o.S.). Verkehr und MobilitätMünchen arbeitet seit vielen Jahren an seiner Verkehrsstrategie. Der ursprüngliche Verkehrsentwicklungsplan wurde bereits im Jahr 2006 veröffentlicht. Im Sommer 2021 wurde ein neuer Entwurf bezüglich der zukünftigen Mobilitätsplanung beschlossen. Der Stadtrat setzte sich dabei ambitionierte Ziele: Der Verkehr im Stadtgebiet sollte demnach innerhalb von vier Jahren zu mindestens 80 Prozent durch abgasfreie Fahrzeuge beziehungsweise den ÖPNV oder den Fuß- und Radverkehr realisiert werden. Weiterhin soll der Verkehr in München bis 2035 vollständig klimaneutral sein (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2023c, o.S.). Der neue Mobilitätsplan der Stadt soll den zukünftigen Herausforderungen gerecht werden. Dazu zählt unter anderem die steigende Bevölkerungszahl und der somit zunehmende Mobilitätsbedarf sowie der Umwelt- und Gesundheitsschutz (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2023b, o.S.).Der motorisierte Individualverkehr nimmt in der bayrischen Landeshauptstadt nach wie vor einen hohen Stellenwert ein und wurde 2017 von rund 24 Prozent der Münchner:innen in Anspruch genommen. Die Anzahl der täglich bewältigten Personenkilometer nahm ebenfalls zu, was durch den Anstieg der Bevölkerung und die Zunahme der täglichen Strecken erklärt wird (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2022, S. 107f.).Der ÖPNV wurde im Jahr 2017 von 24 Prozent der Münchner:innen genutzt, was verglichen mit dem Jahr 2008 ein leichter Anstieg ist. Verglichen mit dem Jahr 2008 wird das Fahrrad mit 18 Prozent von weniger Münchner:innen genutzt (vgl. ebd. 2022, S. 107f.). Die Stadt kommt in ihrem Nachhaltigkeitsbericht zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Entwicklung in Richtung ÖPNV und des Radverkehrs geht. Durch das starke Wachstum der Stadt und des Umlands kommt es jedoch zu einem Anstieg des Verkehrs insgesamt, was die eigentlich positive Entwicklung aufhebt (vgl. ebd. 2022, S. 107f.). Die Stadt München beschäftigt sich seit einiger Zeit mit sogenannten Radschnellverbindungen."Radschnellverbindungen sind hochwertige Verbindungen im Radverkehrsnetz (von Kommunen oder Stadt­Umland­Regionen), die wichtige Zielbereiche (zum Beispiel Stadtteilzentren, Wohn­ und Arbeitsplatzschwerpunkte, (Hoch­)Schulen) mit hohen Potenzialen über größere Entfernungen verknüpfen und durchgängig ein sicheres und attraktives Befahren mit hohen Reisegeschwindigkeiten […] ermöglichen" (Landeshauptstadt München 2022, S. 109).Solche Strecken haben somit das Potential, einen nicht zu unterschätzenden Beitrag hin zur grünen Mobilität zu leisten. Radschnellwege können nicht nur für die Freizeit, sondern auch von Berufspendler:innen genutzt werden und sind daher eine Alternative zum Auto. Die Landeshauptstadt München hat bereits mehrere Machbarkeitsstudien in Auftrag gegeben. Die Ergebnisse belegen, dass viele dieser Strecken, beispielsweise die Strecke zwischen der Innenstadt Münchens und Starnberg, technisch machbar und wirtschaftlich gewinnbringend sind (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München/Landratsamt München/Landratsamt Starnberg 2020, S. 29).Die lange Planung der Radschnellwege ist seit diesem Jahr in einer neuen Phase. Im Juni 2023 wurde mit dem Bau der ersten von insgesamt fünf Strecken begonnen, welche die Stadt München mit Unterschleißheim und Garching verbinden soll (vgl. Heudorfer 2023, o.S.). Gleichzeitig müssen die enorm hohen Kosten für den Bau solcher Strecken berücksichtigt werden. Dies ist der Grund, weshalb beispielsweise die Strecke zwischen München und Starnberg nicht realisiert wird (vgl. ebd. 2023, o.S.).München plant die Reduzierung des Autoverkehrs in seiner Altstadt. So soll mehr Platz für Fußgänger:innen, Radfahrende und den ÖPNV geschaffen werden. Die Stadt nennt eine Reihe an Maßnahmen, die das Ziel einer autofreien Altstadt realisieren sollen. Dazu zählen unter anderem das Errichten und die Erweiterung von Fußgängerzonen, die Neuregelung des Parkens, was auch das Erhöhen der Parkgebühren beinhaltet, die Verbesserung des Liefer- und Ladeverkehrs sowie das Erbauen eines breiten Radrings in der Altstadt (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2023a, o.S.).Ein Pilotprojekt diesbezüglich befindet sich in der zentral gelegenen Kolumbusstraße. Die Straße wurde für Fahrzeuge gesperrt und mit Rollrasen, Sitzmöglichkeiten und Hochbeeten ausgestattet (vgl. Stäbler 2023, o.S.). Das Projekt hat jedoch nicht nur Befürworter:innen. Der Verlust von knapp 40 Parkplätzen sowie der Lärm durch spielende Kinder wird kritisiert (vgl. ebd. 2023, o.S.).Der ÖPNV hat in München einen hohen Stellenwert. Bereits im Jahr 2010 lag München im Vergleich unter den besten deutschen Städten. Berücksichtigt wurde damals unter anderem die Fahrtdauer, die Informationslage und die Preise (vgl. Wagner 2010, o.S.). Eine ADAC-Studie zeigt, dass München im Jahr 2021 die teuerste Einzelfahrkarte unter 21 deutschen Großstädten mit mehr als 300.000 Einwohner:innen hatte. Die Münchner Monatskarte sowie die Wochenkarte hingegen war mit Abstand am günstigsten. Die Monatskarte kostete im Vergleich zu Hamburg knapp die Hälfte (vgl. ADAC 2021, o.S.). Dieser Aspekt muss hinsichtlich der Einführung des Deutschlandtickets und der damit verbundenen Preisentwicklung des ÖPNV neu bewertet werden, ist jedoch aufgrund der damals fehlenden Alternative des Deutschlandtickets nicht zu vernachlässigen.Langfristig plant München eine Bahnstrecke, die Stadt und Umland miteinander verbindet und das bereits vorhandene Schienennetz ergänzt. Dieses Projekt ist zuletzt aus finanziellen Gründen gescheitert, soll jedoch durch spezielle Buslinien kompensiert und nach Möglichkeit neu geprüft werden (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2023d, o.S.). Um die Kapazität des ÖPNV in München und Umland zu erhöhen, werden im Rahmen eines Programms verschiedene Maßnahmen umgesetzt. Dazu zählt unter anderem die Anbindung an den Flughafen und der Ausbau der Schieneninfrastruktur im Nordosten Münchens (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2023d, o.S.).Auch das U-Bahn- und Tramnetz soll durch die Münchner Verkehrsgesellschaft (MVG) ausgebaut werden. Vorgesehen ist die Verlängerung beziehungsweise der Neubau verschiedener Strecken (vgl. ebd. 2023d, o.S.). Gleichzeitig wird auf die Problematik verwiesen, dass die Kapazitätsgrenze des Schienenverkehrs in München und der Region bereits erreicht ist (vgl. ebd., o.S.).Die bayrische Landeshauptstadt setzt sich selbst ambitionierte Ziele, was den Verkehr und die Mobilität betreffen. Bereits seit vielen Jahren wurde mit entsprechenden Planungen begonnen. Auf der Webseite der Landeshauptstadt finden sich viele Informationen und Vorhaben bezüglich der Verkehrsplanung. Der Ausbau des Fahrradverkehrs, vor allem die Planungen von Radschnellstrecken sind vielsprechend. Die Machbarkeitsstudien belegen das große Potential. Da jedoch erst vor einigen Monaten mit dem Bau der ersten Strecke begonnen wurde, muss München hier in relativ kurzer Zeit viel erreichen.Gleichzeitig kann somit nicht abschließend festgestellt werden, wie groß das Potential der Radschnellverbindungen in der Praxis ist. Der Zuwachs der Stadt München und des Umlands stellt die Landeshauptstadt vor Herausforderungen in doppelter Hinsicht. Obwohl der Anteil der Radfahrenden und der ÖPNV-Fahrenden deutlich zugenommen hat, steigt der Verkehr insgesamt. Gleichzeitig stellt die Stadt fest, dass der ÖPNV an der Kapazitätsgrenze ist. Dennoch müssen die positiven Aspekte betrachtet werden. Hierzu zählt unter anderem das Potential des Münchner ÖPNV und der verschiedenen Projekte. Auch wenn es von der Planung bis zur Umsetzung viele Jahre dauert, ist München sicherlich vielen Städten, vor allem im deutschen Städtevergleich, voraus, da die Planungen früh begonnen haben.Weitere Maßnahmen und HerausforderungenHier werden nun weitere Maßnahmen untersucht. Dabei wird, wie bei Kopenhagen, in exemplarischer Weise auf den Bereich der Extremwetter- beziehungsweise Klimawandelanpassung und den Bereich der kommunalen Wärmeplanung eingegangen. Gleichzeitig werden Herausforderungen, Chancen und Schwierigkeiten beleuchtet, die sich daraus ergeben.Die bayrische Landeshauptstadt hat im Jahr 2019 den Klimanotstand ausgerufen. Damit verbunden ist das Ziel der Klimaneutralität bis 2035 (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2023e, o.S.). Das Klima in der Stadt München weist aufgrund der dichten Bebauung spezifische Besonderheiten auf. Dazu zählt der sogenannte "Wärmeinseleffekt", der dazu führt, dass ein Temperaturunterschied im Vergleich zum Münchner Umland besteht (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München u. a. 2016, S. 8).Im Stadtgebiet ist es deshalb im Durchschnitt zwei bis drei Grad wärmer, wobei der Temperaturunterschied in der Nacht deutlich höher ausfällt: Im Vergleich zum Münchner Umland ist es nachts im Stadtgebiet Münchens bis zu zehn Grad wärmer, was durch den Klimawandel und den damit verbundenen Anstieg der Durchschnittstemperatur noch deutlich ansteigen wird (vgl. ebd. 2016, S. 8).Dementsprechend sieht das Klimaanpassungskonzept verschiedene Maßnahmen vor. Dazu zählt zum Beispiel der Ausbau der Dachbegrünung und Photovoltaikanlagen auf Gebäuden, die Verbesserung des Wärmeschutzes in der Gebäudeplanung und Förderprogramme für Klimaanpassungsmaßnahmen auf privaten Grundstücken (vgl. ebd. 2016, S. 40). In München gründeten sich einige Bewegungen, die sich für mehr Nachhaltigkeit einsetzen. Die Münchner Initiative Nachhaltigkeit (MIN) ist ein Beispiel dafür und setzt sich aus mehrheitlich zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen zusammen. Die Ziele der MIN orientieren sich an den SDGs (vgl. Münchner Initiative Nachhaltigkeit 2023, o.S.).Der Münchner Nachhaltigkeitsbericht liefert interessante Aufschlüsse. Der Anteil der erneuerbaren Energien im Gebiet der Stadtwerke München lag 2019 bei insgesamt 6,4 Prozent. Den größten Anteil hat dabei die Wasserkraft, gefolgt von Solar (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2022, S. 85). Ökostrom soll in den eigenen Stadtwerken langfristig betrachtet in ausreichender Menge erzeugt werden, um damit die Stadt München selbst versorgen zu können.Daraus ergibt sich für den Leiter der Stadtwerke die politische Aufgabe, die Energiewende voranzubringen (vgl. Hutter 2019, o.S.). Gerade die lokale Erzeugung von Ökostrom kann sich in einer dicht bebauten Stadt als schwierig herausstellen. Hier stellt sich die Frage, wie viel Potential München und das direkte Umland hat. Dabei kann es sich zum Beispiel um den Auf- und Ausbau umliegender Windräder oder Biomassekraftwerke handeln (vgl. ebd., o.S.).München setzt auf Tiefengeothermie und kann einen Anstieg in der Erzeugung und den Anteil der Tiefengeothermie am Fernwärmeverbrauch verbuchen. Jedoch lag der Anteil der Geothermie am Fernwärmeverbrauch im Jahr 2019 lediglich bei 3,8 Prozent (vgl. Landeshauptstadt München 2022, S. 86f.). Aktuell wird in München das größte Geothermiekraftwerk Europas erbaut. Somit ist davon auszugehen, dass der Anteil der Geothermie innerhalb der Fernwärmeversorgung in München weiter zunimmt und diese in der Konsequenz Schritt für Schritt nachhaltiger und regenerativ gestalten (vgl. Schneider 2022, o.S.). In München befinden sich momentan sechs Geothermieanlagen. Durch die Erweiterungen soll das Fernwärmenetz den Wärmebedarf Münchens bis 2040 klimaneutral abdecken (vgl. Stadtwerke München 2023a, o.S.).Die Methode der Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung (KWK), also die gleichzeitige Gewinnung von mechanischer Energie und nutzbarer Wärme (vgl. Umweltbundesamt 2022, o.S.), wird von den Stadtwerken München genutzt und dient als eine Art Zwischenlösung, die intensiver genutzt wird, bis der Ausbau der Geothermieanlagen abgeschlossen ist (vgl. Stadtwerke München 2023b, o.S.). Die durch die Stromerzeugung der KWK-Methode gewonnene Abwärme wird in das Fernwärmenetz der Stadt München eingespeist. Die so erzeugte Fernwärme kann dementsprechend schon heute in einem beträchtlichen Maß umweltschonend bereitgestellt werden und ersetzt laut den Stadtwerken München bereits etwa 400 Millionen Liter Heizöl und spart pro Jahr eine Millionen Tonnen CO2 ein (vgl. ebd. 2023b, o.S.).Die Stromerzeugung selbst funktioniert mit Brennstoffen. Neben erneuerbaren Energien können dabei auch fossile Energieträger zum Einsatz kommen. Die Stadtwerke München selbst setzen sich das langfristige Ziel, fossile Brennstoffe abzulösen (vgl. ebd. 2023b, o.S.). Das Heizkraftwerk Süd der Stadtwerke München arbeitet beispielsweise mit der KWK-Methode. Die Stromerzeugung wird durch Erdgas gewährleistet (vgl. Stadtwerke München 2022, o.S.). Somit wird ein fossiler Brennstoff verwendet.Im deutschen Städtevergleich gilt München oft als Vorreiter, was Nachhaltigkeitsbemühungen betrifft. München hat 2019 den Klimanotstand ausgerufen und sich das Ziel gesetzt, bis 2035 klimaneutral zu werden. Das Ausrufen des Klimanotstands hat eher symbolischen Charakter. Dennoch wird die Dringlichkeit der Sache damit auch auf kommunaler Ebene betont.Bezüglich der Anpassung an Extremwetterereignisse finden sich viele Informationen der Stadt München. Dabei werden auch viele Maßnahmen genannt, die nach und nach umgesetzt werden sollen. Die Stadt ist sich der Relevanz des Themas bewusst. Durch das veränderte Stadtklima wird deutlich, wie wichtig die Anpassung an Extremwetterereignisse ist, um das Leben in der Stadt auch zukünftig zu sichern.Im Fall von München sind die Maßnahmen gegen Hitze besonders relevant. Hier hat München bereits Pilotprojekte und verschiedene Fördermaßnahmen in die Wege geleitet. Im Bereich der Energieversorgung muss vor allem die Tiefengeothermie benannt werden. München setzt verstärkt darauf und erkennt das große Potential. Gleichzeitig müssen die hohen Kosten und der damit verbundene Aufwand berücksichtigt werden.Aktuell kommen auch KWK-Werke zum Einsatz. Dies ermöglicht die umweltschonende Bereitstellung von Fernwärme. Der Einsatz mehrerer Geothermieanlagen kann dieses Potential jedoch beträchtlich steigern. Erdgas wird zur Erzeugung von Strom in München auch aktuell eingesetzt. Langfristig wollen die Stadtwerke jedoch ohne den Einsatz fossiler Brennstoffe arbeiten. Die Fernwärme Münchens ist weit ausgebaut und bietet hohes Potential. Dennoch zeigen erst die nächsten Jahre, wie nachhaltig und flächendeckend das Fernwärmenetz konkret ausgebaut werden kann.ErkenntnisseDie Einwohnerzahl Kopenhagens ist in den letzten Jahren gestiegen. Auch zukünftig muss die Stadt mit einem Bevölkerungswachstum rechnen. In München ist ebenso von einem Bevölkerungsanstieg auszugehen, was auch in den letzten Jahren der Fall war. Der Anstieg der Bevölkerung in Zahlen ist deutlich höher, was sich durch die größere Fläche der bayrischen Landeshauptstadt zumindest teilweise relativieren lässt. Im direkten Vergleich ist München mehr als drei Mal so groß wie Kopenhagen.Kopenhagen gilt als eine der besten Fahrradstädte weltweit. Dies führt neben den positiven Aspekten auch zu vollen Fahrradwegen. Die Stadt reagiert mit der Verbreiterung von Fahrradwegen und der Sperrung beziehungsweise Verkleinerung von Autofahrbahnen und ganzen Straßen. München geht diesbezüglich nicht so konsequent vor, hat jedoch ein vergleichbares Pilotprojekt gestartet, welches eine zentrale Straße zeitweise für den Autoverkehr gesperrt hat.Das Fahrrad als Verkehrsmittel konnte sich in Kopenhagen bereits früh etablieren. Ein zentraler Faktor, der für das Fahrrad in Kopenhagen spricht, ist unter anderem die Zeitersparnis. Eine Reihe nicht-diskursiver Faktoren spielen eine wichtige Rolle für die bedeutsame Rolle des Fahrrads in der dänischen Hauptstadt. Neben der flachen Lage und der geringen Größe zählt dazu auch der politische Wille und die Bereitschaft, das Fahrrad als Verkehrsmittel kontinuierlich zu fördern.In München wurde die Relevanz des Fahrrads ebenfalls erkannt. München kann im Vergleich jedoch auf keine derart ausgeprägte Fahrradkultur zurückblicken. Dennoch stellt sich heraus, dass das Fahrrad in München nicht unterschätzt wird. Die aktuellen Planungen und erste bauliche Maßnahmen der Radschnellverbindungen belegen, dass die Stadt den Radverkehr als Alternative zum Auto etablieren möchte.Dabei sollen, wie es in Kopenhagen bereits der Fall ist, nicht nur Freizeitradler:innen, sondern auch Berufspendler:innen angesprochen werden. Das Münchner Umland soll in den Bau der Radschnellverbindungen zu weiten Teilen integriert werden. Theoretisch könnte München auf diese Weise trotz der deutlich weiteren Distanzen die optimale Infrastruktur für das Fahrrad als grüne Alternative etablieren.Der Autoverkehr spielt in Kopenhagen nach wie vor eine Rolle. Trotz einiger Maßnahmen müssen die CO2-Emissionen weiter reduziert werden. Die Emissionen im PKW-Bereich sind bis vor fünf Jahren noch angestiegen. Auch in München ist der Autoverkehr relevant und wurde im Jahr 2017 von fast einem Viertel der Münchner:innen genutzt. Von der Stadt München werden verschiedene Maßnahmen benannt, die zu einer autofreien Altstadt führen sollen. Dabei soll ähnlich wie in Kopenhagen vorgegangen werden, unter anderem mit der Erweiterung von Fußgängerzonen. Kopenhagen scheint diesbezüglich jedoch weiter fortgeschritten zu sein. Bei der Verkleinerung von Fahrbahnen im Bereich des Autoverkehrs handelt es sich dort um dauerhafte Maßnahmen. In München beschränkt sich dies bislang auf Pilotprojekte und Vorhaben.Beide Städte haben ein gut ausgebautes ÖPNV-Netz. In München ist sich die Stadt der Tatsache bewusst, dass die aktuelle ÖPNV-Infrastruktur an seiner Kapazitätsgrenze angekommen ist. Aus diesem Grund plant München den Ausbau und setzt bereits einige Großprojekte, unter anderem die Erweiterung der Schieneninfrastruktur, in verschiedenen Stadteilen, um. Vor allem das Tramnetz hat sicherlich das Potential, für Münchner:innen eine dauerhafte Alternative zum Auto zu sein. Da das Hauptproblem augenscheinlich die Kapazitätsgrenze des bestehenden Schienennetzes ist, kommt es auf den zügigen und konsequenten Ausbau in den nächsten Jahren an.Kopenhagen hat im Vergleich bereits im Jahr 2019 eine Stadtlinie eröffnet, die immer weiter ausgebaut wird. Kopenhagen will die Attraktivität des ÖPNVs auch während der Rushhour gewährleisten. Dies lässt darauf schließen, dass einer der Hauptfaktoren auch hier die aktuelle Auslastung der vorhandenen öffentlichen Verkehrsmittel ist. In diesem Bereich haben beide Städte somit ähnliche Herausforderungen zu bewältigen. Beide Städte sind aktiv und scheinen den ÖPNV als dauerhaftes Verkehrsmittel fördern zu wollen.Kopenhagen liegt direkt am Meer und 24 Meter über dem Meeresspiegel. Ähnlich wie München sieht sich Kopenhagen mit Extremwetterereignissen konfrontiert. In Kopenhagen regnet es sehr häufig und durch die Lage am Meer und die geringe Höhe über dem Meeresspiegel sind Sturmfluten und Überschwemmungen keine Seltenheit. München hat ebenso mit Starkregen zu kämpfen, wobei Hitzewellen hier auch nicht zu unterschätzen sind. Beide Städte stellen verschiedene Maßnahmen vor, die zur Vermeidung negativer Folgen führen sollen. In der Umsetzung hat Kopenhagen bereits Erstaunliches erreicht, um sich vor Starkregen zu schützen. Beide Städte nehmen die durch den Klimawandel entstehenden Extremwetterereignisse und deren mögliche Folgen ernst und arbeiten an spezifischen Lösungen.Die Energieversorgung ist in beiden Städten ein zentraler Aspekt. Beide Städte nehmen hier in gewisser Weise Vorreiterrollen ein. Sowohl Kopenhagen als auch München fördern den Einsatz erneuerbarer Technologien in verschiedener Hinsicht. Das Fernwärmenetz in Kopenhagen ist bereits sehr gut ausgebaut. Gleichzeitig kann die Fernwärme Kopenhagens bereits zu 80 Prozent aus erneuerbaren Energien gewonnen werden. Die dänische Hauptstadt hat hier einige Vorzeigeprojekte, unter anderem die Müllverbrennungsanlage Amager Bakke.Die Stadt München setzt vermehrt auf Tiefengeothermie und treibt den Ausbau voran. Dies soll die Fernwärme nach und nach nachhaltiger machen. Bis 2040 soll das Fernwärmenetz in München somit klimaneutral arbeiten können. Die KWK-Methode wird in München eingesetzt und spart nennenswerte Mengen an CO2 ein. Fossile Brennstoffe kommen hier aber nach wie vor zum Einsatz. Dennoch hat auch München ein ausgefeiltes Konzept und ist vor allem im deutschen Vergleich weit vorangeschritten und hat bereits früh nach alternativen Wegen gesucht. Daher sind die Fortschritte Münchens in der Wärmeversorgung beachtlich. Im direkten Vergleich kann Kopenhagen jedoch mit noch mehr Innovation und aktuell größeren Fortschritten punkten.FazitEs wurde untersucht, wie eine nachhaltige Stadt gestaltet werden kann. Eine aktuelle Bestandsaufnahme zeigt, dass die Entwicklungen in Städten sehr unterschiedlich sind. Die Abkehr von der Vorstellung einer autogerechten Stadt scheint sinnvoll. Bereits vorhandene ÖPNV-Strukturen und weitere Alternativen zum motorisierten Individualverkehr müssen effizienter genutzt oder geschaffen werden. Der Energiesektor ist besonders relevant, da hier die größten Möglichkeiten hinsichtlich einer Reduzierung von Emissionen bestehen. Städte sollten daher Maßnahmen etablieren, um den Energiebedarf zu senken und auf regenerative Energien umsteigen zu können. In dieser Arbeit wurde bezogen auf den Bereich der Energie die kommunale Wärmeplanung berücksichtigt.Untersucht wurden die Bereiche des Verkehrs und der Mobilität, der Extremwetteranpassung und der kommunalen Wärmeplanung. München und Kopenhagen haben in den untersuchten Bereichen bereits eine Vielzahl an Maßnahmen und Vorhaben vorgestellt und initiiert. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass die spezifischen Gegebenheiten in Städten stets berücksichtigt werden müssen. Diese unterschiedlichen Gegebenheiten führen dazu, dass ein Städtevergleich nicht in jedem Aspekt einer nachhaltigen Stadtentwicklung zielführend ist. München zeigt jedoch am Beispiel der geplanten Radschnellverbindungen, dass es auch Lösungen für suboptimale Gegebenheiten gibt, in diesem Fall für größere Distanzen beim Radverkehr.Beide Städte sind fortgeschritten, was den Bereich der nachhaltigen Mobilität betrifft. Hier stellt vor allem der erwartete Bevölkerungsanstieg eine Herausforderung dar, da dies zur weiteren Be- beziehungsweise Überlastung der bestehenden Verkehrsinfrastruktur und zur Zunahme des Verkehrs generell führen wird. Dementsprechend finden sich in beiden Städten Projekte, die auch teils in der Umsetzung und bezogen auf die Zukunft der nachhaltigen Mobilität vielversprechend sind. Hier bleiben jedoch die konkreten Fortschritte in den nächsten Jahren abzuwarten, was eine erneute Untersuchung zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt interessant macht. Die Vision beziehungsweise Utopie einer autofreien Stadt scheint für Kopenhagen einen Schritt näher zu sein. München zeigt jedoch, dass zumindest eine autofreie Altstadt in naher Zukunft nicht undenkbar ist.Die Anpassung an die Folgen des Klimawandels ist für beide Städte relevant. Kopenhagen hat hier eine Reihe innovativer Projekte bereits umgesetzt. München stellt viele Maßnahmen vor, die im Detail jedoch noch weiter vorangetrieben werden müssen.Bezogen auf die kommunale Wärmeplanung gehen beide Städte verschiedene Wege und haben bestimmte Visionen. Einen Beitrag zur Energiewende wollen beide Städte und deren ansässige Stadtwerke leisten. Die Fernwärme ist sowohl in Kopenhagen als auch in München der zentrale Faktor. Kopenhagen ist bezogen auf den Anteil erneuerbarer Energien und den Ausbau des Fernwärmenetzes weiter fortgeschritten als München. Ebenso bestehen in Kopenhagen innovative Ideen zur nachhaltigen Erzeugung von Fernwärme und zur Einbettung verschiedener Anlagen in die Kopenhagener Stadt und das Umland. München setzt auf die Nutzung von Geothermie, was zu einer sehr guten CO-2-Bilanz beitragen kann.In den untersuchten Bereichen weisen beide Städte Fortschritte auf. Kopenhagen hat zeitlich betrachtet deutlich früher mit dem Ausbau einer nachhaltigen Stadtentwicklung begonnen. Dementsprechend sind einige Pläne ausgereifter und es finden sich hinsichtlich der untersuchten Bereiche mehr konkrete Umsetzungen. München könnte hier jedoch in den nächsten Jahren ähnlich weit voranschreiten, was unter anderem hinsichtlich des Maßnahmenkatalogs deutlich wird. Auch aus diesem Grund wäre die Betrachtung zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt interessant und würde weitere Aufschlüsse liefern.Durch die Untersuchung der Verkehrsinfrastruktur und der kommunalen Wärmeplanung beider Städte wurden Schlüsselaspekte einer nachhaltigen Stadtentwicklung berücksichtigt. Dennoch muss betont werden, dass bei weitem nicht alle Aspekte einer nachhaltigen Stadt berücksichtigt und untersucht werden konnten. Dies würde den Rahmen dieser Arbeit sprengen. Eine Untersuchung in weiteren Bereichen würde daher eine sinnvolle Ergänzung darstellen.LiteraturverzeichnisAachener Stiftung Kathy Beys (2015): Nachhaltiger Lebensstil (Aachener Stiftung Kathy Beys vom 16.12.2015) < https://www.nachhaltigkeit.info/artikel/nachhaltiger_lebensstil_1978.htm > (11.11.2023).ADAC (2021). 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This Nota internacional CIDOB summarises the discussions held during a Foreign Policy Dialogue organised by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) on April 19th, 2024. It is based on contributions from the participants, although not all views and opinions expressed in this publication are necessarily theirs.Rethinking the prevailing approach to peace between Palestinians and Israelis requires more than the symbolic recognition of Palestinian statehood; it means addressing the root causes of this conflict such as colonisation and occupation, as well as practical clarity on how to guarantee the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Regional de-escalation cannot begin without a ceasefire in Gaza. In the long view, the desire to restore stability shared by most Middle Eastern countries should be seen as an opportunity to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European Union (EU) can contribute to conflict resolution and peace by taking action against Israel's war crimes, making the two-state solution more than an empty slogan and supporting regional de-escalation.The Hamas-led attacks of October 7th, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza clearly represent a pivotal moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel's military response to these attacks, resulting in nearly 1,140 deaths and the abduction of around 240 Israelis and foreign nationals, has killed over 34,200 Palestinians, mostly civilians. Additionally, more than 85% of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have been forcibly displaced and half of Gaza's population is on the brink of starvation. Meanwhile, violence in the West Bank has surged to levels not seen since the Second Intifada. Clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians there, coupled with increased Israeli military raids, have claimed the lives of over 460 Palestinians in the past seven months.The conflict has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine, too, heightening the risk of regional war. Increasing clashes between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah raise the spectre of an all-out war, while other emerging flashpoints in the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and Jordan have drawn the United States and some allies into confrontation with armed groups aligned with the "axis of resistance". The recent Iranian retaliation against Israel adds a further layer of potential risk of regional escalation.Despite mounting casualties, calls for a ceasefire in Gaza have gone unheeded. But there is a growing chorus of voices advocating for conflict resolution and peace, including High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. While the specifics of his 10-point plan have yet to be revealed, the underlying principles resonate within the international community: a political resolution to this conflict is imperative, involving the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders alongside that of Israel. Amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza and escalating violence in the region, what impacts is this war having in Israel and the Occupied Palestinians Territories (OPT)? What does a political solution in Israel and Palestine require? How can the Palestinian question, which is pivotal to regional stability, remain at the forefront of discussions about regional de-escalation? Finally, what role can the European Union (EU) play in this volatile context? Assessing the failures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflictPrior to October 7th, the United States considered the Middle East to be "quieter" than it had been in two decades. The Hamas-led attacks shattered this perception by exposing the deep-rooted operational and conceptual failures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Operationally, these attacks laid bare the longstanding security failures in Israel's conflict management strategy. In addition to the air, land and sea blockade of the Gaza Strip since 2007, the Israeli military occupation and expansion of illegal settlements across the West Bank have helped to make a two-state solution an elusive prospect. These approaches failed to deliver peace and security to the Israelis, not to mention how they denied Palestinian security and resulted in multilevel forms of oppression. In essence, the shift from conflict resolution to conflict management has proven ineffective.Conceptually, the Hamas attacks underscore the absence of any true "status quo" in such profoundly asymmetric circumstances, where the dominant party, Israel, continues to expand its illegal settlements in the OPT, rendering any efforts by the weaker party, the Palestinians, to challenge such a situation fraught with peril. Regionally, October 7th shattered the illusion that stability and peace in the Middle East could be attained while obliterating the Palestinian cause. Globally, they serve as a tragic reminder of the lack of accountability mechanisms and effective pressure on Israel to comply with international law and address human rights violations.While the root causes of this conflict remain the same as prior to October 7th, the main difference between the current Gaza war and previous episodes of violence lies in the unprecedented intensity of that violence. In Israel, the magnitude of the death toll resulting from the Hamas-led attacks revived the idea that Israel is under existential threat and brought an end to 39 weeks of mass protests. Portrayed by Israeli diplomats as Israel's equivalent of 9/11, these attacks have intensified calls for the erasure (or resettlement) of the Gaza Strip and the annexation of the West Bank. Israel is engaged in one of its largest and bloodiest wars since it was formed, yet the ongoing military operation has failed to achieve any of the stated goals: Hamas has not been eradicated, the Israeli hostages have not been freed through military coercion, and rockets continue to be launched from Gaza into Israeli territory. Consequently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces pressure on at least three fronts: a military stalemate in Gaza; domestic pressure to free Israeli hostages; and growing international pressure over accusations Israel is provoking a man-made famine and committing genocide. Yet without strong US pressure, it is difficult to see an end to this war.In Gaza, the death toll and level of destruction are unprecedented. The EU's top diplomat, Josep Borrell, described the Strip as the world's "greatest open-air graveyard". According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), if the current Israeli operation were to end immediately, it would take Gaza until 2092 to restore the GDP levels of 2022. But Israel's strategy, which consisted of attacking the civil population to make it turn against Hamas, has proven a failure. While some of its leaders have been killed by Israel, Hamas is proving resilient militarily and politically. Palestinians in Gaza have not turned against it yet and support for the Palestinian movement has increased across the West Bank. Moreover, the ongoing war in Gaza has relaunched intra-Palestinian talks for national reconciliation, confirming that a role for Hamas in future negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis is inevitable.These talks should not overlook the fact that there are diverging interests between Fatah and Hamas in both the short and long term. While Fatah recognises Hamas as part of the Palestinian political landscape, it is currently under pressure from the US to exclude Hamas from any plans for after the war in Gaza. Fatah's engagement in these talks is driven by the intention on the part of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to administer Gaza once the war ends. Hamas, however, has no desire to be part of a body that has been grappling with a deep legitimacy crisis, nor does it want to participate in a hypothetical technocratic government in the Gaza Strip. Its primary objectives are to become part of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), the sole political entity representing the Palestinian people, and to have a hand in attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.With Israel's war against Hamas showing no signs of ending, regional escalation presents an opportunity to address these conceptual and operational failures and rethink the dominant approach to achieving peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Rethinking peace: from symbolic gestures to concrete actionIn the words of former Jordanian diplomat Marwan al-Muasher, returning to the previous negotiating format once the war on Gaza ends "would be like reheating spoiled food, and is bound to fail". Rethinking peace in the current context requires addressing the often overlooked root causes of this conflict, while applying the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.In this respect, the two-state solution should commence – rather than conclude – by addressing Israeli colonisation and occupation. Three decades on since the Oslo Accords, approximately 700,000 Israeli settlers reside illegally in the OPT. Colonisation still remains one of the main priorities of Netanyahu's government, and has accelerated dramatically since October 7th. This has exacerbated the systematic oppression, violence and discrimination against Palestinians. While various actors, including the US administration and the EU, advocate for the two-state solution, the Israeli prime minister openly stated that Israel should "control the entire area from the river to the sea" in any future arrangement. Furthermore, years-long settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank has increased over the past seven months, often with active support from the Israeli security forces. Both the US and the EU have imposed sanctions on individuals and entities financing the violence. While these sanctions are a commendable effort to hold Israel accountable for its illegal settlements, they must not overlook the systemic character of colonisation and occupation in the OPT. Discussions about the two-state solution should therefore be inseparable from ending Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.Similarly, calls to recognise Palestinian statehood should carry more than symbolic weight. While they hold significant symbolic value, recognising Palestinian statehood is also an act of justice towards the Palestinians, placing them on an equal footing with Israelis. Moreover, such calls serve as a means to put pressure on Israel, which rejects the two-state solutions, and to advocate for the "revitalisation" of the Palestinian Authority. In Europe, the momentum for recognition is building, with several EU member states – including Belgium, Ireland, Malta, Norway, Slovenia and Spain – seeking to form an alliance to recognise Palestine as a nation state in accordance with the 1999 Berlin Declaration. However, the practical implications of Palestinian statehood remain unclear, highlighting the urgent need to address these issues. Questions persist regarding enforcement and implementation mechanisms to ensure Palestinian statehood, as well as how to effectively tackle colonisation and resolve the fate of over 5.9 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).In the immediate term, there is a consensus among observers on the need to hold new elections in both Israel and Palestine to usher in leaders committed to resolving this conflict. In Israel, the current wave of anti-government protests could trigger another snap vote. However, new elections may not necessarily bring an end to the conflict, as the majority of Israeli citizens support the ongoing war in Gaza.On the Palestinian side, the key question revolves around the role Hamas would play in such a process. Despite military setbacks, Hamas remains a necessary player in Palestinian politics. Notably, Israel has failed to "eradicate" it and its popularity has surged in the West Bank since the October 7th attacks. Put simply, Hamas is here to stay. Over the past seven months, the Palestinian movement has repeatedly signalled its willingness to engage in a peace process aimed at achieving the two state solution, which would involve recognising Israel and renouncing armed conflict against it. However, October 7th also reinforced perceptions that Hamas seeks the destruction of Israel, which presents significant obstacles to its participation in peace talks. Israel continues to call for Hamas's complete elimination and the EU continues to consider Hamas as a terrorist organisation and maintains its policy of no contact with the Islamist movement.The PA, meanwhile, faces a legitimacy crisis. There have been no elections for almost two decades and a staggering 84% of Palestinians are calling for the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas. Despite this, the EU views the PA as the sole legitimate Palestinian interlocutor. In this context, can Hamas be excluded from Palestinian politics despite its growing popularity? If so, how can the EU avoid repeating the 2006 scenario when it rejected Hamas's victory in the democratically held parliamentary elections? More importantly, how can any peace process between Palestinians and Israelis be conducted while excluding one of the parties that is labelled a terrorist organisation? These questions become more urgent as the regional dimensions of this conflict further stress the pivotal role of Hamas in regional de-escalation efforts. Regional escalation: an opportunity for regional peace?The regionalisation of the conflict between Israel and Hamas had already happened by October 2023. Several thousand professional mercenaries and non-Israeli foreign fighters joined the IDF, while Hezbollah, the Houthis and pro-Iranian militias have attacked Israeli and US targets across the region in response to the war in Gaza. Therefore, the question is not whether regionalisation can be avoided, but rather how to prevent the situation from deteriorating. In other words, the key challenge is to avoid a complete regional unravelling.The threat of wider war became more imminent with the escalation between Israel and Iran. Over the past few months, Iran has consistently declared its intention not to get involved in this conflict as it found itself in a favourable position. Firstly, the Hamas-led attacks shattered the myth of Israel's invincibility and temporarily halted the Abraham Accords, which were threatening to marginalise Iran. Secondly, Israel has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives in its current military operation in Gaza. Furthermore, Israel faces increasing isolation on the global stage and a growing domestic discontent. Despite this, repeated Israeli attacks on Iranian targets, culminating with the air strike on Tehran's consulate in Syria, provoked a large-scale response from Iran. Iran's response may have been large in scale, but the limited damage suggests that Tehran sent a clear message to the US and Israel: it does not seek a war with Israel.From a regional perspective, the escalation between Iran and Israel serves as a litmus test for both the Abraham Accords and the ongoing reconciliation efforts between Iran and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. While some Arab states' collaboration with US intelligence and/or Israeli forces may suggest a strategic alignment with Israel, the notion of an "Arab NATO" is overstated. GCC countries are not willing to jeopardise their reconciliation with Iran by forming an anti-Iran axis, despite the importance of their strategic and security ties with the US and Israel. Conversely, since October 7th, several GCC countries have engaged in dialogue with Tehran, primarily seeking to de-escalate tensions and safeguard their own security.Contrary to what Europeans and Americans may assume, most Gulf Arab states are not inclined to choose between normalisation with Israel or reconciliation with Iran. Instead, they see the necessity for both normalisation and reconciliation to restore regional stability. Rather than viewing it as a "normalisation versus reconciliation" dilemma, most regional actors prefer a scenario of "normalisation and reconciliation". And they all agree that addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial for restoring stability.In this context, the role played by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is paramount. For one thing, the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation facilitated by China has been instrumental in ensuring a minimum level of regional stability since October 2023. Following the escalation between Israel and Iran, this agreement is likely to have trickle-down effects in relation to the conflict in Yemen, regional economic cooperation dynamics and diplomacy. For another thing, a normalisation deal between KSA and Israel would not only benefit Israel but also the Biden administration, which has advocated for normalisation for several years. However, as the threat of regional escalation persists as long as the war on Gaza continues, Saudi Arabia will likely demand more concessions from the US to strike such a deal. In addition to US security guarantees and support for its civil nuclear programme, Riyadh insists on the creation of a Palestinian state as part of any such deal with Tel Aviv. Given that Arab countries have only limited ability to ease regional tensions without effective US pressure on Israel, Saudi Arabia's aspirations for regional leadership could be enhanced by advocating for the creation of a Palestinian state in exchange for normalisation of ties with Israel.While these scenarios may or may not come to fruition, one thing remains certain: regional de-escalation is impossible without a ceasefire in Gaza. Moreover, a ceasefire in Gaza alone may not suffice, considering the overlay of other conflicts. Mounting tensions between Hezbollah and Israel could escalate into full-scale war, while the Houthis in Yemen and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have leveraged their attacks for strategic advantage. Additionally, there is no indication that the recent escalation between Israel and Iran has concluded. In essence, the regional dimensions of this conflict must be central to ongoing discussions about the "day after" in Gaza. Recommendations for the European UnionDespite the magnitude of the Gaza war, the EU appears to be stuck in the pre-October 7th era and logic, behaving as if the situation on the ground had not deteriorated. While the current conflict has deepened existing divisions among EU member states, EU officials continue to engage in the same routines, issuing regular statements expressing regret over Israel's actions in the OPT without following up with concrete action. Against this backdrop, how can EU officials navigate an approach that breaks this cycle of repetitive poor practice? Despite its waning credibility in the region, the EU still has an opportunity to contribute to peace between Palestinians and Israelis and to stabilise the new regional order in the making.First, restoring the EU's legitimacy, credibility and reputation in the region involves setting firmer boundaries regarding Israel. This means concrete action such as suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement due to Israel's violation of the agreement's human rights clauses (as suggested by Spain and Ireland); imposing a complete arms embargo on Israel in response to its violation of international humanitarian law; and exerting effective pressure on Israel to cease its illegal settlement expansion in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem. While these actions should be taken at EU level, they can also be implemented by blocs of states, as demonstrated by the current initiative to recognise Palestinian statehood. Otherwise, the EU's failure to apply its own standards, values and principles – those it applies to Russia and Iran among others – will only render it more vulnerable to accusations of double standards and further deepen mistrust from Middle Eastern countries and societies.Second, from a regional perspective, the EU should aim for the best-case scenario for de-escalation, which would combine Arab states normalising relations with Israel and reconciliation with Iran. On the one hand, for normalisation to succeed, the Abraham Accords need to incorporate conditions for Palestinians, including the recognition of the State of Palestine and the realisation of their self-determination. On the other, any plan to de-escalate in the region should involve Iran, given its considerable influence on regional security and its leverage over Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other allies. The EU could play a key role here by diplomatically engaging with Iran to facilitate regional de-escalation. By leveraging its different approach to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the EU can contribute to building a more inclusive attitude to regional order, one that incorporates Iran rather than one shaped by an anti-Iran alliance.Third, the EU must ensure that the Palestinian question, which is crucial to regional peace, remains at the forefront of discussions related to regional stability. In the short term, a European call for – and action towards – a ceasefire in Gaza is necessary to fulfil the EU's duty and moral obligation to prevent further Israeli war crimes. Additionally, concrete action is required from the EU to make the two-state solution more than just an empty slogan. To achieve this, Brussels needs clarity on the form the State of Palestine would take and how to support it. This involves addressing issues relating to Israel's occupation, colonisation, borders and Palestinian refugees, among others, and participating in enforcement and implementation mechanisms for the recognition of Palestinian statehood.In this regard, one of the most challenging issues is how the EU will address the fact that Hamas is a necessary actor in present and future negotiations for a political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Brussels still adheres to its policy of no contact with Hamas, despite the acknowledgement that Hamas will not be eradicated by Israel. In addition, Palestinians and many countries in the Middle East share the same observation: discussing a hypothetical state of Palestine while excluding Hamas would not only impact any project aimed at "revitalising" the Palestinian Authority, but also perpetuate this conflict for many more decades to come.All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donorsDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/305/enISSN: 2013-4428

This Nota internacional CIDOB summarises the discussions held during a Foreign Policy Dialogue organised by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) on April 19th, 2024. It is based on contributions from the participants, although not all views and opinions expressed in this publication are necessarily theirs.Rethinking the prevailing approach to peace between Palestinians and Israelis requires more than the symbolic recognition of Palestinian statehood; it means addressing the root causes of this conflict such as colonisation and occupation, as well as practical clarity on how to guarantee the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Regional de-escalation cannot begin without a ceasefire in Gaza. In the long view, the desire to restore stability shared by most Middle Eastern countries should be seen as an opportunity to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European Union (EU) can contribute to conflict resolution and peace by taking action against Israel's war crimes, making the two-state solution more than an empty slogan and supporting regional de-escalation.The Hamas-led attacks of October 7th, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza clearly represent a pivotal moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel's military response to these attacks, resulting in nearly 1,140 deaths and the abduction of around 240 Israelis and foreign nationals, has killed over 34,200 Palestinians, mostly civilians. Additionally, more than 85% of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have been forcibly displaced and half of Gaza's population is on the brink of starvation. Meanwhile, violence in the West Bank has surged to levels not seen since the Second Intifada. Clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians there, coupled with increased Israeli military raids, have claimed the lives of over 460 Palestinians in the past seven months.The conflict has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine, too, heightening the risk of regional war. Increasing clashes between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah raise the spectre of an all-out war, while other emerging flashpoints in the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and Jordan have drawn the United States and some allies into confrontation with armed groups aligned with the "axis of resistance". The recent Iranian retaliation against Israel adds a further layer of potential risk of regional escalation.Despite mounting casualties, calls for a ceasefire in Gaza have gone unheeded. But there is a growing chorus of voices advocating for conflict resolution and peace, including High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. While the specifics of his 10-point plan have yet to be revealed, the underlying principles resonate within the international community: a political resolution to this conflict is imperative, involving the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders alongside that of Israel. Amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza and escalating violence in the region, what impacts is this war having in Israel and the Occupied Palestinians Territories (OPT)? What does a political solution in Israel and Palestine require? How can the Palestinian question, which is pivotal to regional stability, remain at the forefront of discussions about regional de-escalation? Finally, what role can the European Union (EU) play in this volatile context? Assessing the failures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflictPrior to October 7th, the United States considered the Middle East to be "quieter" than it had been in two decades. The Hamas-led attacks shattered this perception by exposing the deep-rooted operational and conceptual failures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Operationally, these attacks laid bare the longstanding security failures in Israel's conflict management strategy. In addition to the air, land and sea blockade of the Gaza Strip since 2007, the Israeli military occupation and expansion of illegal settlements across the West Bank have helped to make a two-state solution an elusive prospect. These approaches failed to deliver peace and security to the Israelis, not to mention how they denied Palestinian security and resulted in multilevel forms of oppression. In essence, the shift from conflict resolution to conflict management has proven ineffective.Conceptually, the Hamas attacks underscore the absence of any true "status quo" in such profoundly asymmetric circumstances, where the dominant party, Israel, continues to expand its illegal settlements in the OPT, rendering any efforts by the weaker party, the Palestinians, to challenge such a situation fraught with peril. Regionally, October 7th shattered the illusion that stability and peace in the Middle East could be attained while obliterating the Palestinian cause. Globally, they serve as a tragic reminder of the lack of accountability mechanisms and effective pressure on Israel to comply with international law and address human rights violations.While the root causes of this conflict remain the same as prior to October 7th, the main difference between the current Gaza war and previous episodes of violence lies in the unprecedented intensity of that violence. In Israel, the magnitude of the death toll resulting from the Hamas-led attacks revived the idea that Israel is under existential threat and brought an end to 39 weeks of mass protests. Portrayed by Israeli diplomats as Israel's equivalent of 9/11, these attacks have intensified calls for the erasure (or resettlement) of the Gaza Strip and the annexation of the West Bank. Israel is engaged in one of its largest and bloodiest wars since it was formed, yet the ongoing military operation has failed to achieve any of the stated goals: Hamas has not been eradicated, the Israeli hostages have not been freed through military coercion, and rockets continue to be launched from Gaza into Israeli territory. Consequently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces pressure on at least three fronts: a military stalemate in Gaza; domestic pressure to free Israeli hostages; and growing international pressure over accusations Israel is provoking a man-made famine and committing genocide. Yet without strong US pressure, it is difficult to see an end to this war.In Gaza, the death toll and level of destruction are unprecedented. The EU's top diplomat, Josep Borrell, described the Strip as the world's "greatest open-air graveyard". According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), if the current Israeli operation were to end immediately, it would take Gaza until 2092 to restore the GDP levels of 2022. But Israel's strategy, which consisted of attacking the civil population to make it turn against Hamas, has proven a failure. While some of its leaders have been killed by Israel, Hamas is proving resilient militarily and politically. Palestinians in Gaza have not turned against it yet and support for the Palestinian movement has increased across the West Bank. Moreover, the ongoing war in Gaza has relaunched intra-Palestinian talks for national reconciliation, confirming that a role for Hamas in future negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis is inevitable.These talks should not overlook the fact that there are diverging interests between Fatah and Hamas in both the short and long term. While Fatah recognises Hamas as part of the Palestinian political landscape, it is currently under pressure from the US to exclude Hamas from any plans for after the war in Gaza. Fatah's engagement in these talks is driven by the intention on the part of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to administer Gaza once the war ends. Hamas, however, has no desire to be part of a body that has been grappling with a deep legitimacy crisis, nor does it want to participate in a hypothetical technocratic government in the Gaza Strip. Its primary objectives are to become part of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), the sole political entity representing the Palestinian people, and to have a hand in attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.With Israel's war against Hamas showing no signs of ending, regional escalation presents an opportunity to address these conceptual and operational failures and rethink the dominant approach to achieving peace between Palestinians and Israelis and. Rethinking peace: from symbolic gestures to concrete actionIn the words of former Jordanian diplomat Marwan al-Muasher, returning to the previous negotiating format once the war on Gaza ends "would be like reheating spoiled food, and is bound to fail". Rethinking peace in the current context requires addressing the often overlooked root causes of this conflict, while applying the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.In this respect, the two-state solution should commence – rather than conclude – by addressing Israeli colonisation and occupation. Three decades on since the Oslo Accords, approximately 700,000 Israeli settlers reside illegally in the OPT. Colonisation still remains one of the main priorities of Netanyahu's government, and has accelerated dramatically since October 7th. This has exacerbated the systematic oppression, violence and discrimination against Palestinians. While various actors, including the US administration and the EU, advocate for the two-state solution, the Israeli prime minister openly stated that Israel should "control the entire area from the river to the sea" in any future arrangement. Furthermore, years-long settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank has increased over the past seven months, often with active support from the Israeli security forces. Both the US and the EU have imposed sanctions on individuals and entities financing the violence. While these sanctions are a commendable effort to hold Israel accountable for its illegal settlements, they must not overlook the systemic character of colonisation and occupation in the OPT. Discussions about the two-state solution should therefore be inseparable from ending Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.Similarly, calls to recognise Palestinian statehood should carry more than symbolic weight. While they hold significant symbolic value, recognising Palestinian statehood is also an act of justice towards the Palestinians, placing them on an equal footing with Israelis. Moreover, such calls serve as a means to put pressure on Israel, which rejects the two-state solutions, and to advocate for the "revitalisation" of the Palestinian Authority. In Europe, the momentum for recognition is building, with several EU member states – including Belgium, Ireland, Malta, Norway, Slovenia and Spain – seeking to form an alliance to recognise Palestine as a nation state in accordance with the 1999 Berlin Declaration. However, the practical implications of Palestinian statehood remain unclear, highlighting the urgent need to address these issues. Questions persist regarding enforcement and implementation mechanisms to ensure Palestinian statehood, as well as how to effectively tackle colonisation and resolve the fate of over 5.9 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).In the immediate term, there is a consensus among observers on the need to hold new elections in both Israel and Palestine to usher in leaders committed to resolving this conflict. In Israel, the current wave of anti-government protests could trigger another snap vote. However, new elections may not necessarily bring an end to the conflict, as the majority of Israeli citizens support the ongoing war in Gaza.On the Palestinian side, the key question revolves around the role Hamas would play in such a process. Despite military setbacks, Hamas remains a necessary player in Palestinian politics. Notably, Israel has failed to "eradicate" it and its popularity has surged in the West Bank since the October 7th attacks. Put simply, Hamas is here to stay. Over the past seven months, the Palestinian movement has repeatedly signalled its willingness to engage in a peace process aimed at achieving the two state solution, which would involve recognising Israel and renouncing armed conflict against it. However, October 7th also reinforced perceptions that Hamas seeks the destruction of Israel, which presents significant obstacles to its participation in peace talks. Israel continues to call for Hamas's complete elimination and the EU continues to consider Hamas as a terrorist organisation and maintains its policy of no contact with the Islamist movement.The PA, meanwhile, faces a legitimacy crisis. There have been no elections for almost two decades and a staggering 84% of Palestinians are calling for the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas. Despite this, the EU views the PA as the sole legitimate Palestinian interlocutor. In this context, can Hamas be excluded from Palestinian politics despite its growing popularity? If so, how can the EU avoid repeating the 2006 scenario when it rejected Hamas's victory in the democratically held parliamentary elections? More importantly, how can any peace process between Palestinians and Israelis be conducted while excluding one of the parties that is labelled a terrorist organisation? These questions become more urgent as the regional dimensions of this conflict further stress the pivotal role of Hamas in regional de-escalation efforts. Regional escalation: an opportunity for regional peace? The regionalisation of the conflict between Israel and Hamas had already happened by October 2023. Several thousand professional mercenaries and non-Israeli foreign fighters joined the IDF, while Hezbollah, the Houthis and pro-Iranian militias have attacked Israeli and US targets across the region in response to the war in Gaza. Therefore, the question is not whether regionalisation can be avoided, but rather how to prevent the situation from deteriorating. In other words, the key challenge is to avoid a complete regional unravelling.The threat of wider war became more imminent with the escalation between Israel and Iran. Over the past few months, Iran has consistently declared its intention not to get involved in this conflict as it found itself in a favourable position. Firstly, the Hamas-led attacks shattered the myth of Israel's invincibility and temporarily halted the Abraham Accords, which were threatening to marginalise Iran. Secondly, Israel has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives in its current military operation in Gaza. Furthermore, Israel faces increasing isolation on the global stage and a growing domestic discontent. Despite this, repeated Israeli attacks on Iranian targets, culminating with the air strike on Tehran's consulate in Syria, provoked a large-scale response from Iran. Iran's response may have been large in scale, but the limited damage suggests that Tehran sent a clear message to the US and Israel: it does not seek a war with Israel.From a regional perspective, the escalation between Iran and Israel serves as a litmus test for both the Abraham Accords and the ongoing reconciliation efforts between Iran and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. While some Arab states' collaboration with US intelligence and/or Israeli forces may suggest a strategic alignment with Israel, the notion of an "Arab NATO" is overstated. GCC countries are not willing to jeopardise their reconciliation with Iran by forming an anti-Iran axis, despite the importance of their strategic and security ties with the US and Israel. Conversely, since October 7th, several GCC countries have engaged in dialogue with Tehran, primarily seeking to de-escalate tensions and safeguard their own security.Contrary to what Europeans and Americans may assume, most Gulf Arab states are not inclined to choose between normalisation with Israel or reconciliation with Iran. Instead, they see the necessity for both normalisation and reconciliation to restore regional stability. Rather than viewing it as a "normalisation versus reconciliation" dilemma, most regional actors prefer a scenario of "normalisation and reconciliation". And they all agree that addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial for restoring stability.In this context, the role played by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is paramount. For one thing, the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation facilitated by China has been instrumental in ensuring a minimum level of regional stability since October 2023. Following the escalation between Israel and Iran, this agreement is likely to have trickle-down effects in relation to the conflict in Yemen, regional economic cooperation dynamics and diplomacy. For another thing, a normalisation deal between KSA and Israel would not only benefit Israel but also the Biden administration, which has advocated for normalisation for several years. However, as the threat of regional escalation persists as long as the war on Gaza continues, Saudi Arabia will likely demand more concessions from the US to strike such a deal. In addition to US security guarantees and support for its civil nuclear programme, Riyadh insists on the creation of a Palestinian state as part of any such deal with Tel Aviv. Given that Arab countries have only limited ability to ease regional tensions without effective US pressure on Israel, Saudi Arabia's aspirations for regional leadership could be enhanced by advocating for the creation of a Palestinian state in exchange for normalisation of ties with Israel.While these scenarios may or may not come to fruition, one thing remains certain: regional de-escalation is impossible without a ceasefire in Gaza. Moreover, a ceasefire in Gaza alone may not suffice, considering the overlay of other conflicts. Mounting tensions between Hezbollah and Israel could escalate into full-scale war, while the Houthis in Yemen and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have leveraged their attacks for strategic advantage. Additionally, there is no indication that the recent escalation between Israel and Iran has concluded. In essence, the regional dimensions of this conflict must be central to ongoing discussions about the "day after" in Gaza. Recommendations for the European UnionDespite the magnitude of the Gaza war, the EU appears to be stuck in the pre-October 7th era and logic, behaving as if the situation on the ground had not deteriorated. While the current conflict has deepened existing divisions among EU member states, EU officials continue to engage in the same routines, issuing regular statements expressing regret over Israel's actions in the OPT without following up with concrete action. Against this backdrop, how can EU officials navigate an approach that breaks this cycle of repetitive poor practice? Despite its waning credibility in the region, the EU still has an opportunity to contribute to peace between Palestinians and Israelis and to stabilise the new regional order in the making.First, restoring the EU's legitimacy, credibility and reputation in the region involves setting firmer boundaries regarding Israel. This means concrete action such as suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement due to Israel's violation of the agreement's human rights clauses (as suggested by Spain and Ireland); imposing a complete arms embargo on Israel in response to its violation of international humanitarian law; and exerting effective pressure on Israel to cease its illegal settlement expansion in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem. While these actions should be taken at EU level, they can also be implemented by blocs of states, as demonstrated by the current initiative to recognise Palestinian statehood. Otherwise, the EU's failure to apply its own standards, values and principles – those it applies to Russia and Iran among others – will only render it more vulnerable to accusations of double standards and further deepen mistrust from Middle Eastern countries and societies.Second, from a regional perspective, the EU should aim for the best-case scenario for de-escalation, which would combine Arab states normalising relations with Israel and reconciliation with Iran. On the one hand, for normalisation to succeed, the Abraham Accords need to incorporate conditions for Palestinians, including the recognition of the State of Palestine and the realisation of their self-determination. On the other, any plan to de-escalate in the region should involve Iran, given its considerable influence on regional security and its leverage over Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other allies. The EU could play a key role here by diplomatically engaging with Iran to facilitate regional de-escalation. By leveraging its different approach to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the EU can contribute to building a more inclusive attitude to regional order, one that incorporates Iran rather than one shaped by an anti-Iran alliance.Third, the EU must ensure that the Palestinian question, which is crucial to regional peace, remains at the forefront of discussions related to regional stability. In the short term, a European call for – and action towards – a ceasefire in Gaza is necessary to fulfil the EU's duty and moral obligation to prevent further Israeli war crimes. Additionally, concrete action is required from the EU to make the two-state solution more than just an empty slogan. To achieve this, Brussels needs clarity on the form the State of Palestine would take and how to support it. This involves addressing issues relating to Israel's occupation, colonisation, borders and Palestinian refugees, among others, and participating in enforcement and implementation mechanisms for the recognition of Palestinian statehood.In this regard, one of the most challenging issues is how the EU will address the fact that Hamas is a necessary actor in present and future negotiations for a political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Brussels still adheres to its policy of no contact with Hamas, despite the acknowledgement that Hamas will not be eradicated by Israel. In addition, Palestinians and many countries in the Middle East share the same observation: discussing a hypothetical state of Palestine while excluding Hamas would not only impact any project aimed at "revitalising" the Palestinian Authority, but also perpetuate this conflict for many more decades to come.All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/305/en

Las críticasEn el marco de este derrotero por el que ha pasado la tesis de la Paz Democrática, se han montado diversos ángulos de críticas hacia la misma. Una primera vertiente destaca la implausibilidad de las explicaciones que intentan dar cuenta de la supuesta "ley". Así por ejemplo se ha señalado que en momentos de crisis aún en las democracias se produce una reducción del tamaño en el círculo decisor final. O que los dirigentes de los estados no democráticos también enfrentan condicionamientos de índole institucional o por parte de grupos de poder a los que están vinculados. O, incluso, que la opinión pública no es necesariamente una fuerza pacificadora. Asimismo, una crítica de índole realista se refiere a la escasez histórica de democracias que se traduce en pocas oportunidades de conflicto (Peñas, 1997: 133).Otro ángulo ha sido la existencia de serios problemas en la recolección y clasificación de los datos que sustentan la tesis. Su génesis yace en buena medida en la definición de los dos conceptos centrales detrás de la idea de la Paz Democrática: la democracia y la guerra. Sobre el concepto de "democracia" se advierten importantes diferencias en los criterios constitutivos del mismo. ¿Qué es una democracia? ¿Qué rasgos la definen? ¿Cuál es su condición? ¿Son éstas frágiles? Además, existen discrepancias entre las bases de datos y/o bien calificaciones bastante arbitrarias como por ejemplo la consideración en la basePolity II de Francia entre los años 1981 y 1986 como una "anocracia", mientras que El Salvador de la misma época, enfrascado en una cruenta guerra civil sí figuraba como "democracia".En cuanto a las guerras, el criterio de selección de datos más aceptado fue el implementado por Small y Singer que consiste en catalogar como guerra internacional a un conflicto que involucra uno o más participantes estatales y que provoca un mínimo de mil víctimas. Esto excluye intervenciones violentas que causan menos víctimas, pero no por ello políticamente menos significativas o bien las operaciones encubiertas (Salomón, 2001: 247). Tampoco ésta conceptualización da cuenta de las tendencias más modernas en los conflictos internacionales, entre las que se destaca la caída relativa de las disputas interestatales frente a las intraestatales ). En definitiva, "[lo] que caracteriza a nuestros días no es la desaparición de la violencia del sistema internacional ni la ausencia del recurso a la fuerza por parte de los Estados, sino la disminución del número de guerras formalmente declaradas y el aumento de guerras de guerrillas, guerras a través de terceros, subversión interior de los Estados instigada por otros Estados, acciones encubiertas, etc., menos costosas y que no necesitan ser justificadas, por lo menos tanto como una declaración formal de guerra" (Peñas, 1997: 135). Asimismo, los estudios cuantitativos en general han olvidado distinguir entre agresores y agredidos, o también la medición de la intensidad de la guerra (determinar si las democracias causan más muertes que otros Estados). La tesis de la Paz Democrática a su vez no ha logrado dar respuesta a ciertas anomalías que denotan la existencia de variables perturbadoras. Una anomalía es la existencia de zonas de paz en regiones del mundo donde no todas las sociedades son democráticas, como es el caso de América del Sur. Otra es que la correlación entre paz y democracia es más fuerte en el período posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Farber y Gowa, 1995). Este tipo de anomalías ha llevado a que explicaciones alternativas cobren fuerza. Entre estas, la más destacada es la teoría de Comunidades de Seguridad Pluralistas de Karl Deutsch (1957) que refiere a zonas donde sus miembros tienen la certeza de que sus disputas no se resolverán por medio de la fuerza. También se advierten reajustes y matizaciones de la tesis que debilitan su poder. Un ejemplo es la afirmación de Raymond Cohen (1994) de que la única conclusión razonables es que "los Estados democráticos del área del Atlántico Norte/Europa occidental, compartiendo una serie de circunstancias históricas particulares y una herencia cultural común, han evitado enfrentarse en una guerra" (en Peñas, 1997: 134). Asimismo, es posible encontrar evidencia en contra. Es el caso de la investigación de Charles Kegley y Margaret Hermann (1996) que arroja el interesante resultado de quince casos de intervención militar con uso de la fuerza, entre 1975 y 1995, por parte de democracias estables contra otras democracias estables, de las cuales ocho de ellas correspondían a intervenciones estadounidenses. Más recientemente, Thomas Schwartz y Kiron Skinner (2002: 160-161) identificaron un listado de conflictos que contrarían la tesis o están muy próximos a hacerlo y que hacen a lo que ellos llaman el "problema histórico" de la Paz Democrática:American Revolutionary War, 1775 (Great Britain vs. U.S.)Wars of French Revolution (democratic period), esp. 1793, 1795 (France vs. Great Britain)Quasi War, 1798 (U.S. vs. France)War of 1812 (U.S. vs. Great Britain)Texas War of Independence, 1835 (Texas vs. Mexico)Mexican War, 1846 (U.S. vs. Mexico)Roman Republic vs. France, 1849American Civil War, 1861 (Northern Union vs. Southern Confederacy)Ecuador-Columbia War, 1863Franco-Prussian War, 1870War of the Pacific, 1879 (Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia)Indian Wars, much of nineteenth century (U.S. vs. various Indian nations)Spanish-American War, 1898Boer War, 1899 (Great Britain vs. Transvaal and Orange Free State)World War I, 1914 (Germany vs. Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and U.S.)Chaco War, 1932 (Paraguay vs. Bolivia)Ecuador-Peru, 1941Palestine War, 1948 (Israel vs. Lebanon)Dominican Invasion, 1967 (U.S. vs. Dominican Republic)Cyprus Invasion, 1974 (Turkey vs. Cyprus)Ecuador-Peru, 1981Nagorno-Karabakh, 1989 (Armenia vs. Azerbaijan)Yugoslav Wars, 1991 (Serbia and Bosnian-Serb Republic vs. Croatiaand Bosnia; sometimes Croatia vs. Bosnia)Georgia-Ossetia, 1991 (Georgia vs. South Ossetia)Georgia-Abkhazia, 1992 (Georgia vs. Abkhazia and allegedly Russia)Moldova-Dnestr Republic, 1992 (Moldova vs. Dnestr Republic and allegedly Russia)Chechen War of Independence, 1994 (Russia vs. Chechnya)Ecuador-Peru, 1995NATO-Yugoslavia, 1999India-Pakistan, 1999 Como se advierte, la teoría de la Paz Democrática se enfrenta a problemas tanto de índole empírica como de índole explicativa. Frente a este tipo de críticas, las reacciones se han dividido entre las defensivas (Maoz, 1997), las que han ignorado los hallazgos, las que han empezado a considerar otros factores (Russett, 1998) y las que se han dedicado a verificar su validez mediante estudios de casos (Elman, 1997). En definitiva, el debate ha sido prolífico y entre una de sus evoluciones más interesantes es la que ha recomendado evitar "las dicotomías simplistas y estudiar el mayor número posible de interacciones entre factores de conflicto internos e internacionales" (Salomón, 2001: 253).La materialización política de la Paz DemocráticaEn el contexto del "optimismo liberal" despertado por el colapso soviético y el fin de la guerra fría, la tesis de la Paz Democrática suscitó gran entusiasmo, sobre todo entre aquellos estudiosos de las Relaciones Internacionales que ansiaban acabar con la hegemonía retórica del realismo-neorrealismo en la disciplina. Como señala Peñas (1997: 130), "la gran virtud de esta tesis (…) es que en su discurso disuelve o reconcilia la escisión entre principios e intereses: una política de extensión de las democracias de libre mercado es a la vez una política éticamente justa y políticamente adecuada". Por tanto, el corolario político de la tesis de la Paz Democrática no es otro que la presunción de que el imperio de la paz y la cooperación internacionales requieren de la democratización de los Estados en el Sistema Internacional. Esto ha dado lugar al plano prescriptivo de los teóricos de la Paz Democrática. El más destacado en este sentido ha sido Russett al recomendar al gobierno en Washington la activa promoción democrática en base a las "pruebas sólidas de que las democracias no se hacen la guerra entre sí". Su propuesta se cuida de no alentar intervenciones militares unilaterales, sino apoyadas y legitimadas por organizaciones como la ONU o la OEA; y sus preceptos, en efecto, se materializaron durante la administración Clinton en la estrategia de Engagement y Enlargement ("compromiso y expansión"), en la que primacía global estadounidense, democracia y libre mercado caminaron de la mano.Pero lejos está de ser la Paz Democrática algo reciente o coyuntural en el discurso de política exterior de Estados Unidos. John Ikenberry sostiene que "[the] American preoccupation with promoting democracy abroad fits into a larger view about the sources of a stable, legitimate, secure, and prosperous international order. This outlook may not always be the chief guiding principle of policy, and it may sometimes lead to error. Still, it is a relatively coherent orientation rooted in the American political experience and American understandings of history, economics, and the sources of political stability" (Ikenberry, 1999). Sus orígenes políticos se remontan, claro es, a Woodrow Wilson quien en 1917 señaló: "A steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants". De acuerdo con el análisis de Henry Kissinger (1995), Wilson retomó postulados ya volcados en su momento por Thomas Jefferson, a saber: a) que la misión especial de Estados Unidos trasciende la diplomacia cotidiana, y los obliga a servir como faro de libertad para el resto de la humanidad, y b) que la política exterior de las democracias es moralmente superior porque el pueblo es, en esencia, amante de la paz. Esta misma línea de argumentación fue bien visible en la prédica de Harry Truman sobre las naciones libres, en la visión maníquea del "Imperio del Mal" de Ronald Reagan y, además del mencionado Clinton, más recientemente en las administraciones Bush (h) y Obama, como puede verse en los siguientes extractos obtenidos de distintos documentos estratégicos. Estamos en presencia por tanto de una constante de política exterior estadounidense.A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998."…We seek international support in helping strengthen democratic and free market institutions and norms in countries making the transition from closed to open societies. This commitment to see freedom and respect for human rights take hold is not only just, but pragmatic, for strengthened democratic institutions benefit the United States and the world" (p. 33).The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002."…We will (…) use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take (…) [and we will] make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity andcooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future" (p. 4).National Security Strategy, May 2010."… The United States supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate. We also do so because their success abroad fosters an environment that supports America's national interests. Political systems that protect universal rights are ultimately more stable, successful, and secure. As our history shows, the United States can more effectively forge consensus to tackle shared challenges when working with governments that reflect the will and respect the rights of their people, rather than just the narrow interests of those in power" (p. 37).Esta prédica democrática, sin embargo, pareciera marchar a contramano de ciertas realidades. Señala Peñas, "la historia demuestra que las islas liberales no sólo han hecho la guerra por doquier, sino que además han sido responsables de un alto grado de militarización del mundo y han contribuido significativamente a la militarización y los conflictos entre los Estados no democráticos: esta militarización podría poner en peligro la paz democrática que el liberalismo propugna" (Peñas, 1997: 136). Estados Unidos, una de las democracias más importantes a nivel mundial (sino la más), posee en particular una historia reciente de retroalimentación entre militarización y conflictividad en el Tercer Mundo. Vale recordar, cómo a través de la CIA, Washington ayudó armar a la red al-Qaeda para combatir a la ocupación soviética de Afganistán en la década del '80, lo que a la postre generó una guerra civil en dicho país y el surgimiento de un importante enemigo en la figura de Osama Bin Laden, o bien el apoyo a Saddam Hussein durante la guerra irano-iraquí por aquellos mismos años en coexistencia casi paradojal con la venta encubierta de armamento a Irán —destinada a su vez a financiar la guerra sucia de los Contras nicaragüenses contra el gobierno revolucionario sandinista. La invasión a Iraq en marzo de 2003 y el posterior caos del país, también constituye un buen ejemplo del fracaso y los peligros que conlleva la aplicación de una retórica democrático-mesiánica a través de la manu militari.Ciertamente, el repaso de estos eventos despierta temores si se contempla el actual caso de Libia. Allí, la intervención bajo autorización del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas para frenar la crisis humanitaria en curso en el país, por iniciativa de Francia, Estados Unidos, Italia, Gran Bretaña y España (todas democracias), se ha convertido en una operación liderada por la OTAN, donde se está financiando y proveyendo a las fuerzas insurgentes opositoras a Kadafy y en la que el objetivo del cambio de régimen parece cada vez más claro (van Tijen, 2011). A pesar del importante despliegue de poder aéreo y naval, la balanza del conflicto parece no sólo equilibrada sino estancada, contrariando las expectativas iniciales de los mandos políticos y militares occidentales, lo que a su vez augura una potencial inestabilidad en el corto y mediano plazo para todo el Magreb. ¿Es esta la clase de escenario regional que desea la comunidad internacional? ¿Es esto lo que pretenden las principales democracias occidentales? Difícilmente.Resulta por tanto un desafío tan grande como imperioso el lograr romper con la trampa entre democracia, militarización y conflictividad en aumento. Más aún si se advierten datos tan desalentadores como el tamaño del gasto militar de Estados Unidos, el cual eclipsa el gasto correspondiente al resto de las potencias y regiones del planeta.Tal contrariedad entre discurso pacífico-democrático y los hechos, en parte, se explica porque el objetivo estadounidense de la difusión de la democracia liberal a nivel mundial no es el único que compone su política exterior. Existen otros intereses (de seguridad, económicos, poder, etc.) y los medios para conseguirlos no siempre son pacíficos, ni justificables. Desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la política exterior estadounidense ha oscilado entre métodos como la negociación, disuasión, unilateralismo y multilateralismo (Barceló Sasía, 2006: 64). En este marco, por momentos el discurso político de la Paz Democrática ha generado la impresión de actuar más como una mera justificación retórica, como un auxilio para encubrir ideológicamente motivaciones de otro orden, antes que como el verdadero leit motif de las acciones emprendidas.Reflexión finalEn definitiva, la Paz Democrática, la idea de que las democracias no guerrean entre sí, cuyo corolario nos dice que la construcción de estados democráticos promueve la estabilidad en las relaciones internacionales, resulta una sugestiva noción desprendida del Liberalismo cuya corroboración científica, a pesar de las frases pomposas que puedan emitirse sobre su certeza y fiabilidad, se encuentra aún en juego. Siendo una tesis por demás atractiva, defendida y cuestionada en el mundo académico, resulta aún más trascendente su estudio dada su cristalización fáctica como supuesto criterio guía en el comportamiento exterior de los Estados democráticos más poderosos a nivel internacional. Los dilemas que ello entraña no son menores, como los intentos recientes y actuales de "democratizar" Medio Oriente y el Mundo Árabe nos recuerdan. Dobles discursos —morales de doble-standard de acuerdo con la célebre crítica de Stanley Hoffman— parecen conjugar anhelos democráticos con intereses geopolíticos y/o geoeconómicos, o más bien encubrir estos últimos bajo el manto de los primeros. En el medio, se resuelven y dirimen en el tablero mundial las corrientes de cambio pacífico o revolucionario, de progreso democrático o de restauración autocrática, las viejas lógicas de poder, de conquista y de influencia, la estabilidad internacional, el porvenir de la guerra y las sombras de la paz. *Candidato doctoral, Universidad Nacional de General San Martín (UNSAM, Argentina). 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Over the past decade the Chinese economy has nearly doubled in size, going from 8.93 trillion dollars in 2012, to 16.33 trillion dollars in 2022 (the most recent year for which we have data). This has led to concerns that China represents a viable alternative to the Western Order and that the "China's Model" is superior to the experience of the West. Such concerns have extended all the way to the top of the American government. The White House's most recent National Security Strategy argues that we must out-compete China, and further states that "The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it." President Biden has directly weighed in with his March 2021 statement [RZ1] that "we've got to prove democracy works," which led to concerns that China's version of development and authoritarianism is not only preferable, but more importantly, better suited to the needs to the world's developing countries. Such fears are misguided. It is true that China's growth has been phenomenal with the country transforming from an agrarian society to a high-tech juggernaut that is now the world's second largest economy. The World Bank estimates that this growth has lifted roughly 800 million people out of poverty, and according to the UN, China's Human Development Index (HDI) has increased from .41 in 1978 to .76 in 2021, the most recent year data is available. These impressive statistics have led to anxiety among some that a version of authoritarianism is a necessary condition for economic growth. However, these fears are misplaced. The Chinese experience (not the so called "China model") does not represent a viable alternative to development under democratic governments with strong institutions. The real-world data does not support the argument that non-democratic regimes perform better at developing their countries. In fact, the data proves that democracy is far superior to authoritarianism. While there is no doubt that the Chinese government has done many things right in its quest to modernize China and turn it into a great power, a key question remains: does it represent an alternative to the Western order?. This question is not an esoteric academic debate. If China represents a viable and alternative "model" to the Western experience, other states may be well served by emulating the Chinese experience. This issue has been clouded by the Sino-US rivalry and has taken on ideological undertones with Chinese officials insisting that their "socialist system" is "superior" and Chinese commentators arguing that the United States and its system of governance is in decline. Based on an examination of Chinese language sources, academic studies, and publicly available data, I argue that China and its development experience do not challenge the Western order. I break this observation into three parts. First, I point out that contrary to popular belief, there is no discernible China "model." Second, if there is a specific China model, after 45 years of "Opening and Reform" in China, there should be real world examples of countries that have successfully adopted China's experience. The reality is that there are no states that have effectively copied China's experience. Finally, if the foundation of the China experience is the supposed superiority of non-democratic regimes to "get things done," the data on global development and regime type should reflect this. The data does not. A Model or a Process?If the experience of China constitutes a viable alternative to democratic-market-based systems, there needs to be a rough agreement on what exactly a "China model" consists of. The International Monetary Fund states that economic models can be explained by the regularities of their systems or the objectives they seek to achieve. Unfortunately for China, there is no agreement on what exactly the China model is, with some scholars calling the so called model a myth. Xiaoyang Tang of Tsinghua University argues that the Chinese government has not specified what exactly is the China model. Yu Wen Chen and Obert Hodzi point out that it is frequently defined by comparisons to the Washington Consensus instead of what it actually is. Interestingly, Zhao Qizheng, the former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, eschewed the term China "model" in 2010 and states that it is not only not universal, but that "Exporting the "China model" violates China's adherence to the principle of formulating policies in combination with China's national conditions." Furthermore, he prefers the term "China case," (中国案例) instead of "China model" (中国模式). Regardless of whether a coherent "model" actually exists, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated at the 19th Party Congress that China offered a "blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind." More recently, President Xi's August 2023 trip to the BRICS summit in South Africa furthered this perception. China's economic and development success are best understood as a process of trial and error ("crossing the river by feeling the stones") that has mixed different approaches over the decades. Crucially, many of China's experiences proved contradictory over the decades with periods of free market capitalism, significant market restrictions, state capitalism, and more recently attacks on the tech sector. Taken as a whole, this does not constitute a model but is better understood as a process with key aspects such as a massive rural population, large injections of FDI, geographic advantages, high levels of state capacity, and perhaps most importantly, a vast, competent and professional bureaucracy. When combined with constant changes of direction by the Chinese state, it is difficult to discern what elements of the model need to be replicated for other states to achieve success. The absence of a step-by-step model makes it extremely challenging, if not impossible, to copy. For example, should foreign countries copy the more entrepreneurial friendly free market capitalism of the 1980s, the crackdown on the private sector after Tiananmen in 1989, the gutting of state-owned enterprises of the late 1990s, the "gilded age" of crony capitalism of the 2000s, the advancement of the state at the private sectors expanse, or should they focus on achieving high levels of state capacity and a professional bureaucracy? What matters here is that the contradictory policies of various periods of Chinese economic reforms debunk the perception that a linear, and therefore, easy to follow model exists. Understanding the ups and downs of the China experience is essential. Unfortunately for China and the rest of the world, important junctures in China's economic history are no longer readily accessible due to Chinese government censorship. For example, former Party Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, was instrumental in China's early economic reforms in the 1980s, but has largely been removed from official history. Where are the Examples? Since the start of Chinese reforms 45 years ago, there has been plenty of time for real world examples of emulation to emerge and determine if the China "model" is transferable. Additionally, the fact that Beijing sponsors training programs in China for people and groups from all over the world (especially the Global South) to learn about China's experience can be viewed as an attempt by Beijing to share its experience. For example, Beijing has established training institutions such as the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development (ISSCAD) set up at Peking University in 2016 to train foreign officials and elites from the developing world. These people earn a professional degree in national development. Another academy was set up in Guangxi for similar purposes, with most students coming from Southeast Asian countries. In this author's in-depth interviews with experts based in think tanks and universities, as well as former and current government officials in states ranging from Nepal to Sri Lanka to Kenya, one hears about the "China model" and how this offers an alternative. However, details are scant on both what the "China model" is and on what their specific country is doing to make this happen. Media and scholarly reports have suggested that African countries are the best test cases for the success of Chinese style modernization. However, on close examination, many of these reports have concluded that there is little evidence of African states' emulation of China's experience.Ethiopia has been signaled out as a crucial test case for the application of the "China model." With Africa's second largest population at 123 million people, Ethiopian elites have been eager to emulate China and its success since at least 2005. The results for Ethiopia are, at best, mixed. China is supporting Ethiopia's quest to becoming an African manufacturing center, and this sector in Ethiopia has been influenced by China. Critically, as Edson Ziso points out, Ethiopia has not exactly copied China's model, instead various circumstances have led the country on a trajectory that has allowed for the accommodation of Chinese and Ethiopian interests. The crucial data for the percentage of annual GDP growth is arguably the most important indicator for measuring whether Addis Abba's embrace of China "model" has been successful. Considering Ethiopian leaders started to look to China since at least 2005, we should see sustained and increasing GDP growth over the past two decades. Instead, according to the World Bank, the annual growth rate of GDP in Ethiopia has been on a clear downward trajectory. In 2004 it was 13.6 percent. By 2012 it was 8.6 percent, 2018 it came in at 6.8 percent, and in 2021 and 2022 it was in the 5 percent range. The trajectory of GDP growth in Ethiopia, coupled with the recent civil war and the current insurgency, raises serious questions about how applicable the China "model" is in the country. One academic study pointed out that Ethiopia will end up with its own version of development, which it will call "the Chinese model of development," thus superficially coupling it with China. African leaders have adopted Chinese norms not out of the attractiveness of China's experience, but as justification for a strong state that keeps their regimes in power. Leaders in Zambia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have engaged with China to challenge liberal values and expand surveillance of their citizens. Thus adoption of a "China model" by African elites is best seen as a way for leaders to leverage their ties with Beijing to renegotiate with the West. One scholarly study argued that African elites "pretend to follow the ideological preferences of China to derive material benefits." Despite Zimbabwe's attempts to implement the "China model, it has failed to adopt any meaningful reforms aimed at increasing innovation and experimentation. Instead, over the past 20 years, Zimbabwe has tried to strengthen the ruling party but has neglected critical areas such as a pro-business environment, a stable political structure and a strong bureaucracy. Outside of the African context, other studies cast doubt on the "China model's" ability to gain traction in other settings. The relatively low levels of state capacity in many Middle Eastern states is cited as a major impediment for the model in the region. In the absence of viable institutions and qualified policymakers, China's experience will not be repeated in most countries. The Gulf states are different in that they depend heavily on rents from their energy resource. As such, they do not need to follow China's example. Furthermore, even in states that are politically close to China, like Iran, no consensus exists on the "China model."Overall, there is a lack of concrete evidence of a successful state not only effectively copying the so called "China model" but, more importantly, experiencing long-term increases in economic growth. This raises serious questions about Beijing possessing a viable development model that can be exported. The Proof is in the Pudding"Look, I predict to you, your children or grandchildren are going to be doing their doctoral thesis on the issue of who succeeded: autocracy or democracy? Because that is what is at stake, not just with China." The above comments from President Biden's 2021 remarks speak to the heart of the concerns over whether China represents a viable, replicable model that can outperform the western approach. Fortunately for President Biden, he does not have to worry about this, at least for now, as we have a simple and clear way to ascertain whether democratic or authoritarian states deliver to their people. As noted above, the UN's HDI is a well-respected dataset. By measuring life expectancy, income and levels of education, the index gets to the core of benefits being delivered by a state to its people. If politics is crudely defined as "who gets what, when, and how" the HDI is a good way to measure this. For authoritarianism to pose a significant threat to democratic norms, we should see a high number of non-democratic states represented among states with high HDI scores. Based on 2019 HDI scores (2019 was used as the COVID-19 pandemic may have skewed HDI levels), we find that of the top 30 countries with the highest HDI scores only two (Hong Kong-part of China, and Singapore) are not full democracies according to the Economist's Democracy Index. Of equal importance, of the bottom 30 states, not a single country is a "full," of "flawed" democracy. What the data shows is that democratic states for all of their warts and recent backsliding, are vastly superior for delivering to the people. In fact, there is no viable alternative. Apart from Gulf Petro states, China is the exception that proves the rule when it comes to authoritarian states and economic development. Simply put, the Chinese experience is an anomaly that has generated enormous opportunities for the Chinese people, but has little applicability for other states. China's experience is not necessarily unique, but it is distinct enough to limit its ability to be emulated by others. Moreover, we need to keep in mind the fact that democracies air their dirty laundry and shine a spotlight on their problems and inherent contradictions. The fact that China has stopped publishing consumer confidence and youth unemployment data in the past several months is a smoking gun of something to hide. The current economic crisis in China is largely the result of poor decision making at the top of China's political system. Furthermore, the disastrous "Zero Covid policy," which according to a recent study led to an estimated 1.87 million excess deaths, was completely avoidable. The fact that the Chinese government refused to accept more effective MRNA vaccines from the West on the eve of ending Zero Covid is horrific. Apart from this, there appears to have been no preparation for the predicated catastrophe that immediately followed the end of the policy. While the West also performed poorly during the pandemic, the fact that China was touting its supposedly superior model during the pandemic, to then let it lapse raises serious questions about the utility of the "China model." ConclusionAmerican concerns that authoritarianism will triumph over democratic norms are overblown. Authoritarian China has experienced spectacular economic growth over the past four decades, but its model is poorly understood and is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in non-Chinese settings. The fact that Chinese themselves disagree on what exactly is the "China model" is a clear indication of the difficulties for Beijing challenging the Western system. Concerns that China wants to make the world "safe for autocracy," are not without merit, but this does not represent a viable and alternative system of development. What matters most is sustained growth that delivers to the masses. China's reforms have been ongoing for 45 years, thus providing plenty of time for other developing states to successfully copy China's experience and transform their own countries. Unfortunately for China, there is scant evidence of other states doing this. Developing countries will frequently speak of following China's example and copying their system, but the empirical reality is that they do not. Reasons include multitude of factors, ranging from a lack of knowledge of what the China experience actually is, to paying lip service to China in order to obtain more benefits from both Beijing and the West, to having incompetent and corrupt bureaucracies. Yes, many democratic states, including the United States, have experienced an erosion of democratic practices and norms over the past decade, but the resilience and self-correcting nature of democracies has acted as a brake on system collapse. The reality is not that we need to prove that democracy still works, as the broad data clearly indicates that it does, but instead that China needs to prove that authoritarianism can deliver long-term measurable development beyond a couple of micro/petro-states. China's current economic crisis is proof of the inefficiencies of their system. This has led to calls that the China "model" is in its "death throes." The real question is, was there ever a model to begin with? Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.