Article(print)2003

Strategic Debt Accumulation in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union

In: European journal of political economy, Volume 19, Issue 1, p. 1-15

Beetsma, Roel M. W. J; Bovenberg, A. Lans

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Abstract

This paper explores the interaction between centralized monetary policy & decentralized fiscal policy in a monetary union with heterogeneous countries. Discretionary monetary policy suffers from a failure to commit. Moreover, heterogeneous decentralized fiscal policymakers impose externalities on each other through the influence of their debt policies on the common monetary policy. These imperfections can be alleviated by adopting shock-contingent inflation targets (to combat the monetary policy commitment problem) & shock-contingent debt targets (to internalize the externalities due to decentralized fiscal policy). 3 Tables, 17 References. Adapted from the source document.

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