Politicians Do Pander: Mass Opinion, Polarization, and Law Making

In: The Forum: a journal of applied research in contemporary politics, Band 7, Heft 4

Abstract

The capabilities of the American state sometimes depend on the ability of policy-makers to act autonomously, on the basis of their own preferences and beliefs, in ways that serve broad societal and state interests but lack support from powerful constituencies. In a highly acclaimed book on the politics of health care reform in the Clinton administration, Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue that "politicians don't pander." Rather, they do indeed act on their own ideological and policy views, using polls mainly to guide rhetorical strategy, not to make policy decisions. I challenge their interpretation and bring to bear other considerations to argue for an increased influence of mass opinion, and to present a high-pandering, limited-autonomy account of the contemporary politics of law-making. In concluding, I comment briefly on this account's consistency with recent events and on the issues it poses for future research. Adapted from the source document.