Determinants of Perceived Gubernatorial Budgetary Influence among State Executive Budget Analysts and Legislative Fiscal Analysts

In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 43-54

Abstract

Recent scholarship points to governors losing budgetary influence to legislatures. A survey of executive and legislative budget analysts from thirteen western states is used to test hypotheses derived from Abney and Lauth's theoretical propositions regarding the end of executive dominance over the budgetary process. This article finds that the legislature's ability to independently access budgetary information, a separate legislative budget agenda from the governor, the addition of detailed language in appropriation bills, and consensus revenue forecasting all decrease the likelihood of gubernatorial budgetary influence. Pork barrel additions and the ability to item veto appropriation language increase the likelihood of gubernatorial influence.