Courts as Coordinators: Endogenous Enforcement and Jurisdiction in International Adjudication
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 56, Heft 2, S. 257-289
Abstract
Why do states build international courts, submit cases, and enforce court judgments? This article examines the role of a court that is neither a "decider" nor an "information provider." Litigation is costly and does not reveal private information. The court's ruling is not binding and bargaining can occur before and after the court has ruled. Nevertheless, an alternative dispute resolution mechanism emerges: court rulings can coordinate endogenous multilateral enforcement. Disinterested states will enforce to ensure that they can profitably use the court in the future. Accepting jurisdiction of the court allows a state to make efficiency-enhancing "trades," winning high-value disputes in exchange for losing low-value disputes. This is possible because litigation is a screening device: states only sue when they derive relatively high value from the disputed asset. The use of the court as a coordination device for multilateral enforcement allows for the existence of a court with endogenous enforcement and jurisdiction. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
Themen
Sprachen
Englisch
Verlag
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks CA
ISSN: 1552-8766
DOI
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