TY  - JOUR
TI  - Information asymmetries and simultaneous versus sequential voting
AU  - Morton, Rebecca B
AU  - Williams, Kenneth C
PY  - 1999
LA  - eng
KW  - Abstimmung
KW  - Wahl
KW  - Wahlverhalten
KW  - Staatsoberhaupt
KW  - Wahlforschung
KW  - Vereinigte Staaten
KW  - Wahl/Abstimmung
KW  - Wahlverhalten/Abstimmungsverhalten
KW  - Wahlforschung/Wahlanalyse
KW  - Kandidaten (Wahl)
KW  - Nominierung
KW  - Wahlverfahren/Abstimmungsverfahren
KW  - Gleichgewicht
KW  - Hypothese
KW  - Theorie
KW  - Statistische Methoden
AB  - Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We find evidence that in sequential voting later voters can use early outcomes to infer information about candidates and make choices that better reflect their preferences. The ability of later voters to infer information increases with higher levels of risk aversion and information provided on early outcomes. We discover that when a moderate candidate is largely unknown, information aggregation in sequential voting can increase the probability s/he will win, which supports the contention of policymakers that sequential voting can lead to different electoral outcomes. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
T2  - American political science review
VL  - 93
IS  - 1
SN  - 0003-0554
SN  - 1537-5943
SP  - 51-67
UR  - https://www.pollux-fid.de/r/kxp-1644279401
H1  - Pollux (Fachinformationsdienst Politikwissenschaft)
ER  -