TY  - GEN
TI  - Campaign Contributions and Judicial Behavior
AU  - Cann, Damon M
PY  - 2002
PB  - University of Oklahoma Libraries
LA  - eng
KW  - Politics; United States; America
AB  - Many states select judges using competitive elections. Proponents of appointment plans contend that judicial candidates may be tempted to grant favors to lawyers who donate to their campaigns, thus compromising the independence of the judiciary. I contend that previous studies have failed to rigorously test the hypothesis that campaign contributions directly affect judicial decision-making. Using data from the 1998 term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, I show that lawyers who make campaign contributions are no more likely to win cases than lawyers who do not. Furthermore, the data show that judges who are faced by lawyers who contributed large amounts to their campaigns are more likely to recuse themselves.
UR  - https://journals.shareok.org/arp/article/view/516
DO  - 10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2002.23.0.261-274
UR  - https://www.pollux-fid.de/r/base-ftoklahunisojs:oai:journals.shareok.org:article/516
H1  - Pollux (Fachinformationsdienst Politikwissenschaft)
ER  -