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The present paper analyzes the projection of Russia's economic and military power in the Black Sea region, seen both in terms of its huge resources and as a way of projecting military power in the coastal States and the Eastern Mediterranean. The energy perspective is important in Russia's geopolitics, and the Black Sea region is perceived by it as the point of confluence of several globalist interests, in which Russia desires not only to be a mediator, but the decisive pivot to impose regional policy. Creating an energy dependency of the West on Russian resources represents a well-defined political goal in the Russian strategy. Russian gas is thus becoming a Trojan horse, by which Russia can influence European policies, this energy instrument being complemented by other powerful instruments aimed at undermining or diminishing NATO's role in Eastern Europe. Russian interests are concentrating firstly on the desire to maintain different levels of political and economic influence in each coastal State, to maintain the Black Sea under control for oil or gas exports and other maritime transport through Novorossiysk port as well as preventing a security deficit toward NATO that could threaten the South-West flank of Kremlin. In pursuing these interests, Russia's strategy is based on the use of political, diplomatic, information and economic instruments, which are supported by an increasingly credible military capacity, analyzed and explained in this paper.

Keywords: Russian-Ukrainian war; Crimea; energy weapon; Black Sea

After the Crimean Peninsula was invaded and the amplification of conflicts in South-Eastern Ukraine, it has become obvious that Russia's policy is concentrated on preserving its influence and strategic control over the decisions and political directions taken by the States from the former Soviet bloc. To understand the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the West, as well as to anticipate and counteract a possible future evolution of similar events not only in geopolitical risk states such as Moldavia, but also even in NATO members such as the Baltic countries, Romania or Bulgaria, it is worth paying attention to the geopolitical consequences of the loss of Crimea and the South-Eastern provinces by Ukraine. The article analyses the reason, mechanisms and stakes behind the Russian-Ukrainian war, from both a geopolitical and historical perspective. To understand the way in which different hybrid instruments can be used by the Russian Federation to influence the States in its proximity and, in particular, how their combination leads to effective satisfaction of the aims, it is useful to assess and address the systemic risks and vulnerabilities of States in the concerned areas of Russia and the West in recent years.

Keywords: Ukraine; Russian Federation; Crimea; Russian-Ukrainian war; hybrid warfare; limited warfare; maskirovka.

After the Crimean Peninsula was invaded and the amplification of conflicts in South-Eastern Ukraine, it has become obvious that Russia's policy is concentrated on preserving its influence and strategic control over the decisions and political directions taken by the States from the former Soviet bloc. To understand the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the West, as well as to anticipate and counteract a possible future evolution of similar events not only in geopolitical risk states such as Moldavia, but also even in NATO members such as the Baltic countries, Romania or Bulgaria, it is worth paying attention to the geopolitical consequences of the loss of Crimea and the South-Eastern provinces by Ukraine. The article analyses the reason, mechanisms and stakes behind the Russian-Ukrainian war, from both a geopolitical and historical perspective. To understand the way in which different hybrid instruments can be used by the Russian Federation to influence the States in its proximity and, in particular, how their combination leads to effective satisfaction of the aims, it is useful to assess and address the systemic risks and vulnerabilities of States in the concerned areas of Russia and the West in recent years. Keywords: Ukraine; Russian Federation; Crimea; Russian-Ukrainian war; hybrid warfare; limited warfare; maskirovka.

The present paper analyzes the projection of Russia's economic and military power in the Black Sea region, seen both in terms of its huge resources and as a way of projecting military power in the coastal States and the Eastern Mediterranean. The energy perspective is important in Russia's geopolitics, and the Black Sea region is perceived by it as the point of confluence of several globalist interests, in which Russia desires not only to be a mediator, but the decisive pivot to impose regional policy. Creating an energy dependency of the West on Russian resources represents a well-defined political goal in the Russian strategy. Russian gas is thus becoming a Trojan horse, by which Russia can influence European policies, this energy instrument being complemented by other powerful instruments aimed at undermining or diminishing NATO's role in Eastern Europe. Russian interests are concentrating firstly on the desire to maintain different levels of political and economic influence in each coastal State, to maintain the Black Sea under control for oil or gas exports and other maritime transport through Novorossiysk port as well as preventing a security deficit toward NATO that could threaten the South-West flank of Kremlin. In pursuing these interests, Russia's strategy is based on the use of political, diplomatic, information and economic instruments, which are supported by an increasingly credible military capacity, analyzed and explained in this paper. Keywords: Russian-Ukrainian war; Crimea; energy weapon; Black Sea

În prezentul articol se va analiza proiecția puterii economice și militare a Rusiei în regiunea Mării Negre, văzută atât prin prisma resurselor imense ale acesteia, cât și ca mijloc de proiecție a puterii militare în statele riverane și în Mediterana de Est. Perspectiva energetică este fundamentală în geopolitica Rusiei, iar regiunea Mării Negre este percepută de aceasta ca punct de confluență a mai multor interese globaliste, în care Rusia își dorește să fie nu doar mediator, ci pivotul determinant care să impună politica regională. Crearea unei dependențe energetice a Occidentului față de resursele rusești reprezintă un scop politic bine definit în strategia rusească. Gazele rusești devin astfel un veritabil cal troian prin care Rusia poate influența politicile europene, acest instrument energetic fiind completat și de alte instrumente de forță, menite să submineze sau să diminueze rolul NATO în Europa de Est. Interesele rusești se concentrează, în primul rând, pe dorința de a menține diferite niveluri de influență politică și economică în fiecare stat riveran, de a menține Marea Neagră sub control în privința exporturilor de petrol sau gaze naturale și a altor transporturi maritime prin portul Novorossiysk, precum și pe dorința de a preveni un deficit de securitate față de NATO, care ar putea amenința flancul de sud-vest al Kremlinului. În urmărirea acestor interese, strategia Rusiei se bazează pe utilizarea instrumentelor politice, diplomatice, informaționale și economice, care sunt susținute de o capacitate militară din ce în ce mai credibilă, aspecte care vor fi analizate și explicate în acest articol.

The disappearance of the bipolar hegemonic character, the globalization process, the preservation of some hegemonic statutes and the hybrid aggressions emergence against the tense competitive markets and resources background were the key factors that led to international security environment major changes, fact that required a national defence rethinking, based on new risks and state threats. The way national defence strategies are designed and their content have varied from one period to another, depending on international events, economic crises, geopolitical games as well as past and present affiliations with regional or international institutions and organizations. The hybrid war concept was graduallly introduced in the defence strategies, initially being associated with some more well-known patterns such as asymmetric, informational aggression, terrorism or cyber attacks. However, considering that the conceptual boundaries between peace and war were diluted, they would all need a better nuanced, developed and argued approach.

The deindustrialization process of Romania, applied methodically and persistently after the 90s, seems not to be part of the natural path towards industry 4.0, but rather to be a systematic process of planned destruction and erasure of the post-December industry, on a new Valev Plan system conceived in the secret laboratories of the artisans of the new world configuration. The insistence with which there was a systematic and planned demolition of most of the large industrial capacities and platforms betrays obscure interests that can no longer be placed under the umbrella of classifying them as obsolete or non-performing, but rather as inconvenient for foreign markets and foreign capitals. To better understand the mechanisms that acted in order to reset Romania and return it to the status of a semi-agrarian colony, exporting raw materials, natural resources and cheap labor, materialized by the destruction of the heavy, petrochemical, food and car manufacturing industry, we will need to analyze in depth the essence of the manifestation framework of the processes that support globalism as an ideology and globalization as a supra-state and neo-colonialist policy of the great international power centers.

După invadarea peninsulei Crimeea și amplificarea conflictelor din sud-estul Ucrainei, a devenit evident că politica Rusiei este axată pe prezervarea sferei de influență și a controlului strategic asupra deciziilor și direcțiilor politice luate de statele desprinse din fostul bloc sovietic. Pentru a putea înțelege efectele războiului ruso-ucrainean asupra Occidentului, precum și pentru a putea anticipa și a contracara o posibilă evoluție viitoare a unor fenomene similare, în state cu risc geopolitic, precum Moldova, dar chiar și în state membre ale NATO, precum țările baltice, România sau Bulgaria, merită să acordăm atenție consecințelor geopolitice ale pierderii Crimeii și a provinciilor de sud-est de către Ucraina. Articolul analizează rațiunea, mecanismele și mizele care au stat la baza declanșării războiului ruso-ucrainean atât din perspectivă geopolitică, cât și istorică. Înțelegerea modului în care diferite instrumente hibride pot fi folosite de Federația Rusă pentru a influența statele din proximitatea sa și, în special, a modului în care combinarea acestora conduce la o satisfacere eficientă a scopurilor este utilă pentru a evalua și a aborda riscurile și vulnerabilitățile sistemice ale statelor aflate în zonele disputate de Rusia și de Occident, în ultimii ani.

Procesul de dezindustrializare a României, aplicat metodic și insistent după anii `90, pare a nu se integra parcursului firesc spre industria 4.0, ci mai degrabă pare a fi un proces sistematic de distrugere planificată și de radiere a industriei postdecembriste, pe sistemul unui nou plan Valev, conceput în laboratoarele secrete ale artizanilor noii configurații mondiale. Insistența cu care s-a procedat la demolarea sistematică și planificată a majorității capacităților și platformelor industriale mari trădează interese obscure, care nu mai pot fi plasate sub umbrela catalogării lor ca învechite sau neperformante, ci mai mult ca incomode pentru piețele externe și capitalurile străine. Pentru a înțelege mai bine mecanismele care au acționat în vederea resetării României și readucerii acesteia la statutul de colonie semiagrară, exportatoare de materii prime, de resurse naturale și de forță de muncă ieftină, concretizată prin distrugerea industriei grele, petrochimice, alimentare și constructoare de mașini, va trebui să pătrundem în esența cadrului de manifestare a proceselor care susțin globalismul ca ideologie și globalizarea ca politică suprastatală și neocolonialistă a marilor centre de putere internaționale

Dispariţia caracterului hegemonic bipolar, procesul de globalizare, prezervarea unor statute hegemonice și apariția unor agresiuni de tip hibrid, pe fondul concurențial tensionat al piețelor și resurselor au fost factorii fundamentali care au produs mutaţii majore în mediul de securitate internaţional, fapt ce a necesitat regândirea apărării naționale, pe baza noilor riscuri și amenințări la adresa statului. Modalitatea de concepere a strategiilor naționale de apărare și conţinutul acestora au variat de la o perioadă la alta, în funcţie de evenimentele internaționale, de crizele economice, de jocurile geopolitice, precum şi de afilierile trecute şi prezente la instituţii şi organizaţii regionale sau internaţionale. Conceptul de război hibrid a fost introdus etapizat în strategiile de apărare, inițial acesta fiind asociat cu unele tipare mai cunoscute, precum agresiuni asimetrice, informaționale, terorism sau atacuri cibernetice, urmând ca, pe măsura diluării granițelor dintre pace și război, acesta să fie mai bine nuanțat, dezvoltat și argumentat.

Background: COVID-19 caused by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 placed the health systems around the entire world in a battle against the clock. While most of the existing studies aimed at forecasting the infections trends, our study focuses on vaccination trend(s). Material and methods: Based on these considerations, we used standard analyses and ARIMA modeling to predict possible scenarios in Romania, the second-lowest country regarding vaccinations from the entire European Union. Results: With approximately 16 million doses of vaccine against COVID-19 administered, 7,791,250 individuals had completed the vaccination scheme. From the total, 5,058,908 choose Pfizer–BioNTech, 399,327 Moderna, 419,037 AstraZeneca, and 1,913,978 Johnson & Johnson. With a cumulative 2147 local and 17,542 general adverse reactions, the most numerous were reported in recipients of Pfizer–BioNTech (1581 vs. 8451), followed by AstraZeneca (138 vs. 6033), Moderna (332 vs. 1936), and Johnson & Johnson (96 vs. 1122). On three distinct occasions have been reported >50,000 individuals who received the first or second dose of a vaccine and >30,000 of a booster dose in a single day. Due to high reactogenicity in case of AZD1222, and time of launching between the Pfizer–BioNTech and Moderna vaccine could be explained differences in terms doses administered. Furthermore, ARIMA(1,1,0), ARIMA(1,1,1), ARIMA(0,2,0), ARIMA(2,1,0), ARIMA(1,2,2), ARI-MA(2,2,2), ARIMA(0,2,2), ARIMA(2,2,2), ARIMA(1,1,2), ARIMA(2,2,2), ARIMA(2,1,1), ARIMA(2,2,1), and ARIMA (2,0,2) for all twelve months and in total fitted the best models. These were regarded according to the lowest MAPE, p-value (p < 0.05, p < 0.01, and p < 0.001) and through the Ljung–Box test (p < 0.05, p < 0.01, and p < 0.001) for autocorrelations. Conclusions: Statistical modeling and mathematical analyses are suitable not only for forecasting the infection trends but the course of a vaccination rate as well.

Since mid-November 2019, when the first SARS-CoV-2-infected patient was officially reported, the new coronavirus has affected over 10 million people from which half a million died during this short period. There is an urgent need to monitor, predict, and restrict COVID-19 in a more efficient manner. This is why Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models have been developed and used to predict the epidemiological trend of COVID-19 in Ukraine, Romania, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary, USA, Brazil, and India, these last three countries being otherwise the most affected presently. To increase accuracy, the daily prevalence data of COVID-19 from 10 March 2020 to 10 July 2020 were collected from the official website of the Romanian Government GOV.RO, World Health Organization (WHO), and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) websites. Several ARIMA models were formulated with different ARIMA parameters. ARIMA (1, 1, 0), ARIMA (3, 2, 2), ARIMA (3, 2, 2), ARIMA (3, 1, 1), ARIMA (1, 0, 3), ARIMA (1, 2, 0), ARIMA (1, 1, 0), ARIMA (0, 2, 1), and ARIMA (0, 2, 0) models were chosen as the best models, depending on their lowest Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) values for Ukraine, Romania, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary, USA, Brazil, and India (4.70244, 1.40016, 2.76751, 2.16733, 2.98154, 2.11239, 3.21569, 4.10596, 2.78051). This study demonstrates that ARIMA models are suitable for making predictions during the current crisis and offers an idea of the epidemiological stage of these regions.