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A major feature characterizing recent currency crises in emerging markets has been the large proportion of private foreign currency debt. This feature has made the conduct of monetary policy particularly difficult. This paper proposes a simple model to better understand these issues where firms are credit constrained and the currency denomination of debt matters. I argue that the recent financial crises are well explained by such a model. In this framework, monetary policy can be ineffective since the interest rate and the exchange rate channels of transmission of monetary policy go in opposite directions. This potential ineffectiveness should be taken into account in the choice of a monetary or exchange rate regime.

Purpose
Using hedging theories, we analyse the variables that determine the decision to hedge with foreign currency debt.


Design/methodology/approach
Using a sample of 100 Spanish companies with a significant social and economic role in Latin American during 2004‐2007, we estimated probit models for panel data.


Findings
Our results showed that the main determinants are scale economies and the use of derivatives. On the one hand, we found that this hedging is positively related to tax loss carry‐forwards and long‐term economic sectors, and on the other, that it is related negatively to information asymmetries and growth opportunities. Results were mixed for foreign currency exposure.


Research limitations/implications
The limitations of this paper are associated to the availability of information from annual reports and the SABI database, especially the variables in relation to operational hedging. Therefore, as a future line of research, we propose gathering of data on these internal hedging practices in order to obtain more accurate evidence about its use in companies and their relationship with financial hedging.


Originality/value
This paper makes three major contributions to the existing literature. First, it contributes by illustrating currency hedging practices used by Spanish firms – which are important in Latin markets – to manage exchange rate exposure in. Second, we used more variables for the empirical analyses to contrast the hedging theories than previous studies had. Finally, we used a data panel because it allows the control of unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity problems. Previous studies only used cross‐section estimations.

This paper is a study of default risk on Finnish government debt. The objectives of the study are to estimate the size of the default risk and to shed some light to the causes of default risk, using simple regression runs.To estimate the Finnish government default risk premium, we measured the interest rate differential on Finnish government DEM- and USD-denominated bonds compared to respectively German and US government bonds over the period October 1991 February 1995.For the sake of comparison, we also measured the interest rate differential between Finnish government FIM-denominated bonds and German government bonds.Our results indicate that for the period studied the default risk premium on the Finnish government foreign-currency denominated debt was quite small, but by no means trivial and clearly not constant.The default risk premium on DEM-denominated debt was a small fraction of the differential for FIM-denominated debt.Our results provide strong evidence that the default risk premium was mainly determined by the level and growth rate of government debt and was not related to the general economic indicators (GDP and current account).

AbstractStarting from the constraints and incentives that cause countries to issue debt in foreign currency, this paper provides an overview of policy approaches for choosing the optimal currency structure of sovereign foreign‐currency debt. The objective of sovereign debt managers generally includes both risk and cost minimisation, while constraints to foreign‐currency debt allocation originate in the parameters of the domestic macroeconomy, the shocks it faces and the initial conditions. Overall, the main parameters that drive the solutions for optimal currency allocation of foreign‐currency debt are the covariances of macrovariables with exchange rates and the variances of different exchange rates. Both the covariances and the exchange rate volatility can be deceptive when a fixed exchange rate regime is maintained, however. To adequately capture the expected covariances in the context of managed exchange rate regimes, we suggest that sovereign debt managers work with equilibrium instead of actual exchange rates. For the same reason and because the estimates of relative exchange rate variances should be forward looking, we suggest using synchronisation indicators in the policy analysis to better capture the underlying drivers of exchange rate volatility across currencies. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.