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Post-Independence federal arrangement of the Nigerian state has suffered undue torture of tinkering, especially during the prolonged military rule. It's coming into power had resulted in the emergence of unitary federalism with the attendant fall-out of over-concentration of powers and resources at the centre, thereby rendering other component units of the federation, a mere appendage in inter-governmental relations. The current agitation for restructuring that is the re-ordering of relationships, distribution of power and resources within the components of the federation, by a wide-spectrum of ethnic nationalities across the geopolitical zones, is a reaction to the current arrangement of the Nigerian federation. This paper using Deils Wrights' models as a framework of analysis with data generated through secondary sources, examines federal-Local and State-Local relates which is receiving scant attention compared to federal-state relations in the current agitation. Findings revealed that Local Governments has been at the mercy of the other two levels of government in fiscal, political and administrative relations. This has rendered the institution mostly ineffective in their functional responsibilities. It is therefore concluded that any reform agenda that will improve the standard of governance in Nigeria, should pay particular attention to this inclusive authority model of inter-governmental relations. Therefore the need arises for constitutional reforms for devolution of power and financial resources to local government for an effective local governance system that ultimately translates to national development.

This paper seeks to examine the conflictual relationship between/among the apparatus of government during the fourth Nigerian republic. Data were gathered from secondary sources. It adopts the instrumentalists' view of federalism by interrogating the impact of ethnicity on the allocation of federal finance and establishing the argument on the constitutional basis for revenue distribution with careful examination of the 'imperfect' federation bequeathed to Nigeria at Independence in 1960. This paper, therefore, underscores the conflict emanating from quarters of ethnicity and lopsided nation-state arrangement in Nigeria with the reference point to her fourth republic.

Intergovernmental relation is an interaction among different levels of government. Intergovernmental relation is oftentimes conflict-ridden, and the extent of the conflict depends on how they are managed by the actor operating at the government levels. This study examines conflict management in intergovernmental relation in Nigeria. The content analysis method would be used. This will be carried out by analyzing data obtained from extant literature on the subject matter. This paper found that intergovernmental conflicts mainly borders on tax jurisdiction and revenue allocation. Other areas of conflict were found to include domination by the center of other units, as well as, parallel and vertical misunderstanding among units on administrative, legal, social and economic matters. It was suggested that levels of government should introduce such method as discussion, integration, good management of communication in other to attain a peaceful intergovernmental relations regime.

This article discusses the intense, politically inspired oppositional relations between the centre and the federal States during Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-1983) which ultimately led to its breakdown. The paper analyses the underlying sources of intergovernmental opposition during the Second Republic. Five major instances of this opposition are described. The first was the controversy over the liaison officers appointed by President Shagari in 1980 to supervise federal projects in the States. The second had to do with differences over the division and administration of federally collected revenues. A third conflict arose over the attempts by the non-NPN (National Party of Nigeria) States to prevent direct federal involvement in general housing delivery. A fourth conflict centred on the control of the police and the maintenance of public order. Finally, the 1983 elections represented the last, and politically most decisive, instance of confrontation between the central government and the non-NPN States. In conclusion, strategies to ensure a less intensively conflictual system of Federal-State relations are suggested. (Documentatieblad/ASC Leiden)

Tanzania in embarking the decentralization by devolution policy (D by D) as a mechanism of facilitating quick development process through the involvement of people from grass root levels has been carried out through the inter-government relations between the central government and the local government authorities (LGAs). Throughout its implementation there had been a supportive structural set up, including a constitutional mandate for local governments. Also, there has been an increased recognition of LGAs by central and sector ministries as partners rather than subordinate structures. However, the lack of a clear and effective institutional framework to govern the implementation of D by D and the lack of a shared understanding of D by D across ministries and other governmental institutions has made led to structural confusion between the Central government and the Local Government Authorities. Thus, this paper explores the undertakings of the inter-government relations between the central government and the local government authorities (LGAs) in order to forge a way forward for a inclusive and responsive governance in the country.

In many African countries, decentralization has long been viewed as a means for improving local service delivery. Yet, despite various decentralization initiatives, poor service delivery continues to be problematic in two of Kenya's largest cities, Nairobi and Mombasa. Despite various governance reforms to enhance Kenya's decentralization process, backed up by constitutional provisions and legislation, this study highlights that a proliferation of actors with overlapping mandates, opaque development frameworks, and intra- and inter-party politics remain major obstacles to providing critical services in these two cities. It is concluded that the effective decentralization of service delivery in cities cannot occur without key accompanying policies, including the devolution of resources and amicable inter-governmental relations.

This paper looks at the intergovernmental mechanisms by which federalism operates in Australia, notably the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), Australian Loan Council (ALC). These three main systems contribute to improve Australian intergovernmental relations, that is, establish managerial mechanism in Australia. Australia's intergovernmental system provides the foundation for new federalism operations. And these mechanisms are an opportunity to consider the intergovernmental relations as a whole. Reform of intergovernmental operations and federal financial arrangements would contribute to greater economic efficiency, improved equity outcomes, and greater accountability and transparency. Reform will deliver benefits to the national economy and improve both Commonwealth and state fiscal operation.