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The paper is a response to H.Lindahl's extensive reply to Ferrara's critical remarks. This reply was published as part of a larger symposium (in Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics XXI, 2019, 3) on Lindahl's recently published Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion. In an effort to push the dialogue further, new reflections and counterarguments are here put forward in relation to four thematic areas: a) the notion of a-legality, revisited in light of a distinction between foreground and background assumptions of a practice; b) exemplarity, positive and negative, in law, c) the paradox of constituent power, and d) the relation of Lindahl's notion of "collective self-restraint" to the later Rawls's paradigm of "political liberalism".

En este artículo el soberanismo, como parte del populismo, se define por la combinación de tres factores. Primero, por la reducción del "pueblo", como autor de la Constitución y titular de la soberanía, al electorado. Segundo, por la atribución de un poder constituyente, entendido como el poder de reescribir las reglas del juego político, al electorado. Tercero, por el supuesto de que existe una interpretación única del interés general del pueblo reducido a un electorado y que está justificada la intolerancia hacia fuerzas políticas que se oponen. Contribuyen al impresionante caudal del río soberanista populista tres afluentes insospechados, arraigados en nuestra cultura política, no directamente relacionados con el populismo. ; In this article populist sovereignism is defined by the combination of three constituent elements of the notion of "the people". First, as authors of the Constitution it reduces the people to a mere electorate. Second, attributing to it a constituent power, understood as the power to rewrite the rules of the political game, also reduces the people to a mere electorate. Third, the assumption that one and only one correct interpretation exists of the general interest of the people, again reduced to the voters, and thus justifying the intolerance vis-à- vis its opponents. Although not directly related to populism, these three elements rooted in our political culture contribute to the impressive flow of populist sovereignism. ; Fil: Ferrara, Alessandro. Universidad de Roma Tor Vergata; Italia.

En este artículo el soberanismo, como parte del populismo, se define por la combinación de tres factores. Primero, por la reducción del "pueblo", como autor de la Constitución y titular de la soberanía, al electorado. Segundo, por la atribución de un poder constituyente, entendido como el poder de reescribir las reglas del juego político, al electorado. Tercero, por el supuesto de que existe una interpretación única del interés general del pueblo reducido a un electorado y que está justificada la intolerancia hacia fuerzas políticas que se oponen. Contribuyen al impresionante caudal del río soberanista populista tres afluentes insospechados, arraigados en nuestra cultura política, no directamente relacionados con el populism. ; In this article populist sovereignism is defined by the combination of three constituent elements of the notion of "the people". First, as authors of the Constitution it reduces the people to a mere electorate. Second, attributing to it a constituent power, understood as the power to rewrite the rules of the political game, also reduces the people to a mere electorate. Third, the assumption that one and only one correct interpretation exists of the general interest of the people, again reduced to the voters, and thus justifying the intolerance vis-àvis its opponents. Although not directly related to populism, these three elements rooted in our political culture contribute to the impressive flow of populist sovereignism.

The author argues that in Lindahl's Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion, and also in his Julius Stone Address "Inside and Outside Global Law", one can find a) a great rebuttal to the once fashionable deconstructionist fantasies about "multitudes" (Hardt and Negri) and to a variously termed "community of difference" (Nancy, Blanchot, Esposito, Agamben) that excludes nothing and no one; b) an interesting concept of law as linked with collective action; c) an ingenious questioning of the vexed binary of representative and direct democracy. At the same time, Lindahl's theory is argued to be susceptible of significant improvement if the central notion of a-legality were to be defined in a non-ambiguous way, if the presently unclear relation of his guiding principle of the "dutiful restraint of majorities" to political liberalism were to be spelled out, and if his counterintuitive blessing of a-legal conduct with the insignia of constituent power were to be backed up by a stronger justification.

Il saggio prende in esame due punti della teorizzazione di Harry Frankfurt in merito alla moral agency. Il primo č la corretta concettualizzazione del momento della 'decisione' all'interno della catena deliberativa. Vengono esaminati tre passaggi critici: a) la base normativa a cui la decisione risponde; b) la teoria della 'unificazione della persona' attraverso la decisione e c) la distinzione fra 'scelta' e 'decisione'. Il secondo punto č l'ambiguitÀ insita nel concetto di 'doveri d'amore' proposto da Frankfurt. A questo proposito vengono esaminate: a) la distinzione fra amore "attivo" e "passivo" e b) la mancata tematizzazione della "legittimitÀ dell'amore", ovvero del rapporto fra l'amore in quanto relazione sociale e i quadri interpretativi della cultura entro cui si sviluppa.

This article addresses the issue of future cosmopolitanism, building on a minimal reconstruction of what cosmopolitanism has been in the past. It will elucidate the notion of 'political' cosmopolitanism in its relation to a certain methodological option which is designated by the shorthand term 'judgment'. Cosmopolitanism is not a new idea but a new version of it is constituted by 'political' cosmopolitanism, bound up with a judgmentbased, as opposed to principle-based, understanding of normativity.