Suchergebnisse

The original model and organic growth of Spanish political parties through their spread nationwide during the early stages of the country's transition to democracy (1973-83) conditioned these parties to move towards centralized organizational models in which political and staff decisions were left to the parties' core leadership, a situation driven by a political climate dominated by the fear of instability. The phase which saw the institutionalization of political parties, as of 1983, coincided with the construction of the so-called States of the Autonomous Regions and reforms to the civil service, system of Justice and savings banks which yielded vast numbers of selective incentives (paid public appointments) in politics, reinforcing the trend for centralization. These reforms were developed in the form of changes to inside regulations on the functioningof parties which reduced internal controls, leading to the extension of the intervals between party conferences, the proliferation of underused national executive committees, the supreme control of leaders over the composition of candidate lists, and so on. Over the long term, this has resulted in low quality politics marred by cases of corruption that does not attract or connect with society and faces difficulties in renewing its programmes and leaders. The political sphere's response is currently characterized by the absolute centralization of decisions — within the PP — and pilot primary elections to choose candidates to head-lists, which in reality reinforce the power of inside party circles and further increase the bureaucratization of party politics. ; El modelo originario y el crecimiento orgánico por difusión territorial de los partidos españoles durante las primeras fases de la Transición política (1973-1983) los condicionaron hacia modelos organizativos centralizados en los que las decisiones políticas y sobre personal quedaron en manos de sus direcciones centrales, algo impulsado por un clima político dominado por el temor a la inestabilidad. La fase de institucionalización de los partidos, a partir de 1983, coincidió con la construcción del Estado de las Autonomías y las reformas de la Función Pública, la Justicia y las cajas de ahorro que suministraron ingentes cantidades de incentivos selectivos (cargos públicos retribuidos) a la política, reforzando las tendencias centralizadoras, que se manifestaron en cambios en las normas internas de funcionamiento de los partidos que redujeron los controles internos: prolongación de los periodos entre congresos, masificación e inutilización de los parlamentos internos, dominio de las direcciones para componer las listas electorales, etc. El resultado a largo plazo ha sido una política de baja calidad, salpicada de casos de corrupción, poco atrayente e integradora para la sociedad y con problemas para renovar programas y dirigentes. La reacción desde la política está siendo la centralización absoluta de las decisiones, en el PP; o el ensayo de «primarias» para elegir cabezas de lista que refuerzan el poder de las cúpulas y burocratizan aún más la política partidaria.The original model and organic growth of Spanish political parties through their spread nationwide during the early stages of the country's transition to democracy (1973-83) conditioned these parties to move towards centralized organizational models in which political and staff decisions were left to the parties' core leadership, a situation driven by a political climate dominated by the fear of instability. The phase which saw the institutionalization of political parties, as of 1983, coincided with the construction of the so-called States of the Autonomous Regions and reforms to the civil service, system of Justice and savings banks which yielded vast numbers of selective incentives (paid public appointments) in politics, reinforcing the trend for centralization. These reforms were developed in the form of changes to inside regulations on the functioningof parties which reduced internal controls, leading to the extension of the intervals between party conferences, the proliferation of underused national executive committees, the supreme control of leaders over the composition of candidate lists, and so on. Over the long term, this has resulted in low quality politics marred by cases of corruption that does not attract or connect with society and faces difficulties in renewing its programmes and leaders. The political sphere's response is currently characterized by the absolute centralization of decisions — within the PP — and pilot primary elections to choose candidates to head-lists, which in reality reinforce the power of inside party circles and further increase the bureaucratization of party politics.