Rising societal and economic needs of the increasing human population together with the growing size of fishing fleets, developing technology in the fishing and globalization of fish food market exerted a significant pressure on the marine ecosystems within the last decades. These pressures resulted in irreversible changes on the marine ecosystem structures and, in turn, limited the socio-economic benefits obtained from marine ecosystems. Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management aims to achieve a sustainable balance between the sociatial needs of the society and ecological health of the natural resources. This study provides a base for Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) for Turkish Seas employing an interdisciplinary holistic approach in three steps; I) Evaluating the historical development of the Turkish fisheries sector with its diverse sub-sectoral (marine and inland capture and aquaculture), sub-regional (along seven discrete geographical areas) and species based production trends as well as defining its diverse societal objectives, II) Exploring the direction and magnitude of the historical changes in the Turkey's marine capture fisheries (in the Black Sea, the Marmara Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea) and the corresponding response of its supporting ecosystems in relation to concurrent management measures, III) elucidating and comparing the structure, function and fisheries impact of the regional EEZs and predicting the impact of different management options. The holistic approach included socioeconomic and ecological indicators as well as modelling studies with Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE). Results quantified the level of human induced pressures driven by increasing societal and economic demands due to the human population increase, national economic crises and corresponded governmental subsidies. Since 1980s, per capita fish consumption decreased 1.5 kg/year with 14% increase in Turkey's fisheries production capacity and 52% rise of the human population. Indicator trends and interrelations observed between the indicators in this study could be summarised as follows; i) regional fisheries fleets have developed an over-fishing capacity, too many fishers were exploiting the constrained amount of stocks with excessive number of vessels that have excessive engine power with very low efficiency, ii) this fishing over-capacity eradicated the long sized, vulnerable fish species from the ecosystem and the ecosystem became significantly dominated by small pelagic fish, iii) even though the numbers of fishers, vessels and fishing effort of the fleet have been decreasing within the last decade, ecological indicators continued to give warning signals for a possible more severe deterioration in the regional ecosystems. Scenario simulations (except the ecology weighted scenario in the Black Sea) indicated that if the histrorical management policies were based on the ecosystem characteristics, the current targeted fish species biomass, landing weight and value would be in a better condition. Similar to the past scenario simulations, future predictions showed that EBFM can contribute to the ecological health of the ecosystems as well as to their economic efficiency. For this reason, the achievement and sustainability of ecological and socio-economic targets can be possible with a successful implementation of 'Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management' to the regional seas. The produced information and assessed gaps within the thesis study can be taken as a step forward on this way. ; Geçtiğimiz on yıllık süreçler içerisinde nüfusla birlikte artan sosyo-ekonomik ihtiyaçlar, balık avlama filolarındaki büyüme, balık avcılığındaki teknolojik gelişmeler ve su ürünleri pazarının küreselleşmesi deniz ekosistemleri üzerinde önemli bir baskı unsuru oluşturmaktadır. Bu baskılar deniz ekosistemlerinin yapısında geri dönüşü olmayan değişikliklere yol açmakta ve deniz ekosistemlerinden elde edilen sosyo-ekonomik faydaların azalması ile sonuçlanmaktadır. Ekosistem Temelli Balıkçılık Yönetimi (ETBY), balıkçılık yönetiminde, toplumsal ihtiyaçlar ile doğal kaynakların ekolojik sağlığı arasında sürdürülebilir bir denge sağlamayı hedeflemektedir. Bu tez çalışması disiplinlerarası bütüncül bir yöntem uygulayarak ETBY kararları için üç aşamalı bilimsel bir temel oluşturmaktadır; I) Türkiye balıkçılık sektörünün tarihsel gelişimini alt sektörler (deniz ve iç sularda avcılık ve yetiştiricilik), alt bölgeler (ülkenin yedi coğrafi bölgesi) ve tür bazında değerlendirmek ve toplumsal önceliklerini belirlemek, II) Türkiye deniz balıkları avcılığında (ulusal düzeyde ve Karadeniz, Marmara Denizi, Ege Denizi ve Akdeniz'de) ve geçmişten günümüze gerçekleşen değişimlerin yönünü ve boyutlarını, bölgesel ekosistemler üzerindeki sonuçları ile birlikte süregelen yönetim uygulamaları ile ilişki içerisinde değerlendirmek, III) bölgesel denizlerdeki Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge (MEB) ekosistemlerinin yapı ve işleyişlerini açıklamak ve karşılaştırmak ve aynı zamanda farklı yönetimsel uygulamalarının etkilerini tahmin etmek. Bu amaç için kullanılan bütüncül yöntem sosyo-ekonomik ve ekolojik indikatörler ile birlikte Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE) ekosistem modeli ile yapılan modellemele çalışmalarından oluşmaktadır. Sonuçlar insan nüfusu ile birlikte artan sosyal ve ekonomik ihtiyaçlar, ulusal ekonomik krizler ve eş zamanlı hükümet teşviklerinin seviyesini sayısal olarak ortaya koymuştur. Türkiye nüfusunun artarken, toplam balıkçılık üretiminin sadece artmasıyla ile Türkiye'de kişi başına düşen balık tüketimi 1980'lerden günümüze 1,5 kg azalmıştır. Türkiye deniz balıkçılığına uygulanan indikatör eğilimleri I) bölgesel balıkçılıkların yüksek seviyede motor gücüne sahip çok sayıda tekne ve çok sayıda balıkçı ile, düşük verimliliğe neden olan aşırı avcılık seviyesine ulaştığını, II) bu aşırı avcılık kapasitesi ile zaman içerisinde bölgesel ekosistemlerdeki uzun boylu, uzun ömürlü, balıkçılığa hassas türleri azalttığı ve ekosistemlerde küçük pelajik balıkların dominant olduğunu, III) son yıllarda balıkçı ve tekne sayısının ve balık avlama gücünün azalmasına ragmen ekolojik indikatörlerin daha ileri ekolojik zarara yönelik uyarı sinyalleri vermeye devam ettiğini göstermiştir. EwE ile yapılan senaryo simülasyonları (Karadeniz'deki ekoloji öncelikli senaryo dışında) geçmişteki balıkçılık yönetimi uygulamalarının ekosistem temelli yapılmış olmaları halinde avlanan türlerin biyokütle, av miktar ve değerlerinin günümüz değerlerinden daha iyi olacağını göstermiştir. Geçmişe dönük senaryolara benzer şekilde, geleceğe yönelik tahminler ETBY sonuçlarının ekosistem sağlığına olduğu kadar balıkçılığın ekonomik verimliliğine de katkı verebileceğini göstermektedir. Bu nedenle balıkçılıkta ekolojik ve sosyo-ekonomik hedeflere ulaşmanın ETBY'nin bölgesel denizlere uygulanması ile mümkün olabileceği ortaya çıkmaktadır. Tez çalışması kapsamında üretilen bilgiler ve belirlenen eksiklikler bu amaç için bir adım olarak kullanılabilir. ; Ph.D. - Doctoral Program
Sweet sorghum processing and production in the Philippines still at its infancy stage in the country. It was introduced in Ilocos Norte by Dr. Heraldo H. Layoen, Vice President of Mariano Marcos State University (MMSU) in 2005. The crop has been found to be highly efficient in producing fuel in other countries like Indonesia, Tanzania, and USA. Other products that can be produced from the sweet sorghum crop are molasses, animal feeds, fertilizer, flour, syrup, vinegar, juice, liquor, and sugar. BAPAMIN Enterprise, (BAPAMIN) is the sole enterprise which has engaged in sweet sorghum production and marketing of products made from the crop in the country. BAPAMIN was established in 2009 as the marketing arm of the BAPAMIN Farmer?s Cooperative (BFC), a group of farmers into planting and growing of sweet sorghum in Batac, Ilocos Norte. Both the enterprise and cooperative ids headed by Engr. Antonio Arcangel. BAPAMIN and his wife, Doris who are co-managing the company. It was observed that the enterprise was encountering difficulty in taking off even it has existing for seven years already. Thus, this research was conducted to draw up a strategic plan that would help make BIPAMIN Enterprise a viable social enterprise. The specific objectives of the research are to: 1) Present and discuss a noteworthy business issue faced by BAPAMIN Enterprise, which has company wide implications. 2) Evaluate the BAPAMIN sweet sorghum business model in terms of its various business functions. 3) Analyze the opportunities, threats and the critical strategic and operational issue(s) facing the venture 4) recommend a strategic plan and operational options for BAPAMIN Enterprise to become viable. Primary and secondary data were used to gather information. Interviews were conducted with Engr. And Ms. Arcangel as well as key informants from BAPAMIN Enterprise. Technical and socio-economic experts from MMSU and government agencies like the Philippine Council for Agriculture, Aquatic and Natural Resources Research and Development (PCAARRD)-DOST DA-Bureau of Agricultural Research were also interviewed. Secondary data on sweet sorghum were gathered from various publications as well as internet sources. The collected data were analyzed using Business Model Canvas, Personal Entrepreneurial Competencies Self-Rating Analysis, Internal Factor Evaluation, Porters Five Forces Model, Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) Analysis, and the Qualitative Strategic Planning (QSPM) Matrix. It was learned through the Business Model Canvas that there were eight (8) participants in BAPAMIN?s business model: the Bureau of Agricultural Research (BAR) and the Department of Agriculture (DA) for funding the research and some equipment the Mariano Marcos State University (MMSU) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for research and development Bapamin Farmers? Cooperative (BFC) for the production of raw materials and university, outlets, and institutions as the distribution channels. These participants were connected to one another and the efficiency of BAPAMIN depended on its linkages with the other components of the business model. Based on the interview with the entrepreneur, the vision for BAPAMIN is to be ?the pioneer in the propagation and processing of sweet sorghum in the country and the main advocate for developing high value products from sweet sorghum?. On the other hand, the mission of BAPAMIN is ?to campaign for mass planting of sweet sorghum as an alternative crop, address the goal of food sufficiency in the country and promote and educate the farmers on the best agricultural and cultural management practices for the adoption and propagation of sweet sorghum to consequently improve the financial condition of the farmers?. An examination of BAPAMIN?s vision and mission revealed that the mission statement only consisted of 4 out of 9 elements. Thus, improvements in both the mission and vision statements were suggested. BAPAMINS business functions were also presented in the study. The production and operations activities to the enterprise were not programmed and intermittent as they produced different products which were being introduced to the market and also displayed in trade exhibits. It was analyzed that then current equipment was still not enough to achieve the target production volume. In terms of raw materials supply, the enterprise bought grains from the BFC at Php 13/kg and the juice at Php 3/liter. Generally, the harvest were much higher during the dry season that the wet season. The enterprise as of the time of the study employed 4 full time and 210 seasonal workers because processing operations in the company took place only during harvest season. The marketing aspects of the enterprise were assessed to be relatively weak as the firm does not employ any marketing strategy. A closer look at the financial aspects of BAPAMIN revealed that the enterprise yielded an acceptable amount of profit but a part of it was plowed back for research and development of the sweet sorghum crop. Through the problem flowchart, it was seen that there were factors hindering BAPAMIN to becoming a true social enterprise. The owner was more focused on his advocacy of promoting sweet sorghum production and processing in the country to uplift the situation of farmers rather than focus on the profitability of the business itself. He overlooked the fact that BAPAMIN must first a profitable enterprise which is a must for any social enterprise. The EFE score derived for BAPAMIN was 2.53 which means the enterprise was only a little above the average in its effort to pursue strategies that capitalized on external opportunities and avoid threats on the other hand, the IFE score was 2.45 which implies that the enterprise is below average in terms of its overall internal strength. There was only one alternative formulated from the SWOT and this is the owner should exert more aggressive efforts in showcasing BAPAMIN as a model social enterprise. To achieve this, it must align its strategies to consumer preferences expose its customers to the various aspects of its business model through field and plant tours, and come up with a compelling product labeling and appealing packaging which would reflect the social enterprise dimension of the business.
Sweet sorghum processing and production in the Philippines still at its infancy stage in the country. It was introduced in Ilocos Norte by Dr. Heraldo H. Layoen, Vice President of Mariano Marcos State University (MMSU) in 2005. The crop has been found to be highly efficient in producing fuel in other countries like Indonesia, Tanzania, and USA. Other products that can be produced from the sweet sorghum crop are molasses, animal feeds, fertilizer, flour, syrup, vinegar, juice, liquor, and sugar. BAPAMIN Enterprise, (BAPAMIN) is the sole enterprise which has engaged in sweet sorghum production and marketing of products made from the crop in the country. BAPAMIN was established in 2009 as the marketing arm of the BAPAMIN Farmer?s Cooperative (BFC), a group of farmers into planting and growing of sweet sorghum in Batac, Ilocos Norte. Both the enterprise and cooperative ids headed by Engr. Antonio Arcangel. BAPAMIN and his wife, Doris who are co-managing the company. It was observed that the enterprise was encountering difficulty in taking off even it has existing for seven years already. Thus, this research was conducted to draw up a strategic plan that would help make BIPAMIN Enterprise a viable social enterprise. The specific objectives of the research are to: 1) Present and discuss a noteworthy business issue faced by BAPAMIN Enterprise, which has company wide implications. 2) Evaluate the BAPAMIN sweet sorghum business model in terms of its various business functions. 3) Analyze the opportunities, threats and the critical strategic and operational issue(s) facing the venture 4) recommend a strategic plan and operational options for BAPAMIN Enterprise to become viable. Primary and secondary data were used to gather information. Interviews were conducted with Engr. And Ms. Arcangel as well as key informants from BAPAMIN Enterprise. Technical and socio-economic experts from MMSU and government agencies like the Philippine Council for Agriculture, Aquatic and Natural Resources Research and Development (PCAARRD)-DOST DA-Bureau of Agricultural Research were also interviewed. Secondary data on sweet sorghum were gathered from various publications as well as internet sources. The collected data were analyzed using Business Model Canvas, Personal Entrepreneurial Competencies Self-Rating Analysis, Internal Factor Evaluation, Porters Five Forces Model, Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) Analysis, and the Qualitative Strategic Planning (QSPM) Matrix. It was learned through the Business Model Canvas that there were eight (8) participants in BAPAMIN?s business model: the Bureau of Agricultural Research (BAR) and the Department of Agriculture (DA) for funding the research and some equipment the Mariano Marcos State University (MMSU) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for research and development Bapamin Farmers? Cooperative (BFC) for the production of raw materials and university, outlets, and institutions as the distribution channels. These participants were connected to one another and the efficiency of BAPAMIN depended on its linkages with the other components of the business model. Based on the interview with the entrepreneur, the vision for BAPAMIN is to be ?the pioneer in the propagation and processing of sweet sorghum in the country and the main advocate for developing high value products from sweet sorghum?. On the other hand, the mission of BAPAMIN is ?to campaign for mass planting of sweet sorghum as an alternative crop, address the goal of food sufficiency in the country and promote and educate the farmers on the best agricultural and cultural management practices for the adoption and propagation of sweet sorghum to consequently improve the financial condition of the farmers?. An examination of BAPAMIN?s vision and mission revealed that the mission statement only consisted of 4 out of 9 elements. Thus, improvements in both the mission and vision statements were suggested. BAPAMINS business functions were also presented in the study. The production and operations activities to the enterprise were not programmed and intermittent as they produced different products which were being introduced to the market and also displayed in trade exhibits. It was analyzed that then current equipment was still not enough to achieve the target production volume. In terms of raw materials supply, the enterprise bought grains from the BFC at Php 13/kg and the juice at Php 3/liter. Generally, the harvest were much higher during the dry season that the wet season. The enterprise as of the time of the study employed 4 full time and 210 seasonal workers because processing operations in the company took place only during harvest season. The marketing aspects of the enterprise were assessed to be relatively weak as the firm does not employ any marketing strategy. A closer look at the financial aspects of BAPAMIN revealed that the enterprise yielded an acceptable amount of profit but a part of it was plowed back for research and development of the sweet sorghum crop. Through the problem flowchart, it was seen that there were factors hindering BAPAMIN to becoming a true social enterprise. The owner was more focused on his advocacy of promoting sweet sorghum production and processing in the country to uplift the situation of farmers rather than focus on the profitability of the business itself. He overlooked the fact that BAPAMIN must first a profitable enterprise which is a must for any social enterprise. The EFE score derived for BAPAMIN was 2.53 which means the enterprise was only a little above the average in its effort to pursue strategies that capitalized on external opportunities and avoid threats on the other hand, the IFE score was 2.45 which implies that the enterprise is below average in terms of its overall internal strength. There was only one alternative formulated from the SWOT and this is the owner should exert more aggressive efforts in showcasing BAPAMIN as a model social enterprise. To achieve this, it must align its strategies to consumer preferences expose its customers to the various aspects of its business model through field and plant tours, and come up with a compelling product labeling and appealing packaging which would reflect the social enterprise dimension of the business.
Summary In the Master's final thesis "Does Lithuania violate human rights by refusing to provide treatment for people free of charge?" are analyzed the obligation of the State, set by Article 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and problems in the health system. The right to free of charge treatment belongs to the group of social human rights. The implementation of this group of human rights usually depends on the economic situation of the state and, in particular, right to free charge treatment depends on the health protection policy of the state. Health care systems are criticized around a world. By reason of expensive medical technologies and medicine as such, require huge sums of money, which is scare. Patient's needs and expectations for health care, health and quality of life are growing. Patients become more aware and demanding on health care. In these conditions health care quality helps to save resources and better meets patient's needs and expectations. Globalization and privatization processes determine expansion of health care services and patient's market. The Constitution was adopted by referendum on the 25th of October 1992. Since these days continues a period of biggest changes: a new system of social, economical, political relations was settled. The right of to free of charge health protection is established in Article 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which determines that the state shall take care of people's health and have to guarantee medical aid and services in the event of sickness. The procedure for providing medical aid to citizens free of charge at state health care institutions shall be established by law. The Constitution shall be an integral and directly applicable statute. Every person may defend his or her rights on the basis of the Constitution. Also there are more documents which define the existence of the free of charge treatment such as the Law of Health Care institutions of the Republic of Lithuania, Law of Health system of the Republic of Lithuania, Law of Public Health of Republic of Lithuania. After all, the coming of the Constitution was preconditioned by the need to protect human rights and freedoms from the possible state abuse with power. The idea of the Constitution is the limitation of power that guarantees the individual's rights and freedoms. This study consists of three chapters. The first part of the study entitled "The concept of the right to health care" presents conception of health care definition, objectives and their development, also patient's rights and responsibilities. There are various definitions of the term "health", as well as health assessment indicators are analyzed in detail. This chapter presents strategic aspects of health care quality: health care quality better meets human requirements and expectations for health care. Health care quality is a systemic, universal, continuous process oriented to the patients needs. The point of health care quality is not only to seek for better health of patients, but also approvingly effect their quality of life. Health care quality is based on continuous learning of health professionals and patients, health care quality helps to economize resources and make reinvestments. This chapter deals with health care quality and quality improvement problems and basic principles. The second chapter of the study is entitled "Constitutional right to free of charge treatment" includes three different sections. Part one "The Constitutional right to free of charge treatment at the international level" presents the aspect of Australia, Canada, Germany and Poland health care system, quality management, steady progress, patient's view, government regulation. Part two "The right to free of charge treatment is firmed in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania" defines major social factors of the state: government budget, social health protection. Moreover, presents the obligation to guarantee medical aid and services in the event of sickness. Part three is analyzing the obligation of the State, set by Article 53 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. Right to free of charge treatment consists of five related aspects – health care system, government funding, compulsory health insurance and patient's rights. Chapter free "Right to health protection" presents health care situation in Lithuania and in other countries. Health protection system is the main social target of suitable development. This system, for public health care aims to ensure adequate health care and the improvement in population's health status. This chapter involves three sections. The first section is about right to health protection. Citizens have a right to health protection which was consolidated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and was adopted in early December 2000. The second is about compulsory health insurance. Compulsory health insurance is a national population for the costs of health care and usually is instituted as a program of health care reform. It is enforced by law. This chapter dilates on analyses compulsory health care insurance advantages and disadvantages. Besides chapter three includes empirical analysis – layers and medic interview – has been made. The results of analysis confirmed the hypothesis, that due to unprovided treatment free of charge, the human rights are partially violated. Statistics shows that 19, 5 % of Lithuanian people say that free of charge treatment doesn't exist in Lithuania. More and more people disappoint of situation in Lithuania. Other 7, 4 % claim that free of charge treatment exists. This thesis is analyzing the establishment of the right to free of charge treatment in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and other laws. The aim of this study is to determine a situation of medical care and free of charge treatment in Lithuania. The study analyses the nature of the obligations of states under Article 53 of the Constitution. In the end of the work an empirical analyses – layers and medic interview. The results of analyses confirmed the hypothesis that human rights are partly violated in Lithuania. There is no political awareness of human rights violations.
In line with the national government goal of alleviating the poverty in the country, regional sectors have made plans to meet the targets and objectives set. Cabuyao, being one of the municipalities in Laguna under Region IV-A CALABARZON, in the course of its vision of uplifting the quality of lives of its people, supported the said primary aim. The Cabuyao Investment and Development Authority (CIDA) was subsequently established to promote entrepreneurship among the citizens of the town. In order to do so, there is a need to assess the entrepreneurial potential and business assistance needs of different types of organizations. Operating cooperatives within the area were identified as one. CIDA was the direct response of the Municipal Government of Cabuyao to exercise its corporate power in accordance with Section 15 of RA 7160 or the Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units under the Local Government Code of 1991. Data obtained from the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) revealed that since 1991 up to present there were already 75 registered cooperatives in Cabuyao. However, only 25 were considered operating. Given this condition suggests that these cooperatives to be placed under research study. The study was conducted to assess the entrepreneurial potential and business assistance needs of the cooperatives in Cabuyao, Laguna. Specifically, it aimed to present the profile of the cooperatives of the study, identify common problems encountered by the cooperatives, assess the Municipal Cooperative and Livelihood Development Office (MCLDO) in its program and services to the cooperatives, present the identified specific business assistance needs of the cooperatives that can be provided by the Cabuyao Investment and Development Authority (CIDA) in its business support service offerings, and assess the capacity of the cooperatives to engage in entrepreneurship. Twenty three out of the 25 operating cooperatives or 92% were included in the study. Respondents of the study were primarily officers of the cooperatives. The study employed descriptive design to answer the research problems and objectives posed at the beginning of the study. Primary data consisted of the answers of the respondents through the survey and self-rating questionnaires. Interviews were done to determine in-depth pieces of information pertaining to the activities and management of cooperatives. A survey questionnaire, test of organizational and managerial efficiency, and Personal Entrepreneurial Competency (PEC) self-rating questionnaire were used as research instruments. On the other hand, secondary data were sourced from the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO) and the Municipal Cooperative and Livelihood Development Office (MCLDO). The Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) was the one that provided the list of operating cooperatives. Preliminary studies related to CIDA were also used. The study also made use of previous special problems and theses related to cooperatives conducted by undergraduate students in UPLB. Some articles published by the Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute (ACCI) were utilized too. Also, electronic journals and articles were sourced from the Internet regarding entrepreneurship and business support services. It was noted that operating cooperatives were vulnerable to failures considering that most of them are still new together with MCLDO which was also regarded to be still young in handling cooperatives. Thus, given the conditions of the two wherein the former has to enhance its internal management while the latter has to complete its resources including competent staffs, business incubation program cannot be entirely embraced. However, even without the physical appearance of the business incubation program, its core features which are the business support services can still be pushed through. Based from the assessment of the entrepreneurial potential of the cooperatives, majority of them were remarked as weak considering the five criteria used. These were risk-taking, opportunity- seeking, and persuasion and networking, availability of capital, and members' participation. Out of the 23 cooperatives, only three surpassed all the criteria. This implied that majority of the operating cooperatives, at present, were not yet ready to promote entrepreneurship to their members. Recommended strategies to address the findings of the study with respect to the assessment of the business assistance needs include capability-building programs, diversification and market development, new product development, strategic alliance, and service development combined with basic entrepreneurship support, business development support, financing and networking services to be initiated by MCLDO. Some of the specific business support services include lectures with regards to cooperative management by either MCLDO or other institutions, seminars regarding risk management, persuasion and networking, debt management, human resource management, credit management, budget preparation and financial statement analysis, access to financial institution or modification of the loan program to solve the lack of operating capital, linkage to research institutions for possible technology transfer and identification of investment opportunities that engaged in agribusiness, conduct of supply chain analysis, establishing partnerships with manufacturing firms around the municipality, formation of federation among the operating cooperatives in Cabuyao and assistance to conduct community development programs. MCLDO is also suggested to have an annual recognition rite for outstanding operating cooperatives in Cabuyao to strengthen and promote the cooperative sector. Key success attributes were shown using the balanced scorecard which were classified in its four domains namely customer, financial, internal business process, and learning and growth perspectives. On the other hand, recommendations in terms of assessment of the entrepreneurial potential include reorienting the loan program of the MCLDO towards promoting entrepreneurship rather than economic activities of the cooperatives. Also, MCLDO should assist the Cabuyao-based cooperatives in forming strategic alliance either among them or to federations. Every cooperative to make their entrepreneurial endeavor a success should have a clear vision of improving the wealth of all the members in terms of earning more than what they received from interest on share capital and patronage refund for the patrons to support the entrepreneurial activity of the cooperative. Finally, it is suggested for the officers coming from cooperatives to undergo seminars, trainings and workshops related to enhancing their entrepreneurial capacity that can influence them in their decision-making and then eventually enabling them to encourage all the patrons to engage in an entrepreneurial activity.
Arviointitutkimus koskee Suomen talouden ytimen, valtiokonsernin talousohjauksen tilaa vuosien 1987-2008 uudistuskauden jälkeen. Mihin oli tultu vuonna 2008 ja miten talousohjausjärjestelmä toimii? Arvioinnin kohteena on myös se, miten ohjausjärjestelmän tila vastaa 2010-luvun haasteita. Arviointiaineiston muodostavat uudistuskauden dokumentit sekä ohjausjärjestelmän kaikkien tasojen eduskunnan, hallituksen, valtiovarainministeriön, ministeriöiden, virastojen ja laitosten sekä tarkastusviranomaisten haastattelut. Vastaavaa lähestymistapaa ei suomalaisessa hallinnontutkimuksessa ole aikaisemmin sovellettu. Arviointi tukeutuu kompleksisuusteoreettiseen viitekehykseen. Kompleksisuusteoriaa ei ole myöskään vastaavalla tavalla hyödynnetty. Tutkimus on siten sekä lähestymistapansa että teoriaulottuvuutensa osalta pioneerityötä, jota ei ole voitu perustaa aiempaan tutkimukseen. Sellaisena se avaa, vaatii ja osoittaa useita jatkotutkimustarpeita. Tutkimuksen päätuloksia ovat ensinnäkin se, että talousohjauksen ytimen, finanssipolitiikan ohjausrakenne on tasapainossa uudistustavoitteiden kanssa ja sellaisena se tukee talouden kokonaishallintaa. Toiseksi tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että tulosohjaustavoitteet, tuottavuus, taloudellisuus ja vaikuttavuus eivät ole toteutuneet talousarviolain edellyttämällä tavalla. Laki ja käytännön toiminta ovat kaukana tasapainosta. Lain vaatimukset ovat taakkana toimijoille. Taakka ei kuitenkaan näy suoraan menoina momenteilla ja siksi se ei ole saanut osakseen ansaitsemaansa huomiota. Kolmantena uudistustavoitteena ollut demokraattisen ohjauksen vahvistaminen näyttää valtiokonsernin osalta rakenteellisesti toteutuneen. Toimivuuden kannalta rakenne on kuitenkin vielä niin uusi, että erityisesti eduskunnan näkökulmasta sen toimivuutta on vaikea arvioida. 2010-luvun haasteiden kannalta tutkimuksessa tulee esiin joukko riskitekijöitä. Yksi niistä on talousohjauksen päätoimijan, valtiovarainministeriön ohjausrakenne. Se näyttää olevan epätasapainossa ministeriön kasvaneiden vastuiden kanssa. Taloudellisesti vaikeina aikoina valtiovarainministeriön rooli lisäksi korostuu järjestelmälogiikan mukasesti talouden tasapainottajana. Ministeriön ohjausrakenteella on yleistä merkitystä, koska se heijastuu koko hallinnon talousohjaukseen. Se voi olla sille joko tukena tai taakkana. ; In the administrative reforms of 1987-2008 in Finland the state as a whole was divided into three parts the core state, autonomous parts and actors operating in market conditions. The structural division was taken further when in 2010 the universities were split off from the financial governance of the core state to join the autonomous actors. Each part of the state body has its own financial governance. The study is confined to reforms in the system of financial governance of a state concern (core state) and the functionality of the system of governance after the reforms. This is an evaluative study assessing first the reforms in the structure and governance tools and thereafter their functionality. The structural research is based chiefly on documentary material from the era of reform. The functionality of the structures is evaluated from the perspectives of Parliament, the Government, the Ministry of Finance, the ministries, agencies and institutions and also the inspectorate. The functionality evaluation is based on 96 personal interviews with actors in charge of governance, the elite in financial governance. The object of the evaluation was the main finances under overall control and the objectives set for management by results of improving productivity, economy of operations and effectiveness. As the reforms progressed, it became a political objective to strengthen democracy or political governance in financial governance. This, too, was made a target of evaluation. The evaluation relies on the concepts of complexity theory. It was the working hypothesis of the study that through the concepts of the theory it would be possible to explain and comprehend reform processes, the functionality of the reforms and the problems experienced in them. In the study of the structure the main criterion was the complexity theory concept far from a state of equilibrium and in the study of functionality the concept of significance . No such complexity theory based study in the field of administrative science has so far been presented in Finland. Thus on the basis of the study the applicability of complexity theory to the research of reform processes and the functionality of reforms was evaluated. In the study of structure the research question was how after the reforms of 1987-2008 the governance structure of a state financial governance system is in a state of equilibrium with the goals of the reforms. The question in the study of functionality was how the financial governance system of a state concern functioned after the reforms from the perspectives of various actors. Likewise thereafter an answer was sought in the nature of triangulation to how the situation of the financial governance system structure and functionality appear to be in equilibrium with the challenges to financial governance apparent in the 2010s. Is the financial governance system a support, burden or risk to the challenges of the 2010s? In summary the answers to the research questions in light of the evaluation of the structure and functionality data are as follows: 1. The core of financial governance, the governance structure of financial policy and its functionality would appear to be almost in equilibrium with the goals of financial overall administration. In this respect the structure also supports overall financial governance. 2. The objectives of productivity, economical and efficacy in management by results would appear to be very far from being in equilibrium with respect to the requirements of the budgetary legislation (Talousarviolaki). Due to shortcomings in accounting and evaluation systems the objectives has not been achieved. Thus the management by results structure would appear to be a burden on financial governance and administration of the state economy as a whole. The structure of management by results would appear to be in a state of disintegration 3. The aim of strengthening democracy through the structural reforms of the 2000s appears to have been achieved. However, the structure is still mostly so new that its functionality, especially as regards Parliament, is difficult to evaluate. The structure appears mostly to support overall financial management, but this may entail risks from the perspective of overall financial management. 4. The situation of financial governance, from the perspective of the challenges of the 2010s would appear, as far as financial policy is concerned to be almost in equilibrium with the policy challenges, but from the perspective of overall financial management this would not appear to be the case in all respects; the situation in governance is likely to require reforms and attention to the obvious risk factors latent therein. The study permits the evaluation that complexity theory, a derivative of systems theory, would appear to be applicable to the research of reforms of complex systems and their functionality and to offer opportunities to explain and comprehend the successes and failures of reforms.
El origen del auge económico de 1983 a 1989 se encuentra en el mecanismo de déficit del tesoro norteamericano, que alcanzó la cifra de 134 billones de dólares en 1982; 230,8 billones en 1983, manteniéndose en este escalón hasta 1989 (237.8 billones); este déficit se habían elevado en la década de los 70 en torno a los 50 billones de dólares anuales, lo que llevó a un amplio movimiento por la contención de los gastos o por el aumento de los impuestos en el país. Reagan eliminó la segunda hipótesis (llegando inclusive a reducir los impuestos sobre el capital y las rentas elevadas) y realizó cortes en los presupuestos, solamente de los gastos sociales, bajo la presión del establishment de investigación y desarrollo militar dedicado a la tecnología; aumentaron drásticamente los gastos militares y en particular aquellos relacionados con investigaciones de las tecnologías de punta que se sintetizaron en la iniciativa de la defensa estratégica, la ridícula guerra de las galaxias que se convirtió en objeto de crítica de las mayores autoridades científicas del país por su inviabilidad y por el desperdicio de recursos que representaba y aún representa. De alguna manera, podemos comparar la guerra de las galaxias con el papel económico que Keynes atribuía a las pirámides egipcias: un enorme gasto estatal para generar empleo y renta y permitir así el funcionamiento de la economía. El diagnóstico neoliberal coincide en que una de las causas inmediatas de la crisis económica de América latina se encuentra en la recesión internacional de los años ochenta, en especial por la combinación de caídas acentuadas en los precios de las exportaciones y agudas alzas en la tasas de interés reales en el mercado internacional, lo que provocó un cuantioso déficit en las cuentas externas de la región. La actual corriente de pensamiento denominada neoestructuralismo afirma, en lo fundamental, que los problemas económicos principales y la condición de subdesarrollados que aún prevalece en los países latinoamericanos no se debe tanto a distorsiones inducidas por la política económica sino que, más bien, son de origen histórico y de índole endógena y estructural. A juicio de Rosales (1988), una muestra palpable de esta * Economista, profesor investigador del Grupo de realidad subyace en tres características cruciales de la economía latinoamericana de fines de los años ochenta: a) la vigencia de un patrón de inserción externa que, dadas las tendencias del comercio y el sistema financiero internacional, conduce a una especificación empobrecedora; b) el predominio de factor productivo desarticulado, vulnerable y muy heterogéneo y concentrador del progreso técnico, incapaz de absorber productivamente el aumento de la fuerza de trabajo; y c) la persistencia de una distribución de ingreso muy concentrada y excluyente, que evidencia la incapacidad del sistema para disminuir la pobreza.El presente documento se presenta en tres partes, iniciando por un acercamiento al modelo que hoy conocemos como neoliberal; para posteriormente hacer un intento de comparar el modelo neoestructuralista con el modelo neoliberal, teniendo como hecho presente que este intento está enmarcado en los años noventa; y finalmente se esboza un marco teórico en cuanto a la posición del neoestructuralismo frente a los problemas del desarrollo latinoamericano; este documento solamente intenta dar una breve mirada al neoliberalismo en América latina, sin desestimar los alcances del mismo dentro y fuera de nuestras latitudes. ; The origin of the economic boom between 1983 to 1989 is found in the mechanism of the American Treasury deficit that reached the amount of US$ 134 billion in 1982, US$ 230.8 billion in 1983, this level was kept until 1989 (US$237.8 billion) this deficit had increased in the seventies around US$50 billion on a yearly basis which allowed a wide movement in favor of the reduction of expenditures or the increase of taxes in the country. Reagan eliminated the second hypothesis (getting to reduce moreover the taxes on capital and high incomes) and made cuts in the budgets exclusively of social expenditures under the pressure of the research establishment and military development devoted to technology, increasing drastically military expenditures and in particular those related to high technology research that turned out to be the initiative of strategic defense, the ridiculous Stars War that became the target of criticism of major scientific authorities of the country for its unfeasibility and waste of recourses involved and that still involves. In any manner, we can compare Stars War with the economic paper that Keynes attributed to the Egyptian Pyramids: a huge state expenditure to generate employment and income allowing in that manner the economy to function.The neo-liberalism diagnostic agrees to the fact that one of the immediate causes of the economical crisis in Latin America is found in the international recession of the eighties in special for the combination of falling down in the prices of exports and sharp increases in the real interest rates in the international markets generating a big deficit in the external accounts of the region. The present current of thinking named neo-structuralism affirms fundamentally that the main economical problems and the condition of underdevelopment that still prevails in the Latin-American countries are not due to induced distortions by the economical policy but they are based on historical reasons and have an endogenous and structural origin. In the opinion of Rosales (1988), a noticeable sample of this reality underlines in three crucial characteristics of the Latin-American economy at the end of eighties: a) the patron still in effect of external insertion that given the trade tendencies end the international financial system conducts to an impoverished specification, b) the predominance of a disarticulated, vulnerable and very heterogeneous productive factor concentrating the technical progress, and unable to absorb increases of labor force on a productive manner; and c) persistence of a very concentrated and excluding income distribution that makes evident the incapacity of the system to reduce poverty.
La utilización práctica del efecto Doppler en la emisión láser fue propuesta desde los inicios del desarrollo de los láseres en los años sesenta. Sólo en los años ochenta la investigación realizada pudo salir del laboratorio y dar lugar a la fabricación de aparatos de medida de velocidad comerciales. A partir de los noventa estos aparatos se popularizaron rápidamente. Actualmente se utilizan medidores de velocidad láser por efecto Doppler en múltiples aplicaciones, entre las que sobresale la medida de velocidad de fluidos, para estudios aéreo e hidrodinámicos. Sus características únicas, como la precisión obtenida en la medida, su alta resolución espacial y el carácter no intrusivo, sólo han comenzado recientemente a tener rivales de consideración, como pueden ser la velocimetría de imagen de partículas (PIV). También la medida de velocidades de móviles sólidos comienza a resultar, con el abaratamiento general de los componentes opto-electrónicos, un objetivo para muchas empresas. Entre las aplicaciones de este tipo se contemplan el control de velocidad de los vehículos en carretera y el control de procesos industriales del ramo textil, papelero y de empresas fabricantes de cables, entre otros. Empresas europeas y americanas, como Dantec Electronik y TSI, por citar las más representativas, comercializan aparatos LDA de propósito general de altas prestaciones. Hasta la fecha estos sistemas sólo podían ser adquiridos por importantes centros de investigación o grandes empresas, debido a su elevado coste. El futuro comercial de la velocimetría láser Doppler exige la fabricación de aparatos más económicos y adaptados a las necesidades del cliente. Muchos de los sistemas actuales son voluminosos, difíciles de manejar y con potencias de trabajo elevadas. Se está llevando a cabo un importante trabajo para conseguir reducir el tamaño y coste de los equipos sin perder sus principales prestaciones. Asimismo la alta velocidad y capacidad de cálculo de los ordenadores personales actuales debe hacer innecesaria la inclusión de procesadores específicos para estos equipos. Presentamos el diseño y construcción de un sistema integral de medida de dos componentes de la velocidad, sistema 2D-LDA, para aplicaciones industriales e hidrodinámicas de baja potencia. Siguiendo la filosofía delineada arriba, el diseño de nuestro sistema LDA fue realizado utilizando únicamente una fuente laser y un módulo detector. Los sistemas LDA de medida de dos componentes de velocidad comercialmente disponibles, por el contrario, emplean dos longitudes de onda óptica y dos fotodetectores independientes. Las emisiones azul y verde típicas de los láseres de ion-Ar son las longitudes de onda a menudo elegidas en este tipo de medidas. Por otra parte, se ha empleado los dos canales de entrada de una tarjeta de adquisición de uso general para realizar el disparo multinivel. Esta configuración permite trabajar en cada momento con la parte de señal burst teóricamente más adecuada, con mayor valor de relación señal a ruido. Este trabajo ha sido financiado por la CICYT Proyecto PETRI 95-0249-OP: REALIZACIÓN DE SISTEMAS LÁSER PORTÁTILES DE MEDIDA DE VELOCIDAD POR EFECTO DOPPLER (LDA-LDV) DE BAJO COSTE PARA APLICACIONES INDUSTRIALES E HIDRODINÁMICAS. ; The practical use of the Doppler effect at optical wavelengths was proposed at the early beginning of the development of the laser, in the sixties. However, it was only in the eighties when the results of the experimental work could finally get out of the laboratories, and the first Laser Velocimeters were commercially available. In the nineties this kind of systems became rapidly popular. Nowadays the Laser Velocimeters based on the Doppler frequency shift find a lot of important applications, especially in some industrial processes and in hydrodynamic and aerodynamic research. The unique characteristics of the Laser Doppler Velocimetry (LDV) only recently have encountered a rival technique in the Particle Image Velocimetry (PIV), for applications on fluids. The main features of LDV systems are the accuracy and the speed of the measurements, the high spatial resolution and, of course, the non-intrusive character of the technique. Moreover this kind of systems present advantages not only in fluid applications: actually it can compete with the microwave radar in the estimation of the velocity of solid targets. This becomes possible due to the progressive reduction of prices of optoelectronic devices and the improvement of its performances. The monitoring of the traffic velocity and the control of machinery in the manufacture of paper, wires and cables or thread can be mentioned among these applications. European an American companies, as Dantek Electronic or TSI, to mention the two most representative, commercialize high performance general-purpose LDV systems. Up to the date these instruments are sizeable and expensive, and its use requires some special training. There is not doubt that the future market of the LDV systems goes through a substantial decrease of prices and, indeed, through the possibility of custom-built designs. The potential number of users would increase then in an important manner. Many efforts are now being devoted by researchers in that direction. Moreover, the important improvement of capabilities of the desktop computers makes unnecessary the special electronic processors that, up to now, have been provided by the manufacturers of LDV systems as a part of them. In this Thesis the design and realization of a complete Laser Doppler Anemometer is presented. The system can measure two components of a fluid velocity (2D-LDA) and originally it was conceived to be used in industrial and hydrodynamics applications. Following the philosophy outlined above, the design of our LDA system was performed with only one laser source and one detector module. The common commercially available LDAs, on the contrary, designed to measure two components of velocity, use two different optical wavelengths and two independent photodiodes. On the other hand, a general-purpose acquisition card with two input channels has been used to implement a multilevel trigger. The configuration performed here permits to work in each moment with the part of the burst having the best signal to noise ratio. This work has been supported by the Spanish Government, CICYT project PETRI 95-0249-OP. ; Postprint (published version)
La utilización práctica del efecto Doppler en la emisión láser fue propuesta desde los inicios del desarrollo de los láseres en los años sesenta. Sólo en los años ochenta la investigación realizada pudo salir del laboratorio y dar lugar a la fabricación de aparatos de medida de velocidad comerciales. A partir de los noventa estos aparatos se popularizaron rápidamente. Actualmente se utilizan medidores de velocidad láser por efecto Doppler en múltiples aplicaciones, entre las que sobresale la medida de velocidad de fluidos, para estudios aéreo e hidrodinámicos. Sus características únicas, como la precisión obtenida en la medida, su alta resolución espacial y el carácter no intrusivo, sólo han comenzado recientemente a tener rivales de consideración, como pueden ser la velocimetría de imagen de partículas (PIV). También la medida de velocidades de móviles sólidos comienza a resultar, con el abaratamiento general de los componentes opto-electrónicos, un objetivo para muchas empresas. Entre las aplicaciones de este tipo se contemplan el control de velocidad de los vehículos en carretera y el control de procesos industriales del ramo textil, papelero y de empresas fabricantes de cables, entre otros. Empresas europeas y americanas, como Dantec Electronik y TSI, por citar las más representativas, comercializan aparatos LDA de propósito general de altas prestaciones. Hasta la fecha estos sistemas sólo podían ser adquiridos por importantes centros de investigación o grandes empresas, debido a su elevado coste. El futuro comercial de la velocimetría láser Doppler exige la fabricación de aparatos más económicos y adaptados a las necesidades del cliente. Muchos de los sistemas actuales son voluminosos, difíciles de manejar y con potencias de trabajo elevadas. Se está llevando a cabo un importante trabajo para conseguir reducir el tamaño y coste de los equipos sin perder sus principales prestaciones. Asimismo la alta velocidad y capacidad de cálculo de los ordenadores personales actuales debe hacer innecesaria la inclusión de procesadores específicos para estos equipos. Presentamos el diseño y construcción de un sistema integral de medida de dos componentes de la velocidad, sistema 2D-LDA, para aplicaciones industriales e hidrodinámicas de baja potencia. Siguiendo la filosofía delineada arriba, el diseño de nuestro sistema LDA fue realizado utilizando únicamente una fuente laser y un módulo detector. Los sistemas LDA de medida de dos componentes de velocidad comercialmente disponibles, por el contrario, emplean dos longitudes de onda óptica y dos fotodetectores independientes. Las emisiones azul y verde típicas de los láseres de ion-Ar son las longitudes de onda a menudo elegidas en este tipo de medidas. Por otra parte, se ha empleado los dos canales de entrada de una tarjeta de adquisición de uso general para realizar el disparo multinivel. Esta configuración permite trabajar en cada momento con la parte de señal burst teóricamente más adecuada, con mayor valor de relación señal a ruido. Este trabajo ha sido financiado por la CICYT Proyecto PETRI 95-0249-OP: REALIZACIÓN DE SISTEMAS LÁSER PORTÁTILES DE MEDIDA DE VELOCIDAD POR EFECTO DOPPLER (LDA-LDV) DE BAJO COSTE PARA APLICACIONES INDUSTRIALES E HIDRODINÁMICAS. ; The practical use of the Doppler effect at optical wavelengths was proposed at the early beginning of the development of the laser, in the sixties. However, it was only in the eighties when the results of the experimental work could finally get out of the laboratories, and the first Laser Velocimeters were commercially available. In the nineties this kind of systems became rapidly popular. Nowadays the Laser Velocimeters based on the Doppler frequency shift find a lot of important applications, especially in some industrial processes and in hydrodynamic and aerodynamic research. The unique characteristics of the Laser Doppler Velocimetry (LDV) only recently have encountered a rival technique in the Particle Image Velocimetry (PIV), for applications on fluids. The main features of LDV systems are the accuracy and the speed of the measurements, the high spatial resolution and, of course, the non-intrusive character of the technique. Moreover this kind of systems present advantages not only in fluid applications: actually it can compete with the microwave radar in the estimation of the velocity of solid targets. This becomes possible due to the progressive reduction of prices of optoelectronic devices and the improvement of its performances. The monitoring of the traffic velocity and the control of machinery in the manufacture of paper, wires and cables or thread can be mentioned among these applications. European an American companies, as Dantek Electronic or TSI, to mention the two most representative, commercialize high performance general-purpose LDV systems. Up to the date these instruments are sizeable and expensive, and its use requires some special training. There is not doubt that the future market of the LDV systems goes through a substantial decrease of prices and, indeed, through the possibility of custom-built designs. The potential number of users would increase then in an important manner. Many efforts are now being devoted by researchers in that direction. Moreover, the important improvement of capabilities of the desktop computers makes unnecessary the special electronic processors that, up to now, have been provided by the manufacturers of LDV systems as a part of them. In this Thesis the design and realization of a complete Laser Doppler Anemometer is presented. The system can measure two components of a fluid velocity (2D-LDA) and originally it was conceived to be used in industrial and hydrodynamics applications. Following the philosophy outlined above, the design of our LDA system was performed with only one laser source and one detector module. The common commercially available LDAs, on the contrary, designed to measure two components of velocity, use two different optical wavelengths and two independent photodiodes. On the other hand, a general-purpose acquisition card with two input channels has been used to implement a multilevel trigger. The configuration performed here permits to work in each moment with the part of the burst having the best signal to noise ratio. This work has been supported by the Spanish Government, CICYT project PETRI 95-0249-OP. ; Postprint (published version)
How did bilateral relations between Italy and Ethiopia-Eritrea evolved after the colonial period? What was the impact of the Italian economic presence on the economy of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the post-colonial period? Why since the end of the World War II has been existing in Ethiopia a widespread pro-Italian judgment despite the colonial past? The purpose of this research is to answer to such questions. Description of the research Chapter 1 is dedicated to the evolution of the bilateral relations between Italy and Ethiopia between 1947 and 1955. The Treaty of Peace, signed in Paris on February 10, 1947, imposed to Italy, among the other provisions, the recognition of the independence of Ethiopia, the renouncement of claims to colonies including Eritrea and the payment of war reparations to Ethiopia. These issues took time to be actually solved. Especially with regard to the future of Eritrea the tensions between Italy and Ethiopia flared up despite the fact that diplomatic relations were resumed at the beginning of 1952. In addition there were complex negotiations on the amount of the war reparations to be paid. Finally, the artworks carried away from Ethiopia during the occupation period were returned with delay and in several tranches between 1954 and 2005. As a general consideration, the whole picture of the bilateral relations between 1947 and the beginning of the '70s shows the alternation of long periods of strong tension with shorter ones of détente. Chapter 2 and 3 outline the main characteristics and the evolution of the Italian economic presence in Ethiopia and in Eritrea between 1941 and 1974. The first years after 1941 were extremely troubled. Many Italians were expelled from the two countries, many were confined to concentration camps, and in Ethiopia many became clandestines in order not to be forced to leave the country. In the late '40s, Italians in Eritrea became the target of terrorist actions by the shifta. Many Italians were killed and several companies managed by them were destroyed or seriously damaged. Italians went through other serious difficulties in the early '70s when the growing guerrilla made Eritrea highly insecure. Despite these difficulties Italians kept on carrying out their activities that flourished in the '50s and the '60s but were decimated by the nationalizations of the Derg during the first half of the '70s. Main Results With regard to the bilateral relations Italian diplomatic documents show the will of both parties to reach an agreement on the post war issues. However it was a very tough negotiation, as expected. In contrast to the belief expressed in some relevant and well-known works, i.e. Del Boca's one, the complexity of such a negotiation seems to be due more to the Ethiopian tactics than to the alleged Italian purpose to delay the final settlement. Furthermore it is crystal clear that one of the top priority of the Italian Government in negotiating was to protect the Italian communities in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This result is in contrast with what affirmed by Del Boca in particular, who stressed a sort of lack of interest of Italy in the co-nationals resident in the two countries. Chapter 2 and 3 shows that the efforts of Italians workers and entrepreneurs in Ethiopia and Eritrea after the end of the occupation are worthy of note and memory. Such efforts testify to an extraordinary commitment. Italians arrived in Ethiopia and Eritrea with dreams and hopes that many were finally able to see come true. Some of their stories are uniquely interesting. Emperor Haile Selassie undoubtedly played a significant role in fostering the rapid development of Italian economic activities and in shaping fruitful and cooperative relations between Italians and Ethiopians. He protected the Italians because he was deeply convinced of the important economic role that Italians would still have been able to play in Ethiopia, not only in the early post-occupation period, but also for the future of the country. Italian economic presence was strong in quantity and quality both in Ethiopia and Eritrea. However it is quite clear that throughout the period between 1941 and 1974 the incidence of Italian economic activities was significantly higher in Eritrea than Ethiopia. Italian firms were modern and efficient, and they were the backbone of the economy of Eritrea. The higher impact of our entrepreneurs in Eritrea was due to the longer stay of Eritrea itself under the Italian Government, which resulted in a much larger Italian community in Eritrea than in Ethiopia, both in absolute and relative terms. Almost the entire industrial and advanced agricultural sectors in Eritrea was in hands of the Italians. Provided that at the beginning of the '50s, the 80% of manufacturing plants of the Ethio-Eritrean Federation was based in Eritrea, it must concluded that the incidence of the Italian companies in the whole industrial sector was huge. In addition, except for the Italian activities, there were only a few other companies, especially in the agricultural and commercial sectors, managed by Eritreans or expatriates of other communities. In agriculture, where traditional ways and means of cultivation and a subsistence production still prevailed, the big agricultural and agro-processing companies run by the Italians were extraordinarily efficient. The Italians used modern techniques and machinery. They diversified their production. They also built dams, irrigation systems and major infrastructure projects for the reclamation of land to production. Even before the 50's and increasingly in the following decades, the Italian agricultural firms were able to export to neighboring markets, after meeting domestic demand. For the rest, the Eritrean economy was based on subsistence and largely unproductive agriculture. Italian activities strongly contributed to the national economy. In the economy of the Empire, characterized by a very low incidence of industrial development and the export of a few agricultural products (coffee, hides, oilseeds), the production for export made by Italian companies represented a unique economic opportunity for the entire country. The contribution of Italian economic activities was more evident in Eritrea than in Ethiopia. According to many sources, if Eritrean exports and imports would have been precisely accounted for - that is without considering the value of the goods that passed through Eritrea, but whose final destination was Ethiopia - Eritrea's trade deficit would have been significantly reduced or even zeroed out. Furthermore, the presence of flourishing Italian companies had positive repercussions also on the Eritrean state budget thanks to the tax 5 income they produced. By the way, the rates applied to Italian companies were much higher than those applied to local ones. The Italian business elite was also able to translate in images the social renewal processes of the 50's and the 60's. The buildings designed by Arturo Mezzedimi were perhaps the most evident symbols of such ability. Such buildings represented the avant-garde architecture of those years. Another building contractor, Mario Buschi, very active throughout the Empire, highly contributed to shape the modern image of Addis Ababa. The statistics shows that from 1957 to 1974 Italy was, together with USA, the main commercial partner of the Ethiopian Empire. Even in the period 1941-1951, during which official diplomatic relations between Italy and Ethiopia were absent, the bilateral trade was relevant and in particular Italy was in those years the first importer from Ethiopia. These exceptional results were due indeed to Italian resident community that with its economic activities highly contributed to nurture commercial flows from and to Italy. The good relations between the Italians who remained after 1941 and the Ethiopians played a decisive role in rapidly archiving the memory of the Italians as colonizers. Indeed such relationship was generally dominated by a constructive spirit of cooperation and probably fueled by some deep affinity of character between our two peoples. They were the Italians that contributed to maintain a good image of Italy in Ethiopia even during the absence of official diplomatic relations or at times of misunderstandings and difficulties in the dialogue between the two governments. In decades of coexistence the Italians and Ethiopians have been able to establish a fruitful dialogue, marked by mutual understanding, esteem and respect. Workplaces were the main venue where such a dialogue has taken its shape. The author spent 4 years in Ethiopia, from 2008 to 2012, as head of the commercial section of the Italian Embassy. This experience allowed her to learn parts of the history of the Italian community in Ethiopia and in Eritrea between 1941 and 1974 directly from the present generations of Italian businessmen resident in Ethiopia. The author also had the opportunity to consult Italians' personal archives in which she could find documents and books that are not anymore on the market and difficult to find in libraries. Her personal experience and knowledge of the country and the people added depth to this work that is however based almost exclusively on written sources.
Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina. Escuela de Posgrado. Maestría en Producción Agrícola ; La presente investigación se realizó con agricultores del Valle Chancay Lambayeque en la Región Lambayeque durante los años 2009 al 2012 quienes fueron los beneficiarios directos del Programa de Capacitación y Asistencia Técnica para la Agricultura con Riego Tecnificado, llamado Componente C2, el cual muestra la estrategia de intervención del mencionado programa y el proceso de adopción del sistema de riego tecnificado, identificando los factores limitantes que influyen en el proceso de adopción y plantear las correcciones para un mejor desempeño en el proceso de adopción. En el estudio se tomaron en cuenta las apreciaciones de los agricultores que no se beneficiaron con el programa, a los agricultores que formaron grupos de interés, los que formaron grupos de gestión, los grupos de gestión que elaboraron su perfil técnico para beneficiarse, los que lograron que se aprobaran su perfil técnico con código SNIP, y los que lograron ejecutar la obra. De ello se encontró que de los 26 grupos de interés que se formaron al inicio solamente 6 grupos de gestión lograron beneficiarse con el Programa llegando a instalar el sistema de riego tecnificado. Los factores socio económicos influyen en la adopción del Sistema de Riego Tecnificado existiendo una correlación entre ellos. El nivel de educación, a mayor nivel de educación mayor adopción. La titulación de la propiedad, eso hace que el agricultor se sienta más seguro para beneficiarse. La hipoteca de la propiedad, también ayuda a la gestión del financiamiento tanto del Sistema de Riego Tecnificado como para el cultivo a instalar. Se considera importante los saberes o conocimientos previos del Sistema de Riego Tecnificado para su adopción; todavía no está bien introducida esta tecnología a nivel del valle. Siendo un buen método de extensión los viajes o giras con agricultores. También el trabajo de los profesionales técnicos como promotores del Programa influyen en el proceso de adopción en forma positiva, la confiabilidad y liderazgo que ejercen como promotores del programa es muy importante. La asociatividad de los agricultores en el proceso de adopción es importante debido que al inicio es difícil romper el pensamiento del trabajo individual. Una vez que se forma el grupo se vuelve una fortaleza. El aseguramiento del mercado para la producción, la rentabilidad de los cultivos y el costo del sistema de riego influyen de cierta forma en el proceso de adopción. Si bien es cierto este Programa se inició en el año 2009, se tiene que seguir trabajando para incrementar la adopción del sistema de riego tecnificado a nivel de los agricultores del valle, debido a que son resultados que se van obtener a mediano y largo plazo para ello se debe identificar a la persona líder del núcleo familiar que toma decisión o que influye en ésta. Crear una conciencia del uso adecuado y ahorro de agua en la producción agrícola; esto podría ser parte del Programa Subsectorial de Irrigaciones como programa de gobierno. Los promotores deben tener un perfil con capacidades para desarrollar y actuar como extensionista agrícola, así mismo deben continuar su labor durante todo el Programa para aprovechar el liderazgo desarrollado hacia los agricultores. Identificar la población objetivo a beneficiar, sus características, disponibilidad de inversión, acceso al crédito, acceso al mercado, asistencia técnica, emprendimiento. La asociatividad como grupo debe estar fortalecida hasta que puedan conducirse solos a través de un acompañamiento del promotor del programa. Capacitar a los agricultores en las nuevas prácticas agrícolas que genera la innovación, además se debe realizar un acompañamiento y seguimiento durante toda la producción y comercialización; en operación y mantenimiento del sistema de riego; todo como un apoyo del estado. Los beneficiarios, deben recibir el apoyo del gobierno local y regional; interinstitucional público, como INIA, AGROBANCO, UNIVERSIDADES, para lograr un mejor acercamiento al sector privado con la finalidad de generar la rentabilidad de los cultivo. Finalmente. La contrapartida de los beneficiarios para adquirir el equipo de riego debe cubrirse con la producción y no con una hipoteca del terreno; el Programa podría asumir los intereses de la campaña cuando no se obtienen buenos resultados; y el gobierno debe continuar con el programa de titulación de tierras para beneficiarse en los diferentes programas de incentivos, así mismo poder acceder al crédito agrícola. ; During the years 2009 to 2012, this research was conducted with farmers the Chancay Lambayeque Valley in Lambayeque Region who were the direct beneficiaries of the Training and Technical Assistance Program for Agriculture with Tech Irrigation, called Component C2, which shows the strategy of intervention of the above-mentioned program and the process of adoption of modern irrigation system, identifying the limiting factors that influence the adoption process and raise corrections for better performance in the adoption process.The study took into account the views of the farmers who did not benefit from the program, to the farmers that formed interest groups, which formed management groups, the management groups that developed their technical background to benefit, those who have succeeded to be adopted its technical profile with SNIP code, and those who have succeeded to execute the work. It was found that of the 26 interest groups that were formed at the beginning only 6 groups of management were able to benefit from the program coming to install the modern irrigation system. The socio-economic factors influence the adoption of Modern Irrigation System there a correlation between them. The level of education, the higher level of education increased adoption. The titling of the property, so that means the farmer feel safer to benefit. The mortgage of the property also helps managing finance much of the modern irrigation system for growing as installed. It is considered important the knowledge or prior knowledge of the modern irrigation system for adoption; still not well introduced this technology at the level of the valley. Being good extension method travel or tours with farmers. Also the work of technical professionals as promoters of the program influence the process of adoption in a positive way, reliability and leadership role as promoters of the program is very important. The associativity of the farmers in the process of adoption is important because at the beginning it is difficult to break the thought of individual work. Once that form the group becomes a fortress. The insurance market for production, profitability of crops and the cost of the irrigation system in some way influence the adoption process.While it is true this program was started in 2009, we have to keep working to increase adoption system irrigated level farmers in the valley; because they are results to be obtained in the medium and long term for this should identify the leading person of the household who takes decisions or influencing it. Create an awareness of proper use and water saving in agricultural production; this could be part of Sub sectorial-Irrigation Program as government program. Promoters must have a profile with capacities to develop and act as agricultural extensionist; well same should continue its work throughout the program to take the lead developed to farmers. Identify the target population to benefit, their characteristics, availability of investment, access to credit, market access, technical assistance, entrepreneurship. The associativity as a group should be strengthened until they can conduct themselves through a promoter accompaniment program. Train farmers in the new agricultural practices that generate innovation, should be performed in addition support and monitoring throughout the production and marketing; in operation and maintenance of the irrigation system; all as a state support. The beneficiaries must receive public agency support, as local and regional government, INIA, AGROBANCO and UNIVERSITIES, to achieve a better approach to the private sector in order to generate the profitability of the crops. Finally, the counterpart of beneficiaries, to acquire irrigation equipment, to be covered with production and not with a mortgage of the land; this program could take the interests of the campaign when was not obtained good result; and the government should continue the land titling program to benefit in different incentive programs, also have access to agricultural credit. ; Tesis
The provision of career information and guidance throughout a citizen's life has become an issue of great importance worldwide, as societies prepare themselves to meet the challenges that the transition to knowledge-based economies represents. An unprecedented research effort has in fact been initiated by the OECD, which has distributed a dedicated questionnaire to 14 countries internationally in order to create a baseline of information on the current state of policy development in career guidance. That same survey instrument has been used by CEDEFOP to gather data on the remaining EU countries, and by the ETF in relation to 11 ACCs . The World Bank has initiated a parallel review in a number of middle-income countries, again using the OECD questionnaire. The thematic review by these key partners will lead to the development of the most extensive harmonised international database ever on guidance policy and practice. This synthesis report summarises the state of play in the development of career information and guidance in both the education and labour market sectors in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Experts from each of these countries have written a report, structured around the OECD survey and on the basis of their own knowledge of the field, often following extensive consultation with key partners. The broad purpose of this exercise is, first of all, to provide an account of the most recent and most significant developments, trends, challenges and major issues, as well as the strengths and weaknesses, of national career information and guidance systems and policies, in such a way as to render the data susceptible to comparative analysis. Secondly, the synthesis report aims to facilitate the generation of benchmarks, enabling the countries that participated in the review to gauge how well they are doing in career information and guidance provision in relation to other comparable countries, and to facilitate the sharing of good practice. Thirdly, the report should prove to be a useful tool for the development of policy, particularly as ACCs have acknowledged the centrality of lifelong learning in their strategic response to the challenges of integration in the global economy generally, and in the EU more specifically, and the value of career information and guidance throughout life for citizens within that context. The synthesis report consists of six sections, which closely follow the OECD outline in order to facilitate comparison between the different reports once these become available. In the Annex, experts responsible for writing up the detailed country reports have contributed a summary providing an overview of the key elements of the national arrangements for careers information and guidance, outlining the strengths, weaknesses, issues and challenges for their systems. The first section provides a background to the Commission's involvement in the career information and guidance review. It also outlines briefly the geopolitical, economic and cultural contexts of the 11 countries surveyed, particularly in so far as these impact on career guidance provision. The second section focuses on the policy challenges for career information and guidance in terms of national objectives. The latter include the upgrading of the knowledge and skills base of the population, with a view to addressing unemployment, to meeting the demands of knowledge-based economies, and to ensuring that the labour supply and demand are in harmony. Another set of challenges arises from a social policy context that seeks to ensure equitable distribution of education and employment opportunities, with guidance services having a key role to play as active measures in combating early school leaving, facilitating the integration of at-risk groups in both education and the labour market, and reducing poverty. Governments in ACCs – and to a lesser extent, the private sector – have acknowledged the important contribution that career guidance can make in reaching these educational, employment and social objectives, and indeed have launched several initiatives to underscore their commitment to the cause. Nevertheless, while the discourse around career guidance has intensified, it appears that in some cases that discourse has outstripped practice, and plans tend to suffer from a lack of implementation. The third section constitutes the heart of the report, as it considers several aspects that contribute to the more effective delivery of career guidance. An initial focus is the services provided in the education sector. Here attention is given to the extent to which guidance is a stand-alone activity offered infrequently and at key transition and decision-making points, which seems to be the key modality of provision when compared to other models where guidance issues permeate the curriculum. Attention is also given to the initiatives that help to connect the school with the world of work; to the instruments used in delivering guidance; to the groups that are targeted; and to the education sectors where services are non-existent (namely primary schooling), or where they are most present (secondary level), or where they are on the increase (tertiary level, including universities). A second focus is on the employment sector, and the extent to which adults receive guidance as they negotiate occupational and further education and training trajectories in a lifelong learning society. The synthesis report highlights the fact that most adult guidance is offered in the context of public employment services, and that it tends to be remedial in nature, narrowly targeted at unemployed people, with the immediate goal of finding them employment. Other key trends noted are the lack of cross-sectorial collaboration, and the minor involvement of the private sector in the provision of adult guidance, where at best they function as job-brokerage services. One aspect of guidance that has witnessed a great deal of development in most ACCs is the use of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) to ensure more effective and widespread provision of education- and career-related information to the community. There is also a gradual trend to increased input and involvement by stakeholders, and to a shift in the modality of service whereby clients are provided with the resources to assess their needs and aspirations, and to match these with employment opportunities. A key issue cutting across the whole of this section is the lack of a sound evidence base that would permit the evaluation of the effectiveness of the guidance service in reaching its objectives. Section four considers the human and financial resources dedicated to career guidance. In most ACCs, staff involved in offering guidance services have a higher level of education – often in psychology or the humanities – though not all have had specialised pre-service training in the field. Trends include increased opportunities for in-service training, and the gradual professionalisation of career guidance through the specification of entry and qualification routes, the articulation of clearly defined occupational roles, the drawing up of a formal code of ethics, and the formation of associations and networks that may have a research and training function. Most ACCs report that the profession tends to attract women in the main, and that the qualifications and training routes for staff employed in the education sector tend to be different from those for staff engaged in the employment sector. The information about the financial resources allocated to career guidance is extremely sketchy and inconclusive. Most of the budget for careers information and guidance services comes from the state, with few ACCs reporting any substantial investment in the activity by the private sector. Section five synthesises the observations made by experts from the ACCs in terms of the strategic leadership that is exercised in the field of career guidance, and of how this could be strengthened. Despite the fact that there have been several noteworthy developments, a general conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a need for stronger mechanisms to provide coordination and leadership in articulating strategies for lifelong access to guidance within a national policy framework that is both dynamic and adequately resourced. As things stand at the moment, career guidance still tends to be seen by governments as a marginal activity. There is also much scope for a more vigorous role for the private sector and stakeholders, in a field where, curiously, trade union input seems to be particularly weak. Little evaluation is carried out to monitor quality in service provision, or to measure effectiveness, particularly in relation to specific performance targets and outputs. While examples of good practice exist in a number of the countries surveyed, a more robust evidence base is required if guidance is to be provided in a way that responds to the distinct needs of a differentiated clientele. Section six provides a concluding note identifying the main challenges as well as the way forward for career guidance in the countries surveyed. While none of the ACCs on its own holds the key for addressing the most pressing issues that are identified, collectively they certainly provide a rich thesaurus of good practice from which policy-makers and practitioners can draw inspiration. ; peer-reviewed
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As Ukraine entered the third year of the full-scale war, the situation appeared to have reached a stalemate, despite heavy fighting at different points on the front lines. In mid-February, with Ukrainian supply routes targeted and the troops running short of ammunition, Ukrainian forces had to withdraw from Avdiivka, the scene of some of the most intense fighting in the past half year. However, the Ukrainian army did succeed in destroying much of the Russian Black Sea fleet and airplanes. Ukrainian security services launched successful attacks on Russian oil refineries deep inside Russia, and Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine continued to conduct military operations in the regions along the border with Ukraine. Russia ramped up its disinformation campaign in Ukraine and Europe, striving to sow doubt among Ukrainians and distrust in the Ukrainian government both domestically and internationally. In late March it renewed its massive attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, causing serious damage. It also intensified attacks on civilian residential buildings. Future military aid to Ukraine remained a major topic of discussion with Ukraine's international partners. Nonetheless, during the quarter Ukraine signed security cooperation agreements with G-7 members and other states, and the European states made concerted efforts to provide critically necessary artillery rounds to the Ukrainian army.1. ROLLOUT OF THE WARIn February 2024, Ukraine entered the third year of combating Russia's wide-scale invasion, marking ten years of war since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, later unleashing war in the Donbas. The war has changed the country and its economy drastically, though the changes that have occurred over the decade of war differ from those experienced in the two years of the full-scale war. General Developments during January–MarchIn the first quarter of 2024, heavy fighting continued, but without notable changes to the front line. Throughout the quarter the Russian Air Force (RuAF) continued its intense offensive in all directions, expanding on bombing campaigns it had started in October of last year. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) shifted to defensive actions to exhaust the Russian forces. However, the Ukrainian army had to withdraw from some positions because of a lack of weapons and intense pressure from the RuAF.Russia used phosphorus and chemical weapons during several hard-fought battles. The fiercest Russian attacks were directed at Avdiivka, Donetsk oblast, where the situation resembled the one in Bakhmut last year. In mid-February, lacking ammunition and seeing their supply routes being cutting off, the Ukrainian forces stepped back from their positions in Avdiivka. One month later, the UAF command reported that the situation in the country's East had stabilized. Ukraine stepped up efforts to fortify three major defensive lines.Sea and air operations advances. Though facing a deadlock in land operations, Ukraine realized significant advances in destroying Russia's Black Sea Fleet and shot down several Russian military planes over Ukraine. During the quarter, Ukrainian forces sank five Russian military ships, including three landing ships. As of the end of March, Russia had lost almost all landing ships in the Black Sea. More than a third of the Russian fleet has been disabled, including a submarine. Ukrainian-designed kamikaze sea drones have become the main weapons used in attacking the Russian fleet. To save its Black Sea Fleet, Russia started withdrawing its major vessels from ports in occupied Crimea.Ukraine also shot down Russian military jets that were bombing regions close to the front lines. To illustrate Ukraine's advances in this arena, during just two weeks in late February and early March, Ukrainian forces downed fourteen Russian military airplanes. In addition to Su-34 bombers (used to attack frontline settlements with guided aerial bombs) and modern Su-35 fighter jets, Russia lost two A-50 planes, which together cost about $700 million (they are outfitted with an airborne early warning and control system, designed to detect air defense systems and coordinate targets for Russian fighter jets). Russia had only a few of these planes before the invasion, so the loss of two represents a setback. The RuAF is probably ready to tolerate high losses to maintain the offensive.Russian refineries under attack. In the first quarter of the year, more than a dozen Russian oil refineries deep inside the country came under drone attack by Ukraine (some of the targets were located as far as 560 miles from the border with Ukraine) The Security Service of Ukraine formally admitted to the attacks, defending them on the grounds that refineries are legitimate targets because they provide resources to run the Russian war machine. (Russia's income from oil sales remains high despite international sanctions.) Ukraine also attacked Russian factories producing weapons. Analysts have described the strikes on Russian oil facilities as a new phase of the war. The attacks have affected Russia's refining capabilities. Although Russia has not provided official statistics, the country is believed to have lost about 10 percent of its refining capacity. Because Russia's domestic gas supplies are now diminished, Russia is considering importing gas from Belarus.Contributions of Russian volunteers to the war effort. Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine under the corps names Freedom of Russia, the Siberian Battalion, and the Russian Volunteer Corps started military operations on the border regions with Ukraine, in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. Similar operations took place in May 2023, but now the scale of the military actions is bigger and their duration longer. The operations began before the elections in Russia and continued after them. The anti-Kremlin volunteer military units clashed with Russian servicemen and even claimed to have captured some Russian troops.Russia intensified its attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure, especially in the frontline regions, notably Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. This may be an attempt to increase pressure on Ukraine while the delivery of military aid and supplies to Ukraine is slowed or suspended, especially the delivery of supplies from the United States. In addition to drones and missiles, Russia started using its new Zircon hypersonic missiles and 1,500-kg (3,300-pound) aerial bombs to target Ukrainian cities. The lack of ammunition, especially air defense missiles, may play a critical role in Ukraine's ability to protect the frontline areas and critical infrastructure across the country; a continuation of massive Russian attacks, in particular attacks using North Korean missiles and Iranian drones, could plunge Ukraine into a new stone age.Engagement of Russia's AlliesAt the beginning of the year, it became evident that North Korea was supplying Russia with missiles, including ballistic missiles. Kyiv said that as of mid-March, Russia had used about fifty of these against Ukraine. The DPRK-origin missiles were found to contain U.S. and European parts. The North Korean defense minister said the country might also supply tactical guided missiles to Russia. According to the official, the country's military factories are working at full capacity. Russia uses DPRK artillery shells. Since September 2023, North Korea has delivered more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia. Russia started supplying oil to the DPRK in exchange for weapons.Russia is negotiating with Iran as well to receive ballistic missiles. Foreign media have reported that Iran delivered hundreds of these missiles, but Ukrainian intelligence denies this.Belarus earlier was a key supplier of ammunition to support Russia's war. Though its stocks are probably exhausted by now, it remains one of Russia's important allies. Belarus is now building a new military town twenty-five miles from the border with Ukraine that will house both Russian and Belarusian troops. The combined forces started joint training in the Belarusian facility in March. Though Russia relies heavily on ammunition supplies from its allies, the country is still capable of producing its own weapons. For instance, one of the Russian missiles that hit Kyiv in 2024 was made in the summer of 2023. Russia is also pouring money into developing its own drone systems, with the combat drone Okhotnik-B expected to go into production in Novosibirsk later this year.Russian Disinformation Campaigns and CyberattacksRussia continued its disinformation campaign in Ukraine, hoping to undermine trust in the government and sow suspicions abroad. The clear goal is to weaken international support for Ukraine. These efforts are likely to ramp up in 2024 because many countries are holding elections, and policies regarding aid for Ukraine and the reception of Ukrainian refugees could shift drastically. Under normal conditions, Ukraine would also be holding elections. The curtain continues to be pulled back on Russia's disinformation efforts. The Washington Post published material on Russia's huge campaign to spread distrust of the government and societal despair in Ukraine, and the German Marshall Fund issued a report on Russia's use of Polish media to spread the Kremlin's lies about Ukraine. According to Security and Defense Secretary Oleksii Danilov, Russia has significantly stepped up its disinformation campaigns, issuing or spreading 166 million disinformation posts every week about Ukraine on social media in a global effort to manipulate thinking on Ukraine.According to Ukrainian intelligence sources, Russia is engaged in a massive disinformation campaign code-named Maidan-3 and designed to promote antiwar protests and destabilize the country, with the ultimate goal of removing President Zelensky from his leadership role. The campaign is expected be most active during March–May, and persons inside Ukraine are believed to be involved.Deep-fake videos play a prominent role in Russian propaganda. For instance, a deep-fake video of former president Petro Poroshenko allegedly making incendiary statements about President Zelensky was targeted to Ukrainian soldiers. Videos allegedly showing Russians attacking Ukrainian military training camps or Ukrainian special forces shooting civilians are widely circulated; such misrepresentations are unfortunately becoming commonplace.Russia has also continued cyberattacks against Ukrainian media, authorities, and critically important companies, including one of the biggest banks, the biggest state-owned oil and gas company, Naftogaz, POW Coordination Headquarters, Ukraine's Education Ministry website, and so on. Hackers have been sending Ukrainian soldiers messages containing malware. In 2023, the number of cyberattacks against Ukrainian organizations increased by 15.9 percent compared to 2022, reaching an overall number of 2,543 documented cases.Even though ISIS took responsibility for the terrorist shooting in Moscow's Crocus concert hall in March, and Western intelligence said it has proof that Ukraine did not organize it, Russian top officials, including Vladimir Putin, tried to link it to Kyiv, while constantly changing the narrative. The media reported that some in Putin's circle do not see any link to Ukraine. It's possible the Kremlin will try to capitalize on the attack to mobilize Russian society against Ukraine. The head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) blamed the United States, the UK, and Ukraine as instigators and enablers of the attack.Energy Terrorism and Other Attacks on Critical InfrastructureFrom mid-September 2023 to the end of the year, Russia did not succeed in damaging Ukraine's energy infrastructure, though not for lack of trying. The number of drones Russia launched during October–December 2023 broke records since the invasion. Most were brought down by Ukrainian air defense units before they could inflict damage, so we do not know their intended targets.This picture changed with the new year. Starting in early 2024, Russia focused on attacking energy infrastructure in the frontline regions, which are generally the easiest to reach. Despite the damage this caused, the power systems continued to operate in a relatively stable mode. On the night of March 22, Russia launched a massive attack on the Ukrainian power system, using drones and ballistic and cruise missiles. The largest such attack since the start of the full-scale invasion, it involved sixty Shahed drones and almost ninety missiles of various types. Power production and transmission facilities in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, and Dnipro were targeted. Russians hit the biggest Ukrainian hydropower plant, DniproHES, and the dam of its water reservoir on the Dnipro river in Zaporizhzhia oblast; two other big hydropower plants were damaged in the following days.The biggest private-owned Ukrainian energy company, DTEK, reported that 80 percent of its capacities had been damaged during the attacks by the end of March. In Kharkiv, all thermal power plants and substations were destroyed in the last week of March. The state-owned Centrenergo lost its biggest power plant in Kharkiv oblast. The major attack was followed by attacks in ensuing days. Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureIn the first quarter of the year, Ukraine faced more Russian drone and missile strikes on multi-block residential buildings, with many civilians injured and killed—in some cases dozens in a single attack. Occasionally multiple cities were attacked simultaneously. Big city targets included Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Sumy. In addition, civil infrastructure in the regions under Ukrainian control and well inside the front lines was regularly attacked, sustaining damage. Since March 11, Russia has been shelling the borders of Sumy oblast, mostly using guided aerial bombs, artillery, and Lancet attack drones.In general, from the start of the year, Ukraine has seen an increased number of civilians killed or wounded in air strikes. Fuel depots and fueling stations have been attacked, leading to civilian casualties and environmental damage. It is now commonplace for Russia to target a wide range of civil infrastructure with air strikes and artillery shelling.One of the numerous air attacks on Odesa happened during the visit of the prime minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis. A missile exploded extremely close to the location of Mitsotakis and President Zelensky. Russia has continued committing crimes against civilians in the occupied territories: torturing civilians, forcing them to participate in Russian presidential elections, bugging residents, expropriating apartments, and resettling Russian transplants from deep inside the country in the occupied territories. POW ExchangesPOW exchanges, which had been suspended for a while, were renewed at the beginning of the year, with the largest number of Ukrainians returning home since the start of the wide-scale invasion. On January 24, a few days before the planned POW exchange, a cargo aircraft was shot down in Russia. Moscow blamed Ukraine for downing the plane, claiming it was carrying sixty-five prisoners to be exchanged. However, Russia did not provide any proof that the plane was in fact carrying POWs, and Kyiv said there were no Ukrainian POWs on the plane.Two more POW exchanges took place after the incident, in late January and again in February. 2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSPresident Zelensky's Diplomatic ToursIn the first quarter of 2024, President Zelensky undertook several diplomatic tours, hoping to consolidate support for Ukraine. This mission was especially critical in light of the slowing of aid from the United States, and the number of agreements Ukraine reached during this period is testament to the success of these efforts.In January, President Zelensky made a diplomatic trip to the Baltic states, Lithuania,Estonia, and Latvia, which are among the strongest supporters of Ukraine. Zelensky met with the countries' leaders and political elites and expressed gratitude for their support during the ten years of war. They discussed Ukraine's European integration and future cooperation in electromagnetic warfare and military drone production. The three countries remain strong Ukraine's allies of Ukraine in 2024, providing military and humanitarian aid and political support. Ukraine and Latvia signed an agreement on technical and financial cooperation and a memorandum on cooperation on defense and security.President Zelensky left the Baltics for Switzerland to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he addressed the forum's participants on the war in Ukraine and the need to invest in Ukraine's victory. In Davos, he also met with leaders of different states and the world's finance leaders, seeking to boost investment in Ukraine.In February, President Zelensky visited Germany to give a speech and attend the Munich Security Conference. He met his German and Czech counterparts and discussed joint efforts to produce weapons.Later, he visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and to discuss the Ukrainian Peace Formula and ways to repatriate captured and deported Ukrainians. He left Saudi Arabia for Albania to attend the second Ukraine-Balkans forum, where he also met with the leaders of some Balkan states to discuss European integration efforts. On March 8, he visited Turkey to meet with his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Repatriating Ukrainian citizens held in captivity in Russia was among the key topics discussed at the meeting. The two countries signed an agreement to simplify bilateral trade and extended permit-free cargo truck movement at least until the end of the war. Security Cooperation AgreementsFrom early 2024, Ukraine began signing agreements on security cooperation with other states. The G-7 states intended to sign these during the NATO summit in Vilnius on July 12, 2023. Later, twenty-four more states expressed their intention to join this format. The UK was the first country to sign, on January 12, followed by Germany, France. Denmark, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands. Many countries are in dialogue, negotiating the text of the agreements to be signed. Some agreements stipulate commitments and plans to provide military aid in upcoming years.In Ukraine, these are often called "agreements on security commitments." However, they are more like framework agreements on security and defense cooperation; they do not have the force of a contract and do not spell out specific guarantees or steps the signatories should take to ensure Ukraine's sovereignty. Many experts in Ukraine have criticized the agreements because they do not provide Ukraine with hard security guarantees.Relations with NATOIn January, the NATO-Ukraine Council held a meeting at Ukraine's request after Russia launched massive air strikes against Ukraine at the beginning of the year. The allies reaffirmed their commitment to bolster Ukraine's defenses further and to provide Ukraine with major military, economic, and humanitarian assistance. In March, a NATO military delegation visited Kyiv for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion.Relations with the United States and CanadaPolitical differences in the U.S. Congress remained an obstacle to achieving consensus on the future of military aid to Ukraine. In March the United States announced the first $300 million security assistance package for Ukraine this year, as supplemental funding was blocked in Congress. Funds for the package came from unanticipated cost savings in existing Pentagon contracts. Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau arrived in Kyiv on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to demonstrate his solidarity. Canada joined the drones coalition for Ukraine and allocated $1.5 billion in aid to finance Ukraine's budget deficit.Relations with the EU and the European StatesIn February the EU approved €50 billion in financial support for Ukraine, to run through 2027. Later the EU approved $5.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine for 2024. The EU planned to supply Ukraine by the end of March with half of the one million artillery rounds it has promised to supply by the end of the year. Joint European Efforts to Arm UkraineArtillery rounds to be provided by the Czech Republic. In February, Czech president Petr Pavel said that the country had found a way to acquire 800,000 artillery rounds for Ukraine, but it needed funding. Earlier, the Czech Republic had proposed buying ammunition for Ukraine outside the EU. Almost twenty countries, some outside Europe, joined the initiative and contributed to the fund to buy artillery rounds: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and others. In March, Prague reported it was ready to deliver the first batches of ammunition and that it had found 700,000 shells of other types that could be bought with additional funds.Long-range missiles coalition. In late February, President of France Emmanuel Macron announced a coalition to send Ukraine long-range missiles. On March 15, following a "Weimar Triangle" format meeting in Berlin, the leaders of Germany, France, and Poland agreed on new initiatives in support of Ukraine, including more weapons purchases and a future formation of a coalition on long-range rocket artillery. The initiative includes purchasing more weapons for Ukraine on global markets and expanding military production.Drone coalition. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in February said that allies had established a drone coalition for Ukraine, committing to supplying one million drones. The UK and Latvia will lead an international coalition to develop vital drones for Ukraine.Cybersecurity support. In February, the IT Coalition for Ukraine signed an agreement to enhance Ukraine's defense capabilities in communications and cybersecurity—an important step in light of Russia's use of IT in conducting the war. The coalition was established in September 2023. It is led by Estonia and Luxembourg and includes Ukraine, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.France was the key newsmaker regarding Ukraine and its defensive fighting against Russia. Except for the agreement on security guarantees between the two countries, President Macron was the first leader to observe publicly that troops might have to be sent to Ukraine if Russia continued its advances. The statement caused a heated discussion with the leaders of other states, but Macron insisted it was not an off-the-cuff remark but a well-considered, realistic view. He referred to Russia's war as an existential threat to France and Europe. French foreign minister Stephane Sejourne visited Kyiv in January, reassuring Ukraine of longlasting support. Later, France announced new military aid to Ukraine, including artillery and air defense systems, drones, guided bombs, and other important pieces. France is considering expanding military aid programs for Ukraine, and President Macron called on Europe to be ready to compensate for reduced U.S. support. The UK, Germany, and the Netherlands continued to be among the biggest European supporters in providing military aid and economic assistance.Relations with Hungary remained strained. The country blocked the EU's €50 billion aid initiative for a few months, and also blocked the EU's joint statement commemorating the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale war. Pressure from the European Parliament probably encouraged Hungary to change its position. Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba met his Hungarian counterpart in January to discuss a potential visit by Zelensky to Budapest aimed at improving bilateral relations. Later, Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó explained that such a meeting between Viktor Orbán and Zelensky would be impossible until Kyiv restored the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority as they had existed before 2015.The prime ministers of Ukraine and Slovakia met in Ukraine and signed a joint statement to strengthen bilateral relations "based on mutual trust and respect." The Slovak prime minister promised not to obstruct Ukraine's purchases of weapons from Slovak companies and said that Bratislava would support the EU providing €50 billion in financial aid to Ukraine.The border blockade by farmers was a key issue in bilateral relations with Poland and remained contentious throughout the quarter. At different times, farmers and truck drivers have thrown up blockades, affecting almost all of Ukraine's border crossings.Polish farmers are demanding restrictions on imports from Ukraine, in the belief that their market prices have fallen because of competition. Poland had earlier banned food imports from Ukraine, allowing transit only. Polish officials confirmed that Ukrainian grain was not imported but merely transiting the country to destinations beyond. Kyiv says that now only 5 percent of Ukrainian food exports go through Poland, with most grain exports to be shipped by sea. Farmers are also protesting the EU's climate change policies and blocking other border crossings, including some on the border with Germany. Polish haulers on strike demanded the restoration of permits for Ukrainian carriers, a ban on the issuance of licenses to non-EU transport companies, and a waiver for empty Polish trucks to register through the Ukrainian electronic queue when returning to Poland from Ukraine. However, the blockade by haulers was much shorter this quarter.The blockade lasted the entire quarter, though not with the same sustained intensity. The blockade may be politically inspired, especially if one considers that the country will hold local elections in April. Farmers even tried to block railway connections with Ukraine and passenger transportation. The European Commission expressed concern regarding the blockade. The Polish government's attempts to settle the issue were unsuccessful, though it is unclear how robust those efforts were.The blockades created long lines at the borders, complicating the importation of even critically important goods such as military equipment. During the protests, Polish farmers from time to time dumped Ukrainian grain that was transiting Poland to other states, causing tension and tight-lipped reactions in Ukraine. It should be noted once again that one of the protest organizers is Rafał Mekler, a member of the Polish far-right National Movement Party, also known as the Confederation Party, which is skeptical about the EU and less friendly toward Ukraine. Mekler's role is important because Russia is seeking to take advantage of domestic Polish discontent by spreading its anti-Ukrainian narratives in Poland. Polish prime minister Donald Tusk said he would not tolerate anti-Ukrainian sentiments in his government. Tusk visited Kyiv in January to announce a new aid package for Ukraine. At the same time, Poland continues to import grain and fuel from Russia and Belarus without any protests taking place on Poland's border with those states. Polish police detained Ukrainian journalists who investigated the import of goods at the border with Belarus. Other Ukrainian journalists were later similarly detained and deported from Poland while investigating trade with Russia. In late March, the Ukrainian and Polish prime ministers met in Warsaw to discuss the dispute. The parties have made some progress, but the problem remains. In mid-January, farmers in Romaniaagain started a blockade. However, the Romanian government quickly negotiated with the protesters, and the blockade was dissolved in early February. Ukrainian exports through Romania rose by 50 percent while those through Poland, formerly the biggest transit country, decreased.JapanIn February, Japan hosted a conference on Ukraine's restoration. The event brought together about 200 Japanese and Ukrainian companies, which signed fifty-six agreements and memorandums of cooperation. Japan allocated more than $12 billion in aid to Ukraine and will spend €1.25 billion to support investments in Ukraine.Debates on Transferring Frozen Russian Assets for UkraineIn the first quarter of 2024, Ukraine's allies continued to debate the use of frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine's needs during the war. A group of international law experts and practitioners concluded that it would be lawful, under international law, to transfer Russian state assets as compensation for the damage that has resulted directly from Russia's unlawful conduct. There was a debate in the EU about whether these funds should be held for future use in reconstructing Ukraine or be spent now on weapons. High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell supported the idea of using 90 percent of the revenue generated by frozen Russian assets to purchase weapons for Ukraine. Among the EU member states, Hungary and Austria expressed opposition to using these funds for weapons.The Fighter Jet Coalition DevelopmentsWhen the allies agreed to provide Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, the craft were expected to arrive in early 2024. At the beginning of the year, the media reported that delivery of the first jet might be delayed to mid-2024. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the delivery date will depend on when Ukrainian pilots will be ready to fly them after training.The first group of Ukrainian pilots will complete F-16 training by the summer. But probably only six F-16s will have been delivered out of about forty-five fighter jets that European allies have promised. The Netherlands decided to send six more F-16 jets to Ukraine in addition to the eighteen the country promised to supply in late 2023. 3. INTERNAL AFFAIRSReshufflesOne of the most shocking internal events in Ukraine was the dismissal of Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi. President Zelensky appointed General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who had previously served as commander of Ukraine's Land Forces, the new commander-in-chief and gave him wide latitude to make personnel changes. Zelensky explained his decision by citing the need to reboot management of the military command and to change the military strategy. However, Zaluzhnyi had made clear his frustration with the progress of the war on international media, and there are political tensions between the two men, with Zaluzhnyi's trust rating among survey respondents higher than Zelensky's.In February the government appointed a new head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Viktor Pavlushchyk, as the previous head, Oleksandr Novikov, had completed his four-year term in the position. Pavlushchyk was selected as the head of the agency by a competition. In late March, President Zelensky dismissed the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Oleksiy Danilov, and appointed Oleksandr Lytvynenko, a former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, to the position. Danilov later was appointed ambassador to Moldova. The Economic SituationUkraine's economy remained relatively stable in the first quarter of 2024. However, the government experienced difficulty covering budget expenditures with a drop in foreign financial aid: in the first two months of 2024, Ukraine received only 10 percent of the planned financial aid from its allies.Slowing inflation led the National Bank to decrease its key rate to 14.5 percent. At the same time, the IMF expects the economic shock to begin in the second quarter of 2024 with the intensification of the war. Ukrainian agencies expect lower economic growth for 2024 as well.The Energy SituationDuring January and February 2024, Russia attacked Ukraine's energy facilities, mostly in regions close to the front. The power system continued to operate normally, however, and electricity exports to the EU in early March broke records since the start of the wide-scale invasion. The situation rapidly reversed after the attacks in late March, and Ukraine became deeply dependent on electricity imports from Europe, realizing record-high volumes of imports. Ukraine got through the winter just passed using domestically produced gas only. This was possible in part because the demand for natural gas has fallen since the start of the wide-scale invasion.4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIESPlan of Reforms for the Ukraine Facility Funding ProgramIn March, the government approved a Plan of Reforms for 2024–2027. The plan addresses reform of the public administration and judicial system and strengthening the battle against corruption; economic reforms, such as management of public assets and creating an attractive environment for investment; and sectoral reforms (energy, transport agriculture, critical raw materials, small business, IT, and environment). It provides a basis for funding the Ukraine Facility, the EU's financial support program for Ukraine, which is expected to provide €50 billion over four years. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal submitted the plan to the European Commission for approval. The first tranche of funding was released on March 20.Oscar Award for 20 Days in Mariupol DocumentaryThe Ukrainian film 20 Days in Mariupol won the Best Documentary award at the 96th Academy Awards. It is the first film made by a Ukrainian director to have won an Oscar. The film records the atrocities committed during Russia's months-long siege of the city of Mariupol in 2022. The documentary was put together by a team of Ukrainian journalists from the Associated Press and included the film director, Mstyslav Chernov. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
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As Ukraine entered the third year of the full-scale war, the situation appeared to have reached a stalemate, despite heavy fighting at different points on the front lines. In mid-February, with Ukrainian supply routes targeted and the troops running short of ammunition, Ukrainian forces had to withdraw from Avdiivka, the scene of some of the most intense fighting in the past half year. However, the Ukrainian army did succeed in destroying much of the Russian Black Sea fleet and airplanes. Ukrainian security services launched successful attacks on Russian oil refineries deep inside Russia, and Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine continued to conduct military operations in the regions along the border with Ukraine. Russia ramped up its disinformation campaign in Ukraine and Europe, striving to sow doubt among Ukrainians and distrust in the Ukrainian government both domestically and internationally. In late March it renewed its massive attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, causing serious damage. It also intensified attacks on civilian residential buildings. Future military aid to Ukraine remained a major topic of discussion with Ukraine's international partners. Nonetheless, during the quarter Ukraine signed security cooperation agreements with G-7 members and other states, and the European states made concerted efforts to provide critically necessary artillery rounds to the Ukrainian army.1. ROLLOUT OF THE WARIn February 2024, Ukraine entered the third year of combating Russia's wide-scale invasion, marking ten years of war since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, later unleashing war in the Donbas. The war has changed the country and its economy drastically, though the changes that have occurred over the decade of war differ from those experienced in the two years of the full-scale war. General Developments during January–MarchIn the first quarter of 2024, heavy fighting continued, but without notable changes to the front line. Throughout the quarter the Russian Air Force (RuAF) continued its intense offensive in all directions, expanding on bombing campaigns it had started in October of last year. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) shifted to defensive actions to exhaust the Russian forces. However, the Ukrainian army had to withdraw from some positions because of a lack of weapons and intense pressure from the RuAF.Russia used phosphorus and chemical weapons during several hard-fought battles. The fiercest Russian attacks were directed at Avdiivka, Donetsk oblast, where the situation resembled the one in Bakhmut last year. In mid-February, lacking ammunition and seeing their supply routes being cutting off, the Ukrainian forces stepped back from their positions in Avdiivka. One month later, the UAF command reported that the situation in the country's East had stabilized. Ukraine stepped up efforts to fortify three major defensive lines.Sea and air operations advances. Though facing a deadlock in land operations, Ukraine realized significant advances in destroying Russia's Black Sea Fleet and shot down several Russian military planes over Ukraine. During the quarter, Ukrainian forces sank five Russian military ships, including three landing ships. As of the end of March, Russia had lost almost all landing ships in the Black Sea. More than a third of the Russian fleet has been disabled, including a submarine. Ukrainian-designed kamikaze sea drones have become the main weapons used in attacking the Russian fleet. To save its Black Sea Fleet, Russia started withdrawing its major vessels from ports in occupied Crimea.Ukraine also shot down Russian military jets that were bombing regions close to the front lines. To illustrate Ukraine's advances in this arena, during just two weeks in late February and early March, Ukrainian forces downed fourteen Russian military airplanes. In addition to Su-34 bombers (used to attack frontline settlements with guided aerial bombs) and modern Su-35 fighter jets, Russia lost two A-50 planes, which together cost about $700 million (they are outfitted with an airborne early warning and control system, designed to detect air defense systems and coordinate targets for Russian fighter jets). Russia had only a few of these planes before the invasion, so the loss of two represents a setback. The RuAF is probably ready to tolerate high losses to maintain the offensive.Russian refineries under attack. In the first quarter of the year, more than a dozen Russian oil refineries deep inside the country came under drone attack by Ukraine (some of the targets were located as far as 560 miles from the border with Ukraine) The Security Service of Ukraine formally admitted to the attacks, defending them on the grounds that refineries are legitimate targets because they provide resources to run the Russian war machine. (Russia's income from oil sales remains high despite international sanctions.) Ukraine also attacked Russian factories producing weapons. Analysts have described the strikes on Russian oil facilities as a new phase of the war. The attacks have affected Russia's refining capabilities. Although Russia has not provided official statistics, the country is believed to have lost about 10 percent of its refining capacity. Because Russia's domestic gas supplies are now diminished, Russia is considering importing gas from Belarus.Contributions of Russian volunteers to the war effort. Russian volunteers fighting on the side of Ukraine under the corps names Freedom of Russia, the Siberian Battalion, and the Russian Volunteer Corps started military operations on the border regions with Ukraine, in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. Similar operations took place in May 2023, but now the scale of the military actions is bigger and their duration longer. The operations began before the elections in Russia and continued after them. The anti-Kremlin volunteer military units clashed with Russian servicemen and even claimed to have captured some Russian troops.Russia intensified its attacks on civilian targets and critical infrastructure, especially in the frontline regions, notably Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. This may be an attempt to increase pressure on Ukraine while the delivery of military aid and supplies to Ukraine is slowed or suspended, especially the delivery of supplies from the United States. In addition to drones and missiles, Russia started using its new Zircon hypersonic missiles and 1,500-kg (3,300-pound) aerial bombs to target Ukrainian cities. The lack of ammunition, especially air defense missiles, may play a critical role in Ukraine's ability to protect the frontline areas and critical infrastructure across the country; a continuation of massive Russian attacks, in particular attacks using North Korean missiles and Iranian drones, could plunge Ukraine into a new stone age.Engagement of Russia's AlliesAt the beginning of the year, it became evident that North Korea was supplying Russia with missiles, including ballistic missiles. Kyiv said that as of mid-March, Russia had used about fifty of these against Ukraine. The DPRK-origin missiles were found to contain U.S. and European parts. The North Korean defense minister said the country might also supply tactical guided missiles to Russia. According to the official, the country's military factories are working at full capacity. Russia uses DPRK artillery shells. Since September 2023, North Korea has delivered more than 10,000 containers of munitions or munitions-related materials to Russia. Russia started supplying oil to the DPRK in exchange for weapons.Russia is negotiating with Iran as well to receive ballistic missiles. Foreign media have reported that Iran delivered hundreds of these missiles, but Ukrainian intelligence denies this.Belarus earlier was a key supplier of ammunition to support Russia's war. Though its stocks are probably exhausted by now, it remains one of Russia's important allies. Belarus is now building a new military town twenty-five miles from the border with Ukraine that will house both Russian and Belarusian troops. The combined forces started joint training in the Belarusian facility in March. Though Russia relies heavily on ammunition supplies from its allies, the country is still capable of producing its own weapons. For instance, one of the Russian missiles that hit Kyiv in 2024 was made in the summer of 2023. Russia is also pouring money into developing its own drone systems, with the combat drone Okhotnik-B expected to go into production in Novosibirsk later this year.Russian Disinformation Campaigns and CyberattacksRussia continued its disinformation campaign in Ukraine, hoping to undermine trust in the government and sow suspicions abroad. The clear goal is to weaken international support for Ukraine. These efforts are likely to ramp up in 2024 because many countries are holding elections, and policies regarding aid for Ukraine and the reception of Ukrainian refugees could shift drastically. Under normal conditions, Ukraine would also be holding elections. The curtain continues to be pulled back on Russia's disinformation efforts. The Washington Post published material on Russia's huge campaign to spread distrust of the government and societal despair in Ukraine, and the German Marshall Fund issued a report on Russia's use of Polish media to spread the Kremlin's lies about Ukraine. According to Security and Defense Secretary Oleksii Danilov, Russia has significantly stepped up its disinformation campaigns, issuing or spreading 166 million disinformation posts every week about Ukraine on social media in a global effort to manipulate thinking on Ukraine.According to Ukrainian intelligence sources, Russia is engaged in a massive disinformation campaign code-named Maidan-3 and designed to promote antiwar protests and destabilize the country, with the ultimate goal of removing President Zelensky from his leadership role. The campaign is expected be most active during March–May, and persons inside Ukraine are believed to be involved.Deep-fake videos play a prominent role in Russian propaganda. For instance, a deep-fake video of former president Petro Poroshenko allegedly making incendiary statements about President Zelensky was targeted to Ukrainian soldiers. Videos allegedly showing Russians attacking Ukrainian military training camps or Ukrainian special forces shooting civilians are widely circulated; such misrepresentations are unfortunately becoming commonplace.Russia has also continued cyberattacks against Ukrainian media, authorities, and critically important companies, including one of the biggest banks, the biggest state-owned oil and gas company, Naftogaz, POW Coordination Headquarters, Ukraine's Education Ministry website, and so on. Hackers have been sending Ukrainian soldiers messages containing malware. In 2023, the number of cyberattacks against Ukrainian organizations increased by 15.9 percent compared to 2022, reaching an overall number of 2,543 documented cases.Even though ISIS took responsibility for the terrorist shooting in Moscow's Crocus concert hall in March, and Western intelligence said it has proof that Ukraine did not organize it, Russian top officials, including Vladimir Putin, tried to link it to Kyiv, while constantly changing the narrative. The media reported that some in Putin's circle do not see any link to Ukraine. It's possible the Kremlin will try to capitalize on the attack to mobilize Russian society against Ukraine. The head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) blamed the United States, the UK, and Ukraine as instigators and enablers of the attack.Energy Terrorism and Other Attacks on Critical InfrastructureFrom mid-September 2023 to the end of the year, Russia did not succeed in damaging Ukraine's energy infrastructure, though not for lack of trying. The number of drones Russia launched during October–December 2023 broke records since the invasion. Most were brought down by Ukrainian air defense units before they could inflict damage, so we do not know their intended targets.This picture changed with the new year. Starting in early 2024, Russia focused on attacking energy infrastructure in the frontline regions, which are generally the easiest to reach. Despite the damage this caused, the power systems continued to operate in a relatively stable mode. On the night of March 22, Russia launched a massive attack on the Ukrainian power system, using drones and ballistic and cruise missiles. The largest such attack since the start of the full-scale invasion, it involved sixty Shahed drones and almost ninety missiles of various types. Power production and transmission facilities in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, and Dnipro were targeted. Russians hit the biggest Ukrainian hydropower plant, DniproHES, and the dam of its water reservoir on the Dnipro river in Zaporizhzhia oblast; two other big hydropower plants were damaged in the following days.The biggest private-owned Ukrainian energy company, DTEK, reported that 80 percent of its capacities had been damaged during the attacks by the end of March. In Kharkiv, all thermal power plants and substations were destroyed in the last week of March. The state-owned Centrenergo lost its biggest power plant in Kharkiv oblast. The major attack was followed by attacks in ensuing days. Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian InfrastructureIn the first quarter of the year, Ukraine faced more Russian drone and missile strikes on multi-block residential buildings, with many civilians injured and killed—in some cases dozens in a single attack. Occasionally multiple cities were attacked simultaneously. Big city targets included Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Sumy. In addition, civil infrastructure in the regions under Ukrainian control and well inside the front lines was regularly attacked, sustaining damage. Since March 11, Russia has been shelling the borders of Sumy oblast, mostly using guided aerial bombs, artillery, and Lancet attack drones.In general, from the start of the year, Ukraine has seen an increased number of civilians killed or wounded in air strikes. Fuel depots and fueling stations have been attacked, leading to civilian casualties and environmental damage. It is now commonplace for Russia to target a wide range of civil infrastructure with air strikes and artillery shelling.One of the numerous air attacks on Odesa happened during the visit of the prime minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis. A missile exploded extremely close to the location of Mitsotakis and President Zelensky. Russia has continued committing crimes against civilians in the occupied territories: torturing civilians, forcing them to participate in Russian presidential elections, bugging residents, expropriating apartments, and resettling Russian transplants from deep inside the country in the occupied territories. POW ExchangesPOW exchanges, which had been suspended for a while, were renewed at the beginning of the year, with the largest number of Ukrainians returning home since the start of the wide-scale invasion. On January 24, a few days before the planned POW exchange, a cargo aircraft was shot down in Russia. Moscow blamed Ukraine for downing the plane, claiming it was carrying sixty-five prisoners to be exchanged. However, Russia did not provide any proof that the plane was in fact carrying POWs, and Kyiv said there were no Ukrainian POWs on the plane.Two more POW exchanges took place after the incident, in late January and again in February. 2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSPresident Zelensky's Diplomatic ToursIn the first quarter of 2024, President Zelensky undertook several diplomatic tours, hoping to consolidate support for Ukraine. This mission was especially critical in light of the slowing of aid from the United States, and the number of agreements Ukraine reached during this period is testament to the success of these efforts.In January, President Zelensky made a diplomatic trip to the Baltic states, Lithuania,Estonia, and Latvia, which are among the strongest supporters of Ukraine. Zelensky met with the countries' leaders and political elites and expressed gratitude for their support during the ten years of war. They discussed Ukraine's European integration and future cooperation in electromagnetic warfare and military drone production. The three countries remain strong Ukraine's allies of Ukraine in 2024, providing military and humanitarian aid and political support. Ukraine and Latvia signed an agreement on technical and financial cooperation and a memorandum on cooperation on defense and security.President Zelensky left the Baltics for Switzerland to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he addressed the forum's participants on the war in Ukraine and the need to invest in Ukraine's victory. In Davos, he also met with leaders of different states and the world's finance leaders, seeking to boost investment in Ukraine.In February, President Zelensky visited Germany to give a speech and attend the Munich Security Conference. He met his German and Czech counterparts and discussed joint efforts to produce weapons.Later, he visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and to discuss the Ukrainian Peace Formula and ways to repatriate captured and deported Ukrainians. He left Saudi Arabia for Albania to attend the second Ukraine-Balkans forum, where he also met with the leaders of some Balkan states to discuss European integration efforts. On March 8, he visited Turkey to meet with his counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Repatriating Ukrainian citizens held in captivity in Russia was among the key topics discussed at the meeting. The two countries signed an agreement to simplify bilateral trade and extended permit-free cargo truck movement at least until the end of the war. Security Cooperation AgreementsFrom early 2024, Ukraine began signing agreements on security cooperation with other states. The G-7 states intended to sign these during the NATO summit in Vilnius on July 12, 2023. Later, twenty-four more states expressed their intention to join this format. The UK was the first country to sign, on January 12, followed by Germany, France. Denmark, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands. Many countries are in dialogue, negotiating the text of the agreements to be signed. Some agreements stipulate commitments and plans to provide military aid in upcoming years.In Ukraine, these are often called "agreements on security commitments." However, they are more like framework agreements on security and defense cooperation; they do not have the force of a contract and do not spell out specific guarantees or steps the signatories should take to ensure Ukraine's sovereignty. Many experts in Ukraine have criticized the agreements because they do not provide Ukraine with hard security guarantees.Relations with NATOIn January, the NATO-Ukraine Council held a meeting at Ukraine's request after Russia launched massive air strikes against Ukraine at the beginning of the year. The allies reaffirmed their commitment to bolster Ukraine's defenses further and to provide Ukraine with major military, economic, and humanitarian assistance. In March, a NATO military delegation visited Kyiv for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion.Relations with the United States and CanadaPolitical differences in the U.S. Congress remained an obstacle to achieving consensus on the future of military aid to Ukraine. In March the United States announced the first $300 million security assistance package for Ukraine this year, as supplemental funding was blocked in Congress. Funds for the package came from unanticipated cost savings in existing Pentagon contracts. Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau arrived in Kyiv on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine to demonstrate his solidarity. Canada joined the drones coalition for Ukraine and allocated $1.5 billion in aid to finance Ukraine's budget deficit.Relations with the EU and the European StatesIn February the EU approved €50 billion in financial support for Ukraine, to run through 2027. Later the EU approved $5.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine for 2024. The EU planned to supply Ukraine by the end of March with half of the one million artillery rounds it has promised to supply by the end of the year. Joint European Efforts to Arm UkraineArtillery rounds to be provided by the Czech Republic. In February, Czech president Petr Pavel said that the country had found a way to acquire 800,000 artillery rounds for Ukraine, but it needed funding. Earlier, the Czech Republic had proposed buying ammunition for Ukraine outside the EU. Almost twenty countries, some outside Europe, joined the initiative and contributed to the fund to buy artillery rounds: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and others. In March, Prague reported it was ready to deliver the first batches of ammunition and that it had found 700,000 shells of other types that could be bought with additional funds.Long-range missiles coalition. In late February, President of France Emmanuel Macron announced a coalition to send Ukraine long-range missiles. On March 15, following a "Weimar Triangle" format meeting in Berlin, the leaders of Germany, France, and Poland agreed on new initiatives in support of Ukraine, including more weapons purchases and a future formation of a coalition on long-range rocket artillery. The initiative includes purchasing more weapons for Ukraine on global markets and expanding military production.Drone coalition. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in February said that allies had established a drone coalition for Ukraine, committing to supplying one million drones. The UK and Latvia will lead an international coalition to develop vital drones for Ukraine.Cybersecurity support. In February, the IT Coalition for Ukraine signed an agreement to enhance Ukraine's defense capabilities in communications and cybersecurity—an important step in light of Russia's use of IT in conducting the war. The coalition was established in September 2023. It is led by Estonia and Luxembourg and includes Ukraine, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands.France was the key newsmaker regarding Ukraine and its defensive fighting against Russia. Except for the agreement on security guarantees between the two countries, President Macron was the first leader to observe publicly that troops might have to be sent to Ukraine if Russia continued its advances. The statement caused a heated discussion with the leaders of other states, but Macron insisted it was not an off-the-cuff remark but a well-considered, realistic view. He referred to Russia's war as an existential threat to France and Europe. French foreign minister Stephane Sejourne visited Kyiv in January, reassuring Ukraine of longlasting support. Later, France announced new military aid to Ukraine, including artillery and air defense systems, drones, guided bombs, and other important pieces. France is considering expanding military aid programs for Ukraine, and President Macron called on Europe to be ready to compensate for reduced U.S. support. The UK, Germany, and the Netherlands continued to be among the biggest European supporters in providing military aid and economic assistance.Relations with Hungary remained strained. The country blocked the EU's €50 billion aid initiative for a few months, and also blocked the EU's joint statement commemorating the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale war. Pressure from the European Parliament probably encouraged Hungary to change its position. Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba met his Hungarian counterpart in January to discuss a potential visit by Zelensky to Budapest aimed at improving bilateral relations. Later, Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó explained that such a meeting between Viktor Orbán and Zelensky would be impossible until Kyiv restored the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minority as they had existed before 2015.The prime ministers of Ukraine and Slovakia met in Ukraine and signed a joint statement to strengthen bilateral relations "based on mutual trust and respect." The Slovak prime minister promised not to obstruct Ukraine's purchases of weapons from Slovak companies and said that Bratislava would support the EU providing €50 billion in financial aid to Ukraine.The border blockade by farmers was a key issue in bilateral relations with Poland and remained contentious throughout the quarter. At different times, farmers and truck drivers have thrown up blockades, affecting almost all of Ukraine's border crossings.Polish farmers are demanding restrictions on imports from Ukraine, in the belief that their market prices have fallen because of competition. Poland had earlier banned food imports from Ukraine, allowing transit only. Polish officials confirmed that Ukrainian grain was not imported but merely transiting the country to destinations beyond. Kyiv says that now only 5 percent of Ukrainian food exports go through Poland, with most grain exports to be shipped by sea. Farmers are also protesting the EU's climate change policies and blocking other border crossings, including some on the border with Germany. Polish haulers on strike demanded the restoration of permits for Ukrainian carriers, a ban on the issuance of licenses to non-EU transport companies, and a waiver for empty Polish trucks to register through the Ukrainian electronic queue when returning to Poland from Ukraine. However, the blockade by haulers was much shorter this quarter.The blockade lasted the entire quarter, though not with the same sustained intensity. The blockade may be politically inspired, especially if one considers that the country will hold local elections in April. Farmers even tried to block railway connections with Ukraine and passenger transportation. The European Commission expressed concern regarding the blockade. The Polish government's attempts to settle the issue were unsuccessful, though it is unclear how robust those efforts were.The blockades created long lines at the borders, complicating the importation of even critically important goods such as military equipment. During the protests, Polish farmers from time to time dumped Ukrainian grain that was transiting Poland to other states, causing tension and tight-lipped reactions in Ukraine. It should be noted once again that one of the protest organizers is Rafał Mekler, a member of the Polish far-right National Movement Party, also known as the Confederation Party, which is skeptical about the EU and less friendly toward Ukraine. Mekler's role is important because Russia is seeking to take advantage of domestic Polish discontent by spreading its anti-Ukrainian narratives in Poland. Polish prime minister Donald Tusk said he would not tolerate anti-Ukrainian sentiments in his government. Tusk visited Kyiv in January to announce a new aid package for Ukraine. At the same time, Poland continues to import grain and fuel from Russia and Belarus without any protests taking place on Poland's border with those states. Polish police detained Ukrainian journalists who investigated the import of goods at the border with Belarus. Other Ukrainian journalists were later similarly detained and deported from Poland while investigating trade with Russia. In late March, the Ukrainian and Polish prime ministers met in Warsaw to discuss the dispute. The parties have made some progress, but the problem remains. In mid-January, farmers in Romaniaagain started a blockade. However, the Romanian government quickly negotiated with the protesters, and the blockade was dissolved in early February. Ukrainian exports through Romania rose by 50 percent while those through Poland, formerly the biggest transit country, decreased.JapanIn February, Japan hosted a conference on Ukraine's restoration. The event brought together about 200 Japanese and Ukrainian companies, which signed fifty-six agreements and memorandums of cooperation. Japan allocated more than $12 billion in aid to Ukraine and will spend €1.25 billion to support investments in Ukraine.Debates on Transferring Frozen Russian Assets for UkraineIn the first quarter of 2024, Ukraine's allies continued to debate the use of frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine's needs during the war. A group of international law experts and practitioners concluded that it would be lawful, under international law, to transfer Russian state assets as compensation for the damage that has resulted directly from Russia's unlawful conduct. There was a debate in the EU about whether these funds should be held for future use in reconstructing Ukraine or be spent now on weapons. High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell supported the idea of using 90 percent of the revenue generated by frozen Russian assets to purchase weapons for Ukraine. Among the EU member states, Hungary and Austria expressed opposition to using these funds for weapons.The Fighter Jet Coalition DevelopmentsWhen the allies agreed to provide Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, the craft were expected to arrive in early 2024. At the beginning of the year, the media reported that delivery of the first jet might be delayed to mid-2024. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the delivery date will depend on when Ukrainian pilots will be ready to fly them after training.The first group of Ukrainian pilots will complete F-16 training by the summer. But probably only six F-16s will have been delivered out of about forty-five fighter jets that European allies have promised. The Netherlands decided to send six more F-16 jets to Ukraine in addition to the eighteen the country promised to supply in late 2023. 3. INTERNAL AFFAIRSReshufflesOne of the most shocking internal events in Ukraine was the dismissal of Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi. President Zelensky appointed General Oleksandr Syrskyi, who had previously served as commander of Ukraine's Land Forces, the new commander-in-chief and gave him wide latitude to make personnel changes. Zelensky explained his decision by citing the need to reboot management of the military command and to change the military strategy. However, Zaluzhnyi had made clear his frustration with the progress of the war on international media, and there are political tensions between the two men, with Zaluzhnyi's trust rating among survey respondents higher than Zelensky's.In February the government appointed a new head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Viktor Pavlushchyk, as the previous head, Oleksandr Novikov, had completed his four-year term in the position. Pavlushchyk was selected as the head of the agency by a competition. In late March, President Zelensky dismissed the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Oleksiy Danilov, and appointed Oleksandr Lytvynenko, a former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, to the position. Danilov later was appointed ambassador to Moldova. The Economic SituationUkraine's economy remained relatively stable in the first quarter of 2024. However, the government experienced difficulty covering budget expenditures with a drop in foreign financial aid: in the first two months of 2024, Ukraine received only 10 percent of the planned financial aid from its allies.Slowing inflation led the National Bank to decrease its key rate to 14.5 percent. At the same time, the IMF expects the economic shock to begin in the second quarter of 2024 with the intensification of the war. Ukrainian agencies expect lower economic growth for 2024 as well.The Energy SituationDuring January and February 2024, Russia attacked Ukraine's energy facilities, mostly in regions close to the front. The power system continued to operate normally, however, and electricity exports to the EU in early March broke records since the start of the wide-scale invasion. The situation rapidly reversed after the attacks in late March, and Ukraine became deeply dependent on electricity imports from Europe, realizing record-high volumes of imports. Ukraine got through the winter just passed using domestically produced gas only. This was possible in part because the demand for natural gas has fallen since the start of the wide-scale invasion.4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIESPlan of Reforms for the Ukraine Facility Funding ProgramIn March, the government approved a Plan of Reforms for 2024–2027. The plan addresses reform of the public administration and judicial system and strengthening the battle against corruption; economic reforms, such as management of public assets and creating an attractive environment for investment; and sectoral reforms (energy, transport agriculture, critical raw materials, small business, IT, and environment). It provides a basis for funding the Ukraine Facility, the EU's financial support program for Ukraine, which is expected to provide €50 billion over four years. Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal submitted the plan to the European Commission for approval. The first tranche of funding was released on March 20.Oscar Award for 20 Days in Mariupol DocumentaryThe Ukrainian film 20 Days in Mariupol won the Best Documentary award at the 96th Academy Awards. It is the first film made by a Ukrainian director to have won an Oscar. The film records the atrocities committed during Russia's months-long siege of the city of Mariupol in 2022. The documentary was put together by a team of Ukrainian journalists from the Associated Press and included the film director, Mstyslav Chernov. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
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Climate action, economic competition and geopolitical shifts are more intertwined than ever. In the wake of the skyrocketing inflation and deteriorating China relations, United States President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) into law on 16 August 2022. Conceived as the foundation of the new US industrial policy, the IRA aims to rebuild the country's industrial capacity, including 500 billion US dollars in new spending and tax breaks, among which almost 400 billion aimed at boosting clean energy.[1] Across the Atlantic, the European Union expressed concerns about the potential loss of industrial competitiveness resulting from the IRA. In response, the EU unveiled its own Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) in February 2023.[2] The objective of this plan is to promote the enhancement of net-zero manufacturing capacities in order to meet the EU's climate targets. Both the IRA and the GDIP have a common goal of reducing dependence on China, especially in clean technology, although through different approaches. The US focuses on bringing high-value production back to its shores, while the EU aims to develop and diversify supply chains.[3] This divergence is also reflected in the debate between "decoupling" and "derisking", with the latter recently gaining prominence as policymakers recognise the challenges of completely reshoring supply chains domestically.[4] The US and the EU share industrial and geoeconomic objectives, but will also encounter similar challenges, in particular concerning the first stages of green supply chains. Despite their heterogeneous approaches, Western policymakers will in fact have to secure critical raw materials for clean technology manufacturing, with the aim of resourcing the energy transition.The green transition and its critical materials Critical raw materials (CRMs) encompass various minerals and metals, such as lithium, cobalt, magnesium and rare earths, that are indispensable for numerous applications. Within the framework of the European Green Deal, the EU has identified and listed its CRMs in the dedicated Critical Raw Materials Act, setting clear targets in terms of domestic extraction, processing, recycling and import diversification. Particular attention is paid to the materials employed to produce permanent magnets used in wind turbines and energy storage systems. In a similar vein, the IRA provides subsidies for electric vehicles (EVs) manufactured using at least 40 per cent of domestically sourced CRMs. These measures highlight the US' and the EU's efforts to secure a stable supply of CRMs as part of their respective industrial plans. Sourcing these materials, however, entails significant challenges in the current international landscape.China's dominance in CRMs supply chains Indeed, the People's Republic of China (PRC) stands as the principal player in the extraction, processing and export of CRMs. Its leading position derives from a state capitalist model combining economic, security and strategic interests.[5] This prominence is striking in the rare earths (REs) market. Indeed, China controls 65 per cent of global RE production and 90 per cent of processing operations.[6] From a European perspective, the EU imports up to 98 per cent of its REs from the PRC (depending on the specific mineral).[7] Apart from rare earths, China has also enhanced its position in the supply chains of other CRMs by investing abroad. Notably, Beijing has made significant investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which possesses 70 per cent of the world's reserves of cobalt, thereby gaining control over mining operations. This is particularly concerning considering that China also holds 72 per cent of the global cobalt refining capacity.[8] A similar picture emerges regarding lithium. The Chinese company Tianqi Lithium has the second-largest stake in Sociedad Química y Minera (SQM) and owns 51 per cent of the world's largest lithium mine located in Greenbushes, Western Australia Downstream.[9] Moreover, the PRC dominates roughly 60 per cent of the global lithium refining capacity[10] and is the primary global producer and exporter of lithium-ion batteries and RE permanent magnets, which are high-value-added products.[11] Considering the role of China and the projected increase in CRM demand of over 450 per cent by 2050 in order to meet the Paris Climate Agreement goals,[12] this situation is far from rosy. There is a real risk that Western countries, while promoting clean energy deployment, might see an increasing reliance on CRM-exporting countries, with China at the forefront. Supply shortages may emerge as a potential threat, especially given China's growing domestic demand for CRMs, which has consistently surpassed its domestic supply over the past five years, resulting in a surge in imports.[13]The risk of political weaponisation… In parallel, Western-decision makers must consider the potential political weaponisation of the PRC's control over CRMs. Already in 2010, Beijing unofficially restricted the export of REs to Japan as a retaliatory measure following a dispute over territorial waters in the East China Sea.[14] Two years later, the EU, Japan and the US brought a case to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), seeking its intervention regarding the export quotas imposed by China on REs. The WTO only reached a decision in 2014, compelling China to remove its export restrictions.[15] Between 2009 and 2020, according to the OECD, export restrictions on CRMs have increased fivefold, with China implementing the highest number in 2020.[16] These restrictions mainly take the form of export taxes, which are not prohibited under WTO rules, unlike quantitative export restrictions. More recently, however, China decided to impose stringent export controls on two critical rare earth materials – gallium and germanium – from August 2023, in what may arguably be a retaliation against the US's 2022 restrictions on chip exports.…and how to address it To reduce dependence on CRMs imports, Western policymakers may focus on three different kinds of measures: improving their circular economy, expanding their domestic production and diversifying their import sources. Improving the circular economy of CRMs is crucial: by promoting the recovery and recycling of these materials, policymakers can sustain the domestic demand while reducing reliance on imports. However, there are significant challenges, particularly in the case of RE recovery from permanent magnets. In the EU, for example, the recycling of permanent magnets is not yet well developed due to a combination of regulatory, financial, supply chain and technological obstacles.[17] Expanding the domestic production of CRMs is another avenue to reduce dependence on imports. However, this approach faces socio-economic and ecological barriers. The establishment of new mining activities often encounters resistance from local populations, and resource exploitation can lead to pollution and have profound impacts on the environment of mining areas.[18] Additionally, the process of making a new mine operational and productive typically takes more than ten years.[19] In the short to mid-term, supply chain diversification is likely to be the key factor in reducing risks. This aspect is explicitly addressed by the European Critical Raw Materials Act,[20] which envisages the establishment of new trade agreements to secure and diversify the supply of CRMs. Diversification assumes a significant role as it provides an external and diplomatic dimension to the new EU green industrial policy, given the necessity of enlarging the network of CRMs suppliers, especially in Africa and South America. However, supply chain diversification must deal with China's international action vis-à-vis developing countries rich in CRMs through its Belt and Road Initiative. Strategic and collaborative endeavour between the EU, the US and their closest allies is therefore key. Notably, the US and the EU have recently initiated negotiations aimed at enabling CRMs extracted or processed within the EU to be considered for subsidies granted for electric vehicles by the IRA.[21] Moreover, a cooperative approach emerges as the paradigm for enhanced security and resilience within supply chains against the Chinese centralisation of CRMs. In this regard, the US-led Minerals Security Partnership, aimed at investing in secure CRM supply chains and cooperating on recycling technology development, appears to be a promising step forward.[22] To conclude, the transition towards a "green" industrial structure entails numerous challenges that extend beyond purely economic and environmental considerations. Critical raw materials, one of the pillars of this transformation, are currently entangled in critical geopolitical issues, primarily related to China's dominance over their supply chains. Amidst mounting tensions between China and the US, the geoeconomic leverage wielded by the PRC poses a number of tangible risks – above all, the potential slowdown of the decarbonisation process, jeopardising the efforts against climate change.Salvatore Finizio is a final year master's student in Resource Economics & Sustainable Development at the University of Bologna. This is a winning article (1st place) submitted to the 2023 edition of the IAI Prize contest.[1] Justin Badlam et al., "The Inflation Reduction Act: Here's What's in It", in McKinsey Public Sector Insights, 24 October 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/the-inflation-reduction-act-heres-whats-in-it.[2] European Commission, A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age (COM/2023/62), 1 February 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52023DC0062.[3] Loyle Campbell and Alexandra Gritz, "Europe's Green Industrial Policy and the United States' IRA. Reducing Dependence on China", in DGAP Memos, 21 March 2023, https://dgap.org/en/node/38543.[4] Henry Sanderson, "What Counts as De-Risking? The Geopolitics of Energy and China", in Oxford Energy Forum, No. 137 (August 2023), p. 14-16, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?p=46438.[5] Sophia Kalantzakos, "The Race for Critical Minerals in an Era of Geopolitical Realignments", in The International Spectator, Vol. 55, No. 3 (September 2020), p. 1-16, DOI 10.1080/03932729.2020.1786926.[6] Philip Andrews-Speed and Anders Hove, "China's Rare Earths Dominance and Policy Responses", in OIES Papers, No. CE7 (June 2023), https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?p=46247.[7] Kjeld van Wieringen with Marcos Fernández Álvarez, "Securing the EU's Supply of Critical Raw Materials", in EPRS At a Glance, July 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2022)733586.[8] Jane Nakano, "The Geopolitics of Critical Minerals Supply Chains", in CSIS Reports, March 2021, p. 4, https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-critical-minerals-supply-chains.[9] Sophia Kalantzakos, "The Race for Critical Minerals", cit.[10] Jane Nakano, "The Geopolitics of Critical Minerals Supply Chains", cit., p. 4.[11] Suleyman Orhun Altiparmak, "China and Lithium Geopolitics in a Changing Global Market", in Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2023), p. 487-506, https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-022-00227-3.[12] Kirsten Hund et al., Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition, Washington, World Bank, July 2020, p. 11, https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.[13] Dolf Gielen and Martina Lyons, "Critical Materials for the Energy Transition: Rare Earth Elements", in IRENA Technical Papers, No. 2/2022 (May 2022), p. 24, https://www.irena.org/Technical-Papers/Critical-Materials-For-The-Energy-Transition-Rare-Earth-elements.[14] Rajive Ganguli and Douglas R. Cook, "Rare Earths: A Review of the Landscape", in MRS Energy & Sustainability, Vol. 5, No. 1 (December 2018), Article 6, DOI 10.1557/mre.2018.7.[15] WTO website: Dispute Settlement: DS431: China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds431_e.htm.[16] Przemyslaw Kowalski and Clarisse Legendre, "Raw Materials Critical for the Green Transition. Production, International Trade and Export Restrictions", in OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 269 (April 2023), p. 37 and 41, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6bb598b-en.[17] Vasileios Rizos, Edoardo Righetti and Amin Kassab, "Developing a Supply Chain for Recycled Rare Earth Permanent Magnets in the EU", in CEPS In-Depth-Analysis, No. 2022-07 (December 2022), https://www.ceps.eu/?p=38613.[18] Jingjing Bai et al., "Evaluation of Resource and Environmental Carrying Capacity in Rare Earth Mining Areas in China", in Scientific Reports, Vol. 12 (2022), Article 6105, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-10105-2.[19] Arthur Sullivan, "Rare Earths Find in Sweden: A Game Changer?", in Deutsche Welle, 1 December 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/a-64375644.[20] European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a Framework for Ensuring a Secure and Sustainable Supply of Critical Raw Materials (COM/2023/160), 16 March 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0160.[21] European Commission, Joint Statement by President Biden and President von der Leyen, Washington, 10 March 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_1613.[22] Website of the US Department of State: Minerals Security Partnership, https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership.
